2,764 research outputs found

    An integer programming approach to the Hospitals/Residents problem with ties

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    The classical Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) models the assignment of junior doctors to hospitals based on their preferences over one another. In an instance of this problem, a stable matching M is sought which ensures that no blocking pair can exist in which a resident r and hospital h can improve relative to M by becoming assigned to each other. Such a situation is undesirable as it could naturally lead to r and h forming a private arrangement outside of the matching. The original HR model assumes that preference lists are strictly ordered. However in practice, this may be an unreasonable assumption: an agent may find two or more agents equally acceptable, giving rise to ties in its preference list. We thus obtain the Hospitals/Residents problem with Ties (HRT). In such an instance, stable matchings may have different sizes and MAX HRT, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching, is NP-hard. In this paper we describe an Integer Programming (IP) model for MAX HRT. We also provide some details on the implementation of the model. Finally we present results obtained from an empirical evaluation of the IP model based on real-world and randomly generated problem instances

    A Constraint Programming Approach to the Hospitals / Residents Problem

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    An instance I of the Hospitals / Residents problem (HR) involves a set of residents (graduating medical students) and a set of hospitals, where each hospital has a given capacity. The residents have preferences for the hospitals, as do hospitals for residents. A solution of I is a stable matching, which is an assignment of residents to hospitals that respects the capacity conditions and preference lists in a precise way. In this paper we present constraint encodings for HR that give rise to important structural properties. We also present a computational study using both randomly-generated and real-world instances. Our study suggests that Constraint Programming is indeed an applicable technology for solving this problem, in terms of both theory and practice

    A constraint programming approach to the hospitals/residents problem

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    An instance I of the Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) involves a set of residents (graduating medical students) and a set of hospitals, where each hospital has a given capacity. The residents have preferences for the hospitals, as do hospitals for residents. A solution of I is a <i>stable matching</i>, which is an assignment of residents to hospitals that respects the capacity conditions and preference lists in a precise way. In this paper we present constraint encodings for HR that give rise to important structural properties. We also present a computational study using both randomly-generated and real-world instances. We provide additional motivation for our models by indicating how side constraints can be added easily in order to solve hard variants of HR

    Solving Hard Stable Matching Problems Involving Groups of Similar Agents

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    Many important stable matching problems are known to be NP-hard, even when strong restrictions are placed on the input. In this paper we seek to identify structural properties of instances of stable matching problems which will allow us to design efficient algorithms using elementary techniques. We focus on the setting in which all agents involved in some matching problem can be partitioned into k different types, where the type of an agent determines his or her preferences, and agents have preferences over types (which may be refined by more detailed preferences within a single type). This situation would arise in practice if agents form preferences solely based on some small collection of agents' attributes. We also consider a generalisation in which each agent may consider some small collection of other agents to be exceptional, and rank these in a way that is not consistent with their types; this could happen in practice if agents have prior contact with a small number of candidates. We show that (for the case without exceptions), several well-studied NP-hard stable matching problems including Max SMTI (that of finding the maximum cardinality stable matching in an instance of stable marriage with ties and incomplete lists) belong to the parameterised complexity class FPT when parameterised by the number of different types of agents needed to describe the instance. For Max SMTI this tractability result can be extended to the setting in which each agent promotes at most one `exceptional' candidate to the top of his/her list (when preferences within types are not refined), but the problem remains NP-hard if preference lists can contain two or more exceptions and the exceptional candidates can be placed anywhere in the preference lists, even if the number of types is bounded by a constant.Comment: Results on SMTI appear in proceedings of WINE 2018; Section 6 contains work in progres

    Integer programming methods for special college admissions problems

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    We develop Integer Programming (IP) solutions for some special college admission problems arising from the Hungarian higher education admission scheme. We focus on four special features, namely the solution concept of stable score-limits, the presence of lower and common quotas, and paired applications. We note that each of the latter three special feature makes the college admissions problem NP-hard to solve. Currently, a heuristic based on the Gale-Shapley algorithm is being used in the application. The IP methods that we propose are not only interesting theoretically, but may also serve as an alternative solution concept for this practical application, and also for other ones

    Two algorithms for the student-project allocation problem

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    We study the Student-Project Allocation problem (SPA), a generalisation of the classical Hospitals / Residents problem (HR). An instance of SPA involves a set of students, projects and lecturers. Each project is offered by a unique lecturer, and both projects and lecturers have capacity constraints. Students have preferences over projects, whilst lecturers have preferences over students. We present two optimal linear-time algorithms for allocating students to projects, subject to the preference and capacity constraints. In particular, each algorithm finds a stable matching of students to projects. Here, the concept of stability generalises the stability definition in the HR context. The stable matching produced by the first algorithm is simultaneously best-possible for all students, whilst the one produced by the second algorithm is simultaneously best-possible for all lecturers. We also prove some structural results concerning the set of stable matchings in a given instance of SPA. The SPA problem model that we consider is very general and has applications to a range of different contexts besides student-project allocation

    Dynamic capacities and priorities in stable matching

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    Cette thèse aborde les facettes dynamiques des principes fondamentaux du problème de l'appariement stable plusieurs-à-un. Nous menons notre étude dans le contexte du choix de l'école et de l'appariement entre les hôpitaux et les résidents. Dans la première étude, en utilisant le modèle résident-hôpital, nous étudions la complexité de calcul de l'optimisation des variations de capacité des hôpitaux afin de maximiser les résultats pour les résidents, tout en respectant les contraintes de stabilité et de budget. Nos résultats révèlent que le problème de décision est NP-complet et que le problème d'optimisation est inapproximable, même dans le cas de préférences strictes et d'allocations de capacités disjointes. Ces résultats posent des défis importants aux décideurs qui cherchent des solutions efficaces aux problèmes urgents du monde réel. Dans la seconde étude, en utilisant le modèle du choix de l'école, nous explorons l'optimisation conjointe de l'augmentation des capacités scolaires et de la réalisation d'appariements stables optimaux pour les étudiants au sein d'un marché élargi. Nous concevons une formulation innovante de programmation mathématique qui modélise la stabilité et l'expansion des capacités, et nous développons une méthode efficace de plan de coupe pour la résoudre. Des données réelles issues du système chilien de choix d'école valident l'impact potentiel de la planification de la capacité dans des conditions de stabilité. Dans la troisième étude, nous nous penchons sur la stabilité de l'appariement dans le cadre de priorités dynamiques, en nous concentrant principalement sur le choix de l'école. Nous introduisons un modèle qui tient compte des priorités des frères et sœurs, ce qui nécessite de nouveaux concepts de stabilité. Notre recherche identifie des scénarios où des appariements stables existent, accompagnés de mécanismes en temps polynomial pour leur découverte. Cependant, dans certains cas, nous prouvons également que la recherche d'un appariement stable de cardinalité maximale est NP-difficile sous des priorités dynamiques, ce qui met en lumière les défis liés à ces problèmes d'appariement. Collectivement, cette recherche contribue à une meilleure compréhension des capacités et des priorités dynamiques dans les scénarios d'appariement stable et ouvre de nouvelles questions et de nouvelles voies pour relever les défis d'allocation complexes dans le monde réel.This research addresses the dynamic facets in the fundamentals of the many-to-one stable matching problem. We conduct our study in the context of school choice and hospital-resident matching. In the first study, using the resident-hospital model, we investigate the computational complexity of optimizing hospital capacity variations to maximize resident outcomes, while respecting stability and budget constraints. Our findings reveal the NP-completeness of the decision problem and the inapproximability of the optimization problem, even under strict preferences and disjoint capacity allocations. These results pose significant challenges for policymakers seeking efficient solutions to pressing real-world issues. In the second study, using the school choice model, we explore the joint optimization of increasing school capacities and achieving student-optimal stable matchings within an expanded market. We devise an innovative mathematical programming formulation that models stability and capacity expansion, and we develop an effective cutting-plane method to solve it. Real-world data from the Chilean school choice system validates the potential impact of capacity planning under stability conditions. In the third study, we delve into stable matching under dynamic priorities, primarily focusing on school choice. We introduce a model that accounts for sibling priorities, necessitating novel stability concepts. Our research identifies scenarios where stable matchings exist, accompanied by polynomial-time mechanisms for their discovery. However, in some cases, we also prove the NP-hardness of finding a maximum cardinality stable matching under dynamic priorities, shedding light on challenges related to these matching problems. Collectively, this research contributes to a deeper understanding of dynamic capacities and priorities within stable matching scenarios and opens new questions and new avenues for tackling complex allocation challenges in real-world settings

    A specialised constraint approach for stable matching problems

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    Constraint programming is a generalised framework designed to solve combinatorial problems. This framework is made up of a set of predefined independent components and generalised algorithms. This is a very versatile structure which allows for a variety of rich combinatorial problems to be represented and solved relatively easily. Stable matching problems consist of a set of participants wishing to be matched into pairs or groups in a stable manner. A matching is said to be stable if there is no pair or group of participants that would rather make a private arrangement to improve their situation and thus undermine the matching. There are many important "real life" applications of stable matching problems across the world. Some of which includes the Hospitals/Residents problem in which a set of graduating medical students, also known as residents, need to be assigned to hospital posts. Some authorities assign children to schools as a stable matching problem. Many other such problems are also tackled as stable matching problems. A number of classical stable matching problems have efficient specialised algorithmic solutions. Constraint programming solutions to stable matching problems have been investigated in the past. These solutions have been able to match the theoretically optimal time complexities of the algorithmic solutions. However, empirical evidence has shown that in reality these constraint solutions run significantly slower than the specialised algorithmic solutions. Furthermore, their memory requirements prohibit them from solving problems which the specialised algorithmic solutions can solve in a fraction of a second. My contribution investigates the possibility of modelling stable matching problems as specialised constraints. The motivation behind this approach was to find solutions to these problems which maintain the versatility of the constraint solutions, whilst significantly reducing the performance gap between constraint and specialised algorithmic solutions. To this end specialised constraint solutions have been developed for the stable marriage problem and the Hospitals/Residents problem. Empirical evidence has been presented which shows that these solutions can solve significantly larger problems than previously published constraint solutions. For these larger problem instances it was seen that the specialised constraint solutions came within a factor of four of the time required by algorithmic solutions. It has also been shown that, through further specialisation, these constraint solutions can be made to run significantly faster. However, these improvements came at the cost of versatility. As a demonstration of the versatility of these solutions it is shown that, by adding simple side constraints, richer problems can be easily modelled. These richer problems add additional criteria and/or an optimisation requirement to the original stable matching problems. Many of these problems have been proven to be NP-Hard and some have no known algorithmic solutions. Included with these models are results from empirical studies which show that these are indeed feasible solutions to the richer problems. Results from the studies also provide some insight into the structure of these problems, some of which have had little or no previous study

    Modelling and Solving the Stable Marriage Problem Using Constraint Programming

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    We study the Stable Marriage problem (SM), which is a combinatorial problem that arises in many practical applications. We present two new models of an instance I of SM with n men and n women as an instance J of a Constraint Satisfaction Problem. We prove that establishing arc consistency in J yields the same structure as given by the established Extended Gale/Shapley algorithm for SM as applied to I. Consequently, a solution (stable matching) of I can be derived without search. Furthermore we show that, in both encodings, all stable matchings in I may be enumerated in a failure-free manner. Our first encoding is of O(n^3) complexity and is very natural, whilst our second model, of O(n^2) complexity (which is optimal), is a development of the Boolean encoding in [6], establishing a greater level of structure
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