AGM-Like Paraconsistent Belief Change

Two systems of belief change based on paraconsistent logics are introduced in this article by means of AGM-like postulates. The first one, AGMp, is defined over any paraconsistent logic which extends classical logic such that the law of excluded middle holds w.r.t. the paraconsistent negation. The second one, AGMo , is specifically designed for paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), which have a formal consistency operator that allows to recover all the classical inferences. Besides the three usual operations over belief sets, namely expansion, contraction and revision (which is obtained from contraction by the Levi identity), the underlying paraconsistent logic allows us to define additional operations involving (non-explosive) contradictions. Thus, it is defined external revision (which is obtained from contraction by the reverse Levi identity), consolidation and semi-revision, all of them over belief sets. It is worth noting that the latter operations, introduced by S. Hansson, involve the temporary acceptance of contradictory beliefs, and so they were originally defined only for belief bases. Unlike to previous proposals in the literature, only defined for specific paraconsistent logics, the present approach can be applied to a general class of paraconsistent logics which are supraclassical, thus preserving the spirit of AGM. Moreover, representation theorems w.r.t. constructions based on selection functions are obtained for all the operations

Simple hyperintensional belief revision

I present a possible worlds semantics for a hyperintensional belief revision operator, which reduces the logical idealization of cognitive agents affecting similar operators in doxastic and epistemic logics, as well as in standard AGM belief revision theory. (Revised) belief states are not closed under classical logical consequence; revising by inconsistent information does not perforce lead to trivialization; and revision can be subject to ‘framing effects’: logically or necessarily equivalent contents can lead to different revisions. Such results are obtained without resorting to non-classical logics, or to non-normal or impossible worlds semantics. The framework combines, instead, a standard semantics for propositional S5 with a simple mereology of contents.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Belief Revision, Minimal Change and Relaxation: A General Framework based on Satisfaction Systems, and Applications to Description Logics

Belief revision of knowledge bases represented by a set of sentences in a given logic has been extensively studied but for specific logics, mainly propositional, and also recently Horn and description logics. Here, we propose to generalize this operation from a model-theoretic point of view, by defining revision in an abstract model theory known under the name of satisfaction systems. In this framework, we generalize to any satisfaction systems the characterization of the well known AGM postulates given by Katsuno and Mendelzon for propositional logic in terms of minimal change among interpretations. Moreover, we study how to define revision, satisfying the AGM postulates, from relaxation notions that have been first introduced in description logics to define dissimilarity measures between concepts, and the consequence of which is to relax the set of models of the old belief until it becomes consistent with the new pieces of knowledge. We show how the proposed general framework can be instantiated in different logics such as propositional, first-order, description and Horn logics. In particular for description logics, we introduce several concrete relaxation operators tailored for the description logic \ALC{} and its fragments \EL{} and \ELext{}, discuss their properties and provide some illustrative examples