1,436 research outputs found
Chameleon: a Blind Double Trapdoor Hash Function for Securing AMI Data Aggregation
Data aggregation is an integral part of Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) deployment that is implemented by the concentrator. Data aggregation reduces the number of transmissions, thereby reducing communication costs and increasing the bandwidth utilization of AMI. However, the concentrator poses a great risk of being tampered with, leading to erroneous bills and possible consumer disputes. In this paper, we propose an end-to-end integrity protocol using elliptic curve based chameleon hashing to provide data integrity and authenticity. The concentrator generates and sends a chameleon hash value of the aggregated readings to the Meter Data Management System (MDMS) for verification, while the smart meter with the trapdoor key computes and sends a commitment value to the MDMS so that the resulting chameleon hash value calculated by the MDMS is equivalent to the previous hash value sent by the concentrator. By comparing the two hash values, the MDMS can validate the integrity and authenticity of the data sent by the concentrator. Compared with the discrete logarithm implementation, the ECC implementation reduces the computational cost of MDMS, concentrator and smart meter by approximately 36.8%, 80%, and 99% respectively. We also demonstrate the security soundness of our protocol through informal security analysis
Quantum attacks on Bitcoin, and how to protect against them
The key cryptographic protocols used to secure the internet and financial
transactions of today are all susceptible to attack by the development of a
sufficiently large quantum computer. One particular area at risk are
cryptocurrencies, a market currently worth over 150 billion USD. We investigate
the risk of Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, to attacks by quantum
computers. We find that the proof-of-work used by Bitcoin is relatively
resistant to substantial speedup by quantum computers in the next 10 years,
mainly because specialized ASIC miners are extremely fast compared to the
estimated clock speed of near-term quantum computers. On the other hand, the
elliptic curve signature scheme used by Bitcoin is much more at risk, and could
be completely broken by a quantum computer as early as 2027, by the most
optimistic estimates. We analyze an alternative proof-of-work called Momentum,
based on finding collisions in a hash function, that is even more resistant to
speedup by a quantum computer. We also review the available post-quantum
signature schemes to see which one would best meet the security and efficiency
requirements of blockchain applications.Comment: 21 pages, 6 figures. For a rough update on the progress of Quantum
devices and prognostications on time from now to break Digital signatures,
see https://www.quantumcryptopocalypse.com/quantum-moores-law
Attacks on quantum key distribution protocols that employ non-ITS authentication
We demonstrate how adversaries with unbounded computing resources can break
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) protocols which employ a particular message
authentication code suggested previously. This authentication code, featuring
low key consumption, is not Information-Theoretically Secure (ITS) since for
each message the eavesdropper has intercepted she is able to send a different
message from a set of messages that she can calculate by finding collisions of
a cryptographic hash function. However, when this authentication code was
introduced it was shown to prevent straightforward Man-In-The-Middle (MITM)
attacks against QKD protocols.
In this paper, we prove that the set of messages that collide with any given
message under this authentication code contains with high probability a message
that has small Hamming distance to any other given message. Based on this fact
we present extended MITM attacks against different versions of BB84 QKD
protocols using the addressed authentication code; for three protocols we
describe every single action taken by the adversary. For all protocols the
adversary can obtain complete knowledge of the key, and for most protocols her
success probability in doing so approaches unity.
Since the attacks work against all authentication methods which allow to
calculate colliding messages, the underlying building blocks of the presented
attacks expose the potential pitfalls arising as a consequence of non-ITS
authentication in QKD-postprocessing. We propose countermeasures, increasing
the eavesdroppers demand for computational power, and also prove necessary and
sufficient conditions for upgrading the discussed authentication code to the
ITS level.Comment: 34 page
In-packet Bloom filters: Design and networking applications
The Bloom filter (BF) is a well-known space-efficient data structure that
answers set membership queries with some probability of false positives. In an
attempt to solve many of the limitations of current inter-networking
architectures, some recent proposals rely on including small BFs in packet
headers for routing, security, accountability or other purposes that move
application states into the packets themselves. In this paper, we consider the
design of such in-packet Bloom filters (iBF). Our main contributions are
exploring the design space and the evaluation of a series of extensions (1) to
increase the practicality and performance of iBFs, (2) to enable
false-negative-free element deletion, and (3) to provide security enhancements.
In addition to the theoretical estimates, extensive simulations of the multiple
design parameters and implementation alternatives validate the usefulness of
the extensions, providing for enhanced and novel iBF networking applications.Comment: 15 pages, 11 figures, preprint submitted to Elsevier COMNET Journa
Combinatorics on words in information security: Unavoidable regularities in the construction of multicollision attacks on iterated hash functions
Classically in combinatorics on words one studies unavoidable regularities
that appear in sufficiently long strings of symbols over a fixed size alphabet.
In this paper we take another viewpoint and focus on combinatorial properties
of long words in which the number of occurrences of any symbol is restritced by
a fixed constant. We then demonstrate the connection of these properties to
constructing multicollision attacks on so called generalized iterated hash
functions.Comment: In Proceedings WORDS 2011, arXiv:1108.341
Quantum Tokens for Digital Signatures
The fisherman caught a quantum fish. "Fisherman, please let me go", begged
the fish, "and I will grant you three wishes". The fisherman agreed. The fish
gave the fisherman a quantum computer, three quantum signing tokens and his
classical public key. The fish explained: "to sign your three wishes, use the
tokenized signature scheme on this quantum computer, then show your valid
signature to the king, who owes me a favor".
The fisherman used one of the signing tokens to sign the document "give me a
castle!" and rushed to the palace. The king executed the classical verification
algorithm using the fish's public key, and since it was valid, the king
complied.
The fisherman's wife wanted to sign ten wishes using their two remaining
signing tokens. The fisherman did not want to cheat, and secretly sailed to
meet the fish. "Fish, my wife wants to sign ten more wishes". But the fish was
not worried: "I have learned quantum cryptography following the previous story
(The Fisherman and His Wife by the brothers Grimm). The quantum tokens are
consumed during the signing. Your polynomial wife cannot even sign four wishes
using the three signing tokens I gave you".
"How does it work?" wondered the fisherman. "Have you heard of quantum money?
These are quantum states which can be easily verified but are hard to copy.
This tokenized quantum signature scheme extends Aaronson and Christiano's
quantum money scheme, which is why the signing tokens cannot be copied".
"Does your scheme have additional fancy properties?" the fisherman asked.
"Yes, the scheme has other security guarantees: revocability, testability and
everlasting security. Furthermore, if you're at sea and your quantum phone has
only classical reception, you can use this scheme to transfer the value of the
quantum money to shore", said the fish, and swam away.Comment: Added illustration of the abstract to the ancillary file
Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Hash Functions
Wydział Matematyki i InformatykiKryptograficzne funkcje haszujące stanowią element składowy wielu algorytmów kryptograficznych. Przykładowymi zastosowaniami kryptograficznych funkcji haszujących są podpisy
cyfrowe oraz kody uwierzytelniania wiadomości. Ich własności kryptograficzne mają znaczący wpływ na poziom bezpieczeństwa systemów kryptograficznych wykorzystujących haszowanie.
W dysertacji analizowane są
kryptograficzne funkcje haszujące oraz omówione główne zasady tworzenia
bezpiecznych kryptograficznych funkcji haszujących. Analizujemy bezpieczeństwo dedykowanych funkcji haszujących (BMW, Shabal, SIMD, BLAKE2, Skein) oraz funkcji haszujących zbudowanych z szyfrów blokowych (Crypton, Hierocrypt-3, IDEA, SAFER++, Square). Głównymi metodami kryptoanalizy użytymi są skrócona analiza różnicowa, analiza rotacyjna i przesuwna. Uzyskane wyniki pokazują słabości analizowanych konstrukcji.Cryptographic Hash Functions (CHFs) are building blocks of many cryptographic algorithms. For instance, they are indispensable tools for efficient digital signature and authentication tags. Their security properties have tremendous impact on the security level of systems, which use cryptographic hashing.
This thesis analyzes CHFs and studies the design principles for construction of secure and efficient CHFs. The dissertation investigates security of both dedicated hash functions (BMW, Shabal, SIMD, BLAKE2, Skein) and hash functions based on block ciphers (Crypton, Hierocrypt-3, IDEA, SAFER++, Square). The main cryptographic tools applied are truncated differentials, rotational and
shift analysis. The findings show weaknesses in the designs
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