Elegant security: Concept, evidence and implications

Some security devices can be ugly, inconvenient or an infringement on civil liberties. This means that security is a quality of life issue as well as one of crime prevention. Here we propose that, in addition to preventing crime and being cost effective, security should preferably be ethical and unobtrusive, aesthetically neutral or pleasing, and the easy-to-use or default option. We describe security with such characteristics as ‘elegant’. We use two case studies to explore how, as many types of crime have declined in recent decades, there was an increase in elegant and a decrease in inelegant security. We suggest that the lifecycle of some security technologies sees them evolve from inelegant to elegant, that continual improvement is required to keep ahead of offender adaptations, and that inelegant security can fall into disuse even if it prevents crime. It is hoped that this conceptual contribution might inform discussions about the appropriate form and role of security

Elegant security: Concept, evidence and implications

Some security devices can be ugly, inconvenient or an infringement on civil liberties. This means that security is a quality of life issue as well as one of crime prevention. Here we propose that, in addition to preventing crime and being cost effective, security should preferably be ethical and unobtrusive, aesthetically neutral or pleasing, and the easy-to-use or default option. We describe security with such characteristics as ‘elegant’. We use two case studies to explore how, as many types of crime have declined in recent decades, there was an increase in elegant and a decrease in inelegant security. We suggest that the lifecycle of some security technologies sees them evolve from inelegant to elegant, that continual improvement is required to keep ahead of offender adaptations, and that inelegant security can fall into disuse even if it prevents crime. It is hoped that this conceptual contribution might inform discussions about the appropriate form and role of security

Crime, transport and technology

This chapter aims to examine how changes in transport technology have influenced and altered the landscape for crime, criminal opportunity and the criminal justice system. The original intention at the outset of this chapter was to examine developments in transport and technology separately, and then to discuss a combined definition of what transport technology is. However, in doing this it quickly became apparent that this was a rather futile approach. The traditional definitions of technology were centred on the study of arts and crafts, but soon evolved to include an emphasis on purposeful invention and the strategic deployment of such invention (Rip and Kemp, 1998). In its narrowest sense technology can be thought of as a set of tools. However, more modern definitions of technology encompass a notion of something that works, thus often incorporates systems rather than just tools, and, therefore, in its widest sense, technology can also include skills and infrastructure. When considering advances in transport, from the development of the wheel, of boats and horse drawn carriages, from the first to more modern motorised vehicles, or considering other forms of travel such as bicycles and motorcycles, submarines, hovercraft, aeroplanes, and even spacecraft - it becomes apparent that disentangling developments in transport from developments in technology is rather difficult. When adopting the systems view of technology, this is particularly evident. Indeed, within the transport literature frequent reference is given to the notion of a ‘transport system’. Examples include public transport systems, the growth of Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS), automated and smart transport systems, travel demand and forecasting systems, and fuel efficiency systems. Therefore, by virtue of the way modern transport has evolved, there is a defensible argument for considering transport systems and transport technologies as interchangeable terms

Privatizing Crime Control

Crime problems largely result from opportunities, temptations, and provocations that have been provided to offenders unintentionally by those pursuing other private interests. There is a widespread notion that the state and its agencies can and ought to take full responsibility for crime control and that there is, therefore, nothing that nonstate actors can or need to do. In practice, there is little that the state can do directly to address the opportunities, temptations, and provocations for crime; but where crime control responsibilities have been accepted in the private sector, successful measures to reduce opportunities and temptations have been devised and adopted, preventing many crimes and reducing costs that would otherwise fall on the state as well as on victims. This article sets out the reasons why a shift in responsibility for crime prevention from the public to private sector can produce patterns of crime control that are both effective and socially desirable, albeit important roles remain for the public sector in stimulating and supporting such measures

Preventing phone theft and robbery: the need for government action and international coordination

The banning of stolen handsets from networks has been around for 20 years, but remains little used internationally. Where used, its effectiveness is hindered by implementation problems, reprogramming, easy fencing opportunities, and international trafficking. Kill-switches where the user remotely disables a handset and deletes data have potential but, if non-permanent, are likely to experience similar limitations. This study proposes a set of responses to be adopted by national governments with international coordination

Public Safety through Private Action: An economic assessment of BIDs, locks, and citizen cooperation

Given the central role of private individuals and firms in determining the effectiveness of the criminal justice system, and the quality and availability of criminal opportunities, private actions arguably deserve a central role in the analysis of crime and crime prevention policy. But the leading scholarly commentaries on the crime drop during the 1990s have largely ignored the role of the private sector, as have policymakers. Among the potentially relevant trends: growing reporting rates (documented in this paper); the growing sophistication and use of alarms, monitoring equipment and locks; the considerable increase in the employment of private security guards; and the decline in the use of cash. Private actions of this sort have the potential to both reduce crime rates and reduce arrests and imprisonment. Well-designed regulations and programs can encourage effective private action. One creative method to harness private action to cost-effective crime control is the creation of business improvement districts (BIDs). Our quasi-experimental analysis of Los Angeles BIDs demonstrates that the social benefits of BID expenditures on security are a large multiple (about 20) of the private expenditures. Creation and operation of effective BIDs requires a legal infrastructure that helps neighborhoods solve the collective action problem.

Is ‘Nudge’ as Good as ‘We Think’ in Designing Against Crime? Contrasting Paternalistic and Fraternalistic Approaches to Design for Behaviour Change

This chapter describes a collaborative design-led approach to behaviour change developed in the context of design against crime. It compares this collaborative ‘we think’ way of working to that of ‘nudge’ design and argues that the participatory design-led approach delivers a ‘fraternal’ rather than ‘paternal’ strategy for behaviour change that is transformative in its means as well as its ends. We outline situational crime prevention (SCP) and other approaches to modifying behaviour to explain how socially responsive design against crime draws upon SCP as well as a participatory, asset-oriented design approach to deliver interventions that reduce opportunities for crime. We introduce case studies from the Design Against Crime Research Centre (Bikeoff and ATM Art Mats) to draw attention to two examples of social design that provide exceptions to the idea (summarized by Niedderer et al. 2014) that designers adopt anecdotal approaches rather than meticulous analysis. Finally, we suggest that ‘bottom-up’ participatory strategies associated with socially responsive design may deliver more democratic social transformations, than behaviour change ‘nudges’