Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents

In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain, provides the first framework that allows a truthful dynamic double auction (DA) to be constructed from a truthful, single-period (i.e. static) double-auction rule. The pricing and matching method of the Chain construction is unique amongst dynamic-auction rules that adopt the same building block. We examine experimentally the allocative efficiency of Chain when instantiated on various single-period rules, including the canonical McAfee double-auction rule. For a baseline we also consider non-truthful double auctions populated with zero-intelligence plus"-style learning agents. Chain-based auctions perform well in comparison with other schemes, especially as arrival intensity falls and agent valuations become more volatile

Social Value Propagation for Supply Chain Formation

Supply Chain Formation is the process of determining the participants in a supply chain, who will exchange what with whom, and the terms of the exchanges. Decentralized supply chain formation appears as a highly intricate task because agents only possess local information, have limited knowledge about the capabilities of other agents, and prefer to preserve privacy. State-of-the-art decentralized supply chain formation approaches can either: (i) #12;find supply chains of high value at the expense of high resources usage; or (ii) fi#12;nd supply chains of low value with low resources usage. This work presents chainme, a novel decentralized supply chain formation algorithm. Our results show that chainme fi#12;nds supply chains with higher value than state-of-the-art decentralized algorithms whilst decreasing the amount of resources required from one up to four orders of magnitude.Peer Reviewe

Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets

In two-sided markets, Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility theorem states that one can not maximize the gain-from-trade while also satisfying truthfulness, individual-rationality and no deficit. Attempts have been made to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's result by attaining approximately-maximum gain-from-trade: the double-sided auctions of McAfee (1992) is truthful and has no deficit, and the one by Segal-Halevi et al. (2016) additionally has no surplus --- it is strongly-budget-balanced. They consider two categories of agents --- buyers and sellers, where each trade set is composed of a single buyer and a single seller. The practical complexity of applications such as supply chain require one to look beyond two-sided markets. Common requirements are for: buyers trading with multiple sellers of different or identical items, buyers trading with sellers through transporters and mediators, and sellers trading with multiple buyers. We attempt to address these settings. We generalize Segal-Halevi et al. (2016)'s strongly-budget-balanced double-sided auction setting to a multilateral market where each trade set is composed of any number of agent categories. Our generalization refines the notion of competition in multi-sided auctions by introducing the concepts of external competition and trade reduction. We also show an obviously-truthful implementation of our auction using multiple ascending prices.Comment: Preliminary version accepted to AAAI 2020. This version adds (1) External competition auction for arbitrary recipe vectors; (2) Obvious-truthfulness proof; (3) Simulation experiment

Blockchain-Coordinated Frameworks for Scalable and Secure Supply Chain Networks

Supply chains have progressed through time from being limited to a few regional traders to becoming complicated business networks. As a result, supply chain management systems now rely significantly on the digital revolution for the privacy and security of data. Due to key qualities of blockchain, such as transparency, immutability and decentralization, it has recently gained a lot of interest as a way to solve security, privacy and scalability problems in supply chains. However conventional blockchains are not appropriate for supply chain ecosystems because they are computationally costly, have a limited potential to scale and fail to provide trust. Consequently, due to limitations with a lack of trust and coordination, supply chains tend to fail to foster trust among the network’s participants. Assuring data privacy in a supply chain ecosystem is another challenge. If information is being shared with a large number of participants without establishing data privacy, access control risks arise in the network. Protecting data privacy is a concern when sending corporate data, including locations, manufacturing supplies and demand information. The third challenge in supply chain management is scalability, which continues to be a significant barrier to adoption. As the amount of transactions in a supply chain tends to increase along with the number of nodes in a network. So scalability is essential for blockchain adoption in supply chain networks. This thesis seeks to address the challenges of privacy, scalability and trust by providing frameworks for how to effectively combine blockchains with supply chains. This thesis makes four novel contributions. It first develops a blockchain-based framework with Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC) model to assure data privacy by adopting a distributed framework to enable fine grained, dynamic access control management for supply chain management. To solve the data privacy challenge, AccessChain is developed. This proposed AccessChain model has two types of ledgers in the system: local and global. Local ledgers are used to store business contracts between stakeholders and the ABAC model management, whereas the global ledger is used to record transaction data. AccessChain can enable decentralized, fine-grained and dynamic access control management in SCM when combined with the ABAC model and blockchain technology (BCT). The framework enables a systematic approach that advantages the supply chain, and the experiments yield convincing results. Furthermore, the results of performance monitoring shows that AccessChain’s response time with four local ledgers is acceptable, and therefore it provides significantly greater scalability. Next, a framework for reducing the bullwhip effect (BWE) in SCM is proposed. The framework also focuses on combining data visibility with trust. BWE is first observed in SC and then a blockchain architecture design is used to minimize it. Full sharing of demand data has been shown to help improve the robustness of overall performance in a multiechelon SC environment, especially for BWE mitigation and cumulative cost reduction. It is observed that when it comes to providing access to data, information sharing using a blockchain has some obvious benefits in a supply chain. Furthermore, when data sharing is distributed, parties in the supply chain will have fair access to other parties’ data, even though they are farther downstream. Sharing customer demand is important in a supply chain to enhance decision-making, reduce costs and promote the final end product. This work also explores the ability of BCT as a solution in a distributed ledger approach to create a trust-enhanced environment where trust is established so that stakeholders can share their information effectively. To provide visibility and coordination along with a blockchain consensus process, a new consensus algorithm, namely Reputation-based proof-of cooperation (RPoC), is proposed for blockchain-based SCM, which does not involve validators to solve any mathematical puzzle before storing a new block. The RPoC algorithm is an efficient and scalable consensus algorithm that selects the consensus node dynamically and permits a large number of nodes to participate in the consensus process. The algorithm decreases the workload on individual nodes while increasing consensus performance by allocating the transaction verification process to specific nodes. Through extensive theoretical analyses and experimentation, the suitability of the proposed algorithm is well grounded in terms of scalability and efficiency. The thesis concludes with a blockchain-enabled framework that addresses the issue of preserving privacy and security for an open-bid auction system. This work implements a bid management system in a private BC environment to provide a secure bidding scheme. The novelty of this framework derives from an enhanced approach for integrating BC structures by replacing the original chain structure with a tree structure. Throughout the online world, user privacy is a primary concern, because the electronic environment enables the collection of personal data. Hence a suitable cryptographic protocol for an open-bid auction atop BC is proposed. Here the primary aim is to achieve security and privacy with greater efficiency, which largely depends on the effectiveness of the encryption algorithms used by BC. Essentially this work considers Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and a dynamic cryptographic accumulator encryption algorithm to enhance security between auctioneer and bidder. The proposed e-bidding scheme and the findings from this study should foster the further growth of BC strategies

Decentralized Supply Chain Formation: A Market Protocol and Competitive Equilibrium Analysis

Supply chain formation is the process of determining the structure and terms of exchange relationships to enable a multilevel, multiagent production activity. We present a simple model of supply chains, highlighting two characteristic features: hierarchical subtask decomposition, and resource contention. To decentralize the formation process, we introduce a market price system over the resources produced along the chain. In a competitive equilibrium for this system, agents choose locally optimal allocations with respect to prices, and outcomes are optimal overall. To determine prices, we define a market protocol based on distributed, progressive auctions, and myopic, non-strategic agent bidding policies. In the presence of resource contention, this protocol produces better solutions than the greedy protocols common in the artificial intelligence and multiagent systems literature. The protocol often converges to high-value supply chains, and when competitive equilibria exist, typically to approximate competitive equilibria. However, complementarities in agent production technologies can cause the protocol to wastefully allocate inputs to agents that do not produce their outputs. A subsequent decommitment phase recovers a significant fraction of the lost surplus

Auctions, Bidding and Exchange Design

The different auction types are outlined using a classification framework along six dimensions. The economic properties that are desired in the design of auction mechanisms and the complexities that arise in their implementation are discussed. Some of the most interesting designs from the literature are analyzed in detail to establish known results and to identify the emerging research directions.Engineering and Applied Science

Exploring auction based energy trade with the support of MAS and blockchain technology

This document describes a simulation of the local energy market with support of multi-agent approach and blockchain technology. The investigated points include blockchain technology and its applications, Ethereum platform and smart contracts as a tool for storing data of operations and creating assets, multi-agent approach to model the local energy market. The document explores building a solution for proposed problem with blockchain technology, agent interactions on the simulated market and auction models, that provide sustainability and profit for the local energy market overall

Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges

In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing online activities over public networks. As an essential market process, auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction models

Automated Auction Mechanism Design with Competing Markets

Resource allocation is a major issue in multiple areas of computer science. Despite the wide range of resource types across these areas, for example real commodities in e-commerce and computing resources in distributed computing, auctions are commonly used in solving the optimization problems involved in these areas, since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes. Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. Following this line of work, we present what we call a grey-box approach to automated auction mechanism design using reinforcement learning and evolutionary computation methods. We first describe a new strategic game, called \cat, which were designed to run multiple markets that compete to attract traders and make profit. The CAT game enables us to address the imbalance between prior work in this field that studied auctions in an isolated environment and the actual competitive situation that markets face. We then define a novel, parameterized framework for auction mechanisms, and present a classification of auction rules with each as a building block fitting into the framework. Finally we evaluate the viability of building blocks, and acquire auction mechanisms by combining viable blocks through iterations of CAT games. We carried out experiments to examine the effectiveness of the grey-box approach. The best mechanisms we learnt were able to outperform the standard mechanisms against which learning took place and carefully hand-coded mechanisms which won tournaments based on the CAT game. These best mechanisms were also able to outperform mechanisms from the literature even when the evaluation did not take place in the context of CAT games. These results suggest that the grey-box approach can generate robust double auction mechanisms and, as a consequence, is an effective approach to automated mechanism design. The contributions of this work are two-fold. First, the grey-box approach helps to design better auction mechanisms which can play a central role in solutions to resource allocation problems in various application domains of computer science. Second, the parameterized view and the reinforcement learning-based search method can be used in other strategic, competitive situations where decision making processes are complex and difficult to design and evaluate manually

The Roles of Corporate IT Infastructure and their Impact on IS Effectiveness

In the strategic alignment model of Henderson and Venkatraman (1993) [1] IT infrastructure has an important but only implicitly defined role. According to evolving literature, IT infrastructure serves many different purposes in large companies. We outline the main missions (roles) of the corporate-wide IT infrastructure and its contribution to IS effectiveness and study the relationship of IT infrastructure with alignment processes and strategic integration. Our empirical tests with data from almost one hundred large companies resulted in three IT infrastructure roles, which reflect the IS communality, strategic, and flexibility dimensions of the corporate-wide IT infrastructure. The roles were not symmetrically related to the IS effectiveness and alignment perspectives. IT infrastructure roles had a significant interplay with strategic integration in improving IS effectiveness. However, the interplay of IT infrastructure roles with alignment perspectives had only marginal effects. Implications of the results for research and practice are discussed