e-Uber\textit{e-Uber}: A Crowdsourcing Platform for Electric Vehicle-based Ride- and Energy-sharing

The sharing-economy-based business model has recently seen success in the transportation and accommodation sectors with companies like Uber and Airbnb. There is growing interest in applying this model to energy systems, with modalities like peer-to-peer (P2P) Energy Trading, Electric Vehicles (EV)-based Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G), Vehicle-to-Home (V2H), Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), and Battery Swapping Technology (BST). In this work, we exploit the increasing diffusion of EVs to realize a crowdsourcing platform called e-Uber that jointly enables ride-sharing and energy-sharing through V2G and BST. e-Uber exploits spatial crowdsourcing, reinforcement learning, and reverse auction theory. Specifically, the platform uses reinforcement learning to understand the drivers' preferences towards different ride-sharing and energy-sharing tasks. Based on these preferences, a personalized list is recommended to each driver through CMAB-based Algorithm for task Recommendation System (CARS). Drivers bid on their preferred tasks in their list in a reverse auction fashion. Then e-Uber solves the task assignment optimization problem that minimizes cost and guarantees V2G energy requirement. We prove that this problem is NP-hard and introduce a bipartite matching-inspired heuristic, Bipartite Matching-based Winner selection (BMW), that has polynomial time complexity. Results from experiments using real data from NYC taxi trips and energy consumption show that e-Uber performs close to the optimum and finds better solutions compared to a state-of-the-art approachComment: Preprint, under revie

Social Machinery and Intelligence

Social machines are systems formed by technical and human elements interacting in a structured manner. The use of digital platforms as mediators allows large numbers of human participants to join such mechanisms, creating systems where interconnected digital and human components operate as a single machine capable of highly sophisticated behaviour. Under certain conditions, such systems can be described as autonomous and goal-driven agents. Many examples of modern Artificial Intelligence (AI) can be regarded as instances of this class of mechanisms. We argue that this type of autonomous social machines has provided a new paradigm for the design of intelligent systems marking a new phase in the field of AI. The consequences of this observation range from methodological, philosophical to ethical. On the one side, it emphasises the role of Human-Computer Interaction in the design of intelligent systems, while on the other side it draws attention to both the risks for a human being and those for a society relying on mechanisms that are not necessarily controllable. The difficulty by companies in regulating the spread of misinformation, as well as those by authorities to protect task-workers managed by a software infrastructure, could be just some of the effects of this technological paradigm

Volunteer Selection in Collaborative Crowdsourcing with Adaptive Common Working Time Slots

Skill-based volunteering is an expanding branch of crowdsourcing where one may acquire sustainable services, solutions, and ideas from the crowd by connecting with them online. The optimal mapping between volunteers and tasks with collaboration becomes challenging for complex tasks demanding greater skills and cognitive ability. Unlike traditional crowdsourcing, volunteers like to work on their own schedule and locations. To address this problem, we propose a novel two-phase framework consisting of Initial Volunteer-Task Mapping (i-VTM) and Adaptive Common Slot Finding (a-CSF) algorithms. The i-VTM algorithm assigns volunteers to the tasks based on their skills and spatial proximity, whereas the a-CSF algorithm recommends appropriate common working time slots for successful volunteer collaboration. Both the algorithms aim to maximize the overall utility of the crowdsourcing platform. Experimenting with the UpWork dataset demonstrates the efficacy of our framework over existing state-of-the-art methods

Competition-Congestion-Aware Stable Worker-Task Matching in Mobile Crowd Sensing

Mobile Crowd Sensing is an emerging sensing paradigm that employs massive number of workers’ mobile devices to realize data collection. Unlike most task allocation mechanisms that aim at optimizing the global system performance, stable matching considers workers are selfish and rational individuals, which has become a hotspot in MCS. However, existing stable matching mechanisms lack deep consideration regarding the effects of workers’ competition phenomena and complex behaviors. To address the above issues, this paper investigates the competition-congestion-aware stable matching problem as a multi-objective optimization task allocation problem considering the competition of workers for tasks. First, a worker decision game based on congestion game theory is designed to assist workers in making decisions, which avoids fierce competition and improves worker satisfaction. On this basis, a stable matching algorithm based on extended deferred acceptance algorithm is designed to make workers and tasks mapping stable, and to construct a shortest task execution route for each worker. Simulation results show that the designed model and algorithm are effective in terms of worker satisfaction and platform benefit. IEE

Integration of Blockchain and Auction Models: A Survey, Some Applications, and Challenges

In recent years, blockchain has gained widespread attention as an emerging technology for decentralization, transparency, and immutability in advancing online activities over public networks. As an essential market process, auctions have been well studied and applied in many business fields due to their efficiency and contributions to fair trade. Complementary features between blockchain and auction models trigger a great potential for research and innovation. On the one hand, the decentralized nature of blockchain can provide a trustworthy, secure, and cost-effective mechanism to manage the auction process; on the other hand, auction models can be utilized to design incentive and consensus protocols in blockchain architectures. These opportunities have attracted enormous research and innovation activities in both academia and industry; however, there is a lack of an in-depth review of existing solutions and achievements. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive state-of-the-art survey of these two research topics. We review the existing solutions for integrating blockchain and auction models, with some application-oriented taxonomies generated. Additionally, we highlight some open research challenges and future directions towards integrated blockchain-auction models

Essays In Algorithmic Market Design Under Social Constraints

Rapid technological advances over the past few decades---in particular, the rise of the internet---has significantly reshaped and expanded the meaning of our everyday social activities, including our interactions with our social circle, the media, and our political and economic activities This dissertation aims to tackle some of the unique societal challenges underlying the design of automated online platforms that interact with people and organizations---namely, those imposed by legal, ethical, and strategic considerations. I narrow down attention to fairness considerations, learning with repeated trials, and competition for market share. In each case, I investigate the broad issue in a particular context (i.e. online market), and present the solution my research offers to the problem in that application. Addressing interdisciplinary problems, such as the ones in this dissertation, requires drawing ideas and techniques from various disciplines, including theoretical computer science, microeconomics, and applied statistics. The research presented here utilizes a combination of theoretical and data analysis tools to shed light on some of the key challenges in designing algorithms for today\u27s online markets, including crowdsourcing and labor markets, online advertising, and social networks among others

Supply Side Optimisation in Online Display Advertising

On the Internet there are publishers (the supply side) who provide free contents (e.g., news) and services (e.g., email) to attract users. Publishers get paid by selling ad displaying opportunities (i.e., impressions) to advertisers. Advertisers then sell products to users who are converted by ads. Better supply side revenue allows more free content and services to be created, thus, benefiting the entire online advertising ecosystem. This thesis addresses several optimisation problems for the supply side. When a publisher creates an ad-supported website, he needs to decide the percentage of ads first. The thesis reports a large-scale empirical study of Internet ad density over past seven years, then presents a model that includes many factors, especially the competition among similar publishers, and gives an optimal dynamic ad density that generates the maximum revenue over time. This study also unveils the tragedy of the commons in online advertising where users' attention has been overgrazed which results in a global sub-optimum. After deciding the ad density, the publisher retrieves ads from various sources, including contracts, ad networks, and ad exchanges. This forms an exploration-exploitation problem when ad sources are typically unknown before trail. This problem is modelled using Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP), and the exploration efficiency is increased by utilising the correlation of ads. The proposed method reports 23.4% better than the best performing baseline in the real-world data based experiments. Since some ad networks allow (or expect) an input of keywords, the thesis also presents an adaptive keyword extraction system using BM25F algorithm and the multi-armed bandits model. This system has been tested by a domain service provider in crowdsourcing based experiments. If the publisher selects a Real-Time Bidding (RTB) ad source, he can use reserve price to manipulate auctions for better payoff. This thesis proposes a simplified game model that considers the competition between seller and buyer to be one-shot instead of repeated and gives heuristics that can be easily implemented. The model has been evaluated in a production environment and reported 12.3% average increase of revenue. The documentation of a prototype system for reserve price optimisation is also presented in the appendix of the thesis