Quantum-based security in optical fibre networks

Electronic communication is used everyday for a number of different applications. Some of the information transferred during these communications can be private requiring encryption and authentication protocols to keep this information secure. Although there are protocols today which provide some security, they are not necessarily unconditionally secure. Quantum based protocols on the other hand, can provide unconditionally secure protocols for encryption and authentication. Prior to this Thesis, only one experimental realisation of quantum digital signatures had been demonstrated. This used a lossy photonic device along with a quantum memory allowing two parties to test whether they were sent the same signature by a single sender, and also store the quantum states for measurement later. This restricted the demonstration to distances of only a few metres, and was tested with a primitive approximation of a quantum memory rather than an actual one. This Thesis presents an experimental realisation of a quantum digital signature protocol which removes the reliance on quantum memory at the receivers, making a major step towards practicality. By removing the quantum memory, it was also possible to perform the swap and comparison mechanism in a more efficient manner resulting in an experimental realisation of quantum digital signatures over 2 kilometres of optical fibre. Quantum communication protocols can be unconditionally secure, however the transmission distance is limited by loss in quantum channels. To overcome this loss in conventional channels an optical amplifier is used, however the added noise from these would swamp the quantum signal if directly used in quantum communications. This Thesis looked into probabilistic quantum amplification, with an experimental realisation of the state comparison amplifier, based on linear optical components and single-photon detectors. The state comparison amplifier operated by using the wellestablished techniques of optical coherent state comparison and weak subtraction to post-select the output and provide non-deterministic amplification with increased fidelity at a high repetition rate. The success rates of this amplifier were found to be orders of magnitude greater than other state of the art quantum amplifiers, due to its lack of requirement for complex quantum resources, such as single or entangled photon sources, and photon number resolving detectors

A static analysis for quantifying information flow in a simple imperative language

We propose an approach to quantify interference in a simple imperative language that includes a looping construct. In this paper we focus on a particular case of this definition of interference: leakage of information from private variables to public ones via a Trojan Horse attack. We quantify leakage in terms of Shannon's information theory and we motivate our definition by proving a result relating this definition of leakage and the classical notion of programming language interference. The major contribution of the paper is a quantitative static analysis based on this definition for such a language. The analysis uses some non-trivial information theory results like Fano's inequality and L1 inequalities to provide reasonable bounds for conditional statements. While-loops are handled by integrating a qualitative flow-sensitive dependency analysis into the quantitative analysis

Research on performance enhancement for electromagnetic analysis and power analysis in cryptographic LSI

制度:新 ; 報告番号:甲3785号 ; 学位の種類:博士(工学) ; 授与年月日:2012/11/19 ; 早大学位記番号:新6161Waseda Universit

FPGA IMPLEMENTATION FOR ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY OVER BINARY EXTENSION FIELD

Elliptic curve cryptography plays a crucial role in network and communication security. However, implementation of elliptic curve cryptography, especially the implementation of scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve, faces multiple challenges. One of the main challenges is side channel attacks (SCAs). SCAs pose a real threat to the conventional implementations of scalar multiplication such as binary methods (also called doubling-and-add methods). Several scalar multiplication algorithms with countermeasures against side channel attacks have been proposed. Among them, Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL) has been shown an effective countermeasure against simple power analysis. However, MPL is still vulnerable to certain more sophisticated side channel attacks. A recently proposed modified MPL utilizes a combination of sequence masking (SM), exponent splitting (ES) and point randomization (PR). And it has shown to be one of the best countermeasure algorithms that are immune to many sophisticated side channel attacks [11]. In this thesis, an efficient hardware architecture for this algorithm is proposed and its FPGA implementation is also presented. To our best knowledge, this is the first time that this modified MPL with SM, ES, and PR has been implemented in hardware

Trojan-horse attacks threaten the security of practical quantum cryptography

A quantum key distribution system may be probed by an eavesdropper Eve by sending in bright light from the quantum channel and analyzing the back-reflections. We propose and experimentally demonstrate a setup for mounting such a Trojan-horse attack. We show it in operation against the quantum cryptosystem Clavis2 from ID~Quantique, as a proof-of-principle. With just a few back-reflected photons, Eve discerns Bob's secret basis choice, and thus the raw key bit in the Scarani-Ac\'in-Ribordy-Gisin 2004 protocol, with higher than 90% probability. This would clearly breach the security of the cryptosystem. Unfortunately in Clavis2 Eve's bright pulses have a side effect of causing high level of afterpulsing in Bob's single-photon detectors, resulting in a high quantum bit error rate that effectively protects this system from our attack. However, in a Clavis2-like system equipped with detectors with less-noisy but realistic characteristics, an attack strategy with positive leakage of the key would exist. We confirm this by a numerical simulation. Both the eavesdropping setup and strategy can be generalized to attack most of the current QKD systems, especially if they lack proper safeguards. We also propose countermeasures to prevent such attacks.Comment: 22 pages including appendix and references, 6+2 figure

Attacking AES-Masking Encryption Device with Correlation Power Analysis

Modern communication system use cryptography algorithm to ensure data still confidentiality, integrity, and authentic. There is a new vulnerability in a cryptographic algorithm when implemented on a hardware device. This vulnerability is considered capable of uncovering a secret key used in a cryptographic algorithm. This technique is known as a power analysis attack. Previous and other research introduces countermeasure to countering this new vulnerability. Some researchers suggest using logic level with encoding the AES. The countermeasure using logic is meager cost and efficient. The contribution of this paper is to analyze CPA on encryption device that has been given logic level countermeasure. Our finding of this paper is the use of encoding with one-hot masking technique does not provide the maximum countermeasure effect against CPA-based attacks. In this research, CPA attack can be successfully revealing the AES secret-ke

Les Houches 2015: Physics at TeV Colliders Standard Model Working Group Report

This Report summarizes the proceedings of the 2015 Les Houches workshop on Physics at TeV Colliders. Session 1 dealt with (I) new developments relevant for high precision Standard Model calculations, (II) the new PDF4LHC parton distributions, (III) issues in the theoretical description of the production of Standard Model Higgs bosons and how to relate experimental measurements, (IV) a host of phenomenological studies essential for comparing LHC data from Run I with theoretical predictions and projections for future measurements in Run II, and (V) new developments in Monte Carlo event generators.Comment: Proceedings of the Standard Model Working Group of the 2015 Les Houches Workshop, Physics at TeV Colliders, Les Houches 1-19 June 2015. 227 page