Quantum Sampling Problems, BosonSampling and Quantum Supremacy

There is a large body of evidence for the potential of greater computational power using information carriers that are quantum mechanical over those governed by the laws of classical mechanics. But the question of the exact nature of the power contributed by quantum mechanics remains only partially answered. Furthermore, there exists doubt over the practicality of achieving a large enough quantum computation that definitively demonstrates quantum supremacy. Recently the study of computational problems that produce samples from probability distributions has added to both our understanding of the power of quantum algorithms and lowered the requirements for demonstration of fast quantum algorithms. The proposed quantum sampling problems do not require a quantum computer capable of universal operations and also permit physically realistic errors in their operation. This is an encouraging step towards an experimental demonstration of quantum algorithmic supremacy. In this paper, we will review sampling problems and the arguments that have been used to deduce when sampling problems are hard for classical computers to simulate. Two classes of quantum sampling problems that demonstrate the supremacy of quantum algorithms are BosonSampling and IQP Sampling. We will present the details of these classes and recent experimental progress towards demonstrating quantum supremacy in BosonSampling.Comment: Survey paper first submitted for publication in October 2016. 10 pages, 4 figures, 1 tabl

Are there new models of computation? Reply to Wegner and Eberbach

Wegner and Eberbach[Weg04b] have argued that there are fundamental limitations to Turing Machines as a foundation of computability and that these can be overcome by so-called superTuring models such as interaction machines, the [pi]calculus and the $-calculus. In this paper we contest Weger and Eberbach claims

Computational complexity of the landscape I

We study the computational complexity of the physical problem of finding vacua of string theory which agree with data, such as the cosmological constant, and show that such problems are typically NP hard. In particular, we prove that in the Bousso-Polchinski model, the problem is NP complete. We discuss the issues this raises and the possibility that, even if we were to find compelling evidence that some vacuum of string theory describes our universe, we might never be able to find that vacuum explicitly. In a companion paper, we apply this point of view to the question of how early cosmology might select a vacuum.Comment: JHEP3 Latex, 53 pp, 2 .eps figure

Why Philosophers Should Care About Computational Complexity

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory---the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems---leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.Comment: 58 pages, to appear in "Computability: G\"odel, Turing, Church, and beyond," MIT Press, 2012. Some minor clarifications and corrections; new references adde