794 research outputs found
The Cost of Stability in Coalitional Games
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability,
usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such
that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some
coalitional games have empty cores, and any outcome in such a game is unstable.
In this paper, we investigate the possibility of stabilizing a coalitional
game by using external payments. We consider a scenario where an external
party, which is interested in having the players work together, offers a
supplemental payment to the grand coalition (or, more generally, a particular
coalition structure). This payment is conditional on players not deviating from
their coalition(s). The sum of this payment plus the actual gains of the
coalition(s) may then be divided among the agents so as to promote stability.
We define the \emph{cost of stability (CoS)} as the minimal external payment
that stabilizes the game.
We provide general bounds on the cost of stability in several classes of
games, and explore its algorithmic properties. To develop a better intuition
for the concepts we introduce, we provide a detailed algorithmic study of the
cost of stability in weighted voting games, a simple but expressive class of
games which can model decision-making in political bodies, and cooperation in
multiagent settings. Finally, we extend our model and results to games with
coalition structures.Comment: 20 pages; will be presented at SAGT'0
Computational Aspects of Extending the Shapley Value to Coalitional Games with Externalities
Until recently, computational aspects of the Shapley value were only studied under the assumption that there are no externalities from coalition formation, i.e., that the value of any coalition is independent of other coalitions in the system. However, externalities play a key role in many real-life situations and have been extensively studied in the game-theoretic and economic literature. In this paper, we consider the issue of computing extensions of the Shapley value to coalitional games with externalities proposed by Myerson [21], Pham Do and Norde [23], and McQuillin [17]. To facilitate efficient computation of these extensions, we propose a new representation for coalitional games with externalities, which is based on weighted logical expressions. We demonstrate that this representation is fully expressive and, sometimes, exponentially more concise than the conventional partition function game model. Furthermore, it allows us to compute the aforementioned extensions of the Shapley value in time linear in the size of the input
A Logic-Based Representation for Coalitional Games with Externalities
We consider the issue of representing coalitional games in multiagent systems that exhibit externalities from coalition formation, i.e., systems in which the gain from forming a coalition may be affected by the formation of other co-existing coalitions. Although externalities play a key role in many real-life situations, very little attention has been given to this issue in the multi-agent system literature, especially with regard to the computational aspects involved. To this end, we propose a new representation which, in the spirit of Ieong and Shoham [9], is based on Boolean expressions. The idea behind our representation is to construct much richer expressions that allow for capturing externalities induced upon coalitions. We show that the new representation is fully expressive, at least as concise as the conventional partition function game representation and, for many games, exponentially more concise. We evaluate the efficiency of our new representation by considering the problem of computing the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, a powerful extension of the conventional Shapley value to games with externalities. We show that by using our new representation, the Extended and Generalized Shapley value, which has not been studied in the computer science literature to date, can be computed in time linear in the size of the input
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The power index at infinity: Weighted voting in sequential infinite anonymous games
After we describe the waiting queue problem, we identify a partially observable 2n+1-player voting game with only one pivotal player; the player at the n-1 order. Given the simplest rule of heterogeneity presented in this paper, we show that for any infinite sequential voting game of size 2n+1, a power index of size n is a good approximation of the power index at infinity, and it is difficult to achieve. Moreover, we show that the collective utility value of a coalition for a partially observable anonymous game given an equal distribution of weights is n²+n. This formula is developed for infinite sequential anonymous games using a stochastic process that yields a utility function in terms of the probability of the sequence and voting outcome of the coalition. Evidence from Wikidata editing sequences is presented and the results are compared for 10 coalitions
Stable and Efficient Networks with Farsighted Players: the Largest Consistent Set
In this paper we study strategic formation of bilateral networks with farsighted players in the classic framework of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). We use the largest consistent set (LCS)(Chwe (1994)) as the solution concept for stability. We show that there exists a value function such that for every component balanced and anonymous allocation rule, the corresponding LCS does not contain any strongly efficient network. Using Pareto efficiency, a weaker concept of efficiency, we get a more positive result. However, then also, at least one environment of networks (with a component balanced and anonymous allocation rule) exists for which the largest consistent set does not contain any Pareto efficient network. These confirm that the well-known problem of the incompatibility between the set of stable networks and the set of efficient networks persists even in the environment with farsighted players. Next we study some possibilities of resolving this incompatibility.networks, farsighted, largest consistent set
The Uses of Teaching Games in Game Theory Classes and Some Experimental Games
The results are presented from several experiments. They include the selection of points in the core, interpersonal comparisons of utility, and the reconsideration of Stone results on prominence in contrast with symmetry.Gaming, game theory, fair division, core
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