Computing an Approximately Optimal Agreeable Set of Items

We study the problem of finding a small subset of items that is \emph{agreeable} to all agents, meaning that all agents value the subset at least as much as its complement. Previous work has shown worst-case bounds, over all instances with a given number of agents and items, on the number of items that may need to be included in such a subset. Our goal in this paper is to efficiently compute an agreeable subset whose size approximates the size of the smallest agreeable subset for a given instance. We consider three well-known models for representing the preferences of the agents: ordinal preferences on single items, the value oracle model, and additive utilities. In each of these models, we establish virtually tight bounds on the approximation ratio that can be obtained by algorithms running in polynomial time.Comment: A preliminary version appeared in Proceedings of the 26th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 201

Approximate Maximin Shares for Groups of Agents

We investigate the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among interested agents using the concept of maximin share. Procaccia and Wang showed that while an allocation that gives every agent at least her maximin share does not necessarily exist, one that gives every agent at least $2/3$ of her share always does. In this paper, we consider the more general setting where we allocate the goods to groups of agents. The agents in each group share the same set of goods even though they may have conflicting preferences. For two groups, we characterize the cardinality of the groups for which a constant factor approximation of the maximin share is possible regardless of the number of goods. We also show settings where an approximation is possible or impossible when there are several groups.Comment: To appear in the 10th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 201

Almost Envy-Freeness in Group Resource Allocation

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods between groups of agents using the recently introduced relaxations of envy-freeness. We consider the existence of fair allocations under different assumptions on the valuations of the agents. In particular, our results cover cases of arbitrary monotonic, responsive, and additive valuations, while for the case of binary valuations we fully characterize the cardinalities of two groups of agents for which a fair allocation can be guaranteed with respect to both envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). Moreover, we introduce a new model where the agents are not partitioned into groups in advance, but instead the partition can be chosen in conjunction with the allocation of the goods. In this model, we show that for agents with arbitrary monotonic valuations, there is always a partition of the agents into two groups of any given sizes along with an EF1 allocation of the goods. We also provide an extension of this result to any number of groups

Primer on Competitive Bargaining, A

The aim of this Article is to explore the competitive bargaining strategy in depth. Because competitive negotiation behavior is common, and sometimes advisable, one must understand it well to master negotiation practice. Knowing how competitors operate enables a negotiator to recognize competitive bargaining when it occurs and to deal with it affirmatively by transforming a competitive negotiation into a cooperative one or defensively by countering competitive moves. Furthermore, even parties who negotiate cooperatively sometimes compete. For example, negotiators may create a win-win situation by cooperating to increase the size of the pie to be divided between them. Nonetheless, they still must divide it, and it is when parties must allocate shares or divide gains that they may make competitive moves to secure as much for themselves as they ca

A Dynamic Spectrum Access Framework (Bring Your Own Spectrum)

In this thesis, a unified and sustainable framework for spectrum allocation is presented. This multi-level operator-agnostic framework, Bring Your Own Spectrum (BYOS), is the result of a few thought experiments reflecting the ways in which spectrum could be bought and sold as an asset, similar to service models in cloud computing where every technical element can be traded via an "as-a-Service" model. BYOS architectural features form the major part of this thesis and cover four levels of abstraction as – contextual, conceptual, logical and physical. First, the contextual aspect of BYOS is covered, which addresses the question: "why is the framework needed?". To understand the reasons behind the need for a new framework an exhaustive survey of history of telecommunications policy development of 32 countries was conducted that included major economies in several key regions of the world. This research provided insight into the role of the government, mechanisms used for allocations, success/failure of allocations, and business models in the sector. Additionally, a review of existing and emerging technologies was done to understand various possible mechanisms of spectrum access. Next, the conceptual aspect of BYOS is presented, which addresses the question: "what does the framework look like?". For this, the information from the study above was converted into a skeleton framework, ensuring that it covers the requirements gathered. The framework has a three-level architecture with a quasi-static allocation scheme. The levels of architecture are designated based on periods of ownership and the thesis presents an original exponential-based-scale to determine the allocation periods (longest to shortest). The framework accommodates different types of operators, categorising in terms of their spectrum access privileges. Following this, the thesis focuses on the physical level of the framework, where the question: "with what?" i.e. the technical mechanisms are discussed. In this part, a novel analogy is presented where the wireless spectrum is compared to a multi-lane, multi-level highway. This analogy provides the basis for unit of information transport between two points, which in turn form the trading unit. In this thesis, "Interference (transmission power) spread over bandwidth" is chosen as the basic trading unit for the BYOS framework. Also included is a discussion on the required changes to the calculation of "population" – an inherent part of reserve price calculation – in view of the proliferation of device using different types of mobile technologies. A second part of the physical framework presents an original mechanism for competition management in view of the new framework and trading unit. Using the principles of network traffic management, a new tracking unit – token – is introduced, which helps the regulators keep track of the process of spectrum allocation, but in a hands-off manner. Multiple models of using tokens in the framework are presented. Tokens are intended only for the shortterm trades, though the initial number is determined by the total spectrum acquisitions and cumulative participation behaviour. Finally, the logical or system model of the framework is presented, which addresses the question: "how to structure and organise the architecture to achieve the desired requirements". This discussion is also divided into two parts. First, the discussion focuses on the multiple ways to use tokens and demonstrates the different use cases by way of competition games. Key novel points here are the discussion of competition management over multi-period allocation and addressing the needs of public safety services. Additionally, the discussion also focuses on unequal desirability of available spectrum lots based on spectrum characteristics, acquisition periods, and operator’s own requirements. The second part of the discussion focuses on various methods of implementation of this framework. A potential enterpriseblockchain based method is explored, though there may be other better solutions. Another focus of this thesis, which can be considered as a separate minor segment, came out of the initial policy research was to organize and analyse this information systematically. For this purpose, the theory of policy diffusion was explored, and the research provides evidence for the existence of, and analyses the mechanisms used for policy diffusion in different regions and countries.Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of Electrical and Electronics, 202

Serial Rules in a Multi-Unit Shapley-Scarf Market

We study generalized Shapley-Scarf exchange markets where each agent is endowed with multiple units of an indivisible and agent-specific good and monetary compensations are not possible. An outcome is given by a circulation which consists of a balanced exchange of goods. We focus on circulation rules that only require as input ordinal preference rankings of individual goods, and agents are assumed to have responsive preferences over bundles of goods. We study the properties of serial dictatorship rules which allow agents to choose either a single good or an entire bundle sequentially, according to a fixed ordering of the agents. We also introduce and explore extensions of these serial dictatorship rules that ensure individual rationality. The paper analyzes the normative and incentive properties of these four families of serial dictatorships and also shows that the individually rational extensions can be implemented with efficient graph algorithms.PBiró gratefully acknowledges the financial support by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Momentum Grant No. LP2021-2, and by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund, OTKA, Grant No. K143858. F. Klijn gratefully acknowledges financial support from AGAUR–Generalitat de Catalunya (2017-SGR-1359) and the Spanish Agencia Estatal de Investigación (AEI) through grants ECO2017-88130-P and PID2020-114251GB-I00 (funded by MCIN/ AEI /10.13039/501100011033) and the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&D (Barcelona School of Economics, SEV-2015-0563 and CEX2019-000915-S). S. Pápai gratefully acknowledges financial support from an FRQSC grant titled “Formation des coalitions et des réseaux dans les situations économiques et sociales avec des externalités” (SE-144698

Automated Algorithmic Machine-to-Machine Negotiation for Lane Changes Performed by Driverless Vehicles at the Edge of the Internet of Things

This dissertation creates and examines algorithmic models for automated machine-to-machine negotiation in localized multi-agent systems at the edge of the Internet of Things. It provides an implementation of two such models for unsupervised resource allocation for the application domain of autonomous vehicle traffic as it pertains to lane changing and speed setting selection. The first part concerns negotiation via abstract argumentation. A general model for the arbitration of conflict based on abstract argumentation is outlined and then applied to a scenario where autonomous vehicles on a multi-lane highway use expert systems in consultation with private objectives to form arguments and use them to compete for lane positions. The conflict resolution component of the resulting argumentation framework is augmented with social voting to achieve a community supported conflict-free outcome. The presented model heralds a step toward independent negotiation through automated argumentation in distributed multi-agent systems. Many other cyber-physical environments embody stages for opposing positions that may benefit from this type of tool for collaboration. The second part deals with game-theoretic negotiation through mechanism design. It outlines a mechanism providing resource allocation for a fee and applies it to autonomous vehicle traffic. Vehicular agents apply for speed and lane assignments with sealed bids containing their private feasible action valuations determined within the context of their governing objective. A truth-inducing mechanism implementing an incentive-compatible strategyproof social choice functions achieves a socially optimal outcome. The model can be adapted to many application fields through the definition of a domain-appropriate operation to be used by the allocation function of the mechanism. Both presented prototypes conduct operations at the edge of the Internet of Things. They can be applied to agent networks in just about any domain where the sharing of resources is required. The social voting argumentation approach is a minimal but powerful tool facilitating the democratic process when a community makes decisions on the sharing or rationing of common-pool assets. The mechanism design model can create social welfare maximizing allocations for multiple or multidimensional resources