Enhancing Node Cooperation in Mobile Wireless Ad Hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes

In Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs), nodes depend on each other for routing and forwarding packets. However, to save power and other resources, nodes belonging to independent authorities may behave selfishly, and may not be willing to help other nodes. Such selfish behavior poses a real threat to the proper functioning of MANETs. One way to foster node cooperation is to introduce punishment for selfish nodes. Based on neighbor-monitoring techniques, a fully distributed solution to detect, punish, and re-admit selfish nodes, is proposed here. This solution provides nodes the same opportunity to serve/and be served by others. A light-weight solution regarding battery status is also proposed here. This solution requires neighbor monitoring only when necessary, thereby saving nodes battery power. Another effective way to solve the selfish-node problem is to reward nodes for their service according to their cost. To force nodes to show their true cost, truthful protocols are needed. A low overhead truthful routing protocol to find optimal routes is proposed in this thesis. The most prominent feature of this protocol is the reduction of overhead from existing solutions O(n3) to O(n2). A light-weight scalable truthful routing protocol (LSTOP) is further proposed, which finds near-least-cost paths in dense networks. LSTOP reduces overhead to O(n) on average, and O(n2) in worst case scenarios. Multiple path routing protocols are an effective alternative to single path routing protocols. A generic mechanism that can turn any table-driven multipath routing protocol into a truthful one, is outlined here. A truthful multipath routing protocol (TMRP), based on well-known AOMDV protocol, is presented as an example. TMRP incurs an only 2n message overhead for a route discovery, and can also achieve load balancing without compromising truthfulness. To cope with the selfish-node problem in the area of position-based routing, a truthful geographic forwarding (TGF) algorithm is presented. TGF utilizes three auction-based forwarding schemes to stimulate node cooperation. The truthfulness of these schemes is proven, and their performance is evaluated through statistical analysis and simulation studies

Analysis of a Reputation System for Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks with Liars

The application of decentralized reputation systems is a promising approach to ensure cooperation and fairness, as well as to address random failures and malicious attacks in Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks. However, they are potentially vulnerable to liars. With our work, we provide a first step to analyzing robustness of a reputation system based on a deviation test. Using a mean-field approach to our stochastic process model, we show that liars have no impact unless their number exceeds a certain threshold (phase transition). We give precise formulae for the critical values and thus provide guidelines for an optimal choice of parameters.Comment: 17 pages, 6 figure

Incentive Mechanisms in Peer-to-Peer Networks — A Systematic Literature Review

Centralized networks inevitably exhibit single points of failure that malicious actors regularly target. Decentralized networks are more resilient if numerous participants contribute to the network’s functionality. Most decentralized networks employ incentive mechanisms to coordinate the participation and cooperation of peers and thereby ensure the functionality and security of the network. This article systematically reviews incentive mechanisms for decentralized networks and networked systems by covering 165 prior literature reviews and 178 primary research papers published between 1993 and October 2022. Of the considered sources, we analyze 11 literature reviews and 105 primary research papers in detail by categorizing and comparing the distinctive properties of the presented incentive mechanisms. The reviewed incentive mechanisms establish fairness and reward participation and cooperative behavior. We review work that substitutes central authority through independent and subjective mechanisms run in isolation at each participating peer and work that applies multiparty computation. We use monetary, reputation, and service rewards as categories to differentiate the implementations and evaluate each incentive mechanism’s data management, attack resistance, and contribution model. Further, we highlight research gaps and deficiencies in reproducibility and comparability. Finally, we summarize our assessments and provide recommendations to apply incentive mechanisms to decentralized networks that share computational resources

Performance evaluation of cooperation strategies for m-health services and applications

Health telematics are becoming a major improvement for patients’ lives, especially for disabled, elderly, and chronically ill people. Information and communication technologies have rapidly grown along with the mobile Internet concept of anywhere and anytime connection. In this context, Mobile Health (m-Health) proposes healthcare services delivering, overcoming geographical, temporal and even organizational barriers. Pervasive and m-Health services aim to respond several emerging problems in health services, including the increasing number of chronic diseases related to lifestyle, high costs in existing national health services, the need to empower patients and families to self-care and manage their own healthcare, and the need to provide direct access to health services, regardless the time and place. Mobile Health (m- Health) systems include the use of mobile devices and applications that interact with patients and caretakers. However, mobile devices have several constraints (such as, processor, energy, and storage resource limitations), affecting the quality of service and user experience. Architectures based on mobile devices and wireless communications presents several challenged issues and constraints, such as, battery and storage capacity, broadcast constraints, interferences, disconnections, noises, limited bandwidths, and network delays. In this sense, cooperation-based approaches are presented as a solution to solve such limitations, focusing on increasing network connectivity, communication rates, and reliability. Cooperation is an important research topic that has been growing in recent years. With the advent of wireless networks, several recent studies present cooperation mechanisms and algorithms as a solution to improve wireless networks performance. In the absence of a stable network infrastructure, mobile nodes cooperate with each other performing all networking functionalities. For example, it can support intermediate nodes forwarding packets between two distant nodes. This Thesis proposes a novel cooperation strategy for m-Health services and applications. This reputation-based scheme uses a Web-service to handle all the nodes reputation and networking permissions. Its main goal is to provide Internet services to mobile devices without network connectivity through cooperation with neighbor devices. Therefore resolving the above mentioned network problems and resulting in a major improvement for m-Health network architectures performances. A performance evaluation of this proposal through a real network scenario demonstrating and validating this cooperative scheme using a real m-Health application is presented. A cryptography solution for m-Health applications under cooperative environments, called DE4MHA, is also proposed and evaluated using the same real network scenario and the same m-Health application. Finally, this work proposes, a generalized cooperative application framework, called MobiCoop, that extends the incentive-based cooperative scheme for m-Health applications for all mobile applications. Its performance evaluation is also presented through a real network scenario demonstrating and validating MobiCoop using different mobile applications

Hybrid FPMS: A New Fairness Protocol Management Scheme for Community Wireless Mesh Networks

Node cooperation during packet forwarding operations is critically important for fair resource utilization in Community Wireless Mesh Networks (CoWMNs). In a CoWMN, node cooperation is achieved by using fairness protocols specifically designed to detect and isolate malicious nodes, discourage unfair behavior, and encourage node participation in forwarding packets. In general, these protocols can be split into two groups: Incentive-based ones, which are managed centrally, and use credit allocation schemes. In contrast, reputation-based protocols that are decentralized, and rely on information exchange among neighboring nodes. Centrally managed protocols inevitably suffer from scalability problems. The decentralized, reputation-based protocols lacks in detection capability, suffer from false detections and error propagation compared to the centralized, incentive-based protocols. In this study, we present a new fairness protocol management scheme, called Hybrid FPMS that captures the superior detection capability of incentive-based fairness protocols without the scalability problems inherently expected from a centralized management scheme as a network's size and density grows. Simulation results show that Hybrid FPMS is more efficient than the current centralized approach and significantly reduces the network delays and overhead.Comment: KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems, 201

Game theory for collaboration in future networks

Cooperative strategies have the great potential of improving network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. This new paradigm in terms of network management, however, requires a novel design and analysis framework targeting a highly flexible networking solution with a distributed architecture. Game Theory is very suitable for this task, since it is a comprehensive mathematical tool for modeling the highly complex interactions among distributed and intelligent decision makers. In this way, the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g. content providers, cloud providers, home providers, brokers, network providers or users) should be found to optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure. The authors discuss in this chapter several Game Theory models/concepts that are highly relevant for enabling collaboration among the diverse players, using different ways to incentivize it, namely through pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight several related open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information games in this area.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio