An Analysis of the Selection of Arbitrators

This paper analyses data on union and employer rankings of different panels of arbitrators in an actual arbitration system. A random utility model of bargainer preferences is developed and estimated. The estimates indicate that unions and employers have similar preferences, in favor of lawyers, more experienced arbitrators, and arbitrators who seem to have previously favored their side. Alternative rankings models, which are estimated to test whether bargainers rank arbitrators strategically, reveal no evidence of strategic behavior.

MULTI CRITERIA DECISION MAKING MODELS: AN OVERVIEW ON ELECTRE METHODS

In portfolio analysis, there are a few models that can be used. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to make an overview on multi criteria decision making models, in particular, on ELECTRE methods. We discuss the different versions of ELECTRE, which exist and why they exist. So, when speaking about ELECTRE methods structure, we have to consider two main procedures: construction of one or several outranking relation(s) procedure, and exploitation procedure. In the exploitation procedure, recommendations are elaborated from the results obtained in the first phase. The nature of the recommendation depends on the problematic: choosing, ranking or sorting. Each method is characterized by its construction and exploitation procedure. For choice problem, we can apply ELECTRE I, ELECTRE Iv, and ELECTRE IS; for ranking problem, we can apply ELECTRE II, ELECTRE III, ELECTRE IV and ELECTRE-SS; and for sorting problem we can apply ELECTRE TRI. Finally, some failings on ELECTRE methods assumptions are discussed, for instance, rank reversals. So, when analyzing portfolio management decision problem, the literature suggests AHP method and PROMETHEE family.CAPM; decision problem; multi criteria decision making models; ELECTRE family; ELECTRE rank reversals

Single-Peakedness and Disconnected Coalitions

Ordinally single-peaked preferences are distinguished from cardinally singlepeaked preferences, in which all players have a similar perception of distances in some one-dimensional ordering. While ordinal single-peakedness can lead to disconnected coalitions that have a "hole" in the ordering, cardinal single-peakedness precludes this possibility, based on two models of coalition formation: ¥ Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their preference rankings until a majority coalition forms. ¥ Build-Up (BU): Similar to FB, except that when nonmajority subcoalitions form, they fuse into composite players, whose positions are defined cardinally and who are treated as single players in the convergence process. FB better reflects the unconstrained, or nonmyopic, possibilities of coalition formation, whereas BU-because all subcoalition members must be included in any majority coalition that forms-restricts combinatorial possibilities and tends to produce less compact majority coalitions. The "strange bedfellows" frequently observed in legislative coalitions and military alliances suggest that even when players agree on, say, a left-right ordering, their perceptions of exactly where players stand in this ordering may differ substantially. If so, a player may be acceptable to a coalition but may not find every member in it acceptable, causing that player not to join and possibly creating a disconnected coalition.COALITION FORMATION; SINGLE-PEAKEDNESS; LEGISLATURES; ALLIANCES

Dominance Measuring Method Performance under Incomplete Information about Weights.

In multi-attribute utility theory, it is often not easy to elicit precise values for the scaling weights representing the relative importance of criteria. A very widespread approach is to gather incomplete information. A recent approach for dealing with such situations is to use information about each alternative?s intensity of dominance, known as dominance measuring methods. Different dominancemeasuring methods have been proposed, and simulation studies have been carried out to compare these methods with each other and with other approaches but only when ordinal information about weights is available. In this paper, we useMonte Carlo simulation techniques to analyse the performance of and adapt such methods to deal with weight intervals, weights fitting independent normal probability distributions orweights represented by fuzzy numbers.Moreover, dominance measuringmethod performance is also compared with a widely used methodology dealing with incomplete information on weights, the stochastic multicriteria acceptability analysis (SMAA). SMAA is based on exploring the weight space to describe the evaluations that would make each alternative the preferred one

Analyzing preferences ranking when there are too many alternatives.

Consumer preferences can be measured by rankings of alternatives. When there are too many alternatives, this consumer task becomes complex. One option is to have consumers rank only a subset of the available alternatives. This has an impact on subsequent statistical analysis, as now a large amount of ties is observed. We propose a simple methodology to perform proper statistical analysis in this case. It also allows to test whether (parts of the) rankings are random or not. An illustration shows its ease of application

Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: a theoretical and experimental analysis

We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experiment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking is the socially efficient one. Second, subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.Bidding behavior, Procedural fairness, Voting paradox

Testing for the Internal Consistency of Choice Experiments Using Explicit Rankings of Quality Attributes

Choice experiments (CEs) are an increasingly important tool in the environmental valuation literature because of their ability to deal with multifaceted environmental issues and their basis in random utility theory. One particularly useful aspect of the CE method is that it allows researchers to estimate marginal rates of substitution between an environmental resource’s various attributes. These marginal rates of substitution provide an implicit ranking of the attributes, which can be compared with other ranking mechanisms. In this paper we describe a method for testing for the internal consistency of choice experiments by comparing the implicit attribute ranking generated by a CE with that generated by an explicit attribute-ranking exercise. The analysis uses data gathered through a unique survey in which respondents completed both a CE exercise and an attribute-ranking exercise indicating their preferences over pollution abatement and water quality improvement strategies for a freshwater lake in north-central Iowa. Comparisons are made on a sample-wide basis as well as an individual basis.Environmental valuation, choice experiments, internal consistency