Applications of Game Theory for Co-opetition at Marine Container Terminals

Applications of Game Theory for Co-opetition at Marine Container Terminal

Game theory and port economics: a survey of recent research.

The last decade has seen a significant upsurge of studies seeking to examine the impacts of port agents’ strategic decisions. The outcome has been a wide range of results and conclusions. The aim of this work is to provide a review of this recent research in the port industry that uses strategic interaction approaches from industrial organization and game theory. The paper concentrates on five topics: ownership, relationship between ports and their hinterlands, port authorities and port operators’ relations, capacity investment decisions, and port specialization. We present the objectives, methodologies and results of the papers reviewed, with special emphasis on how models are developed. The results are not always consistent between the works analyzed. On the one hand, this could be due to the complexity of the port industry and the high number of agents that intervene. Researchers need to simplify reality to build their models by imposing restrictive assumptions. On the other hand, results could be very sensitive to the techniques used or to the differences on the port environment of the countries of study. However, some conclusions can be extracted and they present a good starting point to develop more sophisticated models. Finally, we also propose avenues for future research

Modeling of Optimal Concession Contract between Port Authority and Terminal Operators using Channel Coordination Model

세계 해운 시장의 급격한 변화는 항만 산업에 큰 영향을 미친다. PA (항만공사)와 TOC (터미널 운영 회사)는 경쟁 우위를 확보하기 위하여 지금까지 항만 시설과 장비에 많은 투자를 해왔다. TOC는 경쟁사 및 해운 회사로부터의 요구 사항에 따라 수익성을 제고하기 위해 노력한다. 같은 상황에서 PA도 경쟁력을 찾고 있다. 시장의 불확실성과 기술적 변화는 PA와 TOC가 협력하여 더 나은 재정 상태를 요구하고 있다. PA와 TOC간에는계약을 통해 여러 방식으로 운영된다. 세계의 60-70%가 운영중인 임대 기능 모델에 따르면, PA는 항만의 토지 및 인프라를 소유∙관리하며, TOC는 터미널 운영을 담당한다. PA와 TOC는 계약을 통해 고정 요금제 내지 단가 요금제 등의 여부를 결정한다. 세계 항만 임대 시스템을 비교해 볼 때, 절대적인 고정된 계약 방식이 없다고 한다. 아시아의 대부분 지역에서는 고정 요금제를 이용하고, 유럽 지역에서는 고정 요금제와 단가 요금제가 혼합된 계약을 이용한다. 그동안 세계 항만 임대 시스템에 간한 연구는 많지 않았다. 특히 구체적 수치를 제공하지 않거나 비실용적 연구가 많았다. 한편, 이전 연구에서는TOC보다 PA 관점에서의 이익 극대화를 도모하는 데 중점을 두었다. 만약 PA가 처리량을 늘림으로써 이익을 극대화하고자 할 때, 고정 임대 계약이 더 유리한 선택이다. 이 연구는 공공기관과 민간 단체 상호간의 이익 극대화의 방식으로 연결하는 방법에 중점을 두고 있다. PA가 TOC에게 제안하는 4 가지 유형의 계약 방식은 비조정, 조정, Cournot 및 Collusion 모델로 비교하고, 동시에 각 계약 방식에 대해 모듈 수행과 수치 분석을 통해 모델을 비교한다. 연구 결과는 향후 항만 임대 계약을 수립하는 데 중요한 영향을 미칠 것이다. 비교 수치 분석을 관찰하면 다음과 같은 주요 결과를 얻을 수 있다. 결과에 따르면, 고정 계약과 단가 계약을 합친 조건이 각각의 고정 및 단가 계약제 보다 더 높다는 것을 알 수 있다. PA가 TOC의 이익과 위험을 다루는 만큼 TOC가 처리량을 증가시킬 수 있으며, 이것은 PA와 TOC 간의 총이익을 극대화 할 수 있다. 따라서PA가 조정 없는 계약을 제공하는 것보다 조정된 계약을 제공 할 때 더 많은 이익을 낼 수 있다. 그리고 PA와 TOC의 통합 이익은 각각의 이익보다 더 높다. PA와TOC의 통합 이익을 통해서 PA는 TOC에게 적절한 계약 방식을 제공하고 상호간의 이익 극대화를 도모할 수 있다. PA가 이익을 늘리려고 시도 할 때마다 수익과 수요 위험을 공유함으로써 TOC와의 관계를 유지해야한다. PA는TOC와의 협조로 어떤 계약방식을 선택하더라도 이익을 창출할 수 있다.|Rapid changes in the global maritime market have a major impact on the port industry. PA (Port Authority) and TOC (Terminal Operating Company) have invested heavily in port facilities and equipment so far to secure competitive advantage. TOC strives to improve profitability in accordance with requirements from competitors and shipping companies. In the same situation, PA is also looking for its own profitability. Market uncertainty and technological changes require PA and TOC to achieve better financial conditions in cooperation. The ports are operated in different contracts. According to the landlord function model which is operated by 60-70% of the world, the PA owns and manages the land and infrastructure of the port, and the TOC is responsible for terminal operations. The PA and TOC will decide whether to use a fixed fee or a unit fee through the contract. There is no absolute contract method in the port leasing system. Most regions in Asia prefer to use the fixed fee, while European countries prefer to use a mix of fixed fee and unit fee. There have been few studies on the port leasing system. In particular, most of them did not provide specific calculations or were impractical. On the other hand, previous studies have focused on maximizing profits from the perspective of PA rather than TOC. This research focuses on how to connect to the method of maximizing profit between public and private entities. The four types of contracts proposed by the PA to the TOC are compared with the uncoordination, coordination, Cournot and Collusion models, and at the same time, model comparisons and numerical analysis are performed for each contract method. The results of the study will have a significant impact on establishing future port lease contracts. Observing the comparative numerical analysis, the following main results are obtained. According to the results, it can be seen that the two-part tariff is higher than the each of fixed and unit contracts. As the PA shares with the profits and risks in cooperation with the TOC, the TOC can increase throughput, which can maximize the total benefit between PA and TOC. Thus, the PA can make more profits when it comes to providing a contract that is coordination contract provide more than uncoordination contract. And the joint profit of PA and TOC is higher than the respective total profits. Through the joint profit of PA and TOC, the PA can provide the TOC with the appropriate contractual condition and maximize their joint profits. The PA, in cooperation with the TOC, is able to generate profits no matter what contract type it chooses.Table of Contents LIST OF TABLES III LIST OF FIGURES III ABSTRACT IV 초록 VI CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1. BACKGROUND 1 2. AIM AND OBJECTIVES 6 3. SIGNIFICANCE 9 4. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 10 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 11 1. PORT ECONOMICS 11 1. PORT GOVERNANCE 11 2. CONTRACTS: LEASEHOLD AND CONCESSION 16 3. PRICING MECHANISM 18 2. CONCESSION CONTRACT SCHEMES 21 1. FIXED-FEE CONTRACT 21 2. UNIT-FEE CONTRACT 22 3. TWO-PART TARIFF CONTRACT 22 4. FOREIGN AND KOREAN PORT CONTRACT SCHEMES 22 3. RISK SHARING CHARACTERISTICS 26 1. RISKS TYPES IN CONCESSION CONTRACTS 27 2. RISK ALLOCATION BETWEEN PA AND TOC 28 CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 30 1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 30 1. BERTRAND MODEL 31 2. COURNOT MODEL 32 3. STACKELBERG MODEL 33 4. COLLUSION MODEL 34 2. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 38 1. TERMINAL OPERATORS’ OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS UNDER THREE SCHEMES 41 2. PORT AUTHORITY’S OPTIMAL BEHAVIORS UNDER FOUR SCHEMES 45 3. COURNOT COORDINATION 55 4. COLLUSION COORDINATION 59 5. COMPARING THE ASSUMPTION MODELS 64 3. COORDINATION THROUGH SHARING THE RISK AND REVENUE 72 1. ASSUMPTION 72 2. SHARING THE JOINT PROFIT 73 3. SHARING THE MARKET UNCERTAINTY 73 4. SHARING THE MARKET RISK 74 CHAPTER 4. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 75 CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 81 1. SUMMARY 81 2. IMPLICATIONS 83 3. LIMITATION 84 4. FURTHER STUDIES 85 REFERENCE 86Docto

Optimizing multiple truck trips in a cooperative environment through MILP and Game Theory

Today, the challenge of economy regarding freight transport is to generate flows of goods extremely fast, handling information in short times, optimizing decisions, and reducing the percentage of vehicles that circulate empty over the total amount of transportation means, with benefits to roads congestion and the environment, besides economy. Logistic operators need to pose attention on suitable planning methods in order to reduce their costs, fuel consumption and emissions, as well as to gain economy of scale. To ensure the maximum efficacy, planning should be also based on cooperation between the involved subjects. Collaboration in logistics is an effective approach for business to obtain a competitive edge. In a successful collaboration, parties involved from suppliers, customers, and even competitors perform a coordinated effort to realize the potential benefit of collaboration, including reduced costs, decreased lead times, and improved asset utilization and service level. In addition to these benefit, having a broader supply chain perspective enables firms to make better-informed decisions on strategic issues. The first aim of the present Thesis is to propose a planning approach based on mathematical programming techniques to improve the efficiency of road services of a single carrier combining multiple trips in a port environment (specifically, import, export and inland trips). In this way, in the same route, more than two transportation services can be realized with the same vehicle thus significantly reducing the number of total empty movements. Time windows constraints related to companies and terminal opening hours as well as to ship departures are considered in the problem formulation. Moreover, driving hours restrictions and trips deadlines are taken into account, together with goods compatibility for matching different trips. The second goal of the Thesis is to define innovative planning methods and optimization schemes of logistic networks in which several carriers are present and the decisional actors operate in a cooperative scenario in which they share a portion of their demand. The proposed approaches are characterized by the adoption both of Game Theory methods and of new original methods of profits distribution

Game Theory Relaunched

The game is on. Do you know how to play? Game theory sets out to explore what can be said about making decisions which go beyond accepting the rules of a game. Since 1942, a well elaborated mathematical apparatus has been developed to do so; but there is more. During the last three decades game theoretic reasoning has popped up in many other fields as well - from engineering to biology and psychology. New simulation tools and network analysis have made game theory omnipresent these days. This book collects recent research papers in game theory, which come from diverse scientific communities all across the world; they combine many different fields like economics, politics, history, engineering, mathematics, physics, and psychology. All of them have as a common denominator some method of game theory. Enjoy