The lexicographic closure as a revision process

The connections between nonmonotonic reasoning and belief revision are well-known. A central problem in the area of nonmonotonic reasoning is the problem of default entailment, i.e., when should an item of default information representing "if A is true then, normally, B is true" be said to follow from a given set of items of such information. Many answers to this question have been proposed but, surprisingly, virtually none have attempted any explicit connection to belief revision. The aim of this paper is to give an example of how such a connection can be made by showing how the lexicographic closure of a set of defaults may be conceptualised as a process of iterated revision by sets of sentences. Specifically we use the revision process of Nayak.Comment: 7 pages, Nonmonotonic Reasoning Workshop 2000 (special session on belief change), at KR200

Probabilistic Default Reasoning with Conditional Constraints

We propose a combination of probabilistic reasoning from conditional constraints with approaches to default reasoning from conditional knowledge bases. In detail, we generalize the notions of Pearl's entailment in system Z, Lehmann's lexicographic entailment, and Geffner's conditional entailment to conditional constraints. We give some examples that show that the new notions of z-, lexicographic, and conditional entailment have similar properties like their classical counterparts. Moreover, we show that the new notions of z-, lexicographic, and conditional entailment are proper generalizations of both their classical counterparts and the classical notion of logical entailment for conditional constraints.Comment: 8 pages; to appear in Proceedings of the Eighth International Workshop on Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Special Session on Uncertainty Frameworks in Nonmonotonic Reasoning, Breckenridge, Colorado, USA, 9-11 April 200

A Plausibility Semantics for Abstract Argumentation Frameworks

We propose and investigate a simple ranking-measure-based extension semantics for abstract argumentation frameworks based on their generic instantiation by default knowledge bases and the ranking construction semantics for default reasoning. In this context, we consider the path from structured to logical to shallow semantic instantiations. The resulting well-justified JZ-extension semantics diverges from more traditional approaches.Comment: Proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2014). This is an improved and extended version of the author's ECSQARU 2013 pape

Measures of inconsistency and defaults

AbstractWe introduce a method for measuring inconsistency based on the number of formulas needed for deriving a contradiction. The relationships to previously considered methods based on probability measures are discussed. Those methods are extended to conditional probability and default reasoning

Counterfactuals as modal conditionals, and their probability

In this paper we propose a semantic analysis of Lewis' counterfactuals. By exploiting the structural properties of the recently introduced boolean algebras of conditionals, we show that counterfactuals can be expressed as formal combinations of a conditional object and a normal necessity modal operator. Specifically, we introduce a class of algebras that serve as modal expansions of boolean algebras of conditionals, together with their dual relational structures. Moreover, we show that Lewis' semantics based on sphere models can be reconstructed in this framework. As a consequence, we establish the soundness and completeness of a slightly stronger variant of Lewis' logic for counterfactuals with respect to our algebraic models. In the second part of the paper, we present a novel approach to the probability of counterfactuals showing that it aligns with the uncertainty degree assigned by a belief function, as per Dempster-Shafer theory, to its associated conditional formula. Furthermore, we characterize the probability of a counterfactual in terms of Gärdenfors' imaging rule for the probabilistic update