Execution Models for Choreographies and Cryptoprotocols

A choreography describes a transaction in which several principals interact. Since choreographies frequently describe business processes affecting substantial assets, we need a security infrastructure in order to implement them safely. As part of a line of work devoted to generating cryptoprotocols from choreographies, we focus here on the execution models suited to the two levels. We give a strand-style semantics for choreographies, and propose a special execution model in which choreography-level messages are faithfully delivered exactly once. We adapt this model to handle multiparty protocols in which some participants may be compromised. At level of cryptoprotocols, we use the standard Dolev-Yao execution model, with one alteration. Since many implementations use a "nonce cache" to discard multiply delivered messages, we provide a semantics for at-most-once delivery

Combining behavioural types with security analysis

Today's software systems are highly distributed and interconnected, and they increasingly rely on communication to achieve their goals; due to their societal importance, security and trustworthiness are crucial aspects for the correctness of these systems. Behavioural types, which extend data types by describing also the structured behaviour of programs, are a widely studied approach to the enforcement of correctness properties in communicating systems. This paper offers a unified overview of proposals based on behavioural types which are aimed at the analysis of security properties

Parameterized Concurrent Multi-Party Session Types

Session types have been proposed as a means of statically verifying implementations of communication protocols. Although prior work has been successful in verifying some classes of protocols, it does not cope well with parameterized, multi-actor scenarios with inherent asynchrony. For example, the sliding window protocol is inexpressible in previously proposed session type systems. This paper describes System-A, a new typing language which overcomes many of the expressiveness limitations of prior work. System-A explicitly supports asynchrony and parallelism, as well as multiple forms of parameterization. We define System-A and show how it can be used for the static verification of a large class of asynchronous communication protocols.Comment: In Proceedings FOCLASA 2012, arXiv:1208.432

Choreographies with Secure Boxes and Compromised Principals

We equip choreography-level session descriptions with a simple abstraction of a security infrastructure. Message components may be enclosed within (possibly nested) "boxes" annotated with the intended source and destination of those components. The boxes are to be implemented with cryptography. Strand spaces provide a semantics for these choreographies, in which some roles may be played by compromised principals. A skeleton is a partially ordered structure containing local behaviors (strands) executed by regular (non-compromised) principals. A skeleton is realized if it contains enough regular strands so that it could actually occur, in combination with any possible activity of compromised principals. It is delivery guaranteed (DG) realized if, in addition, every message transmitted to a regular participant is also delivered. We define a novel transition system on skeletons, in which the steps add regular strands. These steps solve tests, i.e. parts of the skeleton that could not occur without additional regular behavior. We prove three main results about the transition system. First, each minimal DG realized skeleton is reachable, using the transition system, from any skeleton it embeds. Second, if no step is possible from a skeleton A, then A is DG realized. Finally, if a DG realized B is accessible from A, then B is minimal. Thus, the transition system provides a systematic way to construct the possible behaviors of the choreography, in the presence of compromised principals

Formal Verification of Security Protocol Implementations: A Survey

Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level abstract models which, however, are significantly different from real protocol implementations written in programming languages. Recently, some researchers have started investigating techniques that bring automated formal proofs closer to real implementations. This paper surveys these attempts, focusing on approaches that target the application code that implements protocol logic, rather than the libraries that implement cryptography. According to these approaches, libraries are assumed to correctly implement some models. The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic. The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approac

A gentle introduction to multiparty asynchronous session types

This article provides a gentle introduction to multiparty session types, a class of behavioural types specifically targeted at describing protocols in distributed systems based on asynchronous communication. The type system ensures well-typed processes to enjoy non-trivial properties, including communication safety, protocol fidelity, as well as progress. The adoption of multiparty session types can positively affect the whole software lifecycle, from design to deployment, improving software reliability and reducing its development costs

On Global Types and Multi-Party Session

Global types are formal specifications that describe communication protocols in terms of their global interactions. We present a new, streamlined language of global types equipped with a trace-based semantics and whose features and restrictions are semantically justified. The multi-party sessions obtained projecting our global types enjoy a liveness property in addition to the traditional progress and are shown to be sound and complete with respect to the set of traces of the originating global type. Our notion of completeness is less demanding than the classical ones, allowing a multi-party session to leave out redundant traces from an underspecified global type. In addition to the technical content, we discuss some limitations of our language of global types and provide an extensive comparison with related specification languages adopted in different communities

Formally based semi-automatic implementation of an open security protocol

International audienceThis paper presents an experiment in which an implementation of the client side of the SSH Transport Layer Protocol (SSH-TLP) was semi-automatically derived according to a model-driven development paradigm that leverages formal methods in order to obtain high correctness assurance. The approach used in the experiment starts with the formalization of the protocol at an abstract level. This model is then formally proved to fulfill the desired secrecy and authentication properties by using the ProVerif prover. Finally, a sound Java implementation is semi-automatically derived from the verified model using an enhanced version of the Spi2Java framework. The resulting implementation correctly interoperates with third party servers, and its execution time is comparable with that of other manually developed Java SSH-TLP client implementations. This case study demonstrates that the adopted model-driven approach is viable even for a real security protocol, despite the complexity of the models needed in order to achieve an interoperable implementation

Behavioral types in programming languages

A recent trend in programming language research is to use behav- ioral type theory to ensure various correctness properties of large- scale, communication-intensive systems. Behavioral types encompass concepts such as interfaces, communication protocols, contracts, and choreography. The successful application of behavioral types requires a solid understanding of several practical aspects, from their represen- tation in a concrete programming language, to their integration with other programming constructs such as methods and functions, to de- sign and monitoring methodologies that take behaviors into account. This survey provides an overview of the state of the art of these aspects, which we summarize as the pragmatics of behavioral types