Why (and How) Networks Should Run Themselves

The proliferation of networked devices, systems, and applications that we depend on every day makes managing networks more important than ever. The increasing security, availability, and performance demands of these applications suggest that these increasingly difficult network management problems be solved in real time, across a complex web of interacting protocols and systems. Alas, just as the importance of network management has increased, the network has grown so complex that it is seemingly unmanageable. In this new era, network management requires a fundamentally new approach. Instead of optimizations based on closed-form analysis of individual protocols, network operators need data-driven, machine-learning-based models of end-to-end and application performance based on high-level policy goals and a holistic view of the underlying components. Instead of anomaly detection algorithms that operate on offline analysis of network traces, operators need classification and detection algorithms that can make real-time, closed-loop decisions. Networks should learn to drive themselves. This paper explores this concept, discussing how we might attain this ambitious goal by more closely coupling measurement with real-time control and by relying on learning for inference and prediction about a networked application or system, as opposed to closed-form analysis of individual protocols

Distributed Network Anomaly Detection on an Event Processing Framework

Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) are an integral part of modern data centres to ensure high availability and compliance with Service Level Agreements (SLAs). Currently, NIDS are deployed on high-performance, high-cost middleboxes that are responsible for monitoring a limited section of the network. The fast increasing size and aggregate throughput of modern data centre networks have come to challenge the current approach to anomaly detection to satisfy the fast growing compute demand. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to distributed intrusion detection systems based on the architecture of recently proposed event processing frameworks. We have designed and implemented a prototype system using Apache Storm to show the benefits of the proposed approach as well as the architectural differences with traditional systems. Our system distributes modules across the available devices within the network fabric and uses a centralised controller for orchestration, management and correlation. Following the Software Defined Networking (SDN) paradigm, the controller maintains a complete view of the network but distributes the processing logic for quick event processing while performing complex event correlation centrally. We have evaluated the proposed system using publicly available data centre traces and demonstrated that the system can scale with the network topology while providing high performance and minimal impact on packet latency

Assessing and augmenting SCADA cyber security: a survey of techniques

SCADA systems monitor and control critical infrastructures of national importance such as power generation and distribution, water supply, transportation networks, and manufacturing facilities. The pervasiveness, miniaturisations and declining costs of internet connectivity have transformed these systems from strictly isolated to highly interconnected networks. The connectivity provides immense benefits such as reliability, scalability and remote connectivity, but at the same time exposes an otherwise isolated and secure system, to global cyber security threats. This inevitable transformation to highly connected systems thus necessitates effective security safeguards to be in place as any compromise or downtime of SCADA systems can have severe economic, safety and security ramifications. One way to ensure vital asset protection is to adopt a viewpoint similar to an attacker to determine weaknesses and loopholes in defences. Such mind sets help to identify and fix potential breaches before their exploitation. This paper surveys tools and techniques to uncover SCADA system vulnerabilities. A comprehensive review of the selected approaches is provided along with their applicability