Modelling Authoritarian Regimes

In the last few years, a body of ideas based on political economy theory has been built up by North and Weingast, Olson, Przeworski, and Acemoglu and Robinson. One theme that emerges from this literature concerns the transition to democracy: why would dominant elites give up oligarchic power? This paper addresses this question by considering a formal model of an authoritarian regime, and then examining three historical regimes: the Argentine Junta of 1976-1983; Francoist Spain ,1938-1975; the Soviet System ,1924-1991. We argue that these historical analyses suggest that party dictatorships are more institutionally durable than military or fascist ones.Democratic Transition, Authoritarian Regimes, Rational Choice Theory.

Tracing Authoritarian Learning in Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine

The thesis addresses how authoritarian regimes remain in power, and the processes of learning they engage in, using the case studies of Belarus, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine. I investigate six propositions, arguing that firstly, authoritarian learning differs from democratic learning because authoritarian regimes are concerned principally with survival and so learn best practices to ensure that they possess a full palette of survival practices. Secondly, there is a flattened learning hierarchy or network between authoritarian regimes. Thirdly, internal networks are important for learning among authoritarian regimes. Fourthly, success and failure are equally important for authoritarian learning. Fifthly, internal examples are as relevant to authoritarian learning as external examples. Sixthly, authoritarian regimes use a full palette of survival practices than just relying on repression. Therefore, authoritarian regimes are more likely to be concerned than democratic regimes about survivial, and so they develop a full palette of survival practices. The thesis argues that learning hierarchies are flattened. Success and failure are as important to authoritarian learning as each other, with authoritarian regimes drawing on both successful and failed examples. Similarly, internal sources of learning are as relevant to understanding authoritarian learning as external examples. Lastly, authoritarian regimes have a full palette of survival strategies than just relying on repression. Analysis of the four cases studies helps better understand how authoritarian regimes learn to retain control. Often learning comes from internal sources and this is particularly the case in Moldova and Ukraine. By analysing authoritarian learning in detail I expand existing literature and increase understanding of how authoritarian regimes survive

A State’s Gendered Response to Political Instability: Gendering Labor Policy in Semi-Authoritarian El Salvador (1944-1972)

Unlike much of the gender and welfare literature, this study examines why a regime that constrains pressure from below would adopt gendered social policies. The Salvadoran case (1944-1972) suggests that political instability rather than societal pressures may prompt semi-authoritarian regimes to adopt gendered labor reforms. We extend the motivations for adopting gendered labor reforms to include co-opting labor by examining gendered labor reforms in the context of El Salvador’s historically contingent labor strategy. This gendered analysis helps explain how a semi-authoritarian regime secured political stability and reveals the special appeal gendered labor reforms may have to semi-authoritarian regimes

The demand for military expenditure in authoritarian regimes

We investigate how the influence of the military differs across authoritarian regimes and verify whether there are actually systematic differences in military expenditures amongst different forms of dictatorships. We argue that public choices in autocracies result from a struggle for power between the leader and the elite. Elites matter because they control the fates of dictators, since most dictators are overthrown by members of their inner circle. Both actors want to ensure their continued political influence through a favourable allocation of the government budget. Moreover, the control over the security forces gives access to troops and weaponry, and affects the ease with which elites can unseat dictators. Autocratic rulers employ different bundles of co-option and repression for staying in power, and thus differ in the extent that they are required to buy off the military. Therefore, the institutional makeup of dictatorships affects the nature of leader-elite interaction, and in turn the share of the government budget allocated to military spending. Drawing on a new data set that sorts dictatorships into 5 categories from 1960 to 2000, our empirical results suggest that while military and personalist regimes have respectively the highest and lowest level of military spending among authoritarian regimes, monarchies and single-party regimes display intermediate patterns of spending

When Judges Defy Dictators: An Audience-Based Framework to Explain the Emergence of Judicial Assertiveness against Authoritarian Regimes

Under what conditions do judiciaries act assertively against authoritarian regimes? I argue that the judiciary coalesces around institutional norms and preferences in response to the preferences of institutions and networks, or “audiences,” with which judges interact, and which shape the careers and reputations of judges. Proposing a typology of judicial-regime relations, I demonstrate that the judiciary’s affinity to authoritarian regimes diminishes as these audiences grow independent from the regime. Using case law research, archival research and interviews, I demonstrate the utility of the audience-based framework for explaining judicial behavior in authoritarian regimes by exploring cross-temporal variation across authoritarian regimes in Pakistan. This study integrates ideas-based and interest-based explanations for judicial behavior in a generalizable framework for explaining variation in judicial assertiveness against. authoritarian regimes

What Can Arab Countries Learn From Post-communist Transition?

The commentary by Marek Dabrowski on what Arab countries can learn from the post-communist transition of the early 1990s, after the political uprisings against the authoritarian regimes in the Arab world

Down the Rabbit Hole: Searching for Native Scholarship to Better Understand Populism

Charlotte knew there had to be more to the story when she read comparisons of Donald Trump to Latin American authoritarian regimes, so she spent her summer investigating the validity of these claims

Labour Organising under Authoritarian Regimes

Diese Sammlung liefert Geschichte und Hintergrundinformationen zum Verständnis des Autoritarismus in Ländern von Russland bis eSwatini und von Brasilien bis zu den Philippinen sowie konzeptionelle Ansätze zum Verständnis des Autoritarismus und des Widerstands dagegen, spezifische praktische Erfahrungen beim Aufbau internationaler Solidarität und Debatten, die sich aus diesem Gebot ergeben. Die Kapitel befassen sich mit der Konvergenz von Politik und gewerkschaftlicher Organisierung im Autoritarismus, mit dem Einsatz von Arbeitsgesetzen und -institutionen zur Unterdrückung von Arbeit, mit Alternativen zu herkömmlichen Gewerkschaften, wenn diese kooptiert oder verboten sind, und mit der Behandlung von Flüchtlingen auf ungleichen Arbeitsmärkten. Das Buch richtet sich an Gewerkschaftsaktivisten, Wissenschaftler und Arbeitnehmer überall.This collection provides the history and background necessary to understand authoritarianism in countries ranging from Russia to eSwatini and from Brazil to the Philippines, as well as conceptual lenses for understanding authoritarianism and resistance to it, specific practical experiences of establishing international solidarity and debates emerging from that imperative. Its chapters cover the convergence of politics with the organisation of labour under authoritarianism, the use of labour laws and institutions to suppress labour, alternatives to conventional trade unions where unions are co-opted or banned, and the treatment of refugees in unequal labour markets. This book will appeal to labour activists, scholars and workers everywhere

Labour Organising under Authoritarian Regimes

This collection provides the history and background necessary to understand authoritarianism in countries ranging from Russia to eSwatini and from Brazil to the Philippines, as well as conceptual lenses for understanding authoritarianism and resistance to it, specific practical experiences of establishing international solidarity and debates emerging from that imperative. Its chapters cover the convergence of politics with the organisation of labour under authoritarianism, the use of labour laws and institutions to suppress labour, alternatives to conventional trade unions where unions are co-opted or banned, and the treatment of refugees in unequal labour markets. This book will appeal to labour activists, scholars and workers everywhere. With contributions by Cecilia Brighi, Ramon Certeza, Claire Ceruti, Dr. Frank Hoffer, Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, Can Kaya, Başak Kocadost, Svetlana Kolganova, Kaye Liang, Lizaveta Merliak, Christopher Mung, Moreblessing Nyambara, Yury Ravavoi, Melisa Serrano, Fundizwi Sikhondze, Jana K. Silverman, Verna Dinah Viajar and Khaing Zar Aung.PublishedThis collection provides the history and background necessary to understand authoritarianism in countries ranging from Russia to eSwatini and from Brazil to the Philippines, as well as conceptual lenses for understanding authoritarianism and resistance to it, specific practical experiences of establishing international solidarity and debates emerging from that imperative. Its chapters cover the convergence of politics with the organisation of labour under authoritarianism, the use of labour laws and institutions to suppress labour, alternatives to conventional trade unions where unions are co-opted or banned, and the treatment of refugees in unequal labour markets. This book will appeal to labour activists, scholars and workers everywhere. With contributions by Cecilia Brighi, Ramon Certeza, Claire Ceruti, Dr. Frank Hoffer, Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, Can Kaya, Başak Kocadost, Svetlana Kolganova, Kaye Liang, Lizaveta Merliak, Christopher Mung, Moreblessing Nyambara, Yury Ravavoi, Melisa Serrano, Fundizwi Sikhondze, Jana K. Silverman, Verna Dinah Viajar and Khaing Zar Aung

Open government in authoritarian regimes

Open government has long been regarded as a pareto-efficient policy – after all, who could be against such compelling policy objectives as transparency, accountability, citizen engagement and integrity. This paper addresses why an authoritarian state would want to adopt a policy of open government, which may first seem counter-intuitive, and tracks its outworking by examining several facets of the policy in practice. The research uncovers evidence of insidious bureaucratic obstruction and an implementation deficit counter-posed with an outward-facing political agenda to gain international respectability. The result is ‘half-open’ government in which the more benign elements have been adopted but the vested interests of government and business elites remain largely unaffected