Software Grand Exposure: SGX Cache Attacks Are Practical

Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research efforts are actively seeking countermeasures to SGX side-channel attacks. It is widely assumed that SGX may be vulnerable to other side channels, such as cache access pattern monitoring, as well. However, prior to our work, the practicality and the extent of such information leakage was not studied. In this paper we demonstrate that cache-based attacks are indeed a serious threat to the confidentiality of SGX-protected programs. Our goal was to design an attack that is hard to mitigate using known defenses, and therefore we mount our attack without interrupting enclave execution. This approach has major technical challenges, since the existing cache monitoring techniques experience significant noise if the victim process is not interrupted. We designed and implemented novel attack techniques to reduce this noise by leveraging the capabilities of the privileged adversary. Our attacks are able to recover confidential information from SGX enclaves, which we illustrate in two example cases: extraction of an entire RSA-2048 key during RSA decryption, and detection of specific human genome sequences during genomic indexing. We show that our attacks are more effective than previous cache attacks and harder to mitigate than previous SGX side-channel attacks

Adaptive compiler strategies for mitigating timing side channel attacks

Existing compiler techniques can transform code to make its timing behavior independent of sensitive values to prevent information leakage through time side channels. Those techniques are hampered, however, by their static nature and dependence on details of the processor targeted during the compilation. This paper presents a dynamic compiler approach based on offline profiles and JIT compiler strategies. This approach reduces overhead significantly and enables a trade-off between provided protection and overhead. Furthermore, it supports adaptive policies in which the protection adapts to run-time changes in the requirements. A prototype implementation in the Jikes Research VM is evaluated on RSA encryption, HMAC key verification, and IDEA encryption

Side Channels in the Cloud: Isolation Challenges, Attacks, and Countermeasures

Cloud computing is based on the sharing of physical resources among several virtual machines through a virtualization layer providing software isolation. Despite advances in virtualization, data security and isolation guarantees remain important challenges for cloud providers. Some of the most prominent isolation violations come from side-channel attacks that aim at exploiting and using a leaky channel to obtain sensitive data such as encryption keys. Such channels may be created by vulnerable implementations of cryptographic algorithms, exploiting weaknesses of processor architectures or of resource sharing in the virtualization layer. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive survey of side-channel attacks (SCA) and mitigation techniques for virtualized environments, focusing on cache-based attacks. We review isolation challenges, attack classes and techniques. We also provide a layer-based taxonomy of applicable countermeasures , from the hardware to the application level, with an assessment of their effectiveness

Compiler Mitigations for Time Attacks on Modern x86 Processors

This paper studies and evaluates the extent to which automated compiler techniques can defend against timing-based side channel attacks on modern x86 processors. We study how modern x86 processors can leak timing information through side channels that relate to data flow. We study the efficiency, effectiveness, portability, predictability and sensitivity of several mitigating code transformations that eliminate or minimize key-dependent execution time variations. Furthermore, we discuss the extent to which compiler backends are a suitable tool to provide automated support for the proposed mitigations

Análise de canais laterais de tempo em tradutores dinâmicos de binários

Orientadores: Edson Borin, Diego de Freitas AranhaDissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de ComputaçãoResumo: Ataques de canais laterais são um importante problema para os algoritmos criptográficos. Se o tempo de execução de uma implementação depende de uma informação secreta, um adversário pode recuperar a mesma através da medição de seu tempo. Diferentes abordagens surgiram recentemente para explorar o vazamento de informações em implementações criptográficas e para protegê-las contra esses ataques. Para tanto, a criptografia em tempo constante é uma pratica amplamente adotada visando descorrelacionar a dependencia entre um dado secreto e suas amostras de tempo. Apesar das contra-medidas serem eficazes para garantir execução dos algoritmos em um sistema evitando canais laterais de tempo, emuladores podem modificar e reintroduzir pontos de vazamento durante sua execução. Trabalhos recentes discutem os impactos dos compiladores Just-In-Time (JIT) de linguagens de alto nível no vazamento de informações a partir do tempo de execução. Entretanto, pouco foi dito sobre a emulação entre ISAs e seu impacto em vazamentos de tempo. Neste trabalho, nós investigamos o impacto de emuladores (tradutores dinâmicos de binários) entre ISAs na propriedade de tempo constante de implementações criptográficas. Utilizando métodos estatísticos e rotinas criptográficas validas, nós afirmamos a viabilidade de vazamentos de tempo em códigos gerados por tradutores dinâmicos de binários, usando diferentes técnicas de formação de regiões. Nós mostramos que a emulação pode ter um impacto significante, inserindo construções de tempo não constante durante sua tradução, levando a vazamentos de tempo significantes. Esses vazamentos podem ser observados em tradutores dinâmicos como o QEMU e o HQEMU durante a emulação de rotinas de bibliotecas criptográficas conhecidas, como a mbedTLS e podem ser rapidamente verificados. Por fim, para garantir a propriedade de tempo constante nós propusemos um modelo de mitigação para tradutores dinâmicos de binários baseado em transformações de compiladores, mitigando os canais laterais inseridosAbstract: Timing side-channel attacks are an important issue for cryptographic algorithms. If the execution time of an implementation depends on secret information, an adversary may recover the latter through measuring the former. Different approaches have recently emerged to exploit information leakage on cryptographic implementations and to protect them against these attacks. Therefore, implementation of constant-time cryptography is a widely adopted practice aiming to decorrelate the dependency between a secret data and its timing samples. Despite the countermeasures are effective to guarantee the execution of algorithms in a system by avoiding timing side-channels, emulators can modify and reintroduce leakage points during their execution. Recent works discusses the impact of high level language Just-In-Time (JIT) compilers in leakages through execution time. However, little has been said about Cross-ISA emulation through DBT and its impact on timing leakages. In this work, we investigate the impact of emulators (dynamic binary translators) on constant-time property of cryptographic implementations. By using statistical methods and cryptographic routines we asserted the feasibility of timing leaks in codes generated by a dynamic binary translator, even using different Region Formation Techniques. We show that the emulation may have a significant impact by inserting non constant-time constructions during its translations, leading to a significant timing leakage. This leakage is observed in dynamic binary translation systems such as QEMU and HQEMU when emulating routines from known cryptographic libraries, such mbedTLS and can be quickly verified. Finally, to guarantee the constant-time property we implemented a compiler transformation based on the if-conversion transformation in the dynamic binary translators, mitigating the inserted timing side-channelsMestradoCiência da ComputaçãoMestre em Ciência da Computação2014/50704-7FAPES