65 research outputs found
Lewis meets Brouwer: constructive strict implication
C. I. Lewis invented modern modal logic as a theory of "strict implication".
Over the classical propositional calculus one can as well work with the unary
box connective. Intuitionistically, however, the strict implication has greater
expressive power than the box and allows to make distinctions invisible in the
ordinary syntax. In particular, the logic determined by the most popular
semantics of intuitionistic K becomes a proper extension of the minimal normal
logic of the binary connective. Even an extension of this minimal logic with
the "strength" axiom, classically near-trivial, preserves the distinction
between the binary and the unary setting. In fact, this distinction and the
strong constructive strict implication itself has been also discovered by the
functional programming community in their study of "arrows" as contrasted with
"idioms". Our particular focus is on arithmetical interpretations of the
intuitionistic strict implication in terms of preservativity in extensions of
Heyting's Arithmetic.Comment: Our invited contribution to the collection "L.E.J. Brouwer, 50 years
later
Negation in context
The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well
A Galois connection between classical and intuitionistic logics. I: Syntax
In a 1985 commentary to his collected works, Kolmogorov remarked that his
1932 paper "was written in hope that with time, the logic of solution of
problems [i.e., intuitionistic logic] will become a permanent part of a
[standard] course of logic. A unified logical apparatus was intended to be
created, which would deal with objects of two types - propositions and
problems." We construct such a formal system QHC, which is a conservative
extension of both the intuitionistic predicate calculus QH and the classical
predicate calculus QC.
The only new connectives ? and ! of QHC induce a Galois connection (i.e., a
pair of adjoint functors) between the Lindenbaum posets (i.e. the underlying
posets of the Lindenbaum algebras) of QH and QC. Kolmogorov's double negation
translation of propositions into problems extends to a retraction of QHC onto
QH; whereas Goedel's provability translation of problems into modal
propositions extends to a retraction of QHC onto its QC+(?!) fragment,
identified with the modal logic QS4. The QH+(!?) fragment is an intuitionistic
modal logic, whose modality !? is a strict lax modality in the sense of Aczel -
and thus resembles the squash/bracket operation in intuitionistic type
theories.
The axioms of QHC attempt to give a fuller formalization (with respect to the
axioms of intuitionistic logic) to the two best known contentual
interpretations of intiuitionistic logic: Kolmogorov's problem interpretation
(incorporating standard refinements by Heyting and Kreisel) and the proof
interpretation by Orlov and Heyting (as clarified by G\"odel). While these two
interpretations are often conflated, from the viewpoint of the axioms of QHC
neither of them reduces to the other one, although they do overlap.Comment: 47 pages. The paper is rewritten in terms of a formal meta-logic (a
simplified version of Isabelle's meta-logic
Classifying toposes for non-geometric theories
The classifying topos of a geometric theory is a topos such that geometric
morphisms into it correspond to models of that theory. We study classifying
toposes for different infinitary logics: first-order, sub-first-order (i.e.
geometric logic plus implication) and classical. For the first two, the
corresponding notion of classifying topos is given by restricting the use of
geometric morphisms to open and sub-open geometric morphisms respectively. For
the last one, we restrict ourselves to Boolean toposes instead. Butz and
Johnstone proved that the first-order classifying topos of an infinitary
first-order theory exists precisely when that theory does not have too many
infinitary first-order formulas, up to intuitionistically provable equivalence.
We prove similar statements for the sub-first-order and Boolean case. Along the
way we obtain completeness results of infinitary sub-first-order logic and
infinitary classical logic with respect to (Boolean) toposes.Comment: 24 page
Classical BI: Its Semantics and Proof Theory
We present Classical BI (CBI), a new addition to the family of bunched logics
which originates in O'Hearn and Pym's logic of bunched implications BI. CBI
differs from existing bunched logics in that its multiplicative connectives
behave classically rather than intuitionistically (including in particular a
multiplicative version of classical negation). At the semantic level,
CBI-formulas have the normal bunched logic reading as declarative statements
about resources, but its resource models necessarily feature more structure
than those for other bunched logics; principally, they satisfy the requirement
that every resource has a unique dual. At the proof-theoretic level, a very
natural formalism for CBI is provided by a display calculus \`a la Belnap,
which can be seen as a generalisation of the bunched sequent calculus for BI.
In this paper we formulate the aforementioned model theory and proof theory for
CBI, and prove some fundamental results about the logic, most notably
completeness of the proof theory with respect to the semantics.Comment: 42 pages, 8 figure
Complexities of Proof-Theoretical Reductions
The present thesis is a contribution to a project that is carried out by Michael Rathjen and Andreas Weiermann to give a general method to study the proof-complexity of Pi_2 sentences. This general method uses the generalised ordinal-analysis that was given by Buchholz, Rueede and Strahm as well as the generalised characterisation of provable-recursive functions of PA with axioms for transfinite induction that was given by Weiermann. The present thesis links these two methods by giving an explicit elementary bound, for the proof-complexity increment that occurs after the transition from the theory that was used by Rueede and Strahm, to PA with axioms for transfinite induction, which was analysed by Weiermann
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