Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Cooperative retransmission protocols in fading channels : issues, solutions and applications

Future wireless systems are expected to extensively rely on cooperation between terminals, mimicking MIMO scenarios when terminal dimensions limit implementation of multiple antenna technology. On this line, cooperative retransmission protocols are considered as particularly promising technology due to their opportunistic and flexible exploitation of both spatial and time diversity. In this dissertation, some of the major issues that hinder the practical implementation of this technology are identified and pertaining solutions are proposed and analyzed. Potentials of cooperative and cooperative retransmission protocols for a practical implementation of dynamic spectrum access paradigm are also recognized and investigated. Detailed contributions follow. While conventionally regarded as energy efficient communications paradigms, both cooperative and retransmission concepts increase circuitry energy and may lead to energy overconsumption as in, e.g., sensor networks. In this context, advantages of cooperative retransmission protocols are reexamined in this dissertation and their limitation for short transmission ranges observed. An optimization effort is provided for extending an energy- efficient applicability of these protocols. Underlying assumption of altruistic relaying has always been a major stumbling block for implementation of cooperative technologies. In this dissertation, provision is made to alleviate this assumption and opportunistic mechanisms are designed that incentivize relaying via a spectrum leasing approach. Mechanisms are provided for both cooperative and cooperative retransmission protocols, obtaining a meaningful upsurge of spectral efficiency for all involved nodes (source-destination link and the relays). It is further recognized in this dissertation that the proposed relaying-incentivizing schemes have an additional and certainly not less important application, that is in dynamic spectrum access for property-rights cognitive-radio implementation. Provided solutions avoid commons-model cognitive-radio strict sensing requirements and regulatory and taxonomy issues of a property-rights model

Game theory for collaboration in future networks

Cooperative strategies have the great potential of improving network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. This new paradigm in terms of network management, however, requires a novel design and analysis framework targeting a highly flexible networking solution with a distributed architecture. Game Theory is very suitable for this task, since it is a comprehensive mathematical tool for modeling the highly complex interactions among distributed and intelligent decision makers. In this way, the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g. content providers, cloud providers, home providers, brokers, network providers or users) should be found to optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure. The authors discuss in this chapter several Game Theory models/concepts that are highly relevant for enabling collaboration among the diverse players, using different ways to incentivize it, namely through pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight several related open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information games in this area.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Cooperative smartphone relay selection based on fair power utilization for network coverage extension

This paper presents a relay selection algorithm based on fair battery power utilization for extending mobile network coverage and capacity by using a cooperative communication strategy where mobile devices can be utilized as relays. Cooperation improves the network performance for mobile terminals, either by providing access to out-of-range devices or by facilitating multi-path network access to connected devices. In this work, we assume that all mobile devices can benefit from using other mobile devices as relays and investigate the fairness of relay selection algorithms. We point out that signal strength based relay selection inevitably leads to unfair relay selection and devise a new algorithm that is based on fair utilization of power resources on mobile devices. We call this algorithm Credit based Fair Relay Selection (CF-RS) and in this paper show through simulation that the algorithm results in fair battery power utilization, while providing similar data rates compared with traditional approaches. We then extend the solution to demonstrate that adding incentives for relay operation adds clear value for mobile devices in the case they require relay service. Typically, mobile devices represent self-interested users who are reluctant to cooperate with other network users, mainly due to the cost in terms of power and network capacity. In this paper, we present an incentive based solution which provides clear mutual benefit for mobile devices and demonstrate this benefit in the simulation of symmetric and asymmetric network topologies. The CF-RS algorithm achieves the same performance in terms of achievable data rate, Jain's fairness index and utility of end devices in both symmetric and asymmetric network configurations

Nash Equilibria of Packet Forwarding Strategies in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks

In self-organizing ad hoc networks, all the networking functions rely on the contribution of the participants. As a basic example, nodes have to forward packets for each other in order to enable multi-hop communication. In recent years, incentive mechanisms have been proposed to give nodes incentive to cooperate, especially in packet forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist without incentive mechanisms. We propose a model based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks - where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stable - cooperation needs to be encouraged. forwarding. However, the need for these mechanisms was not formally justified. In this paper, we address the problem of whether cooperation can exist \emph{without} incentive mechanisms. We propose a model based on game theory and graph theory to investigate equilibrium conditions of packet forwarding strategies. We prove theorems about the equilibrium conditions for both cooperative and non-cooperative strategies. We perform simulations to estimate the probability that the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium hold in randomly generated network scenarios. As the problem is involved, we deliberately restrict ourselves to a static configuration. We conclude that in static ad hoc networks -- where the relationships between the nodes are likely to be stable -- cooperation needs to be encouraged

Price-Based Optimal Resource Allocation in Multi-Hop Wireless Networks

Recent advances in wireless communications and digital electronics have enabled rapid development of a variety of wireless network technologies. The undeniable popularity of wireless network is due to its ubiquity and convenience, which is appreciated by the users. In this dissertation, we study the problem of resource allocation in multihop wireless networks (so called ad hoc networks). A wireless ad hoc network consists of a collection of wireless nodes without a fixed infrastructure. Two wireless nodes communicate with each other directly, if they are within the transmission range of each other. Otherwise, the communication is achieved through the relays of intermediate nodes. Compared with traditional wireline networks, the unique characteristics of wireless networks pose fundamental challenges to the design of effective resource allocation algorithms that are optimal with respect to resource utilization and fair across different network flows. Particularly, the following issues of wireless networks need fresh treatment: (1) Interference of wireless communication. Flows not only contend at the same node (contention in the time domain), but also compete for shared channel if they are within the interference ranges of each other (contention in the spatial domain). (2) Multiple resource usage. Sending data from one wireless node to another needs to consume multiple resources, most notably wireless bandwidth and battery energy. (3) Autonomous communication entities. The wireless nodes usually belong to different autonomous entities. They may lack the incentive to contribute to the network functionality in a cooperative way. (4) Rate diversity. Wireless nodes can adaptively change the transmission bit rate based on perceived channel conditions. This leads to a wireless network with rate diversity, where competing flows within the interference range transmit at different rates. None of the existing resource allocation algorithms in wireless ad hoc networks have realistically considered end-to-end flows spanning multiple hops. Moreover, strategies proposed for wireline networks are not applicable in the context of wireless ad hoc network, due to its unique characteristics. In this dissertation, we propose a new price-based resource allocation framework in wireless ad hoc networks to achieve optimal resource utilization and fairness among competing end-to-end flows. We build our pricing framework on the notion of maximal cliques in wireless ad hoc networks, as compared to individual links in traditional wide-area wireline networks. Based on such a price-based theoretical framework, we present a two-tier iterative algorithm. Distributed across wireless nodes, the algorithm converges to a global network optimum with respect to resource allocations. Further, we present a price pair mechanism to coordinate multiple resource allocations, and to provide incentives simultaneously such that cooperation is promoted and the desired global optimal network operating point is reached by convergence with a fully decentralized self-optimizing algorithm. Such desired network-wide global optimum is characterized with the concept of Nash bargaining solution, which not only provides the Pareto optimal point for the network, but is also consistent with the fairness axioms of game theory. Finally, we present a channel aware price generation scheme to decompose the bit rate adjustment and the flow rate allocation. The allocation result achieves channel time fairness where user fairness and channel utilization is balanced. The major achievements of this dissertation are outlined as follows. It models a system-wide optimal operation point of a wireless network, and outlines the solution space of resource allocation in a multihop wireless network; It presents a price-based distributed resource allocation algorithm to achieve this global optimal point; It presents a low overhead implementation of the price-based resource allocation algorithm; It presents an incentive mechanism that enables the resource allocation algorithm when users are selfish

A Trust-Based Relay Selection Approach to the Multi-Hop Network Formation Problem in Cognitive Radio Networks

One of the major challenges for today’s wireless communications is to meet the growing demand for supporting an increasing diversity of wireless applications with limited spectrum resource. In cooperative communications and networking, users share resources and collaborate in a distributed approach, similar to entities of active social groups in self organizational communities. Users’ information may be shared by the user and also by the cooperative users, in distributed transmission. Cooperative communications and networking is a fairly new communication paradigm that promises significant capacity and multiplexing gain increase in wireless networks. This research will provide a cooperative relay selection framework that exploits the similarity of cognitive radio networks to social networks. It offers a multi-hop, reputation-based power control game for routing. In this dissertation, a social network model provides a humanistic approach to predicting relay selection and network analysis in cognitive radio networks

Game theory for cooperation in multi-access edge computing

Cooperative strategies amongst network players can improve network performance and spectrum utilization in future networking environments. Game Theory is very suitable for these emerging scenarios, since it models high-complex interactions among distributed decision makers. It also finds the more convenient management policies for the diverse players (e.g., content providers, cloud providers, edge providers, brokers, network providers, or users). These management policies optimize the performance of the overall network infrastructure with a fair utilization of their resources. This chapter discusses relevant theoretical models that enable cooperation amongst the players in distinct ways through, namely, pricing or reputation. In addition, the authors highlight open problems, such as the lack of proper models for dynamic and incomplete information scenarios. These upcoming scenarios are associated to computing and storage at the network edge, as well as, the deployment of large-scale IoT systems. The chapter finalizes by discussing a business model for future networks.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio