400 research outputs found
New economic sociology and new institutional economics
Abstract: This paper deals with similarities and differences between new economic sociology (NES) and new institu-tional economics (NIE). We start with brief reports on the basic ideas of NES and NIE. Regarding the latter, we concentrate on NIE in the sense of Oliver Williamson who introduced the term and whose work became the main target of sociologists’ critique. We show that the contrast between the two fields is less sharp than some social scien-tists might assume. We then present a review and assessment of the attack of seven sociologists on Oliver William-son’s ideas. The sociologists are Perrow, Fligstein, Freeland, Granovetter, Bradach & Eccles, and Powell. Their battering ram “social network theory” is briefly described and an attempt made to combine network analysis with new institutional economics as understood by Williamson, i.e., his transaction cost economics. The paper is con-cluded with some thoughts on the convergence of NES and NIE.New institutional economics; transaction cost economics; economic sociology
What Does Economics Assume About People’s Knowledge? Who knows?
The purpose of the paper is to explore, from an assessment viewpoint, the ideas below. Economics, as a social science, has always considered sets of individuals with assumed characteristics, namely the level of knowledge, although in an implicit way in most of the cases. In this sense, an influential approach in Economics assumed that society, as a global set of individuals, was characterised by a certain level of knowledge that, indeed, could be associated with the one of its representative agent. In fact, an attentive recall of the evolution of these matters in Economics will immediately recognise that, since the very first economic models of the government, it was assumed that the level of knowledge of society, represented by a set of voters, was not the same as the one of the agent being elected, i.e. the government. The irrelevance of the difference in the level of knowledge of economic agents was soon abandoned after some seminal works of Hayek and Friedman. More recently, the viewpoint of Economics has changed by focusing on the characteristics (e.g. knowledge) of individuals, who may interact in sub-sets of society. From this point of view is clearly relevant, given the close connection with the assumed level of knowledge, to distinguish the adaptive behaviour from the rational one, as well as the full rational from the bounded rationality behaviour by people. Quite recent developments in the Economics of Knowledge, i.e. the so-called learning models, have been considered as more realistic approaches to model the process by which individuals acquire knowledge, for instance from other individuals that are, themselves, acquiring knowledge
What Does Economics Assume About People’s Knowledge? Who knows?
The purpose of the paper is to explore, from an assessment viewpoint, the ideas below. Economics, as a social science, has always considered sets of individuals with assumed characteristics, namely the level of knowledge, although in an implicit way in most of the cases. In this sense, an influential approach in Economics assumed that society, as a global set of individuals, was characterised by a certain level of knowledge that, indeed, could be associated with the one of its representative agent. In fact, an attentive recall of the evolution of these matters in Economics will immediately recognise that, since the very first economic models of the government, it was assumed that the level of knowledge of society, represented by a set of voters, was not the same as the one of the agent being elected, i.e. the government. The irrelevance of the difference in the level of knowledge of economic agents was soon abandoned after some seminal works of Hayek and Friedman. More recently, the viewpoint of Economics has changed by focusing on the characteristics (e.g. knowledge) of individuals, who may interact in sub-sets of society. From this point of view is clearly relevant, given the close connection with the assumed level of knowledge, to distinguish the adaptive behaviour from the rational one, as well as the full rational from the bounded rationality behaviour by people. Quite recent developments in the Economics of Knowledge, i.e. the so-called learning models, have been considered as more realistic approaches to model the process by which individuals acquire knowledge, for instance from other individuals that are, themselves, acquiring knowledge
Naïve Learning in Social Networks: Convergence, Influence and Wisdom of Crowds
We study learning and influence in a setting where agents communicate according to an arbitrary social network and naïvely update their beliefs by repeatedly taking weighted averages of their neighbors’ opinions. A focus is on conditions under which beliefs of all agents in large societies converge to the truth, despite their naïve updating. We show that this happens if and only if the influence of the most influential agent in the society is vanishing as the society grows. Using simple examples, we identify two main obstructions which can prevent this. By ruling out these obstructions, we provide general structural conditions on the social network that are sufficient for convergence to truth. In addition, we show how social influence changes when some agents redistribute their trust, and we provide a complete characterization of the social networks for which there is a convergence of beliefs. Finally, we survey some recent structural results on the speed of convergence and relate these to issues of segregation, polarization and propaganda.Social Networks, Learning, Diffusion, Bounded Rationality
Making Consensus Tractable
We study a model of consensus decision making, in which a finite group of
Bayesian agents has to choose between one of two courses of action. Each member
of the group has a private and independent signal at his or her disposal,
giving some indication as to which action is optimal. To come to a common
decision, the participants perform repeated rounds of voting. In each round,
each agent casts a vote in favor of one of the two courses of action,
reflecting his or her current belief, and observes the votes of the rest.
We provide an efficient algorithm for the calculation the agents have to
perform, and show that consensus is always reached and that the probability of
reaching a wrong decision decays exponentially with the number of agents.Comment: 18 pages. To appear in Transactions on Economics and Computatio
Essays on bounded rationality: individual decision and strategic interaction
Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on
the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations.
It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount
of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between
the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and
predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single
concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each
situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts
that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models
in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions.
However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which
economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal
with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making
in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was
triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain
observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature
in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes
the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity
to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is
on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents
evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts.
The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the
economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail-
able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function
(assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is
simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the
most relevant element it simplifes.
Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the
same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking
is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental
operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided,
but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the
concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same
utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric
Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most
natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking
cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More
interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which
one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to
it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is
able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental
literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al.
, 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend,
2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003).
Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set-
ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities
vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob-
served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking,
introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per-
son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes
that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even
if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes
to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying
a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional
agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria,
and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria,
at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one
may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional
voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able
to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election
leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is
higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen
& Marsh, 1997)
Narcissus to a Man: Lifelogging, Technology and the Normativity of Truth
The growth of the practice of lifelogging, exploiting the capabilities provided by the exponential increase in computer storage, and using technologies such as SenseCam as well as location-based services, Web 2.0, social networking and photo-sharing sites, has led to a growing sense of unease, articulated in books such as Mayer-Schönberger's Delete, that the semi-permanent storage of memories could lead to problematic social consequences. This talk examines the arguments against lifelogging and storage, and argues that they seem less worrying when placed in the context of a wider debate about the nature of mind and memory and their relationship to our environment and the technology we use
Persuasion bias, social influence, and uni-dimensional opinions.
We propose a boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals are subject to persuasion bias; that is, they fail to account for possible repetition in the information they receive. We show that persuasion bias implies the phenomenon of social influence, whereby one’s influence on group opinions depends not only on accuracy, but also on how well-connected one is in the social network that determines communication. Persuasion bias also implies the phenomenon of unidimensional opinions; that is, individuals’ opinions over a multidimensional set of issues converge to a single “left-right” spectrum. We explore the implications of our model in several natural settings, including political science and marketing, and we obtain a number of novel empirical implications.
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