An Investigation Report on Auction Mechanism Design

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used in solving real-world optimization problems, and in structuring stock or futures exchanges. Auctions also provide a very valuable testing-ground for economic theory, and they play an important role in computer-based control systems. Auction mechanism design aims to manipulate the rules of an auction in order to achieve specific goals. Economists traditionally use mathematical methods, mainly game theory, to analyze auctions and design new auction forms. However, due to the high complexity of auctions, the mathematical models are typically simplified to obtain results, and this makes it difficult to apply results derived from such models to market environments in the real world. As a result, researchers are turning to empirical approaches. This report aims to survey the theoretical and empirical approaches to designing auction mechanisms and trading strategies with more weights on empirical ones, and build the foundation for further research in the field

Out of equilibrium dynamics with decentralized exchange cautious trading and convergence to efficiency

Is the result that equilibrium trading outcomes are efficient in markets without frictions robust to a scenario where agents' beliefs and plans aren't already aligned at their equilibrium values? In this paper, starting from a situation where agents' beliefs and plans aren't already aligned at their equilibrium values, we study whether out of equilibrium trading converges to efficient allocations. We show that out-of-equilibrium trading does converge with probability 1 to an efficient allocation even when traders have limited information and trade cautiously. In economies where preferences can be represented by Cobb-Douglass utility functions, we show, numerically, that the rate of convergence will be exponential. We show that experimentation leads to convergence in some examples where multilateral exchange is essential to achieve gains from trade. We prove that experimentation does converge with probability 1 to an efficient allocation and the speed of convergence remains exponential with Cobb-Douglass utility functions

Numerical simulation of nonoptimal dynamic equilibrium models

In this paper we present a recursive method for the computation of dynamic competitive equilibria in models with heterogeneous agents and market frictions. This method is based on a convergent operator over an expanded set of state variables. The fixed point of this operator defines the set of all Markovian equilibria. We study approximation properties of the operator as well as the convergence of the moments of simulated sample paths. We apply our numerical algorithm to two growth models, an overlapping generations economy with money, and an asset pricing model with financial frictions.Econometric models

Efficiency of Continuous Double Auctions under Individual Evolutionary Learning with Full or Limited Information

In this paper we explore how specific aspects of market transparency and agents' behavior affect the efficiency of the market outcome. In particular, we are interested whether learning behavior with and without information about actions of other participants improves market efficiency. We consider a simple market for a homogeneous good populated by buyers and sellers. The valuations of the buyers and the costs of the sellers are given exogenously. Agents are involved in consecutive trading sessions, which are organized as a continuous double auction with electronic book. Using Individual Evolutionary Learning agents submit price bids and offers, trying to learn the most profitable strategy by looking at their realized and counterfactual or "foregone" payoffs. We find that learning outcomes heavily depend on information treatments. Under full information about actions of others, agents' orders tend to be similar, while under limited information agents tend to submit their valuations/costs. This behavioral outcome results in higher price volatility for the latter treatment. We also find that learning improves allocative efficiency when compared with to outcomes with Zero-Intelligent traders.

The European Union's Potential for Strategic Emissions Trading through Minimal Permit Sale Contracts

Strategic market behavior by permit sellers will harm the European Union as the EU as a whole is expected to become a large net buyer of permits in a follow-up agreement to the Kyoto Protocol. In this paper we explore how the EU could benefit from making permit trade agreements with non-EU countries. These trade agreements involve a minimum permit sales requirement complemented by a financial transfer from the EU to the other contract party. Such agreements enable the EU to act strategically in the permit market on behalf of its member states, although each member state is assumed to behave as a price taker in the permit market. Using a stylized numerical simulation model we show that an appropriately designed permit trade agreement between the EU and China can cut EU’s total compliance cost significantly. This result is robust for a wide range of parameterizations of the simulation model.emissions permit, post-Kyoto climate agreement, strategic permit trade

Coordination of Purchasing and Bidding Activities Across Markets

In both consumer purchasing and industrial procurement, combinatorial interdependencies among the items to be purchased are commonplace. E-commerce compounds the problem by providing more opportunities for switching suppliers at low costs, but also potentially eases the problem by enabling automated market decision-making systems, commonly referred to as trading agents, to make purchasing decisions in an integrated manner across markets. Most of the existing research related to trading agents assumes that there exists a combinatorial market mechanism in which buyers (or sellers) can bid (or sell) service or merchant bundles. Todayâ??s prevailing e-commerce practice, however, does not support this assumption in general and thus limits the practical applicability of these approaches. We are investigating a new approach to deal with the combinatorial interdependency challenges for online markets. This approach relies on existing commercial online market institutions such as posted-price markets and various online auctions that sell single items. It uses trading agents to coordinate a buyerâ??s purchasing and bidding activities across multiple online markets simultaneously to achieve the best overall procurement effectiveness. This paper presents two sets of models related to this approach. The first set of models formalizes optimal purchasing decisions across posted-price markets with fixed transaction costs. Flat shipping costs, a common e-tailing practice, are captured in these models. We observe that making optimal purchasing decisions in this context is NP-hard in the strong sense and suggest several efficient computational methods based on discrete location theory. The second set of models is concerned with the coordination of bidding activities across multiple online auctions. We study the underlying coordination problem for a collection of first or second-price sealed-bid auctions and derive the optimal coordination and bidding policies.

The virtues and vices of equilibrium and the future of financial economics

The use of equilibrium models in economics springs from the desire for parsimonious models of economic phenomena that take human reasoning into account. This approach has been the cornerstone of modern economic theory. We explain why this is so, extolling the virtues of equilibrium theory; then we present a critique and describe why this approach is inherently limited, and why economics needs to move in new directions if it is to continue to make progress. We stress that this shouldn't be a question of dogma, but should be resolved empirically. There are situations where equilibrium models provide useful predictions and there are situations where they can never provide useful predictions. There are also many situations where the jury is still out, i.e., where so far they fail to provide a good description of the world, but where proper extensions might change this. Our goal is to convince the skeptics that equilibrium models can be useful, but also to make traditional economists more aware of the limitations of equilibrium models. We sketch some alternative approaches and discuss why they should play an important role in future research in economics.Comment: 68 pages, one figur

Cooperative and non-cooperative solutions to carbon leakage

A modified version of the CGE GTAP-E model is developed for assessing the economic and carbon emissions effects related to alternative policy measures implemented with the aim of reducing carbon leakage. We explore a set of scenarios, comparing solutions where Annex I countries introduce exogenously or endogenously determined carbon border taxes in order to solve the carbon leakage problem unilaterally. Results provide evidence on the scarce effectiveness of carbon tariffs in reducing carbon leakage and enhancing economic competitiveness, while they have large negative welfare effects not only on the Non-Annex countries, but also on certain Annex I countriesCarbon Leakage, Carbon Border Tax, GTAP-E model

Customer-engineer relationship management for converged ICT service companies

Thanks to the advent of converged communications services (often referred to as ‘triple play’), the next generation Service Engineer will need radically different skills, processes and tools from today’s counterpart. Why? in order to meet the challenges of installing and maintaining services based on multi-vendor software and hardware components in an IP-based network environment. The converged services environment is likely to be ‘smart’ and support flexible and dynamic interoperability between appliances and computing devices. These radical changes in the working environment will inevitably force managers to rethink the role of Service Engineers in relation to customer relationship management. This paper aims to identify requirements for an information system to support converged communications service engineers with regard to customer-engineer relationship management. Furthermore, an architecture for such a system is proposed and how it meets these requirements is discussed