Price of Fairness on Networked Auctions

We consider an auction design problem under network flow constraints. We focus on pricing mechanisms that provide fair solutions, where fairness is defined in absolute and relative terms. The absolute fairness is equivalent to “no individual losses” assumption. The relative fairness can be verbalized as follows: no agent can be treated worse than any other in similar circumstances. Ensuring the fairness conditions makes only part of the social welfare available in the auction to be distributed on pure market rules. The rest of welfare must be distributed without market rules and constitutes the so-called price of fairness. We prove that there exists the minimum of price of fairness and that it is achieved when uniform unconstrained market price is used as the base price. The price of fairness takes into account costs of forced offers and compensations for lost profits. The final payments can be different than locational marginal pricing. That means that the widely applied locational marginal pricing mechanism does not in general minimize the price of fairness

Auction-based strategy for distributed task allocation in wireless sensor networks

Master'sMASTER OF ENGINEERIN

Incentives in One-Sided Matching Problems With Ordinal Preferences

One of the core problems in multiagent systems is how to efficiently allocate a set of indivisible resources to a group of self-interested agents that compete over scarce and limited alternatives. In these settings, mechanism design approaches such as matching mechanisms and auctions are often applied to guarantee fairness and efficiency while preventing agents from manipulating the outcomes. In many multiagent resource allocation problems, the use of monetary transfers or explicit markets are forbidden because of ethical or legal issues. One-sided matching mechanisms exploit various randomization and algorithmic techniques to satisfy certain desirable properties, while incentivizing self-interested agents to report their private preferences truthfully. In the first part of this thesis, we focus on deterministic and randomized matching mechanisms in one-shot settings. We investigate the class of deterministic matching mechanisms when there is a quota to be fulfilled. Building on past results in artificial intelligence and economics, we show that when preferences are lexicographic, serial dictatorship mechanisms (and their sequential dictatorship counterparts) characterize the set of all possible matching mechanisms with desirable economic properties, enabling social planners to remedy the inherent unfairness in deterministic allocation mechanisms by assigning quotas according to some fairness criteria (such as seniority or priority). Extending the quota mechanisms to randomized settings, we show that this class of mechanisms are envyfree, strategyproof, and ex post efficient for any number of agents and objects and any quota system, proving that the well-studied Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) is also envyfree in this domain. The next contribution of this thesis is providing a systemic empirical study of the two widely adopted randomized mechanisms, namely Random Serial Dictatorship (RSD) and the Probabilistic Serial Rule (PS). We investigate various properties of these two mechanisms such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and envyfreeness under various preference assumptions (e.g. general ordinal preferences, lexicographic preferences, and risk attitudes). The empirical findings in this thesis complement the theoretical guarantees of matching mechanisms, shedding light on practical implications of deploying each of the given mechanisms. In the second part of this thesis, we address the issues of designing truthful matching mechanisms in dynamic settings. Many multiagent domains require reasoning over time and are inherently dynamic rather than static. We initiate the study of matching problems where agents' private preferences evolve stochastically over time, and decisions have to be made in each period. To adequately evaluate the quality of outcomes in dynamic settings, we propose a generic stochastic decision process and show that, in contrast to static settings, traditional mechanisms are easily manipulable. We introduce a number of properties that we argue are important for matching mechanisms in dynamic settings and propose a new mechanism that maintains a history of pairwise interactions between agents, and adapts the priority orderings of agents in each period based on this history. We show that our mechanism is globally strategyproof in certain settings (e.g. when there are 2 agents or when the planning horizon is bounded), and even when the mechanism is manipulable, the manipulative actions taken by an agent will often result in a Pareto improvement in general. Thus, we make the argument that while manipulative behavior may still be unavoidable, it is not necessarily at the cost to other agents. To circumvent the issues of incentive design in dynamic settings, we formulate the dynamic matching problem as a Multiagent MDP where agents have particular underlying utility functions (e.g. linear positional utility functions), and show that the impossibility results still exist in this restricted setting. Nevertheless, we introduce a few classes of problems with restricted preference dynamics for which positive results exist. Finally, we propose an algorithmic solution for agents with single-minded preferences that satisfies strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, and weak non-bossiness in one-shot settings, and show that even though this mechanism is manipulable in dynamic settings, any unilateral deviation would benefit all participating agents

February 15, 1990

The Breeze is the student newspaper of James Madison University in Harrisonburg, Virginia

A hybridisation technique for game playing using the upper confidence for trees algorithm with artificial neural networks

In the domain of strategic game playing, the use of statistical techniques such as the Upper Confidence for Trees (UCT) algorithm, has become the norm as they offer many benefits over classical algorithms. These benefits include requiring no game-specific strategic knowledge and time-scalable performance. UCT does not incorporate any strategic information specific to the game considered, but instead uses repeated sampling to effectively brute-force search through the game tree or search space. The lack of game-specific knowledge in UCT is thus both a benefit but also a strategic disadvantage. Pattern recognition techniques, specifically Neural Networks (NN), were identified as a means of addressing the lack of game-specific knowledge in UCT. Through a novel hybridisation technique which combines UCT and trained NNs for pruning, the UCTNN algorithm was derived. The NN component of UCT-NN was trained using a UCT self-play scheme to generate game-specific knowledge without the need to construct and manage game databases for training purposes. The UCT-NN algorithm is outlined for pruning in the game of Go-Moku as a candidate case-study for this research. The UCT-NN algorithm contained three major parameters which emerged from the UCT algorithm, the use of NNs and the pruning schemes considered. Suitable methods for finding candidate values for these three parameters were outlined and applied to the game of Go-Moku on a 5 by 5 board. An empirical investigation of the playing performance of UCT-NN was conducted in comparison to UCT through three benchmarks. The benchmarks comprise a common randomly moving opponent, a common UCTmax player which is given a large amount of playing time, and a pair-wise tournament between UCT-NN and UCT. The results of the performance evaluation for 5 by 5 Go-Moku were promising, which prompted an evaluation of a larger 9 by 9 Go-Moku board. The results of both evaluations indicate that the time allocated to the UCT-NN algorithm directly affects its performance when compared to UCT. The UCT-NN algorithm generally performs better than UCT in games with very limited time-constraints in all benchmarks considered except when playing against a randomly moving player in 9 by 9 Go-Moku. In real-time and near-real-time Go-Moku games, UCT-NN provides statistically significant improvements compared to UCT. The findings of this research contribute to the realisation of applying game-specific knowledge to the UCT algorithm

Portfolio Construction: The Efficient Diversification of Marketing Investments

Efforts in the marketing sciences can be distinguished between the analysis of individual customers and the examination of portfolios of customers, giving scarce theoretical guidance concerning the strategic allocation of promotional investments. Yet, strategic asset allocation is considered in financial economics theory to be the most important set of investment decisions. The problem addressed in this study was the application of strategic asset allocation theory from financial economics to marketing science with the aim of improving the financial results of investment in direct marketing promotions. This research investigated the components of efficient marketing portfolio construction which include multiattribute numerical optimization, stochastic Brownian motion, peer index tracking schemes, and data mining methods to formulate unique investable asset classes. Three outcomes resulted from this study on optimal diversification: (a) reduced saturative promotional activities balancing inefficient advertising cost and enterprise revenue objectives to achieve an investment equilibrium state; (b) the use of utility theory to assist in the lexicographic ordering of goal priorities; and (c) the solution approach to a multiperiod linear goal program with stochastic extensions. A performance test using a large archival set of customer data illustrated the benefits of efficient portfolio construction. The test asset allocation resulted in significantly more reward than that of the benchmark case. The results of this grounded theory study may be of interest to marketing researchers, operations research practitioners, and functional marketing executives. The social change implication is increased efficiency in allocation of large advertising budgets resulting in improved corporate performance

Evolutionary Computation

This book presents several recent advances on Evolutionary Computation, specially evolution-based optimization methods and hybrid algorithms for several applications, from optimization and learning to pattern recognition and bioinformatics. This book also presents new algorithms based on several analogies and metafores, where one of them is based on philosophy, specifically on the philosophy of praxis and dialectics. In this book it is also presented interesting applications on bioinformatics, specially the use of particle swarms to discover gene expression patterns in DNA microarrays. Therefore, this book features representative work on the field of evolutionary computation and applied sciences. The intended audience is graduate, undergraduate, researchers, and anyone who wishes to become familiar with the latest research work on this field