Formalising social representation to explain psychiatric symptoms

Recent work in social cognition has moved beyond a focus on how people process social rewards to examine how healthy people represent other agents and how this is altered in psychiatric disorders. However, formal modelling of social representation has not kept pace with these changes, impeding our understanding of how core aspects of social cognition function, and fail, in psychopathology. Here, we suggest that belief-based computational models provide a basis for an integrated sociocognitive approach to psychiatry, with the potential to address important but unexamined pathologies of social representation, such as maladaptive schemas and illusory social agents

On the Nature, Modeling, and Neural Bases of Social Ties

This paper addresses the nature, formalization, and neural bases of (affective) social ties and discusses the relevance of ties for health economics. A social tie is defined as an affective weight attached by an individual to the well-being of another individual (‘utility interdependence’). Ties can be positive or negative, and symmetric or asymmetric between individuals. Characteristic of a social tie, as conceived of here, is that it develops over time under the influence of interaction, in contrast with a trait like altruism. Moreover, a tie is not related to strategic behavior such as reputation formation but seen as generated by affective responses. A formalization is presented together with some supportive evidence from behavioral experiments. This is followed by a discussion of related psychological constructs and the presentation of suggestive neural findings, based on the existing literature. We conclude with some suggestions for future research. Publication forthcoming in 'On the Nature, Modeling and Neural Bases of Social Ties', Daniel E. Houser and Kevin A. McCabe (eds), Neuroeconomics, Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research, Emerald Insight Publishing

Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-Based Interaction

We observed reports of conflicted (concurrent positive and negative) emotions activated after interactions in the Trust game. Our analyses reveal that activation of 20 emotional states following trust-based interaction is better explained by predictions derived from a multi-dimensional Recalibrational perspective than by predictions derived from two-dimensional Valence and Arousal perspectives. The Recalibrational perspective proposes that emotions are activated according to their functional features – for example, emotions help people achieve short or long-sighted goals by up or down-regulating behavioral propensities, whereas Valence and Arousal perspectives consider simpler hedonic dimensions lacking functional specificity. The Recalibrational perspective is also distinguished from the Valence and Arousal perspectives in that it predicts the possibility of conflicted emotions. We discuss the theoretical implications of having conflicted goals and the economic implications of having conflicted emotions

Conflicted Minds: Recalibrational Emotions Following Trust-based Interaction.

Consistent with a modular view of the mind, both short-sighted and long-sighted programs may be simultaneously active in the mind and in conflict with one another when individuals face choice dilemmas in trust-based economic interactions. Recalibrational theory helps us identify the adaptive design features shared among subsets of superordinate emotion programs. According to this design logic and the computation of adaptive problem features produced by Trust games, we predict the activation of emotions after Trust games. While this study successfully predicts reports of twenty distinct emotional states, further studies are needed to demonstrate ultimate recalibrational functions of emotions.emotions, recalibrational theory, modularity, Trust game, experiments

Theory of mind and decision science: Towards a typology of tasks and computational models

The ability to form a Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e., to theorize about others’ mental states to explain and predict behavior in relation to attributed intentional states, constitutes a hallmark of human cognition. These abilities are multi-faceted and include a variety of different cognitive sub-functions. Here, we focus on decision processes in social contexts and review a number of experimental and computational modeling approaches in this field. We provide an overview of experimental accounts and formal computational models with respect to two dimensions: interactivity and uncertainty. Thereby, we aim at capturing the nuances of ToM functions in the context of social decision processes. We suggest there to be an increase in ToM engagement and multiplexing as social cognitive decision-making tasks become more interactive and uncertain. We propose that representing others as intentional and goal directed agents who perform consequential actions is elicited only at the edges of these two dimensions. Further, we argue that computational models of valuation and beliefs follow these dimensions to best allow researchers to effectively model sophisticated ToM-processes. Finally, we relate this typology to neuroimaging findings in neurotypical (NT) humans, studies of persons with autism spectrum (AS), and studies of nonhuman primates

Psychological and Neural Dynamics of Trust

Trust is a key feature of social interactions and central to interpersonal cooperation. Acts of trust are not only pivotal aspects of interpersonal cooperation and group cohesion, they also have important consequences for individual health and life expectancy. However, which social qualities of others foster trust, how individuals learn whom to trust, and how the brain integrates this information for optimal behavioral updating is yet unexplored. Here, I will outline two lines of research. On one hand, I will show the psychological and neural predictors of trust in different social contexts. On the other, pharmacological modulations of the neural brain structures involved in trust will be presented. In the first two behavioral experiments, I show that honesty functions as an antecedent of trustworthiness impressions and that an honest reputation is associated with higher trust during a future social interaction. Next, I delineate the neural signatures of these honesty-based trustworthiness impressions. Notably, similar to the behavioral effects of honesty on future trust decisions, I found that honesty-encoding brain regions predicted those future trust decisions, providing evidence of honesty-related brain regions that entail neural signal predictive of trusting behavior. Furthermore, an honest reputation also modulated neural responses to feedback information. Such neural modulation likely biases information integration during social learning. Consequently, I show in a further behavioral study that an honest reputation seems to indeed impair learning due to an honesty-dependent asymmetry in information weighting. Finally, I demonstrate how the pharmacological modulation of brain dynamics impacts trusting behaviors leaving trustworthiness impressions unchanged. On the one hand, these findings shed light on how honesty not only increases trust in others but also hampers learning processes for optimal behavioral adaptation. On the other, they provide the first pharmacological evidence of how impression-based trust can be changed without impacting those very first trustworthiness impressions. I finally propose accounts that might explain the observed behavioral and neural patterns and outline potential directions for new studies

A neurocognitive model of high anxiety trait in victims with post disasters experience

People with disasters experience are the most vulnerable victims of high anxiety trait. This behavior could develop overtime to pure anxiety if the individuals do not have any means of support. Hence, understanding this behaviour in the individuals is an essential means of unveiling anxiety emergence. Anxiety has been a phenomenon of focus over the years. Its manifestations have been extensively studied at the lower level of human functioning system (the body). Also, some researches have extended to the higher level of cognitive functions. Still, evidences showed that a precise approach have not been provided to elicit its emergence in human behavior. Meanwhile, extant literatures showed that anxiety disorders are the most prevalent psychological problems the world is facing today. More so, numerous numbers of people around the globe were suffering from these disorders. Therefore, this study examines how individuals with post disasters experience could develop anxiety by virtue of exposure to further events in the environment. This is a proactive measure to cater for wider emergence of anxiety disorders that might arise through disasters occurrence which is now a worldwide affair. This aspect was achieved through consideration for the role of neurocognitive mechanisms in the emergence of anxiety. The outcome of the investigation shows that, neurocognitive mechanisms play role in the emergence of anxiety. This was demonstrated through computational modeling concept to simulate those mechanisms identified through literatures and expert opinions. Increased activation of amygdala is observed to favor the development of anxiety while that of the prefrontal cortex favor the prevention of anxiety and vice versa. In addition, possible transformation of the individuals’ conditions was assessed using mathematical equations to show the possible changes overtim

Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: A Preference-based Lucas Critique of Public Policy

Policies and explicit private incentives designed for self-regarding individuals sometimes are less effective or even counterproductive when they diminish altruism, ethical norms and other social preferences. Evidence from 51 experimental studies indicates that this crowding out effect is pervasive, and that crowding in also occurs. A model in which self-regarding and social preferences may be either substitutes or complements is developed and evidence for the mechanisms underlying this non-additivity feature of preferences is provided. The result is a preference-based analogue to the Lucas Critique restricting feasible implementation to allocations that are supportable given the effect of incentives on preferences.public goods, behavioural experiments, social preferences, second best, motivational crowding, explicit incentives

Conflicted Emotions Following Trust-based Interaction

We investigated whether 20 emotional states, reported by 170 participants after participating in a Trust game, were experienced in a patterned way predicted by the “Recalibrational Model” or Valence Models. According to the Recalibrational Model, new information about trust-based interaction outcomes triggers specific sets of emotions. Unlike Valence Models that predict reports of large sets of either positive or negative emotional states, the Recalibrational Model predicts the possibility of conflicted (concurrent positive and negative) emotional states. Consistent with the Recalibrational Model, we observed reports of conflicted emotional states activated after interactions where trust was demonstrated but trustworthiness was not. We discuss the implications of having conflicted goals and conflicted emotional states for both scientific and well-being pursuits