13 research outputs found
Sequence Semantics for Norms and Obligations
This paper presents a new version of the sequence semantics presented at DEON 2014. This new version allows us for a capturing the distinction between logic of obligations and logic of norms. Several axiom schemata are discussed, while soundness and completeness results are proved
Sequence Semantics for Modelling Reason-based Preferences
We study how the non-classical n-ary operator circle times, originally intended to capture the concept of reparative obligation, can be used in the context of social choice theory to model preferences. A novel possible-world model-theoretic semantics, called sequence semantics, was proposed for the operator. In this paper, we propose a sound and complete axiomatisation of a minimal modal logic for the operator, and we extend it with axioms suitable to model social choice consistency principles such as extension consistency and contraction consistency. We provide completeness results for such extensions
Solucionando o dilema de Jørgensen com base na distinção entre imperativismo e prescritivismo
O dilema de Jørgensen tem atormentado os imperativistas até aos nossos dias. Resumidamente, se há uma Lógica das Normas, então esta tem por elementos proposições (as proposições normativas) e, simultaneamente, tem por elementos imperativos, que não possuem conteúdo proposicional. Neste ensaio, defender-se-á que o imperativismo é totalmente compatÃvel com a concebilidade de uma Lógica Deôntica de proposições, pelo que não é necessário afastá-lo para manter a referida concebilidade (ainda que haja outras razões para rejeitar o imperativismo). Todas as posições que aceitam a incompatibilidade suscitada pelo dilema de Jørgensen incorrem num erro, o de confundir imperativismo e prescritivismo.
Jørgensen's dilemma has plagued imperativists to this day. Briefly, if there is a Logic of Norms, then propositions participate in it (normative propositions) and, simultaneously, imperatives participate in it, which do not have propositional content. In this essay, I will argue that imperativism is fully compatible with the conceivability of a Deontic Logic of propositions, so it is not necessary to push it aside to maintain that conceivability (although there are other reasons for rejecting imperativism). All positions that accept the incompatibility raised by Jørgensen's dilemma incur an error, that of confusing imperativism and prescriptivism
Prioritized Conditional Imperatives:Problems and a New Proposal
The sentences of deontic logic may be understood as describing what
an agent ought to do when faced with a given set of norms. If these
norms come into conflict, the best the agent can be expected to do
is to follow a maximal subset of the norms. Intuitively, a priority
ordering of the norms can be helpful in determining the relevant
sets and resolve conflicts, but a formal resolution mechanism has
been difficult to provide. In particular, reasoning about
prioritized conditional imperatives is overshadowed by problems such
as the `order puzzle\u27 that are not satisfactorily resolved by
existing approaches. The paper provides a new proposal as to how
these problems may be overcome
Non-monotonic reasoning with normative conflicts in multi-agent deontic logic
We present two multi-agent deontic logics that consistently accommodate various types of normative conflicts. Its language features modal operators for obligation and permission, and for the realization of individual and collective actions. The logic is non-classical since it makes use of a paraconsistent and paracomplete negation connective. Moreover, it is non-monotonic due to its definition within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The logic is equipped with a defeasible proof theory and semantics
Formalizing Reasons, Oughts, and Requirements
Reasons-based accounts of our normative conclusions face difficulties in distinguishing between what ought to be done and what is required. This article addresses this problem from a formal perspective. I introduce a rudimentary formalization of a reasons-based account and demonstrate that that the model faces difficulties in accounting for the distinction between oughts and requirements. I briefly critique attempts to distinguish between oughts and requirements by appealing to a difference in strength or weight of reasons. I then present a formalized reasons-based account of permissions, oughts and requirements. The model exploits Joshua Gert (2004; 2007) and Patricia Greenspan’s (2005; 2007; 2010) suggestion that some reasons perform a purely justificatory function. I show that the model preserves the standard entailment relationships between requirements, oughts and permissions
Multiagent Deontic Logic and its Challenges from a Normative Systems Perspective
This article gives an overview of several challenges studied in deontic logic, with an emphasis on challenges involving agents. We start with traditional modal deontic logic using preferences to address the challenge of contrary-toduty reasoning, and STIT theory addressing the challenges of non-deterministic actions, moral luck and procrastination. Then we turn to alternative normbased deontic logics detaching obligations from norms to address the challenge of Jørgensen’s dilemma, including the question how to derive obligations from a normative system when agents cannot assume that other agents comply with their norms. We discuss also some traditional challenges from the viewpoint of normative systems: when a set of norms may be termed ‘coherent’, how to deal with normative conflicts, how to combine normative systems and traditional deontic logic, how various kinds of permission can be accommodated, how meaning postulates and counts-as conditionals can be taken into account,how sets of norms may be revised and merged, and how normative systems can be combined with game theory. The normative systems perspective means that norms, not ideality or preference, should take the central position in deontic semantics, and that a semantics that represents norms explicitly provides a helpful tool for analysing, clarifying and solving the problems of deontic logic. We focus on the challenges rather than trying to give full coverage of related work, for which we refer to the handbook of deontic logic and normative systems
Non-normal modal logics, quantification, and deontic dilemmas. A study in multi-relational semantics
This dissertation is devoted to the study of non-normal (modal) systems for deontic logics, both on the propositional level, and on the first order one. In particular we developed our study the Multi-relational setting that generalises standard Kripke Semantics. We present new completeness results concerning the semantic setting of several systems which are able to handle normative dilemmas and conflicts. Although primarily driven by issues related to the legal and moral field, these results are also relevant for the more theoretical field of Modal Logic itself, as we propose a syntactical, and semantic study of intermediate systems between the classical propositional calculus CPC and the minimal normal modal logic K