Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self

The concept of the brain as a prediction machine has enjoyed a resurgence in the context of the Bayesian brain and predictive coding approaches within cognitive science. To date, this perspective has been applied primarily to exteroceptive perception (e.g., vision, audition), and action. Here, I describe a predictive, inferential perspective on interoception: ‘interoceptive inference’ conceives of subjective feeling states (emotions) as arising from actively-inferred generative (predictive) models of the causes of interoceptive afferents. The model generalizes ‘appraisal’ theories that view emotions as emerging from cognitive evaluations of physiological changes, and it sheds new light on the neurocognitive mechanisms that underlie the experience of body ownership and conscious selfhood in health and in neuropsychiatric illness

Sensorimotor supremacy: Investigating conscious and unconscious vision by masked priming

According to the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis, conscious perception draws on motor action. In the present report, we will sketch two lines of potential development in the field of masking research based on the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis. In the first part of the report, evidence is reviewed that masked, invisible stimuli can affect motor responses, attention shifts, and semantic processes. After the review of the corresponding evidence – so-called masked priming effects – an approach based on the sensorimotor supremacy hypothesis is detailed as to how the question of a unitary mechanism of unconscious vision can be pursued by masked priming studies. In the second part of the report, different models and theories of backward masking and masked priming are reviewed. Types of models based on the sensorimotor hypothesis are discussed that can take into account ways in which sensorimotor processes (reflected in masked priming effects) can affect conscious vision under backward masking conditions

Perceptual global processing and hierarchically organized affordances : the lack of interaction between vision-for-perception and vision-for-action

In visual information processing, two kinds of vision are distinguished: vision-for-perception related to the conscious identifi cation of objects, and vision-for-action that deals with visual control of movements. Neuroscience suggests that these two functions are performed by two separate brain neural systems – the ventral and dorsal pathways (Milner and Goodale, 1995). Two experiments using behavioural measures were conducted with the objective of exploring any potential interaction between these two functions of vision. The aim was to combine in one task methods allowing for the simultaneous capture of both perceptual global processing and affordance extraction and to check whether they infi uence each other. This aim was achieved by employing the paradigms of Navon (1977) and Tucker and Ellis (1998). A compound fi gure was created made up of objects with handles that might or might not have orientation congruent between levels. The results revealed that while the affordance effect occurred every time, the Navon effect appeared only when subjects focused their attention on object elements responsible for inconsistence within compound fi gure. Most importantly, even when these two effects occurred at once, they had no effect on each other. Results from the study failed to confi rm the hypothesis about interaction and gives support to the view that vision-for-perception and vision-for-action tend to act as separate systems

Two View of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action

In response to the attack on affirmative action at educational institutions, the argument that the benefits of diversity necessitate keeping affirmative action has emerged as the dominant defense of race-conscious admissions policies. Describing this argument as the “liberal defense of affirmative action,” Professor Lawrence critiques the liberal defense because it fails to challenge the manner in which traditional standards of merit perpetuate race and class privilege, and pushes aside more radically, substantive defenses of affirmative action which articulate the need to remedy past and ongoing discrimination. While recognizing the difficulties and ambivalence inherent in advancing a new vision for defending affirmative action, Professor Lawrence points to post-Proposition 209 litigation by students of color against the Regents of the University of California to articulate a theory of transformative politics upon which to base future strategies for maintaining affirmative action and dismantling racial injustice

Top-down contingent feature-specific orienting with and without awareness of the visual input

In the present article, the role of endogenous feature-specific orienting for conscious and unconscious vision is reviewed. We start with an overview of orienting. We proceed with a review of masking research, and the definition of the criteria of experimental protocols that demonstrate endogenous and exogenous orienting, respectively. Against this background of criteria, we assess studies of unconscious orienting and come to the conclusion that so far studies of unconscious orienting demonstrated endogenous feature-specific orienting. The review closes with a discussion of the role of unconscious orienting in action control

Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?

Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight patients. Vision for action has also come under scrutiny. Recent findings seem to show that information processed by the dor- sal stream for online action contributes to visual awareness. Some interpret these results as showing that some dorsal stream processes are conscious visual processes (e.g., Gallese, 2007; Jacob & Jeannerod, 2003). The aim of this paper is to provide new support for the more traditional view that blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious per- ceptual processes. I argue that individuals with blindsight do not have access to the kind of purely qualitative color and size information which normal individuals do. So, even though people with blindsight have a kind of cognitive consciousness, visual information process- ing in blindsight patients is not associated with a distinctly visual phenomenology. I argue further that while dorsal stream processing seems to contribute to visual awareness, only information processed by the early dorsal stream (V1, V2, and V3) is broadcast to working memory. Information processed by later parts of the dorsal stream (the parietal lobe) never reaches working memory and hence does not correlate with phenomenal awareness. I con- clude that both blindsight and vision for action are genuinely unconscious visual processes

Is Vision for Action Unconscious?

Empirical work and philosophical analysis have led to widespread acceptance that vision for action, served by the cortical dorsal stream, is unconscious. I argue that the empirical argument for this claim is unsound. That argument relies on subjects’ introspective reports. Yet on biological grounds, in light of the theory of primate cortical vision, introspection has no access to dorsal stream mediated visual states. It is thus wrongly assumed that introspective reports speak to absent phenomenology in the dorsal stream. In light of this, I consider a different conception of consciousness’s relation to agency in terms of access. While theoretical reasons suggest that the inaccessibility of the dorsal stream to conceptual report is evidence that it is unconscious, this position begs important questions. I propose a broader notion of access in respect of the guidance of intentional agency and not, narrowly, conceptual report (Note: this paper contradicts my earlier paper, "The Case for Zombie Agency")

Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception

Neuropsychological findings used to motivate the “two visual systems” hypothesis have been taken to endanger a pair of widely accepted claims about spatial representation in visual experience. The first is the claim that visual experience represents 3-D space around the perceiver using an egocentric frame of reference. The second is the claim that there is a constitutive link between the spatial contents of visual experience and the perceiver’s bodily actions. In this paper, I carefully assess three main sources of evidence for the two visual systems hypothesis and argue that the best interpretation of the evidence is in fact consistent with both claims. I conclude with some brief remarks on the relation between visual consciousness and rational agency

Did Jesus Possess the Beatific Vision During His Incarnation?: A Comparative Essay on the Perspectives of Thomas Joseph White and Thomas G. Weinandy

The idea that Jesus possessed the beatific vision during his earthly life had traditionally been upheld by Catholic theologians. However, in the last century or so, this idea has become heavily scrutinised by some of the biggest names in contemporary theology. This paper examines the works of two particular contemporary theologians on the issue, Thomas Joseph White and Thomas G. Weinandy. Thomas White defends the belief that Jesus, during his earthly life, possessed an immediate vision of the Father. White believes that the beatific vision is necessary for the Incarnate Son to know with certainty his own identity as the Son of God. Without the beatific vision, Jesus would have to have had faith in his own divine Sonship, an understanding which runs contrary to the portrayals of Christ in Scripture. White also argues that the beatific vision is the only means by which the Incarnate Son can know, with certitude, his own divine will. Only in this way can Jesus maintain unity in his theandric actions. Thomas Weinandy, on the other hand, rejects the notion of Jesus’ beatific vision. Weinandy argues that the question itself is inherently flawed, giving rise to a conception of Jesus that is implicitly Nestorian. Thus, to believe that Jesus possessed the beatific vision would result in a violation of the Christological declarations of the Council of Chalcedon. Weinandy instead promotes a ‘hypostatic’ or ‘filial’ vision, whereby the Son comes to humanly know himself as Son in relation to the Father, and not in relation to his own divinity

Motor Imagery and Merleau-Pontyian Accounts of Skilled Action

Maurice Merleau-Ponty is often interpreted as claiming that opportunities for action are directly present in perceptual experience. However, he does not provide much evidence for how or why this would occur, and one can doubt that this is an appropriate interpretation of his phenomenological descriptions. In particular, it could be argued the Merleau-Pontyian descriptions mistakenly attribute pre-perceptual or post-perceptual elements such as allocation of attention or judgment to the perceptual experience itself. This paper argues for the Merleau-Pontyian idea that opportunities for action are present in perceptual experience. It further argues that the phenomenological descriptions can be supported and explained via reference to contemporary research on motor imagery. In particular, it will be argued that non-conscious, covert motor imagery is used to prepare for and regulate skilled actions, and that it is plausible that this imagery combines with perception (likely vision) to create a single experience of the environment as enabling action. The paper will also show that contemporary views on motor imagery are broadly compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s aims