Improving schools through school choice : an experimental study of deferred acceptance

In the context of school choice, we experimentally study the student-optimal stable mechanism where subjects take the role of students and schools are passive. Specifically, we study if a school can be better off when it unambiguously improves in the students’ true preferences and its (theoretic) student-optimal stable match remains the same or gets worse. Using firstorder stochastic dominance to evaluate the schools’ distributions over their actual matches, we find that schools’ welfare almost always changes in the same direction as the change of the student-optimal stable matching, i.e., incentives to improve school quality are nearly idle.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

An Experimental Investigation of Preference Misrepresentation in the Residency Match

The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in eliminating preference misrepresentation. We administered an online experiment to 1,714 medical students immediately after their participation in the medical residency match--a leading field application of strategy-proof market design. When placed in an analogous, incentivized matching task, we find that 23% of participants misrepresent their preferences. We explore the factors that predict preference misrepresentation, including cognitive ability, strategic positioning, overconfidence, expectations, advice, and trust. We discuss the implications of this behavior for the design of allocation mechanisms and the social welfare in markets that use them

A Multicity Study of Association between Air Pollution and CHD Mortality in China by Using Time Series Threshold Poisson Regression Model

There are few multicity studies to address the effect of short-term effect of particulate matter air pollution on daily Coronary Heart Disease (CHD) mortality in developing countries, much fewer to further discuss its threshold and seasonal effect. This study investigates the season-varying association between particulate matter less than or equal to 10 μm in aerodynamic diameter (PM10) and daily CHD mortality in seven cities of China. Time series threshold Poisson regression model is specified to estimate the health effect for four cities with the threshold effect, and conventional linear Poisson model is used to analyze the effect for three cities without threshold. We apply the Bayesian hierarchical model to pool the city-specific estimates into overall level. On average, a 10μg/m3 increase of the moving average concentrations of current-day and previous-day PM10 is associated with an increase of 0.81% (95% Posterior Interval, PI: -0.04%, 1.67%) in daily CHD mortality for all the cities as a whole. The associations are smaller than reported in developed countries or regions with lower polluted level, which is consistent to the findings in the literature. The hazardous effect are higher in hot summer and cold winter (1.15% and 0.89%) but lower in relative warm spring and fall (0.85% and 0.69%). In summary, we found significant associations between short-term exposure to PM10 and CHD mortality in China. The sensitivity analyses in the study support the robustness of our results

Dynamic Contracting with Long-Term Consequences

We examine optimal managerial compensation and turnover policy in a principal-agent model in which the firm output is serially correlated over time. The model captures a learning-by-doing feature: higher effort by the manager increases the quality of the match between the firm and the manager in the future. The optimal incentive scheme entails an inefficiently high turnover rate in the early stages of the employment relationship. The optimal turnover probability depends on the past performance and the likelihood of turnover decreases gradually with superior performance. With good enough past performance, the turnover policy reaches efficiency; the manager is never retained if it is inefficient to do so. The manager’s compensation depends on the firm value and the optimal performance-compensation relation increases with past performance

Partial equilibrium mechanism and inter-sectoral coordination: an experiment

This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them. In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the top-trading-cycle mechanism. There is a Pareto-dominant equilibrium, but it requires coordination across sectors. Our results show that coordination failure occurs more frequently when there is asymmetry between the two sectors compared with the one-sector benchmark, even without inter-sectoral complementarity. When mechanisms are run sequentially across the two sectors, such failure is substantially reduced, compared with when they are run simultaneously

Aiding applicants: Leveling the playing field within the immediate acceptance mechanism

In school choice problems, the widely used manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism (IA) disadvantages unsophisticated applicants, but may ex-ante Pareto dominate any strategy-proof alternative. In these cases, it may be preferable to aid applicants within IA, rather than to abandon it. In a laboratory experiment, we first document a substantial gap in strategy choices and outcomes between subjects of higher and lower cognitive ability under IA. We then test whether disclosing information on past applications levels the playing field. The treatment is effective in partially reducing the gap between applicants of above- and below-median cognitive ability and in curbing ability segregation across schools, but may leave the least able applicants further behind

Everyone Likes to Be Liked: Experimental Evidence from Matching Markets

Matching markets can be unstable when individuals prefer to be matched to a partner who also wants to be matched with them. Through a pre-registered and theory-guided laboratory experiment, we provide evidence that such reciprocal preferences exist, significantly decrease stability in matching markets, and are driven both by belief-based and preference-based motives. Participants expect partners who want to be matched with them to be more cooperative, and are more altruistic themselves. This leads to higher cooperation and larger profits when participants can consider each other's preferences