Corruption and Power in Democracies

According to Acton: “Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely”. We study the implications of Acton’s dictum in models where citizens vote (for three parties) and governments then form in a series of elections. In each election, parties have fixed tastes for graft, which affect negotiations to form a government if parliament hangs; but incumbency changes tastes across elections. We argue that combinations of Acton’s dictum with various assumptions about citizen sophistication and inter-party commitments generate tight and testable predictions which cover plausible dynamics of government formation in an otherwise stationary environment.Corruption, government dynamics

A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Border Corruption in the Conflict Regions in Georgia and Moldova

Corruption is perceived as one of the worst factors inhibiting the statebuilding process. It, however, poses a significant threat to young democracies. Some theorists argue that, under certain circumstances, corruption might bring some benefits that can even overweigh its costs. For example, minorities denied certain services that might profit from corruption by bribing their way through. This can contribute to lessening tensions between groups. This article examines two cases of frozen conflicts and the role corruption might have played in the conflict resolution process over the last decade: South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria in Moldova. After analyzing the "soft approach" of the Moldovan state and the "hard power" of the Georgian state towards corruption and smuggling on the borders with the secessionist regions, we argue that the costs young democracies pay for their unwillingness to combat corruption is significantly higher than the modest benefits they can derive from handling these challenges with caution 2

Feature Essay

Democracy in action Fraud, corruption, and late 19th century power politics Earlier this year, voters in the United Kingdom, one of the oldest and least corrupt of modern democracies, went to the polls to elect local councilors and European parliamentary representatives. Asked to...

How the quality of democracy deteriorates:Populism and the backsliding of democ-racy in three West Balkan countries

Assessments of the quality of democracy focus on deviations from the rule of law and decreasing levels of political participation, but do not adequately explore the mechanisms through which the quality of democracy decreases. Populism is such a mechanism, used by populist leaders, after they ascent to power. Populism is combined with clientelism and corruption to form means of political domination in democratic regimes which are backpedalling or backsliding. Examples are three recently consolidated democratic regimes of Western Balkans. The governments of Aleksandar Vucic in Serbia, Nikola Gruevski in FYR Macedonia and Milo Djukanovic in Montenegro purposefully use populism, clientelism and corruption. Although not present in all back-sliding democracies, populism, clientelism and corruption are associated with backsliding from recently consolidated democracies and deterioration of the quality of democracy

The End of the Third Wave and the Global Future of Democracy. IHS Political Science Series No. 45, July 1997

The “Third Wave” of global democratization, which began in 1974, now appears to be drawing to a close. While the number of “electoral democracies” has tripled since 1974, the rate of increase has slowed every year since 1991 (when the number jumped by almost 20 percent) and is now near zero. Moreover, if we examine the more demanding standard of “liberal democracy” – in which there is substantial individual and associational freedom, civic pluralism, civi lian supremacy over the military, a secure rule of law, and “horizontal accountability” of office-holders to one another – we observe today the same proportion of liberal democracies in the world as existed in 1991. If a “third reverse wave” of democratic erosion or breakdowns is to be avoided, the new democracies of the third wave will need to become consolidated. Elites and citizens of every major party, interest, and ethnicity must accept the legitimacy of democracy and of the specific constitutional rules and practices in place in their country. In many new democracies, this requires a sweeping agenda of institutional reform to widen citizen access to power, control corruption, and improve the depth and quality of democracy. Elsewhere – as in China and Indonesia – rapid economic development and the gradual emergence of stronger, more autonomous civil associations and legal and representative institutions may be laying the foundations for a “fourth wave” of democratization at some point in the early twenty-first century

Weapons of the Powerful: Authoritarian Elite Competition and Politicized Anticorruption in China

What motivates authoritarian regimes to crack down on corruption? We argue that just as partisan competition in democracies tends to politicize corruption, authoritarian leaders may exploit anticorruption campaigns to target rival supporters during internal power struggles for consolidating their power base. We apply this theoretical framework to provincial leadership turnover in China and test it using an anticorruption data set. We find that intraelite power competition, captured by the informal power configuration of government incumbents and their predecessors, can increase investigations of corrupt senior officials by up to 20%. The intensity of anticorruption propaganda exhibits a similar pattern. The findings indicate that informal politics can propel strong anticorruption drives in countries without democratically-accountable institutions, although the drives tend to be selective, arbitrary, and factionally biased.postprin

Which type of democracy performs best?

Which type of democracy performs best? While some scholars argue that an electoral system with proportional representation combined with a decentralized system works best, and that the type of electoral system is crucial (Lijphart 1999), others state that a proportional electoral system with a centralized (and hence not decentralized) system lead to better performance (Gerring et al. 2005; Gerring and Thacker 2008). Still other scholars claim that decentralization is crucial, particularly in countries with deeply divided societies (Norris 2008). In this article, we argue that Lijphart’s earlier 1960s work needs to be combined with his more recent 1990s work, which results in an eightfold classification. This cube with eight different types of democracy not only enables us to compare the three rival claims in a systematic way, but is also a helpful tool for future studies focusing on types of democratic systems, and their origins and consequences. Our findings show that the type of electoral system is always crucial; the other two dimensions are crucial as well, though under different circumstances. In order to achieve the highest level of good governance, the best choice for the type of political system (centralization or decentralization) depends on the structure of the society (homogeneous or not). Centralization is best in homogeneous societies, while decentralization is best in heterogeneous societies. We recommend that future studies take into account all eight different types of democracy that can be distinguished based on Lijphart’s theoretical arguments in earlier and later work

Media corruption and issues of journalistic and institutional integrity in post-communist countries: the case of Bulgaria

From a normative standpoint the media are usually seen as one of the pillars of a national integrity system, entrusted with the tasks of exposing and preventing acts of corruption and educating the public of the harm caused by corruption. Nevertheless, corruption continues to be one of the most significant challenges that Europe faces, undermining citizens' trust in democratic institutions and weakening the accountability of political leadership. Evidence suggests that in fragile EU democracies such as Bulgaria, despite more than eight years of full membership and numerous preventive measures, corruption is rife and the press is hardly capable of exposing abuses of power or authority. On the contrary - drawing on in-depth interviews with 35 Bulgarian journalists - this paper argues that since communism collapsed in the late 1980s the media in post-communist societies such as Bulgaria has gradually become an instrument to promote and defend private vested interests, and is plagued by corruption. Senior journalists and editors cast serious doubt over the ability of the post-communist free press and journalism to act as a watchdog for society