Cancelable iris Biometrics based on data hiding schemes

The Cancelable Biometrics is a template protection scheme that can replace a stolen or lost biometric template. Instead of the original biometric template, Cancelable biometrics stores a modified version of the biometric template. In this paper, we have proposed a Cancelable biometrics scheme for Iris based on the Steganographic technique. This paper presents a non-invertible transformation function by combining Huffman Encoding and Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT). The combination of Huffman Encoding and DCT is basically used in steganography to conceal a secret image in a cover image. This combination is considered as one of the powerful non-invertible transformation where it is not possible to extract the exact secret image from the Stego-image. Therefore, retrieving the exact original image from the Stego-image is nearly impossible. The proposed non-invertible transformation function embeds the Huffman encoded bit-stream of a secret image in the DCT coefficients of the iris texture to generate the transformed template. This novel method provides very high security as it is not possible to regenerate the original iris template from the transformed (stego) iris template. In this paper, we have also improved the segmentation and normalization process

Image Watermaking With Biometric Data For Copyright Protection

In this paper, we deal with the proof of ownership or legitimate usage of a digital content, such as an image, in order to tackle the illegitimate copy. The proposed scheme based on the combination of the watermark-ing and cancelable biometrics does not require a trusted third party, all the exchanges are between the provider and the customer. The use of cancelable biometrics permits to provide a privacy compliant proof of identity. We illustrate the robustness of this method against intentional and unintentional attacks of the watermarked content

Performance comparison of intrusion detection systems and application of machine learning to Snort system

This study investigates the performance of two open source intrusion detection systems (IDSs) namely Snort and Suricata for accurately detecting the malicious traffic on computer networks. Snort and Suricata were installed on two different but identical computers and the performance was evaluated at 10 Gbps network speed. It was noted that Suricata could process a higher speed of network traffic than Snort with lower packet drop rate but it consumed higher computational resources. Snort had higher detection accuracy and was thus selected for further experiments. It was observed that the Snort triggered a high rate of false positive alarms. To solve this problem a Snort adaptive plug-in was developed. To select the best performing algorithm for Snort adaptive plug-in, an empirical study was carried out with different learning algorithms and Support Vector Machine (SVM) was selected. A hybrid version of SVM and Fuzzy logic produced a better detection accuracy. But the best result was achieved using an optimised SVM with firefly algorithm with FPR (false positive rate) as 8.6% and FNR (false negative rate) as 2.2%, which is a good result. The novelty of this work is the performance comparison of two IDSs at 10 Gbps and the application of hybrid and optimised machine learning algorithms to Snort

A Survey on Biometrics and Cancelable Biometrics Systems

Now-a-days, biometric systems have replaced the password or token based authentication system in many fields to improve the security level. However, biometric system is also vulnerable to security threats. Unlike password based system, biometric templates cannot be replaced if lost or compromised. To deal with the issue of the compromised biometric template, template protection schemes evolved to make it possible to replace the biometric template. Cancelable biometric is such a template protection scheme that replaces a biometric template when the stored template is stolen or lost. It is a feature domain transformation where a distorted version of a biometric template is generated and matched in the transformed domain. This paper presents a review on the state-of-the-art and analysis of different existing methods of biometric based authentication system and cancelable biometric systems along with an elaborate focus on cancelable biometrics in order to show its advantages over the standard biometric systems through some generalized standards and guidelines acquired from the literature. We also proposed a highly secure method for cancelable biometrics using a non-invertible function based on Discrete Cosine Transformation (DCT) and Huffman encoding. We tested and evaluated the proposed novel method for 50 users and achieved good results

Multibiometric security in wireless communication systems

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University, 05/08/2010.This thesis has aimed to explore an application of Multibiometrics to secured wireless communications. The medium of study for this purpose included Wi-Fi, 3G, and WiMAX, over which simulations and experimental studies were carried out to assess the performance. In specific, restriction of access to authorized users only is provided by a technique referred to hereafter as multibiometric cryptosystem. In brief, the system is built upon a complete challenge/response methodology in order to obtain a high level of security on the basis of user identification by fingerprint and further confirmation by verification of the user through text-dependent speaker recognition. First is the enrolment phase by which the database of watermarked fingerprints with memorable texts along with the voice features, based on the same texts, is created by sending them to the server through wireless channel. Later is the verification stage at which claimed users, ones who claim are genuine, are verified against the database, and it consists of five steps. Initially faced by the identification level, one is asked to first present one’s fingerprint and a memorable word, former is watermarked into latter, in order for system to authenticate the fingerprint and verify the validity of it by retrieving the challenge for accepted user. The following three steps then involve speaker recognition including the user responding to the challenge by text-dependent voice, server authenticating the response, and finally server accepting/rejecting the user. In order to implement fingerprint watermarking, i.e. incorporating the memorable word as a watermark message into the fingerprint image, an algorithm of five steps has been developed. The first three novel steps having to do with the fingerprint image enhancement (CLAHE with 'Clip Limit', standard deviation analysis and sliding neighborhood) have been followed with further two steps for embedding, and extracting the watermark into the enhanced fingerprint image utilising Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT). In the speaker recognition stage, the limitations of this technique in wireless communication have been addressed by sending voice feature (cepstral coefficients) instead of raw sample. This scheme is to reap the advantages of reducing the transmission time and dependency of the data on communication channel, together with no loss of packet. Finally, the obtained results have verified the claims

Pseudo Identities Based on Fingerprint Characteristics

This paper presents the integrated project TURBINE which is funded under the EU 7th research framework programme. This research is a multi-disciplinary effort on privacy enhancing technology, combining innovative developments in cryptography and fingerprint recognition. The objective of this project is to provide a breakthrough in electronic authentication for various applications in the physical world and on the Internet. On the one hand it will provide secure identity verification thanks to fingerprint recognition. On the other hand it will reliably protect the biometric data through advanced cryptography technology. In concrete terms, it will provide the assurance that (i) the data used for the authentication, generated from the fingerprint, cannot be used to restore the original fingerprint sample, (ii) the individual will be able to create different "pseudo-identities" for different applications with the same fingerprint, whilst ensuring that these different identities (and hence the related personal data) cannot be linked to each other, and (iii) the individual is enabled to revoke an biometric identifier (pseudo-identity) for a given application in case it should not be used anymore