On modal expansions of t-norm based logics with rational constants

[eng] According to Zadeh, the term “fuzzy logic” has two different meanings: wide and narrow. In a narrow sense it is a logical system which aims a formalization of approximate reasoning, and so it can be considered an extension of many-valued logic. However, Zadeh also says that the agenda of fuzzy logic is quite different from that of traditional many-valued logic, as it addresses concepts like linguistic variable, fuzzy if-then rule, linguistic quantifiers etc. Hájek, in the preface of his foundational book Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic, agrees with Zadeh’s distinction, but stressing that formal calculi of many-valued logics are the kernel of the so-called Basic Fuzzy logic (BL), having continuous triangular norms (t-norm) and their residua as semantics for the conjunction and implication respectively, and of its most prominent extensions, namely Lukasiewicz, Gödel and Product fuzzy logics. Taking advantage of the fact that a t-norm has residuum if, and only if, it is left-continuous, the logic of the left-continuous t-norms, called MTL, was soon after introduced. On the other hand, classical modal logic is an active field of mathematical logic, originally introduced at the beginning of the XXth century for philosophical purposes, that more recently has shown to be very successful in many other areas, specially in computer science. That are the most well-known semantics for classical modal logics. Modal expansions of non-classical logics, in particular of many-valued logics, have also been studied in the literature. In this thesis we focus on the study of some modal logics over MTL, using natural generalizations of the classical Kripke relational structures where propositions at possible words can be many-valued, but keeping classical accessibility relations. In more detail, the main goal of this thesis has been to study modal expansions of the logic of a left-continuous t-norm, defined over the language of MTL expanded with rational truth-constants and the Monteiro-Baaz Delta-operator, whose intended (standard) semantics is given by Kripke models with crisp accessibility relations and taking the unit real interval [0, 1] as set of truth-values. To get complete axiomatizations, already known techniques based on the canonical model construction are uses, but this requires to ensure that the underlying (propositional) fuzzy logic is strongly standard complete. This constraint leads us to consider axiomatic systems with infinitary inference rules, already at the propositional level. A second goal of the thesis has been to also develop and automated reasoning software tool to solve satisfiability and logical consequence problems for some of the fuzzy logic modal logics considered. This dissertation is structured in four parts. After a gentle introduction, Part I contains the needed preliminaries for the thesis be as self-contained as possible. Most of the theoretical results are developed in Parts II and III. Part II focuses on solving some problems concerning the strong standard completeness of underlying non-modal expansions. We first present and axiomatic system for the non-nodal propositional logic of a left-continuous t-norm who makes use of a unique infinitary inference rule, the “density rule”, that solves several problems pointed out in the literature. We further expand this axiomatic system in order to also characterize arbitrary operations over [0, 1] satisfying certain regularity conditions. However, since this axiomatic system turn out to be not well-behaved for the modal expansion, we search for alternative axiomatizations with some particular kind of inference rules (that will be called conjunctive). Unfortunately, this kind of axiomatization does not necessarily exist for all left-continuous t-norms (in particular, it does not exist for the Gödel logic case), but we identify a wide class of t-norms for which it works. This “well-behaved” t-norms include all ordinal sums of Lukasiewiczand Product t-norms. Part III focuses on the modal expansion of the logics presented before. We propose axiomatic systems (which are, as expected, modal expansions of the ones given in the previous part) respectively strongly complete with respect to local and global Kripke semantics defined over frames with crisp accessibility relations and worlds evaluated over a “well-behaved” left-continuous t-norm. We also study some properties and extensions of these logics and also show how to use it for axiomatizing the possibilistic logic over the very same t-norm. Later on, we characterize the algebraic companion of these modal logics, provide some algebraic completeness results and study the relation between their Kripke and algebraic semantics. Finally, Part IV of the thesis is devoted to a software application, mNiB-LoS, who uses Satisfability Modulo Theories in order to build an automated reasoning system to reason over modal logics evaluated over BL algebras. The acronym of this applications stands for a modal Nice BL-logics Solver. The use of BL logics along this part is motivated by the fact that continuous t-norms can be represented as ordinal sums of three particular t-norms: Gödel, Lukasiewicz and Product ones. It is then possible to show that these t-norms have alternative characterizations that, although equivalent from the point of view of the logic, have strong differences for what concerns the design, implementation and efficiency of the application. For practical reasons, the modal structures included in the solver are limited to the finite ones (with no bound on the cardinality)

Abstract Consequence and Logics - Essays in Honor of Edelcio G. de Souza

Edelcio G. de Souza is a Brazilian logician and philosopher who has researches in the domains of abstract logic, non-classical systems, philosophy of science and the foundations of mathematics. This book is in his honor with the purpose of celebrating his 60th birthday. It contains some articles connected with the above topics and other subjects in logical investigations

Logics of formal inconsistency

Orientadores: Walter Alexandre Carnielli, Carlos M. C. L. CaleiroTexto em ingles e portuguesTese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias HumanasTese (doutorado) - Universidade Tecnica de Lisboa, Instituto Superior TecnicoResumo: Segundo a pressuposição de consistência clássica, as contradições têm um cará[c]ter explosivo; uma vez que estejam presentes em uma teoria, tudo vale, e nenhum raciocínio sensato pode então ter lugar. Uma lógica é paraconsistente se ela rejeita uma tal pressuposição, e aceita ao invés que algumas teorias inconsistentes conquanto não-triviais façam perfeito sentido. A? Lógicas da Inconsistência Formal, LIFs, formam uma classe de lógicas paraconsistentes particularmente expressivas nas quais a noção meta-teónca de consistência pode ser internalizada ao nível da linguagem obje[c]to. Como consequência, as LIFs são capazes de recapturar o raciocínio consistente pelo acréscimo de assunções de consistência apropriadas. Assim, por exemplo, enquanto regras clássicas tais como o silogismo disjuntivo (de A e {não-,4)-ou-13, infira B) estão fadadas a falhar numa lógica paraconsistente (pois A e (nao-A) poderiam ambas ser verdadeiras para algum A, independentemente de B), elas podem ser recuperadas por uma LIF se o conjunto das premissas for ampliado pela presunção de que estamos raciocinando em um ambiente consistente (neste caso, pelo acréscimo de (consistente-.A) como uma hipótese adicional da regra). A presente monografia introduz as LIFs e apresenta diversas ilustrações destas lógicas e de suas propriedades, mostrando que tais lógicas constituem com efeito a maior parte dos sistemas paraconsistentes da literatura. Diversas formas de se efe[c]tuar a recaptura do raciocínio consistente dentro de tais sistemas inconsistentes são também ilustradas Em cada caso, interpretações em termos de semânticas polivalentes, de traduções possíveis ou modais são fornecidas, e os problemas relacionados à provisão de contrapartidas algébricas para tais lógicas são examinados. Uma abordagem formal abstra[cjta é proposta para todas as definições relacionadas e uma extensa investigação é feita sobre os princípios lógicos e as propriedades positivas e negativas da negação.Abstract: According to the classical consistency presupposition, contradictions have an explosive character: Whenever they are present in a theory, anything goes, and no sensible reasoning can thus take place. A logic is paraconsistent if it disallows such presupposition, and allows instead for some inconsistent yet non-trivial theories to make perfect sense. The Logics of Formal Inconsistency, LFIs, form a particularly expressive class of paraconsistent logics in which the metatheoretical notion of consistency can be internalized at the object-language level. As a consequence, the LFIs are able to recapture consistent reasoning by the addition of appropriate consistency assumptions. So, for instance, while classical rules such as disjunctive syllogism (from A and (not-A)-or-B, infer B) are bound to fail in a paraconsistent logic (because A and (not-.4) could both be true for some A, independently of B), they can be recovered by an LFI if the set of premises is enlarged by the presumption that we are reasoning in a consistent environment (in this case, by the addition of (consistent-/!) as an extra hypothesis of the rule). The present monograph introduces the LFIs and provides several illustrations of them and of their properties, showing that such logics constitute in fact the majority of interesting paraconsistent systems from the literature. Several ways of performing the recapture of consistent reasoning inside such inconsistent systems are also illustrated. In each case, interpretations in terms of many-valued, possible-translations, or modal semantics are provided, and the problems related to providing algebraic counterparts to such logics are surveyed. A formal abstract approach is proposed to all related definitions and an extended investigation is carried out into the logical principles and the positive and negative properties of negation.DoutoradoFilosofiaDoutor em Filosofia e Matemátic

Deductive systems and finite axiomatization properties

The notions of a deductive system, equational logic and Gentzen system can be generalized into the notion of a K-deductive system. A universal Horn logic is also a K-deductive system. In Part I the relationship between the existence of equivalence K-terms in a K-deductive system and some semantical properties of these systems is studied. In particular, a K-deductive system S has a finite system of equivalence formulas with parameters if the Leibniz operator on the filter lattice of every S-matrix is monotone. An equivalent semantics theorem, characterizing K-deductive systems that are equivalent to some Birkhoff-like systems, is proved and used to characterize algebraizable K-deductive systems. The connection between the implication terms and semantical properties of one-deductive systems is investigated.;In Part II a finite basis theorem for finitely generated filter-distributive proto-quasivarieties is proved. It says that if the language has only finitely many symbols, and if a K-deductive, filter-distributive, protoalgebraic system S is determined by a finite set of finite matrices, then S has a basis consisting of finitely many axioms and rules of inference. This theorem extends Pigozzi\u27s finite basis theorem for relatively congruence-distributive quasivarieties and therefore also Baker\u27s finite basis theorem for congruence-distributive varieties. If all tautologies of a finite matrix can be derived using only finitely many axioms and rules, then the matrix is called finitely axiomatizable. In particular, a finite algebra A is called finitely axiomatizable if there is a finite set of quasi-identities of A from which every identity of A can be derived. In Part III we consider the problem of finite axiomatizability of finite matrices and finite algebras. Three-element nonfinitely axiomatizable matrices are given. This solves the problem of finding a smallest and simplest possible non-finitely axiomatizable matrix that was posed by Rautenberg, independently by Wojtylak and restated by Dziobiak. Examples, that show that the underlying algebra of a finite nonfinitely axiomatizable matrix can be finitely axiomatizable, are given. The notion of the second-order finite axiomatization is proposed and two sufficient conditions for a finite algebra to be second-order finitely axiomatizable are presented

19th Brazilian Logic Conference: Book of Abstracts

This is the book of abstracts of the 19th Brazilian Logic Conferences. The Brazilian Logic Conferences (EBL) is one of the most traditional logic conferences in South America. Organized by the Brazilian Logic Society (SBL), its main goal is to promote the dissemination of research in logic in a broad sense. It has been occurring since 1979, congregating logicians of different fields — mostly philosophy, mathematics and computer science — and with different backgrounds — from undergraduate students to senior researchers. The meeting is an important moment for the Brazilian and South American logical community to join together and discuss recent developments of the field. The areas of logic covered in the conference spread over foundations and philosophy of science, analytic philosophy, philosophy and history of logic, mathematics, computer science, informatics, linguistics and artificial intelligence. Previous editions of the EBL have been a great success, attracting researchers from all over Latin America and elsewhere. The 19th edition of EBL takes place from May 6-10, 2019, in the beautiful city of João Pessoa, at the northeast coast of Brazil. It is conjointly organized by Federal University of Paraíba (UFPB), whose main campus is located in João Pessoa, Federal University of Campina Grande (UFCG), whose main campus is located in the nearby city of Campina Grande (the second-largest city in Paraíba state) and SBL. It is sponsored by UFPB, UFCG, the Brazilian Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq) and the State Ministry of Education, Science and Technology of Paraíba. It takes place at Hotel Luxxor Nord Tambaú, privileged located right in front Tambaú beach, one of João Pessoa’s most famous beaches

The Proscriptive Principle and Logics of Analytic Implication

The analogy between inference and mereological containment goes at least back to Aristotle, whose discussion in the Prior Analytics motivates the validity of the syllogism by way of talk of parts and wholes. On this picture, the application of syllogistic is merely the analysis of concepts, a term that presupposes—through the root ἀνά + λύω —a mereological background. In the 1930s, such considerations led William T. Parry to attempt to codify this notion of logical containment in his system of analytic implication AI. Parry’s original system AI was later expanded to the system PAI. The hallmark of Parry’s systems—and of what may be thought of as containment logics or Parry systems in general—is a strong relevance property called the ‘Proscriptive Principle’ (PP) described by Parry as the thesis that: No formula with analytic implication as main relation holds universally if it has a free variable occurring in the consequent but not the antecedent. This type of proscription is on its face justified, as the presence of a novel parameter in the consequent corresponds to the introduction of new subject matter. The plausibility of the thesis that the content of a statement is related to its subject matter thus appears also to support the validity of the formal principle. Primarily due to the perception that Parry’s formal systems were intended to accurately model Kant’s notion of an analytic judgment, Parry’s deductive systems—and the suitability of the Proscriptive Principle in general—were met with severe criticism. While Anderson and Belnap argued that Parry’s criterion failed to account for a number of prima facie analytic judgments, others—such as Sylvan and Brady—argued that the utility of the criterion was impeded by its reliance on a ‘syntactical’ device. But these arguments are restricted to Parry’s work qua exegesis of Kant and fail to take into account the breadth of applications in which the Proscriptive Principle emerges. It is the goal of the present work to explore themes related to deductive systems satisfying one form of the Proscriptive Principle or other, with a special emphasis placed on the rehabilitation of their study to some degree. The structure of the dissertation is as follows: In Chapter 2, we identify and develop the relationship between Parry-type deductive systems and the field of ‘logics of nonsense.’ Of particular importance is Dmitri Bochvar’s ‘internal’ nonsense logic Σ0, and we observe that two ⊢-Parry subsystems of Σ0 (Harry Deutsch’s Sfde and Frederick Johnson’s RC) can be considered to be the products of particular ‘strategies’ of eliminating problematic inferences from Bochvar’s system. The material of Chapter 3 considers Kit Fine’s program of state space semantics in the context of Parry logics. Recently, Fine—who had already provided the first intuitive semantics for Parry’s PAI—has offered a formal model of truthmaking (and falsemaking) that provides one of the first natural semantics for Richard B. Angell’s logic of analytic containment AC, itself a ⊢-Parry system. After discussing the relationship between state space semantics and nonsense, we observe that Fabrice Correia’s weaker framework—introduced as a semantics for a containment logic weaker than AC—tacitly endorses an implausible feature of allowing hypernonsensical statements. By modelling Correia’s containment logic within the stronger setting of Fine’s semantics, we are able to retain Correia’s intuitions about factual equivalence without such a commitment. As a further application, we observe that Fine’s setting can resolve some ambiguities in Greg Restall’s own truthmaker semantics. In Chapter 4, we consider interpretations of disjunction that accord with the characteristic failure of Addition in which the evaluation of a disjunction A ∨ B requires not only the truth of one disjunct, but also that both disjuncts satisfy some further property. In the setting of computation, such an analysis requires the existence of some procedure tasked with ensuring the satisfaction of this property by both disjuncts. This observation leads to a computational analysis of the relationship between Parry logics and logics of nonsense in which the semantic category of ‘nonsense’ is associated with catastrophic faults in computer programs. In this spirit, we examine semantics for several ⊢-Parry logics in terms of the successful execution of certain types of programs and the consequences of extending this analysis to dynamic logic and constructive logic. Chapter 5 considers these faults in the particular case in which Nuel Belnap’s ‘artificial reasoner’ is unable to retrieve the value assigned to a variable. This leads not only to a natural interpretation of Graham Priest’s semantics for the ⊢-Parry system S⋆fde but also a novel, many-valued semantics for Angell’s AC, completeness of which is proven by establishing a correspondence with Correia’s semantics for AC. These many-valued semantics have the additional benefit of allowing us to apply the material in Chapter 2 to the case of AC to define intensional extensions of AC in the spirit of Parry’s PAI. One particular instance of the type of disjunction central to Chapter 4 is Melvin Fitting’s cut-down disjunction. Chapter 6 examines cut-down operations in more detail and provides bilattice and trilattice semantics for the ⊢-Parry systems Sfde and AC in the style of Ofer Arieli and Arnon Avron’s logical bilattices. The elegant connection between these systems and logical multilattices supports the fundamentality and naturalness of these logics and, additionally, allows us to extend epistemic interpretation of bilattices in the tradition of artificial intelligence to these systems. Finally, the correspondence between the present many-valued semantics for AC and those of Correia is revisited in Chapter 7. The technique that plays an essential role in Chapter 4 is used to characterize a wide class of first-degree calculi intermediate between AC and classical logic in Correia’s setting. This correspondence allows the correction of an incorrect characterization of classical logic given by Correia and leads to the question of how to characterize hybrid systems extending Angell’s AC∗. Finally, we consider whether this correspondence aids in providing an interpretation to Correia’s first semantics for AC