Lifesaving increases life expectancy

The notion of repeated minimal repair is analyzed and applied to modeling the lifesaving procedure of organisms. Under certain assumptions the equivalence between demographic lifesaving model and reliability shock model is proved. Both of these models are based on the non-homogeneous Poisson processes of underlying potentially harmful events The lifesaving ratio for homogeneous and heterogeneous populations is defined. Some generalizations are discussed. Several simple examples are considered.

Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law

The problem of optimal public enforcement of law is examined in a model in which two types of enforcement effort are distinguished: specific enforcement effort, activity devoted to apprehending and penalizing individuals who have committed a single type of harmful act; and general enforcement effort, activity affecting the likelihood of apprehension of individuals who have committed any of a range of harmful acts. (A policeman on the beat, for instance, is able to apprehend many types of violators of law.) If all enforcement effort is specific, then under wide assumptions it is optimal for sanctions to be extreme for all acts. However, if all enforcement effort is general, optimal sanctions are low for acts of small harmfulness, increase with the degree of harmfulness, and reach the extreme only for the most harmful acts (the main result of the paper). Also considered is the assumption that enforcement effort may be both general and specific.

Inference without randomization or ignorability: A stability­ controlled quasi-experiment on the prevention of tuberculosis

When determining the effectiveness of a new treatment, randomized trials are not always possible or desirable. The stability-controlled quasi-experiment (SCQE) (Hazlett, 2019) is an observational approach that replaces the usual “no-unobserved confounding” assumption with one on the change in non-treatment outcome between successive cohorts, or the “baseline trend.” We extend this method to allow variance estimation and inference, and apply it for the first time by examining whether isoniazid preventive therapy (IPT) reduced tuberculosis (TB) incidence among 26,715 HIV patients in Tanzania. After IPT became available in the clinics we studied, a non-random 25% of patients received it. Within a year, fewer than 1% of patients on IPT developed TB, compared to 16% of the untreated. Regression adjustment using available covari-ates produces an equally large and highly significant estimate of -15 percentage point (pp) [95%CI: -16.6, -13.7]. While those estimates may generate confidence in IPT’s effectiveness, they cannot eliminate confounding. By contrast, SCQE reveals that the average treatment effect on the treated must be small and indistinguishable from zero, if we assume the baseline trend was flat over the study period. Rather, to argue that IPT was beneficial requires claiming that the (non-treatment) incidence rate rose by at least 0.5 pp per year. This is plausible, but far from certain. The SCQE approach has broad applicability and will sometimes lead to definitive claims of effectiveness. In this case, it usefully aids in protecting against over-confidence in claims that IPT was effective

An empirical analysis of mergers

In this article, we extend the literature on merger simulation models by incorporating its potential synergy gains into structural econometric analysis. We present a three-step integrated approach. We estimate a structural demand and supply model, as in Bonnet and Dubois (2010). This model allows us to recover the marginal cost of each differentiated product. Then we estimate potential efficiency gains using the Data Envelopment Analysis approach of Bogetoft and Wang (2005), and some assumptions about exogenous cost shifters. In the last step, we simulate the new price equilibrium post merger taking into account synergy gains, and derive price and welfare effects. We use a homescan dataset of dairy dessert purchases in France, and show that for two of the three mergers considered, synergy gains could offset the upward pressure on prices post. Some mergers could then be considered as not harmful for consumers

Managing Madness: The ethics of identifying and treating mental illness

This essay analyzes different contemporary models for defining mental illness and offers a new framework that promotes the use of normative values during the clinical diagnostic process. Although ethic centric models for identifying mental illness do currently exist, these accounts are limited. Specifically, these accounts acknowledge the relationship between mental illness labels and implied responsibility in making their argument to support a normative framework, yet do not explain what capacities are necessary for an agent to have full responsibility. Recognizing this shortcoming, this paper provides an enriched model for identifying mental illness by marrying a normative conception of psychiatric dysfunction to a differential model for assigning moral responsibility. To end this paper looks at how this model may be applied in clinical practice by working through a specific case study of Alcohol Dependence Disorder. Ultimately, I conclude that a normative conception of mental illness married to an account of responsibility is a more appropriate and comprehensive model for recognizing and treating psychiatric dysfunction in clinical practice. By carefully balancing normative and pragmatic considerations, physicians can create more effective and just therapeutic regimens that are tailored to individual patients’ circumstances and needs

Harm: The counterfactual comparative account, the omission and pre-emption problems, and well-being

The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed, since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper, I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact that both the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this neutrality is illusory

A ten-step model for solving ethical dilemmas

This paper suggests a ten-step model for solving ethical dilemmas taking into account a wide spectrum of ethical values. The model has a prescriptive content that should help decision-makers to find a solution to ethical dilemmas according to the dictates suggested by moral obligation. For each step of the model, different types of simplification procedures are used in order to guide the decision-maker progressively toward a satisfactory solution. We begin with a discussion of the main characteristics that the model should possess. The paper then gives a detailed description of the single steps of the model. Lastly, a case study was analysed

Environmental policy and 'the identity problem'

Since Antiquity philosophy has abounded with provocative arguments in which what appear to be relatively simple and indisputable assumptions lead to unexpected and often baffling conclusions. Zeno's paradoxical arguments against the existence of motion (e.g. Achilles will never catch up the tortoise), or the Liar Paradox which undermines our belief that propositions must be either true or false, or Berkeley's argument against the existence of matter, are just a few examples. In contemporary discussion of the terms of intergenerational justice, which arises out of our concern with environmental problems and our sense of obligation to leave the world to our succesors in an inhabitable state, we encounter one particular argument which - very much like those time-honoured arguments mentioned above - appears to reach highly paradoxical conclusions. From rather simple assumptions, which we might be inclined to accept, we unexpectedly arrive at conclusions which most of us would be inclined to reject since they seem to violate deeply engrained convictions, or common sense, or our moral intuitions. Several authors have discoverd this particular argument, which is now known in the literature as the Identity Problem, or the Non-Identity Problem (both names come from Parfit), or as the Paradox of the Future Individuals (as Kavka calls it).2 The Identity Problem leads to the conclusion that, whatever policy we adopt towards the future, we are not harming future people. Therefore, we have no moral obligations towards them and we are free to choose any policy we like. Whatever choice we make, future generations would have no grounds for complaint even if we left them a very depleted world or exposed them to risks, such as the risks of nuclear radiation. There is no need to emphasize the possible practical significance of this conclusion if we were to accept it and to allow it to provide moral guidance. Much of the environmental debate involving economists, philosophers, politicians, and environmental activists would become pointless. It would no longer be morally relevant whether we leave to our successors enough natural resources and a clean and safe environment. Most of the major environmental questions (including the question of our moral obligations to future generations) discussed today would seem a waste of time. In a sense, therefore, the Paradox of Future Individuals is a prior problem as regards the problem of inter-generational justice. Only if it can be circumvented is there much point in pursuing further other aspects of inter-generational justice - e.g. whether one should adopt a Rawlsian framework, or a Utilitarian framework, or whatever. One of the most interesting apects of the apparently morally inadmissable Paradox of Future Individuals is that it does not follow from any assumptions about our selfishness, or our lack of concern about the future , or even from a belief in the priority of the needs of the present generations over those of future ones. Rather it claims to follow logically from certain assumptions concerning the concept of harm and the concept of personal identity . It is the purpose of this paper to discuss these assumptions and to argue that they do not, in fact, lead to the conclusion that we have no obligations to the future generations

The Price of everything The Value of Nothing: A (Truly) External Review Of BERL’s Study Of Harmful Alcohol and Drug Use

In March 2009, Business and Economic Research Limited ("BERL") published “Costs of Harmful Alcohol and Other Drug Use,” a report jointly commissioned by the Ministry of Health and ACC. BERL was asked to measure the costs of drug and alcohol abuse to New Zealand society, but not to evaluate specific interventions. BERL calculated annual social costs of alcohol and illicit drug consumption of $6.8 billion, including$4.8 billion in social costs from alcohol alone. The report was cited by Law Commission President Sir Geoffrey Palmer as evidence in support of greater regulation, gaining considerable media coverage. We find substantial flaws in BERL’s method that together account for well over 90% of BERL’s calculated costs of alcohol use. Corrected external costs of alcohol use amount to $662 million and are roughly matched by the$516 million collected in alcohol excise taxes. The BERL report is wholly inadequate for use in assisting policy development.costs and benefits of alcohol usage; alcohol policy; New Zealand; adequacy of consultancy reports