71 research outputs found
Path deviations outperform approximate stability in heterogeneous congestion games
We consider non-atomic network congestion games with heterogeneous players
where the latencies of the paths are subject to some bounded deviations. This
model encompasses several well-studied extensions of the classical Wardrop
model which incorporate, for example, risk-aversion, altruism or travel time
delays. Our main goal is to analyze the worst-case deterioration in social cost
of a perturbed Nash flow (i.e., for the perturbed latencies) with respect to an
original Nash flow. We show that for homogeneous players perturbed Nash flows
coincide with approximate Nash flows and derive tight bounds on their
inefficiency. In contrast, we show that for heterogeneous populations this
equivalence does not hold. We derive tight bounds on the inefficiency of both
perturbed and approximate Nash flows for arbitrary player sensitivity
distributions. Intuitively, our results suggest that the negative impact of
path deviations (e.g., caused by risk-averse behavior or latency perturbations)
is less severe than approximate stability (e.g., caused by limited
responsiveness or bounded rationality). We also obtain a tight bound on the
inefficiency of perturbed Nash flows for matroid congestion games and
homogeneous populations if the path deviations can be decomposed into edge
deviations. In particular, this provides a tight bound on the Price of
Risk-Aversion for matroid congestion games
The Price of Anarchy in Routing Games as a Function of the Demand
Most of the literature on the price of anarchy has focused on worst-case
bounds for specific classes of games, such as routing games or more general
congestion games. Recently, the price of anarchy in routing games has been
studied as a function of the traffic demand, providing asymptotic results in
light and heavy traffic. In this paper we study the price of anarchy in
nonatomic routing games in the intermediate region of the demand. We begin by
establishing some smoothness properties of Wardrop equilibria and social optima
for general smooth costs. In the case of affine costs we show that the
equilibrium is piecewise linear, with break points at the demand levels at
which the set of active paths changes. We prove that the number of such break
points is finite, although it can be exponential in the size of the network.
Exploiting a scaling law between the equilibrium and the social optimum, we
derive a similar behavior for the optimal flows. We then prove that in any
interval between break points the price of anarchy is smooth and it is either
monotone, or unimodal with a minimum attained on the interior of the interval.
We deduce that for affine costs the maximum of the price of anarchy can only
occur at the break points. For general costs we provide counterexamples showing
that the set of break points is not always finite.Comment: 22 pages, 6 figure
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Robust Methods for Influencing Strategic Behavior
Today's world contains many examples of engineered systems that are tightly coupled with their users and customers. In these settings, the strategic and economic behavior of users and customers can have a significant impact on the performance of the overall system, and it may be desirable for an engineer to devise appropriate methods of incentivizing human behavior to improve system performance. This work seeks to understand the fundamental tradeoffs involved in designing behavior-influencing mechanisms for complex interconnected sociotechnical systems. We study several examples and pose them as problems of game design: a planner chooses appropriate ways to select or modify the utility functions of individual agents in order to promote desired behavior. In social systems these modifications take the form of monetary or other incentives, whereas in multiagent engineered systems the modifications may be algorithmic. Here, we ask questions of sensitivity and robustness: for example, if the quality of information available to the planner changes, how can we quantify the impact of this change on the planner's ability to influence behavior? We propose a simple overarching framework for studying this, and then apply it to three distinct domains: incentives for network routing, distributed control design for multiagent engineered systems, and impersonation attacks in networked systems. We ask the following questions:- What features of a behavior-influencing mechanism directly confer robustness?We show weaknesses of several existing methodologies which use pricing for congestion control in transportation networks. In response to these issues, we propose a universal taxation mechanism which can incentivize optimal routing in transportation networks, requiring no information about network structure or user sensitivities, provided that it can charge sufficiently large prices. This suggests that large prices have more robustness than small ones. We also directly compare flow-varying tolls to fixed tolls, and show that a great deal of robustness can be gained by using a flow-varying approach.- How much information does a planner need to be confident that an incentive mechanism will not inadvertently induce pathological behavior?We show that for simple enough transportation networks (symmetric parallel networks are sufficient), a planner can provably avoid perverse incentives by applying a generalized marginal-cost taxation approach. On the other hand, we show that on general networks, perverse incentives are always a risk unless the incentive mechanism is given some information about network structure.- How can robust games be designed for multiagent coordination?We investigate a setting of multiagent coordination in which autonomous agents may suffer from unplanned communication loss events; the planner's task is to program agents with a policy (analogous to an incentive mechanism) for updating their utility functions in response to such events. We show that even when the nominal game is well-behaved and the communication loss is between weakly-coupled agents, there exists no utility update policy which can prevent arbitrarily-poor states from emerging. We also investigate a setting in which an adversary attempts to influence a distributed system in a robust way; here, by understanding susceptibility to adversarial influence, we hope to inform the design of more robust network systems
Incentives in dynamic markets
In this thesis, we consider a variety of combinatorial optimization problems within a common theme of uncertainty and selfish behavior. In our first scenario, the input is collected from selfish players. Here, we study extensions of the so-called smoothness framework for mechanisms, a very useful technique for bounding the inefficiency of equilibria, to the cases of varying mechanism availability and participation of risk-averse players. In both of these cases, our main results are general theorems for the class of (lambda,mu)-smooth mechanisms. We show that these mechanisms guarantee at most a (small) constant factor performance loss in the extended settings. In our second scenario, we do not have access to the exact numerical input. Within this context, we explore combinatorial extensions of the well-known secretary problem under the assumption that the incoming elements only reveal their ordinal position within the set of previously arrived elements. We first observe that many existing algorithms for special matroid structures maintain their competitive ratio in the ordinal model. In contrast, we provide a lower bound for algorithms that are oblivious to the matroid structure. Finally, we design new algorithms that obtain constant competitive ratios for a variety of combinatorial problems
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