Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

A Puff of Steem: Security Analysis of Decentralized Content Curation

Decentralized content curation is the process through which uploaded posts are ranked and filtered based exclusively on users\u27 feedback. Platforms such as the blockchain-based Steemit employ this type of curation while providing monetary incentives to promote the visibility of high quality posts according to the perception of the participants. Despite the wide adoption of the platform very little is known regarding its performance and resilience characteristics. In this work, we provide a formal model for decentralized content curation that identifies salient complexity and game-theoretic measures of performance and resilience to selfish participants. Armed with our model, we provide a first analysis of Steemit identifying the conditions under which the system can be expected to correctly converge to curation while we demonstrate its susceptibility to selfish participant behaviour. We validate our theoretical results with system simulations in various scenarios

SUVS: Secure Unencrypted Voting Scheme

[EN] In this paper, we propose a light-weight electronic voting protocol. The approach used by our protocol to conceal the ballots does not imply encryption, and guarantees the privacy of the direction of the vote unless all the contestants (parties) agree to do so. Our method is based on the division of the ballot into different pieces of information, which separately reveal no information at all, and that can be latter aggregated to recover the original vote. We show that, despite its simplicity, this scheme is powerful, it does not sacrifice any of the security properties demanded in a formal electronic voting protocol, and, furthermore, even in post-quantum scenarios, neither the casted votes can be tampered with, nor the identity of any elector can be linked with the direction of her vote.Results related to Spanish Patent Application number P202131209.Larriba, AM.; López Rodríguez, D. (2022). SUVS: Secure Unencrypted Voting Scheme. Informatica. 33(4):749-769. https://doi.org/10.15388/22-INFOR50374976933

Shifting the Conversation: Colbert\u27s Super PAC and the measurement of satirical efficacy

Stephen Colbert’s announcement in 2011 that he was starting his own Super PAC oneupped The Colbert Report’s already substantial commitment to boundary muddling. By raising real money, producing commercials, and exploring the nuances of campaign finance regulations, Colbert acted out his critique of current law in tangible form. The novelty of the experiment created anticipation amongst fans and commentators that the project would have a direct effect on attitudes about campaign finance, or that Colbert would veer into clear advocacy work. Indeed, expectations matched the standard assumptions about satire: that efficacy should be gauged by measurable influence on individual opinions. In reality, the PAC’s commercials likely did not influence many outside his existent fan group. However, the project as a whole did work to license journalistic attention and to impact the wider debate about campaign finance. The example demonstrates that the more grandiose expectations of political entertainment are often misdirected, as they are premised on the prospect of instant audience malleability. Rather the most interesting possibilities involve more incremental shifts in the public conversation

The vicious cycle: fundraising and perceived visibility in US presidential primaries

Scholars of presidential primaries have long posited a dynamic positive feedback loop between fundraising and electoral success. Yet existing work on both directions of this feedback remains inconclusive and is often explicitly cross-sectional, ignoring the dynamic aspect of the hypothesis. Pairing high-frequency FEC data on contributions and expenditures with Iowa Electronic Markets data on perceived probability of victory, we examine the bidirectional feedback between contributions and viability. We find robust, significant positive feedback in both directions. This might suggest multiple equilibria: a candidate initially anointed as the front-runner able to sustain such status solely by the fundraising advantage conferred despite possessing no advantage in quality. However, simulations suggest the feedback loop cannot, by itself, sustain advantage. Given the observed durability of front-runners, it would thus seem there is either some other feedback at work and/or the process by which the initial front-runner is identified is informative of candidate quality

Implementing broadcast channels with memory for electronic voting systems

To provide universal verifiability, cryptographic voting protocols often require a broadcast channel to spread the election data to the public. The basic requirements on such a broadcast channel are similar for most protocols, for example that the channel maintains a memory of all broadcast messages and that nothing can be deleted from the channel’s memory. In this paper, we provide a formal definition for such broadcast channels with memory and describe their properties. We also analyze the significance of a broadcast channel with memory in cryptographic voting protocols and propose that such a channel is provided in form of a service that we call bulletin board. Based on this service, we analyze some real-world problems that cryptographic voting protocols might have and provide possible solutions. For this we define a generic interface for the main board functionalities, which offers a flexible way of extending the basic properties of a bulletin board to comply with all sorts of additional requirements

Developing a distributed electronic health-record store for India

The DIGHT project is addressing the problem of building a scalable and highly available information store for the Electronic Health Records (EHRs) of the over one billion citizens of India