Cores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory

Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory, and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new settings at the intersection of networking and statistics such as distributed estimation problems for sensor networks. Cooperative game theory allows one to understand aspects of all of these problems from a fresh and unifying perspective that treats users as players in a game, sometimes leading to new insights. At the heart of these analyses are fundamental dualities that have been long studied in the context of cooperative games; for information theoretic purposes, these are dualities between information inequalities on the one hand and properties of rate, capacity or other resource allocation regions on the other.Comment: 12 pages, published at http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/2008/318704 in EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking, Special Issue on "Theory and Applications in Multiuser/Multiterminal Communications", April 200

Coalitional Games for Transmitter Cooperation in MIMO Multiple Access Channels

Cooperation between nodes sharing a wireless channel is becoming increasingly necessary to achieve performance goals in a wireless network. The problem of determining the feasibility and stability of cooperation between rational nodes in a wireless network is of great importance in understanding cooperative behavior. This paper addresses the stability of the grand coalition of transmitters signaling over a multiple access channel using the framework of cooperative game theory. The external interference experienced by each TX is represented accurately by modeling the cooperation game between the TXs in \emph{partition form}. Single user decoding and successive interference cancelling strategies are examined at the receiver. In the absence of coordination costs, the grand coalition is shown to be \emph{sum-rate optimal} for both strategies. Transmitter cooperation is \emph{stable}, if and only if the core of the game (the set of all divisions of grand coalition utility such that no coalition deviates) is nonempty. Determining the stability of cooperation is a co-NP-complete problem in general. For a single user decoding receiver, transmitter cooperation is shown to be \emph{stable} at both high and low SNRs, while for an interference cancelling receiver with a fixed decoding order, cooperation is stable only at low SNRs and unstable at high SNR. When time sharing is allowed between decoding orders, it is shown using an approximate lower bound to the utility function that TX cooperation is also stable at high SNRs. Thus, this paper demonstrates that ideal zero cost TX cooperation over a MAC is stable and improves achievable rates for each individual user.Comment: in review for publication in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processin

Coalitional games for downlink multicell beamforming

A coalitional game is proposed for multi-cell multiuser downlink beamforming. Each base station intends to minimize its transmission power while aiming to attain a set of target signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio (SINRs) for its users. In order to reduce power consumption, base stations have incentive to cooperate with other base stations to mitigate intercell interference. The coalitional game is introduced where base stations are allowed to forge partial cooperation rather than full cooperation. The partition form coalitional game is formulated with the consideration that beamformer design of a coalition depends on the coalition structure outside the considered coalition. We first formulate the beamformer design for a given coalition structure, in which base stations in a coalition greedily minimize the total weighted transmit power without considering interference leakage to users in other coalitions. This can be considered as a non-cooperative game with each player as a distinct coalition. By introducing cost for cooperation, the coalition formation game is considered for the power minimization based beamforming. A merge-regret based sequential coalition formation algorithm has been developed that is capable of reaching a unique stable coalition structure. Finally, an α-Modification algorithm has been proposed to improve the performance of the coalition formation algorithm

Information Inequalities for Joint Distributions, with Interpretations and Applications

Upper and lower bounds are obtained for the joint entropy of a collection of random variables in terms of an arbitrary collection of subset joint entropies. These inequalities generalize Shannon's chain rule for entropy as well as inequalities of Han, Fujishige and Shearer. A duality between the upper and lower bounds for joint entropy is developed. All of these results are shown to be special cases of general, new results for submodular functions-- thus, the inequalities presented constitute a richly structured class of Shannon-type inequalities. The new inequalities are applied to obtain new results in combinatorics, such as bounds on the number of independent sets in an arbitrary graph and the number of zero-error source-channel codes, as well as new determinantal inequalities in matrix theory. A new inequality for relative entropies is also developed, along with interpretations in terms of hypothesis testing. Finally, revealing connections of the results to literature in economics, computer science, and physics are explored.Comment: 15 pages, 1 figure. Originally submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Information Theory in May 2007, the current version incorporates reviewer comments including elimination of an erro

Coalitional Game Theory for Communication Networks: A Tutorial

Game theoretical techniques have recently become prevalent in many engineering applications, notably in communications. With the emergence of cooperation as a new communication paradigm, and the need for self-organizing, decentralized, and autonomic networks, it has become imperative to seek suitable game theoretical tools that allow to analyze and study the behavior and interactions of the nodes in future communication networks. In this context, this tutorial introduces the concepts of cooperative game theory, namely coalitional games, and their potential applications in communication and wireless networks. For this purpose, we classify coalitional games into three categories: Canonical coalitional games, coalition formation games, and coalitional graph games. This new classification represents an application-oriented approach for understanding and analyzing coalitional games. For each class of coalitional games, we present the fundamental components, introduce the key properties, mathematical techniques, and solution concepts, and describe the methodologies for applying these games in several applications drawn from the state-of-the-art research in communications. In a nutshell, this article constitutes a unified treatment of coalitional game theory tailored to the demands of communications and network engineers.Comment: IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, Special Issue on Game Theory, to appear, 2009. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, Special Issue on Game Theory, to appear, 200

Resource allocation in networks via coalitional games

The main goal of this dissertation is to manage resource allocation in network engineering problems and to introduce efficient cooperative algorithms to obtain high performance, ensuring fairness and stability. Specifically, this dissertation introduces new approaches for resource allocation in Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) wireless networks and in smart power grids by casting the problems to the coalitional game framework and by providing a constructive iterative algorithm based on dynamic learning theory.  Software Engineering (Software)Algorithms and the Foundations of Software technolog