24,318 research outputs found

    A General Framework for Updating Belief Distributions

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    We propose a framework for general Bayesian inference. We argue that a valid update of a prior belief distribution to a posterior can be made for parameters which are connected to observations through a loss function rather than the traditional likelihood function, which is recovered under the special case of using self information loss. Modern application areas make it is increasingly challenging for Bayesians to attempt to model the true data generating mechanism. Moreover, when the object of interest is low dimensional, such as a mean or median, it is cumbersome to have to achieve this via a complete model for the whole data distribution. More importantly, there are settings where the parameter of interest does not directly index a family of density functions and thus the Bayesian approach to learning about such parameters is currently regarded as problematic. Our proposed framework uses loss-functions to connect information in the data to functionals of interest. The updating of beliefs then follows from a decision theoretic approach involving cumulative loss functions. Importantly, the procedure coincides with Bayesian updating when a true likelihood is known, yet provides coherent subjective inference in much more general settings. Connections to other inference frameworks are highlighted.Comment: This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the article "A General Framework for Updating Belief Distributions", which has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Statistical Society - Series B. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archivin

    Neural signals encoding shifts in beliefs

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    Dopamine is implicated in a diverse range of cognitive functions including cognitive flexibility, task switching, signalling novel or unexpected stimuli as well as advance information. There is also longstanding line of thought that links dopamine with belief formation and, crucially, aberrant belief formation in psychosis. Integrating these strands of evidence would suggest that dopamine plays a central role in belief updating and more specifically in encoding of meaningful information content in observations. The precise nature of this relationship has remained unclear. To directly address this question we developed a paradigm that allowed us to decompose two distinct types of information content, information-theoretic surprise that reflects the unexpectedness of an observation, and epistemic value that induces shifts in beliefs or, more formally, Bayesian surprise. Using functional magnetic-resonance imaging in humans we show that dopamine-rich midbrain regions encode shifts in beliefs whereas surprise is encoded in prefrontal regions, including the pre-supplementary motor area and dorsal cingulate cortex. By linking putative dopaminergic activity to belief updating these data provide a link to false belief formation that characterises hyperdopaminergic states associated with idiopathic and drug induced psychosis

    Reliable Uncertain Evidence Modeling in Bayesian Networks by Credal Networks

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    A reliable modeling of uncertain evidence in Bayesian networks based on a set-valued quantification is proposed. Both soft and virtual evidences are considered. We show that evidence propagation in this setup can be reduced to standard updating in an augmented credal network, equivalent to a set of consistent Bayesian networks. A characterization of the computational complexity for this task is derived together with an efficient exact procedure for a subclass of instances. In the case of multiple uncertain evidences over the same variable, the proposed procedure can provide a set-valued version of the geometric approach to opinion pooling.Comment: 19 page
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