Computational reverse mathematics and foundational analysis

Reverse mathematics studies which subsystems of second order arithmetic are equivalent to key theorems of ordinary, non-set-theoretic mathematics. The main philosophical application of reverse mathematics proposed thus far is foundational analysis, which explores the limits of different foundations for mathematics in a formally precise manner. This paper gives a detailed account of the motivations and methodology of foundational analysis, which have heretofore been largely left implicit in the practice. It then shows how this account can be fruitfully applied in the evaluation of major foundational approaches by a careful examination of two case studies: a partial realization of Hilbert's program due to Simpson [1988], and predicativism in the extended form due to Feferman and Sch\"{u}tte. Shore [2010, 2013] proposes that equivalences in reverse mathematics be proved in the same way as inequivalences, namely by considering only $\omega$-models of the systems in question. Shore refers to this approach as computational reverse mathematics. This paper shows that despite some attractive features, computational reverse mathematics is inappropriate for foundational analysis, for two major reasons. Firstly, the computable entailment relation employed in computational reverse mathematics does not preserve justification for the foundational programs above. Secondly, computable entailment is a $\Pi^1_1$ complete relation, and hence employing it commits one to theoretical resources which outstrip those available within any foundational approach that is proof-theoretically weaker than $\Pi^1_1\text{-}\mathsf{CA}_0$.Comment: Submitted. 41 page

On the alleged simplicity of impure proof

Roughly, a proof of a theorem, is “pure” if it draws only on what is “close” or “intrinsic” to that theorem. Mathematicians employ a variety of terms to identify pure proofs, saying that a pure proof is one that avoids what is “extrinsic,” “extraneous,” “distant,” “remote,” “alien,” or “foreign” to the problem or theorem under investigation. In the background of these attributions is the view that there is a distance measure (or a variety of such measures) between mathematical statements and proofs. Mathematicians have paid little attention to specifying such distance measures precisely because in practice certain methods of proof have seemed self- evidently impure by design: think for instance of analytic geometry and analytic number theory. By contrast, mathematicians have paid considerable attention to whether such impurities are a good thing or to be avoided, and some have claimed that they are valuable because generally impure proofs are simpler than pure proofs. This article is an investigation of this claim, formulated more precisely by proof- theoretic means. After assembling evidence from proof theory that may be thought to support this claim, we will argue that on the contrary this evidence does not support the claim

On the Invariance of G\"odel's Second Theorem with regard to Numberings

The prevalent interpretation of G\"odel's Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of the underlying mathematical theorem depends on several arbitrary formalisation choices. In this paper I examine the theorem's dependency regarding G\"odel numberings. I introduce deviant numberings, yielding provability predicates satisfying L\"ob's conditions, which result in provable consistency sentences. According to the main result of this paper however, these "counterexamples" do not refute the theorem's prevalent interpretation, since once a natural class of admissible numberings is singled out, invariance is maintained.Comment: Forthcoming in The Review of Symbolic Logi

Introduction to clarithmetic I

"Clarithmetic" is a generic name for formal number theories similar to Peano arithmetic, but based on computability logic (see http://www.cis.upenn.edu/~giorgi/cl.html) instead of the more traditional classical or intuitionistic logics. Formulas of clarithmetical theories represent interactive computational problems, and their "truth" is understood as existence of an algorithmic solution. Imposing various complexity constraints on such solutions yields various versions of clarithmetic. The present paper introduces a system of clarithmetic for polynomial time computability, which is shown to be sound and complete. Sound in the sense that every theorem T of the system represents an interactive number-theoretic computational problem with a polynomial time solution and, furthermore, such a solution can be efficiently extracted from a proof of T. And complete in the sense that every interactive number-theoretic problem with a polynomial time solution is represented by some theorem T of the system. The paper is written in a semitutorial style and targets readers with no prior familiarity with computability logic

Justifications-on-demand as a device to promote shifts of attention associated with relational thinking in elementary arithmetic

Student responses to arithmetical questions that can be solved by using arithmetical structure can serve to reveal the extent and nature of relational, as opposed to computational thinking. Here, student responses to probes which require them to justify-on-demand are analysed using a conceptual framework which highlights distinctions between different forms of attention. We analyse a number of actions observed in students in terms of forms of attention and shifts between them: in the short-term (in the moment), medium-term (over several tasks), and long-term (over a year). The main factors conditioning students´ attention and its movement are identified and some didactical consequences are proposed