Fastpass: A Centralized “Zero-Queue” Datacenter Network

An ideal datacenter network should provide several properties, including low median and tail latency, high utilization (throughput), fair allocation of network resources between users or applications, deadline-aware scheduling, and congestion (loss) avoidance. Current datacenter networks inherit the principles that went into the design of the Internet, where packet transmission and path selection decisions are distributed among the endpoints and routers. Instead, we propose that each sender should delegate control—to a centralized arbiter—of when each packet should be transmitted and what path it should follow. This paper describes Fastpass, a datacenter network architecture built using this principle. Fastpass incorporates two fast algorithms: the first determines the time at which each packet should be transmitted, while the second determines the path to use for that packet. In addition, Fastpass uses an efficient protocol between the endpoints and the arbiter and an arbiter replication strategy for fault-tolerant failover. We deployed and evaluated Fastpass in a portion of Facebook’s datacenter network. Our results show that Fastpass achieves high throughput comparable to current networks at a 240 reduction is queue lengths (4.35 Mbytes reducing to 18 Kbytes), achieves much fairer and consistent flow throughputs than the baseline TCP (5200 reduction in the standard deviation of per-flow throughput with five concurrent connections), scalability from 1 to 8 cores in the arbiter implementation with the ability to schedule 2.21 Terabits/s of traffic in software on eight cores, and a 2.5 reduction in the number of TCP retransmissions in a latency-sensitive service at Facebook.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (grant IIS-1065219)Irwin Mark Jacobs and Joan Klein Jacobs Presidential FellowshipHertz Foundation (Fellowship

Networking Mechanisms for Delay-Sensitive Applications

The diversity of applications served by the explosively growing Internet is increasing. In particular, applications that are sensitive to end-to-end packet delays become more common and include telephony, video conferencing, and networked games. While the single best-effort service of the current Internet favors throughput-greedy traffic by equipping congested links with large buffers, long queuing at the congested links hurts the delay-sensitive applications. Furthermore, while numerous alternative architectures have been proposed to offer diverse network services, the innovative alternatives failed to gain widespread end-to-end deployment. This dissertation explores different networking mechanisms for supporting low queueing delay required by delay-sensitive applications. In particular, it considers two different approaches. The first one assumes employing congestion control protocols for the traffic generated by the considered class of applications. The second approach relies on the router operation only and does not require support from end hosts

Systems-compatible Incentives

Originally, the Internet was a technological playground, a collaborative endeavor among researchers who shared the common goal of achieving communication. Self-interest used not to be a concern, but the motivations of the Internet's participants have broadened. Today, the Internet consists of millions of commercial entities and nearly 2 billion users, who often have conflicting goals. For example, while Facebook gives users the illusion of access control, users do not have the ability to control how the personal data they upload is shared or sold by Facebook. Even in BitTorrent, where all users seemingly have the same motivation of downloading a file as quickly as possible, users can subvert the protocol to download more quickly without giving their fair share. These examples demonstrate that protocols that are merely technologically proficient are not enough. Successful networked systems must account for potentially competing interests. In this dissertation, I demonstrate how to build systems that give users incentives to follow the systems' protocols. To achieve incentive-compatible systems, I apply mechanisms from game theory and auction theory to protocol design. This approach has been considered in prior literature, but unfortunately has resulted in few real, deployed systems with incentives to cooperate. I identify the primary challenge in applying mechanism design and game theory to large-scale systems: the goals and assumptions of economic mechanisms often do not match those of networked systems. For example, while auction theory may assume a centralized clearing house, there is no analog in a decentralized system seeking to avoid single points of failure or centralized policies. Similarly, game theory often assumes that each player is able to observe everyone else's actions, or at the very least know how many other players there are, but maintaining perfect system-wide information is impossible in most systems. In other words, not all incentive mechanisms are systems-compatible. The main contribution of this dissertation is the design, implementation, and evaluation of various systems-compatible incentive mechanisms and their application to a wide range of deployable systems. These systems include BitTorrent, which is used to distribute a large file to a large number of downloaders, PeerWise, which leverages user cooperation to achieve lower latencies in Internet routing, and Hoodnets, a new system I present that allows users to share their cellular data access to obtain greater bandwidth on their mobile devices. Each of these systems represents a different point in the design space of systems-compatible incentives. Taken together, along with their implementations and evaluations, these systems demonstrate that systems-compatibility is crucial in achieving practical incentives in real systems. I present design principles outlining how to achieve systems-compatible incentives, which may serve an even broader range of systems than considered herein. I conclude this dissertation with what I consider to be the most important open problems in aligning the competing interests of the Internet's participants

Minimal deployable endpoint-driven network forwarding: principle, designs and applications

Networked systems now have significant impact on human lives: the Internet, connecting the world globally, is the foundation of our information age, the data centers, running hundreds of thousands of servers, drive the era of cloud computing, and even the Tor project, a networked system providing online anonymity, now serves millions of daily users. Guided by the end-to-end principle, many computer networks have been designed with a simple and flexible core offering general data transfer service, whereas the bulk of the application-level functionalities have been implemented on endpoints that are attached to the edge of the network. Although the end-to-end design principle gives these networked systems tremendous success, a number of new requirements have emerged for computer networks and their running applications, including untrustworthy of endpoints, privacy requirement of endpoints, more demanding applications, the rise of third-party Intermediaries and the asymmetric capability of endpoints and so on. These emerging requirements have created various challenges in different networked systems. To address these challenges, there are no obvious solutions without adding in-network functions to the network core. However, no design principle has ever been proposed for guiding the implementation of in-network functions. In this thesis, We propose the first such principle and apply this principle to propose four designs in three different networked systems to address four separate challenges. We demonstrate through detailed implementation and extensive evaluations that the proposed principle can live in harmony with the end-to-end principle, and a combination of the two principle offers more complete, effective and accurate guides for innovating the modern computer networks and their applications.Ope

Implementing Socially Just Climate Adaptation: A Case Study of Boston, Massachusetts

The urgency to adapt to climate change presents important questions about who stands to benefit from these efforts. The previous two decades of scholarship devoted to social justice in climate adaptation has established an important theoretical basis to evaluate these questions. Less understood however, is how and under what conditions climate adaptation policy implementation promotes or inhibits justice for socially vulnerable populations. This work draws upon the disciplines of urban climate change governance, climate adaptation, urban planning, social justice theory, and policy implementation, to evaluate ongoing climate adaptation policy initiatives in Boston, Massachusetts. Through a case study approach, this dissertation examines the role of social justice in the implementation of Boston’s climate adaptation policy from 2016-2020. The findings of this research project are organized into three distinct, but related, parts. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical underpinnings of this project and presents the analytic framework used to carry out this research. Chapter 3 provides a detailed case study of climate adaptation policy implementation in Boston, Massachusetts, referred to as Climate Ready Boston. Findings from this case study demonstrate the importance of strategic interactions among stakeholders and recognition of systemic sources of injustice to promote socially just climate adaptation policy. A lack of metrics to evaluate incremental adaptation policy implementation outcomes is a significant finding from this case study and represents a significant barrier to achieving transformation. To address these findings, Chapter 4 presents a typology that provides a clear metric for evaluating the dimensions of justice in the implementation of climate adaptation policy with an explicit focus on incremental evaluations of justice. Additional case study examples and policy recommendations are provided in support of these research findings. This dissertation suggests that while goals of equity are an important and necessary aspect of climate adaptation policy implementation, conditions for transformation (i.e. just adaptation) remain elusive. Examples from Boston, Massachusetts, demonstrate however, that adaptation efforts operating within different policy domains may support policy learning and incrementally shift the needle closer to transformational adaptation

Voyager spacecraft phase B, task D. Volume 6 - Design alternatives and growth potential Final report

Design alternatives and growth potential of recommended and upgraded Voyager spacecraft configuration

BitTorrent is an Auction: Analyzing and Improving BitTorrent’s Incentives, in:

ABSTRACT Incentives play a crucial role in BitTorrent, motivating users to upload to others to achieve fast download times for all peers. Though long believed to be robust to strategic manipulation, recent work has empirically shown that BitTorrent does not provide its users incentive to follow the protocol. We propose an auction-based model to study and improve upon BitTorrent's incentives. The insight behind our model is that BitTorrent uses, not tit-for-tat as widely believed, but an auction to decide which peers to serve. Our model not only captures known, performance-improving strategies, it shapes our thinking toward new, effective strategies. For example, our analysis demonstrates, counter-intuitively, that BitTorrent peers have incentive to intelligently under-report what pieces of the file they have to their neighbors. We implement and evaluate a modification to BitTorrent in which peers reward one another with proportional shares of bandwidth. Within our game-theoretic model, we prove that a proportional-share client is strategy-proof. With experiments on PlanetLab, a local cluster, and live downloads, we show that a proportional-share unchoker yields faster downloads against BitTorrent and BitTyrant clients, and that underreporting pieces yields prolonged neighbor interest

Boundary Objects in Design: An Ecological View of Design Artifacts

Traditionally, Systems Analysis and Design (SAD) research has focused on ways of working and ways of modeling. Design ecology – the task, organizational and political context surrounding design – is less well understood. In particular, relationships between design routines and products within ecologies have not received sufficient attention. In this paper, we theorize about design product and ecology relationships and deliberate on how design products – viewed as boundary objects – bridge functional knowledge and stakeholder power gaps across different social worlds. We identify four essential features of design boundary objects: capability to promote shared representation, capability to transform design knowledge, capability to mobilize for action, and capability to legitimize design knowledge. We show how these features help align, integrate, and transform heterogeneous technical and domain knowledge across social worlds as well as mobilize, coordinate, and align stakeholder power. We illustrate through an ethnography of a large aerospace laboratory how two design artifacts – early proto-architectures and project plans – shared these four features to coalesce design processes and propel successful movement of designs across social worlds. These artifacts resolved uncertainty associated with functional requirements and garnered political momentum to choose among design solutions. Altogether, the study highlights the importance of design boundary objects in multi-stakeholder designs and stresses the need to formulate sociology-based design theories on how knowledge is produced and consumed in complex SAD tasks