

# A Specialised Constraint Approach for Stable Matching Problems

by

Chris Unsworth

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements  
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
Department of Computing Science  
Information and Mathematical Sciences.  
University of Glasgow

2008

## Abstract

Constraint programming is a generalised framework designed to solve combinatorial problems. This framework is made up of a set of predefined independent components and generalised algorithms. This is a very versatile structure which allows for a variety of rich combinatorial problems to be represented and solved relatively easily.

Stable matching problems consist of a set of participants wishing to be matched into pairs or groups in a stable manner. A matching is said to be stable if there is no pair or group of participants that would rather make a private arrangement to improve their situation and thus undermine the matching. There are many important “real life” applications of stable matching problems across the world. Some of which includes the Hospitals/Residents problem in which a set of graduating medical students, also known as residents, need to be assigned to hospital posts. Some authorities assign children to schools as a stable matching problem. Many other such problems are also tackled as stable matching problems. A number of classical stable matching problems have efficient specialised algorithmic solutions.

Constraint programming solutions to stable matching problems have been investigated in the past. These solutions have been able to match the theoretically optimal time complexities of the algorithmic solutions. However, empirical evidence has shown that in reality these constraint solutions run significantly slower than the specialised algorithmic solutions. Furthermore, their memory requirements prohibit them from solving problems which the specialised algorithmic solutions can solve in a fraction of a second.

My contribution investigates the possibility of modelling stable matching problems as specialised constraints. The motivation behind this approach was to find solutions to these problems which maintain the versatility of the constraint solutions, whilst significantly reducing the performance gap between constraint and specialised algorithmic solutions.

To this end specialised constraint solutions have been developed for the stable marriage problem and the Hospitals/Residents problem. Empirical evidence has been presented which shows that these solutions can solve significantly larger problems than previously published constraint solutions. For these larger problem instances it was seen that the specialised constraint solutions came within a factor of four of the time required by algorithmic solutions. It has also been shown that, through further specialisation, these constraint solutions can be made to run significantly faster. However, these improvements came at the cost of versatility. As a demonstration of the versatility of these solutions

it is shown that, by adding simple side constraints, richer problems can be easily modelled. These richer problems add additional criteria and/or an optimisation requirement to the original stable matching problems. Many of these problems have been proven to be NP-Hard and some have no known algorithmic solutions. Included with these models are results from empirical studies which show that these are indeed feasible solutions to the richer problems. Results from the studies also provide some insight into the structure of these problems, some of which have had little or no previous study.

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Literature review</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1	The constraint satisfaction problem . . . . .	3
2.1.1	Node-consistency . . . . .	6
2.1.2	Arc-consistency . . . . .	6
2.1.3	Generalised arc-consistency . . . . .	7
2.1.4	Path consistency . . . . .	8
2.1.5	Singleton consistency . . . . .	8
2.2	Literature review of arc-consistency . . . . .	8
2.2.1	Introduction . . . . .	8
2.2.2	Coarse grained arc-consistency algorithms . . . . .	8
2.2.3	Fine grained arc-consistency algorithms . . . . .	11
2.2.4	Generic algorithms . . . . .	13
2.2.5	Constraint solvers . . . . .	17
2.2.6	Global constraints . . . . .	18
2.3	Stable matching problems . . . . .	19
2.3.1	The Stable Marriage problem . . . . .	19
2.3.2	Incomplete preference lists . . . . .	21
2.3.3	Ties in preference lists . . . . .	22
2.3.4	Ties and incomplete preference lists . . . . .	23
2.3.5	Hospitals/Residents problem . . . . .	24
2.3.6	Stable Roommates problem . . . . .	27
2.4	Constraint programming approaches to stable matching problems . . . . .	30
2.4.1	Constraint models for stable matching problems . . . . .	31

2.4.2	Evaluating the constraint stable marriage solutions . . . . .	42
2.4.3	Conclusion . . . . .	44
<b>3</b>	<b>SM specialised constraint models</b>	<b>46</b>
3.1	Introduction . . . . .	46
3.2	Specialised binary constraint (SM2) . . . . .	46
3.2.1	The constraint model and supporting data structures . . . . .	47
3.2.2	Complexity of SM2 . . . . .	50
3.2.3	Worked example . . . . .	50
3.2.4	The inherent inefficiency of SM2 . . . . .	57
3.3	Specialised $n$ -ary constraint (SMN) . . . . .	57
3.3.1	The constraint: methods and data structures . . . . .	58
3.3.2	Enhancing the model for incomplete lists . . . . .	61
3.3.3	Arc-consistency in the model . . . . .	61
3.3.4	Properties of SMN . . . . .	66
3.3.5	Complexity of the model . . . . .	72
3.3.6	Worked example . . . . .	72
3.4	Computational experience . . . . .	77
3.4.1	Model creation time . . . . .	78
3.4.2	Enforcing arc-consistency . . . . .	80
3.4.3	Time for finding all solutions . . . . .	85
3.4.4	The number of solutions . . . . .	87
3.5	Conclusion . . . . .	89
<b>4</b>	<b>Specialisations of SMN</b>	<b>91</b>
4.1	Introduction . . . . .	91
4.2	Bound $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint BSMN . . . . .	91
4.2.1	Complexity of BSMN . . . . .	94
4.2.2	Empirical comparison . . . . .	95
4.3	Compact $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint CSMN . . . . .	98
4.3.1	Complexity of CSMN . . . . .	101
4.3.2	Empirical results . . . . .	102
4.4	Conclusion . . . . .	105

<b>5</b>	<b>HR Specialised Constraint</b>	<b>106</b>
5.1	Introduction . . . . .	106
5.2	Specialised $n$ -ary Hospitals/Residents constraint (HRN) . . . . .	107
5.2.1	The Constraint . . . . .	107
5.2.2	Enhancing the model for incomplete lists . . . . .	111
5.2.3	Complexity of HRN . . . . .	112
5.2.4	Optimisations . . . . .	113
5.3	Empirical study . . . . .	116
5.4	Conclusion . . . . .	118
<b>6</b>	<b>Versatility</b>	<b>119</b>
6.1	The sex-equal stable marriage problem . . . . .	119
6.1.1	The problem . . . . .	119
6.1.2	Constraint solution . . . . .	120
6.1.3	Empirical study . . . . .	121
6.2	Balanced stable matching . . . . .	123
6.2.1	The problem . . . . .	123
6.2.2	Constraint solution . . . . .	124
6.2.3	Empirical study . . . . .	124
6.3	The man-exchange stable marriage problem . . . . .	126
6.3.1	The problem . . . . .	126
6.3.2	Constraint solution . . . . .	127
6.3.3	Empirical study . . . . .	128
6.4	Stable roommates . . . . .	130
6.4.1	The problem . . . . .	130
6.4.2	Constraint solution . . . . .	130
6.4.3	Empirical study . . . . .	131
6.5	Egalitarian stable roommates . . . . .	133
6.5.1	The problem . . . . .	133
6.5.2	Constraint solution . . . . .	134
6.5.3	Empirical study . . . . .	134
6.6	Forbidden pairs . . . . .	135
6.6.1	The problem . . . . .	135
6.6.2	Constraint solution . . . . .	136

6.7	Forced pairs . . . . .	137
6.7.1	The problem . . . . .	137
6.7.2	Constraint solution . . . . .	137
6.8	Couples . . . . .	138
6.8.1	The problem . . . . .	138
6.8.2	Constraint solution . . . . .	138
6.9	Conclusions . . . . .	141
6.10	Future work . . . . .	142
<b>7</b>	<b>Conclusion and future work</b>	<b>143</b>
7.1	Conclusion . . . . .	143
7.2	Future work . . . . .	144
7.2.1	Enforcing GAC over SMN . . . . .	144
7.2.2	Value and variable ordering heuristics . . . . .	145
7.2.3	Allowing indifference . . . . .	146
7.2.4	A compact bound stable marriage constraint . . . . .	147
7.2.5	Bound Hospitals/Residents constraint . . . . .	147
7.2.6	Specialised constraints for other variants of stable matching problems . . . . .	147
<b>A</b>	<b>Glossary</b>	<b>149</b>
A.1	Terms and definitions . . . . .	149
A.2	Objects and functions . . . . .	150
<b>B</b>	<b>Problem generators</b>	<b>152</b>
B.1	Stable marriage instance generator . . . . .	153
B.2	Hospitals/Residents instance generator . . . . .	155
B.3	Gent et al SMTI instance generator . . . . .	157
B.4	Hard SMTI instance generator . . . . .	158
B.5	Stable roommates instance generator . . . . .	160

## Acknowledgements

Firstly I would like to thank Patrick Prosser for four years of guidance, inspiration, encouragement, grounding and friendship through good times and bad. Patrick's carrot, stick and countless cups of tea provided me with ample motivation to allow me to complete this Thesis. I would also like to thank David Manlove, my second supervisor, for providing an invaluable second opinion and additional guidance. My appreciation goes out to my examiners Ken Brown and Rob Irving, for their hard work and diligence in reading this thesis and conducting my viva.

Thanks also goes to the "team" of friends who, without (too much) complaint, proof read my thesis. The team includes Brad Glisson, Gregg O'Malley, Iain Darroch and Peter Saffrey. I would like to thank my parents for their support, both financial and emotional. I would also like to thank my girlfriend, Jayne Abdy, for sticking by me throughout.

I would like to thank all members of my research groups FATA and CPpod for their invaluable feedback and camaraderie. I would especially like to thank Barbara Smith for giving me the initial inspiration and guidance to undertake a PhD. Finally I would like to thank the countless people throughout the department that have provided such a friendly and warm environment within which to work.

## Declaration

This thesis is submitted in accordance with the rules for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Glasgow in the Faculty of Information and Mathematical Sciences. None of the material contained herein has been submitted for any other degree. The constraint models detailed in Figures 6.4 and 6.9 were proposed by David Manlove in [70]. Otherwise the work contained within this Thesis is claimed to be original.

## Publications

1. C. Unsworth, P. Prosser, A Specialised Binary Constraint for the Stable Marriage Problem. Symposium on Abstraction, Reformulation and Approximation (SARA 2005) LNCS, Springer, 218-233, 2005. (work from this paper can be seen in Chapter 3)
2. D.F. Manlove, G. O'Malley, P. Prosser, C. Unsworth, A Constraint Programming



- Approach to the Hospitals / Residents Problem. the Fourth Workshop on Modelling and Reformulating Constraint Satisfaction Problems, held at the 11th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2005), 28-43, 2005 (work from this paper can be seen in Chapter 5)
3. C. Unsworth, P. Prosser, An  $n$ -ary Constraint for the Stable Marriage Problem. The Fifth Workshop on Modelling and Solving Problems with Constraints, held at the 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2005), 32-38, 2005. (work from this paper can be seen in Chapter 3)
  4. C. Unsworth, Specialised Constraints for Stable Matching Problems. The Doctoral Program, held at the 11th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2005), 869, 2005. (work from this paper can be seen in Chapter 3)
  5. C. Unsworth, A Specialised Binary Constraint for the Stable Marriage Problem with Ties and Incomplete Preference Lists. The Doctoral Program, held at the 12th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP 2006), 2006. (This paper is related to future work detailed in Chapter 7)

6. D.F. Manlove, G. O'Malley, P. Prosser, C. Unsworth, A Constraint Programming Approach to the Hospitals / Residents Problem. Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Integration of AI and OR Techniques in Constraint Programming for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (CPAIOR), 155-170, 2007. (work from this paper can be seen in Chapter 5)
7. M. Bartlett, A.M. Frisch, Y. Hamadi, I. Miguel, S.A. Tarim, C. Unsworth, The Temporal Knapsack Problem and Its Solution. Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Integration of AI and OR Techniques in Constraint Programming for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (CPAIOR), 34-48, 2005. (not covered in this thesis)
8. A. Miller, P. Prosser, C. Unsworth, A Constraint model and a reduction operator for the minimising open stacks problem. Proceedings of the constraint modelling challenge, in conjunction with the fifth workshop on modelling and solving problems with constraints held at (IJCAI 2005), 44-50, 2005. (not covered in this thesis)
9. P. Prosser, C. Unsworth, A Connectivity Constraint using Bridges Proceedings of the 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 06), 707-708, 2006. (not covered in this thesis)
10. P. Prosser, C. Unsworth, Rooted Tree and Spanning Tree Constraints Workshop on Modelling and Solving Problems with Constraints, held at the 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 06), 39-46, 2006. (not covered in this thesis)
11. P. Prosser, C. Unsworth, LDS : Testing the hypothesis, Dept of Computing Science, University of Glasgow Technical Report, TR-2008-273, 2008. (not covered in this thesis)

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

The work in this thesis is presented in defence of the following thesis statement:

“A specialised constraint model of a stable matching problem can be used within the inherently versatile constraint framework. This will allow many NP-hard variants of stable matching problems to be modelled with the addition of simple side constraints. Such a constraint solution can significantly outperform more traditional toolbox constraint models and can be used to find a stable matching within a small factor of the time of a specialised algorithmic solution.”

To defend this statement the problem will be split into two parts.

- The first is to show that a specialised constraint solution can significantly outperform a toolbox constraint solution. It in fact provides a solution within a small factor of the time required by a specialised algorithmic solution for the problem. In this context, the term “toolbox constraint model” refers to a constraint model that is made up of arithmetic and logical clauses. Such a model can be implemented by using constraints provided as standard by most constraint solving toolkits.
- The second part is that these specialised constraint solutions are versatile by showing how many NP-hard variants of stable matching problems can be modelled by the addition of simple side constraints.

The rest of the thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives the relevant background information about the area of research in this thesis. This chapter begins by defining the constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). It will also show how CSPs are normally solved using a combination of problem reduction and search. A survey of some generalised algorithms, used to reduce the problems, is given along with indications of how the theory

of these algorithms is put into practice in constraint solving toolkits. A number of stable matching problems will then be defined along with specialised algorithms designed to solve them. This chapter is then concluded with a literature review of constraint solutions for stable matching problems along with empirical results comparing the models.

Chapter 3 details specialised constraint solutions proposed by the author for the classical stable marriage problem. Two main constraints are proposed in this chapter. The first is a binary constraint (SM2) and the second an  $n$ -ary constraint (SMN). Empirical evidence is given to show that these constraints offer significant performance improvements over the previously proposed toolbox constraint solutions for the stable marriage problem.

Chapter 4 details two further specialisations of the  $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint. BSMN prevents the memory required to store the variable domains from increasing during propagation by ensuring no internal domain values are removed. CSMN reduces the memory required to store the model by representing only the male variable. Empirical evidence is included that will show the benefits of these improvements. BSMN reduces the time to enforce arc-consistency and CSMN to find all solutions. However, these performance benefits are obtained at the cost of versatility.

Chapter 5 gives a specialised constraint for the many-to-one stable matching problem, the Hospitals/Residents problem. This is presented along with empirical evidence to show that it can solve large problems, equivalent in size to some of the largest “real life” problems of this type.

Finally, Chapter 6 demonstrates the versatility of the specialised constraint models proposed in this thesis. This is done by showing how adding simple side constraints to a specialised constraint model can allow several variations of the stable matching problems to be modelled. In this context, “simple side constraints” refers to toolbox constraints that are added to the existing constraint model. These problem variants consist of optimisation problems and problems in which the set of solutions is restricted to meet additional criteria. Most of these variants have been proven to be NP-hard or NP-complete. Some of these problems are given with empirical evidence of their performance along with statistical data to give an insight into the structure of these problems. Most of these problems have had little or no previous empirical study.

## Chapter 2

# Literature review of the constraint satisfaction problem and stable matching problems

This chapter provides the background information for the work presented later in this thesis. The stable matching problems to be tackled are defined as well as the constraint environment in which these specialised constraint solutions are based. Previous constraint solutions are detailed and empirical evidence is presented that shows the performance gap between the constraint solutions and the algorithmic solutions. This chapter begins with a definition of the constraint satisfaction problem and the different levels of consistency that can be enforced over it. Arc-consistency is the current “golden standard” level of consistency, thus a review of arc-consistency algorithms is presented.

### 2.1 The constraint satisfaction problem

The *Constraint Satisfaction Problem* (CSP) [91] is defined as follows:

- $CSP = (X, D, C)$
- $X$  is a set of  $n$  variables  $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_n\}$
- $D$  is a set of  $n$  finite domains  $D = \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$
- $C$  is a set of  $e$  constraints  $C = \{C_1, \dots, C_e\}$

The CSP is a triple  $(X, D, C)$ , where  $X$  is a set of variables,  $D$  is a set of domains and  $C$  is a set of constraints. Each variable  $x_i \in X$  has an associated finite domain  $D_i \in D$ . A domain  $D_i$  associated with variable  $x_i$  is a finite set of values that can be assigned to variable  $x_i$ . A constraint acts over a subset of  $X$  and restricts the set of values that can be simultaneously assigned to those variables. The cardinality of the set of variables a constraint acts over is said to be its *arity*. A solution to a CSP consists of an assignment of domain values to variables such that no constraints are violated.




Figure 2.1: An example of a CSP.

Figure 2.1 is an example of a simple binary CSP containing four variables and five constraints. A CSP is said to be binary if all its constraints are at most arity two. Each of the variables has an initial domain of  $\{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ . The first constraint  $C_a$  is a unary constraint as it constrains only a single variable. The other four constraints are all binary constraints because they each constrain two variables. Constraints  $C_{ab}$ ,  $C_{bc}$  and  $C_{cd}$  all express a mathematical relation between the two constrained variables. The fifth constraint  $C_{ad}$  is defined extensionally, meaning that it is a set of integer pairs that represent




Figure 2.2: The CSP from Figure 2.1 in graph form.

the complete set of valid assignments for the two constrained variables,  $a$  and  $d$ . If a pair of values  $(v_1, v_2) \in C_{ad}$  then  $v_1$  and  $v_2$  are allowed assignments for variables  $a$  and  $d$  respectively, and if  $(v_1, v_2) \notin C_{ad}$  then these assignments are not allowed. A binary CSP can also be represented as a graph, where each variable is represented by a vertex and the constraints are represented by edges. Figure 2.2 shows the CSP from Figure 2.1 as an undirected graph. A CSP can also be represented as a directed graph, where a constraint  $C_{ab}$  would be represented by two arcs  $(a, b)$  and  $(b, a)$ .

A CSP is usually solved by a combination of reducing the domains through removal of values that could not appear in any solution, and some kind of search. The reduction is achieved by inspecting the variable domains and the constraints that act upon them and removing values from domains that could never satisfy a constraint or combination of constraints. This is known as constraint propagation. There are two main classes of search, namely complete and incomplete. An incomplete search, such as local search [34, 76], generally requires less memory than a complete search. However, it is not guaranteed to find a solution even if one exists. In a complete search a solution will always be found if one exists. This means that if a complete search terminates without finding a solution then no solution exists. There are many different complete search strategies [38, 39, 46, 50, 51, 77, 88, 97]. All search techniques involve some type of decision where domain values are removed from domains in an attempt to find a solution (assuming constraint propagation was not sufficient to solve the problem). These decisions are made using search heuristics. Variable ordering heuristics [11–14, 42, 84, 85] are used to determine which domain should be reduced and value ordering heuristics [35, 86, 87] are used to determine which values should be removed from that domain. In the general case, the decision problem of determining if a solution exists for a given CSP instance is NP-complete

[63].

In solving a CSP, one of the most important considerations is the level of constraint propagation. The two extreme cases are as follows:

- *No propagation*

This results in a brute force search. The CSP is NP-complete in the general case making it very unlikely that a brute force search approach would be effective.

- *Full propagation*

This involves removing all domain values that do not appear in any solution. It is usually the case that the problem of determining whether a domain value appears in a solution or not is as hard as solving the CSP.

Therefore a compromise is required; the effort used to find inconsistent domain values must be balanced with the level of consistency attained. There are a number of different levels of consistency. The main ones are now defined below.

### 2.1.1 Node-consistency

The simplest level of consistency is node-consistency [63]. Also known as 1-consistency, this is concerned with unary constraints such as  $C_a$  in Figure 2.1. A value  $v$  in domain  $D_x$  is node-consistent with respect to constraint  $C_x$  iff  $x \in C_x$ . A variable is node-consistent if all values in its domain are node-consistent with respect to all its associated unary constraints. A CSP is node-consistent if all its variables are node-consistent. If we were to make the domain of variable  $a$  from the CSP in Figure 2.1 node-consistent, we would have to remove all values from  $D_a$  that do not satisfy the constraint  $C_a$ . The constraint states that  $a \geq 2$ , consequently, all domain values that are less than 2 would be removed. When made node-consistent,  $D_a$  will equal  $\{2, 3, 4, 5\}$ . Unary constraints constrain only one variable, thus, the set of values that do not satisfy the constraint is static. Therefore, once a domain has been made node-consistent, no matter what other values are removed from that or any other domain, the domain will remain node-consistent.

### 2.1.2 Arc-consistency

The next level of consistency is arc-consistency or 2-consistency. A CSP is said to be arc-consistent iff all variable domains are arc-consistent. A domain  $D_x$  is arc-consistent



iff for each constraint arc  $(x, y)$  all values in  $D_x$  have at least one supporting value in  $D_y$ . More formally a value  $v_1 \in D_x$  is arc-consistent iff  $\forall v_1 \in D_x, \exists v_2 \in D_y : (v_1, v_2) \in C_{xy}$ .

The constraint arc  $(a, b)$  from the CSP in Figure 2.1 states  $a = b + 2$ , which means that a value  $v_1$  in  $D_a$  is *supported* if there is a value  $v_2$  in  $D_b$  such that  $v_1 = v_2 + 2$ . The value 2 in  $D_a$  clearly has no support in  $D_b$  because if  $a$  were assigned the value 2 then  $b$  would need to be assigned the value 0 to satisfy this constraint and  $0 \notin D_b$ . After the  $(a, b)$  arc has been made consistent  $D_a$  would contain  $\{3, 4, 5\}$  and after the arc  $(b, a)$  has been made consistent  $D_b$  would contain  $\{1, 2, 3\}$ . At this point all values in  $D_a$  and  $D_b$  are arc-consistent with respect to the constraint  $C_{ab}$ . However, it is possible that while making these domains consistent with respect to another constraint that more values could be removed from either of their domains. In this case some of the remaining values may have lost their supporting values and thus the domain is no longer arc-consistent.

There are three classes of algorithms that can achieve arc-consistency. Coarse grained algorithms such as AC1 [63], AC3 [63] and AC2001 [22] concentrate on variable domains. When a domain  $D_x$  loses a value then all domains  $D_y$  will be revised where there is a constraint arc  $(y, x)$ . Fine grained algorithms such as AC4 [72], AC6 [15] and AC7 [17] concentrate on domain values. Such algorithms begin with an information gathering phase that finds support information for each domain value. Unsupported values are removed, and the support information is updated. Any value whose support has been reduced to zero is then removed. This is repeated until all remaining values have one or more supporting values. Generic algorithms, such as AC5 [96], exploit the structure of a constraint to improve the efficiency of revising a constraint arc. Depending on the implementation, AC5 can be made to emulate either a coarse or fine grained algorithm. These algorithms are presented in greater detail in Section 2.2.

### 2.1.3 Generalised arc-consistency

Generalised Arc-Consistency [64,90] is a level of consistency that can be used on constraints with any arity. A value  $v \in D_x$  is consistent with respect to a constraint  $C$  if all of the other variables in  $C$  have a value in their domain that they can all be simultaneously assigned such that  $C$  is satisfied. For example, a value  $v_1 \in D_x$  is generalised arc-consistent with respect to a constraint  $C_{xyz}$  if there exists a triple  $(v_1, v_2, v_3)$  such that  $v_2 \in D_y \wedge v_3 \in D_z \wedge (v_1, v_2, v_3) \in C_{xyz}$ . Generalised Arc-Consistency can be achieved by most arc-consistency algorithms with slight modifications [22, 63].

### 2.1.4 Path consistency

Path consistency [28,63,90] assumes that there is a constraint linking each pair of variables, meaning that the constraint graph would be a clique. If this is not the case, then for every pair of variables that do not have a constraint, one is added that allows all combinations of domain values. A value  $v_1$  from the domain  $D_x$  is path consistent if, for all pairs of variables  $y, z$ , there exists a pair of values  $v_2, v_3$  such that  $v_2 \in D_y$ ,  $v_3 \in D_z$  and  $(v_1, v_2) \in C_{xy} \wedge (v_2, v_3) \in C_{yz} \wedge (v_3, v_1) \in C_{zx}$ . Path consistency can be achieved by a modified versions of arc-consistency algorithms [22]. This technique is not widely used due to its high cost; it requires  $O(n^3d^3)$  time and  $O(n^3d^2)$  space to enforce with the latest algorithm [22], where  $n$  is the number of variables and  $d$  is the size of the largest domain.

### 2.1.5 Singleton consistency

Singleton consistency [29], also known as S-consistency, is one of the highest levels of consistency. A value  $v$  from the domain  $D_x$  is checked to determine if it is singleton consistent by assigning the value  $v$  to the variable  $x$  and enforcing arc-consistency over the CSP. If this results in the domain of a variable being reduced to an empty set then  $v$  is not singleton consistent. Currently enforcing singleton consistency is considered too expensive to be of practical use. However, current research activity [16,61] aims to improve the efficiency of the algorithms in order to make this a more practical technology.

## 2.2 Literature review of arc-consistency

### 2.2.1 Introduction

To date, there is not a level of consistency that has been proven to work best in the general case. Currently the most commonly used level of consistency is arc-consistency. This is the level of consistency enforced as standard in most commercial constraint solving software. There are three different classes of algorithm designed to enforce arc-consistency over a constraint model: coarse grained, fine grained and generic arc-consistency algorithms.

### 2.2.2 Coarse grained arc-consistency algorithms

The first arc-consistency algorithm to be published was AC3 in 1977 by Mackworth [63]. This paper also proposed AC1 as a “straw man” algorithm to provide a comparison. AC2 was also proposed but this algorithm is very similar to AC3 and so will not be described

here. Despite being originally proposed to solve binary CSPs, these algorithms can easily be extended to handle constraints with greater arities. These algorithms are classified as coarse grained because they are centred around constraint arcs; each binary constraint  $C_{ab}$  can be represented as two constraint arcs  $(a, b)$  and  $(b, a)$ .

```

1. AC3(X,D,C)
2.   Q := {(x, y), (y, x) | Cxy ∈ C}
3.   while Q ≠ {} loop
4.     dequeue an element (x, y) from Q
5.     if REVISE((x, y), X, D, C) then
6.       Q := Q ∪ {(z, x) | Czx ∈ C ∧ z ≠ x ∧ z ≠ y}
7.     end if
8.   end loop
9.   return X, D, C

```

Figure 2.3: AC3 algorithm.

AC3 (as shown in Figure 2.3) starts by initialising  $Q$  to contain the set of all constraint arcs (line 2). A constraint arc  $(x, y)$  is then removed from the set  $Q$  (line 4). All values in the domain of variable  $x$  that do not have supporting values in the domain of  $y$  are then removed, via a call to the revise function (shown in Figure 2.4). If that call to revise causes one or more values to be removed from the domain of variable  $x$  (line 5) then all constraint arcs that end with variable  $x$  are re-added to  $Q$  (line 6). This is then repeated until  $Q$  has been reduced to the empty set (line 3).

```

1. REVISE((x, y), X, D, C)
2.   Deleted := False
3.   for each a ∈ Dx loop
4.     if there exists no b ∈ Dy such that Cxy(a, b) then
5.       Dx := Dx − {a}
6.       Deleted := True
7.     end if
8.   end loop
9.   return Deleted

```

Figure 2.4: REVISE method.

The REVISE method shown in Figure 2.4 removes all values from the domain of variable  $x$  that do not have a supporting value in the domain of  $y$  with respect to the constraint  $C_{xy}$ . This is done by cycling through each value  $a$  in  $D_x$  (line 3), checking for a supporting value (line 4), if no such value exists then  $a$  is removed from the domain of  $x$  (line 5). If on termination no domain reduction has occurred then the function will return

the value **False** otherwise the value **True** will be returned (line 8). In the worst case, the REVISE method will check each of the  $e$  domain values in the domain of  $x$  against the  $f$  values in the domain of  $y$ . Both  $e$  and  $f$  are less than or equal to  $d$ . Therefore, a single call to REVISE will run in  $O(d^2)$  time.

The loop in the AC3 algorithm will loop once for each constraint arc added to the set  $Q$ . Initially  $2e$  constraint arcs are added to  $Q$ , where  $e$  is the number of constraints in the CSP. Additional constraint arcs can only be added when the domain of a target variable has values removed. A constraint arc  $(x, y)$  can, in the worse case, be re-introduced to  $Q$  once for each of the  $d$  values in the domain of  $y$ . Therefore, a maximum of  $2ed$  constraint arcs can be re-introduced to  $Q$ . This means the loop will cycle  $O(ed)$  times. Each loop will make a call to the REVISE function, which runs in  $O(d^2)$  time, making the overall worse case time complexity of a call to AC3  $O(ed^3)$ .

In 2001, Bessiere et al. [21], and Zhang et al. [98], presented AC2001 and AC3.1 respectively. Due to the similarity of these algorithms the authors went on to publish a joint paper [22] that describes the algorithm named AC2001. This algorithm uses the same basic principle as AC3 (shown in Figure 2.3). The difference between the two is that AC2001 has an improved REVISE method. When the original REVISE method was called to revise a constraint arc  $(x, y)$ , each value in the domain of  $x$  is checked against each value in the domain of  $y$ . In AC2001 the REVISE method stores previously found supporting values. This enables subsequent calls to REVISE to simply check to see if the previous supporting value is still in the domain.

REVISE2001 shown in Figure 2.5 loops for each value in  $D_x$  (line 3).  $l$  is assigned the value held by  $LAST(x, a, (x, y))$  (line 4). Initially  $LAST(x, a, (x, y))$  will hold a value that is strictly less than any value in  $D_y$ . After the first call and any subsequent calls to REVISE2001 for the arc  $(x, y)$ ,  $LAST(x, a, (x, y))$  will hold the smallest value  $v$  in  $D_y$  such that  $(a, v) \in C_{xy}$ . If  $l \notin D_y$  (line 5) then  $l$  is set to the next value in  $D_y$ . This is done using the  $NEXT(D, v)$  method which returns the smallest value in  $D$  which is strictly greater than  $v$ . If no such value exists then the special value  $NIL$  is returned.  $NIL$  is a special value that cannot appear in any domain. If  $l$  is not a supporting value or equal to  $NIL$ , the remaining values in  $D_y$  are cycled through in turn until such a value is found (lines 7,8). If  $l$  is a supporting value then  $LAST(x, a, (x, y))$  will be set to  $l$  (line 11) otherwise the value  $a$  is removed from  $D_x$  and the value that will be returned is set to **True**.

For each constraint arc  $(x, y)$  the revise method can be called at most  $d$  times, once

```

1. REVISE2001(( $x, y$ ), $X, D, C$ )
2.   Deleted := False
3.   for each  $a \in D_x$  loop
4.      $l := \text{LAST}(x, a, (x, y))$ 
5.     if  $l \notin D_y$  then
6.        $l := \text{NEXT}(D_y, l)$ 
7.       while  $l \neq \text{NIL} \wedge (a, l) \notin C_{xy}$  loop
8.          $l := \text{NEXT}(D_y, l)$ 
9.       end loop
10.      if  $l \neq \text{NIL}$  then
11.         $\text{LAST}(x, a, (x, y)) := l$ 
12.      else
13.         $D_x := D_x - \{a\}$ 
14.        Deleted := True
15.      end if
16.    end if
17.  end loop
18.  return Deleted

```

Figure 2.5: REVISE2001 method.

at the head of propagation, and once for each of the  $d - 1$  possible domain reductions from  $y$  (if all  $d$  values were removed then no solution exists and propagation would stop). In the original REVISE method each call would take  $O(d^2)$  time, making the total time complexity for the  $d$  possible calls  $O(d^3)$ . By storing the previously found supporting values the total time complexity for the  $d$  possible calls is reduced to  $O(d^2)$ . This reduces the overall time complexity of AC2001 to  $O(ed^2)$ , which is optimal. We know this is optimal because we have  $e$  constraint arcs each of which needs to be checked. To check an arc  $(x, y)$  we need to check if each of the  $d$  values in  $D_x$  has a supporting value in  $D_y$ . In the worst case, each of the  $d$  values in  $D_y$  is checked to find a supporting value. Thus in the worst case each arc will take  $d^2$  checks to enforce AC. The space required to hold the *LAST* values is linear in the size of the variable domains. Therefore, AC2001 does not increase the space complexity over that needed to store the CSP.

### 2.2.3 Fine grained arc-consistency algorithms

The coarse grained algorithms will revise a constraint arc  $(x, y)$  if a value is removed from  $D_y$ . Each time an arc is revised all values in  $D_x$  are checked to see if they still have supporting values or not. However, if a value  $v$  from  $D_x$  still has supporting values in  $D_y$  then no action will be taken when that value is checked. If it could be known that

a supporting value still exists then that value need not be checked. The fine grained algorithms try to address this by storing information about supporting values for each value in each domain and only when a value's known support set is empty is that value checked.

In 1986 Mohr and Henderson proposed AC4 [72] the first fine grained arc-consistency algorithm. AC4 has a pre-processing step in which it gathers support information. For each constraint arc  $(x, y)$  and for each value in the domain of  $x$ , it finds the set of all supporting values in the domain of  $y$ . If any values have an empty support set for any constraint arc then that value is removed from the domain and from all support sets. This in turn could reduce some other value's support set to the empty set in which case that value will also be removed. This is then repeated until all values have a non-empty support set for each constraint arc with which their respective variables are associated. At this point, the variable domains will have reached the same fixed point as achieved by the course grained arc-consistency algorithms.

AC4 has an optimal worst case time complexity of  $O(ed^2)$ . However, because of the computation required to produce the support sets the best case time complexity of AC4 is also  $\Omega(ed^2)$ , thus making the complexity of AC4  $\Theta(ed^2)$ . The support sets also require  $O(ed^2)$  space. Due to this poor best case complexity, the sub-optimal AC3 can outperform AC4 on many CSP instances. For example, consider a CSP with  $n$  variables and  $e$  constraint arcs, in which each value in each domain is supported by the first value in any other variable's domain (in which case enforcing AC would not remove any values). AC3 would cycle through each of the  $e$  arcs and check each of the  $d$  values against the first value in the connected domain, it would find that it was a supporting value and move on. The algorithm would terminate after making  $ed$  checks. AC4 on the same CSP would check each of the  $d$  values in the first domain against each of the  $d$  values in the second domain, for each of the  $e$  constraints. The algorithm would then terminate after making  $ed^2$  checks.

In 1993, Bessiere [15] proposed AC6 as an improvement on the best case performance of AC4 whilst retaining the optimal worst case performance. Instead of computing the full support set for each constraint arc, AC6 finds and stores only the first support value. If that single support value is removed then an attempt to find a new support value starts from the next value in the domain; this works in a similar way to the AC2001 REVISE method.

AC6 has the same optimal worst case time complexity as AC4, namely  $O(ed^2)$ . However, the best case complexity is reduced to  $O(ed)$ , which is the same as that of AC3. The space complexity is also reduced to  $O(ed)$ .

In 1999, Bessiere et al. proposed AC7 [17], which improves on AC6 by exploiting the bidirectional nature of support values over a binary constraint, meaning that  $(a, b) \in C_{xy}$  iff  $(b, a) \in C_{yx}$ . AC7 uses this knowledge by inferring support for some domain values instead of searching for one. For example, for a constraint arc  $(x, y)$ , if value  $v_2$  from  $D_y$  was found to support the value  $v_1$  from  $D_x$ , then when the arc  $(y, x)$  is processed, instead of searching for a support value for  $v_2$ , AC7 would infer that  $v_1$  was a supporting value.

AC7 has the same time complexities as AC6, namely  $O(ed^2)$  in the worst case and  $O(ed)$  in the best. However, in practice AC7 can significantly reduce the number of checks required, which provides a reasonable time reduction.

#### 2.2.4 Generic algorithms

Both the coarse and fine grained algorithms require each constraint to have a function which returns **True** if the value  $v_1$  in  $D_x$  is consistent with the value  $v_2$  in  $D_y$ , otherwise it must return **False**. This leaves little room to exploit any constraint specific knowledge. For example, a constraint  $x > y$  where  $D_x = \{1, 2, 3\}$  and  $D_y = \{4, 5, 6\}$  is clearly unsatisfiable, however all previously mentioned AC algorithms would require at least nine constraint checks to discover this. For this constraint the arc  $(x, y)$  could be found to be unsatisfiable with only one check, by comparing the smallest value in  $D_y$  with the largest value in  $D_x$ .

In 1992, Van Hentenryck et al. proposed AC5 [96] to exploit the structures of different classes of constraints. In the course grained algorithms the  $Q$  object contains constraint arcs to be revised, whilst in the fine grained algorithms,  $Q$  contains pairs  $(x_i, a)$  where  $x_i$  is a variable and  $a$  is a value that has been removed from  $D_i$ . In AC5,  $Q$  contains elements  $\langle (x, y), a \rangle$  where  $(x, y)$  is a constraint arc and  $a$  is a value removed from  $D_y$ .

In AC5, shown in Figure 2.6, all constraint arcs are first placed in a set  $A$  (line 2), the  $Q$  object is initialised to the empty set (line 3). For each arc in the set  $A$  (line 4) all the unsupported values in the domain of  $x$  are found via a call to the `GetUnsupp((x, y))` function (detailed in Figure 2.7) (line 5). An element is then added to  $Q$  for each constraint arc that ends with  $x$  and each unsupported value (line 7), and all unsupported values are removed from the domain of  $x$  (line 8). After all constraint arcs have been removed from

```

1. AC5(X,D,C)
2.    $A := \{(x, y) | C_{x,y} \in C\}$ 
3.    $Q := \{\}$ 
4.   for each  $(x, y) \in A$  loop
5.      $V := \text{GetUnsupp}((x, y))$ 
6.     for each  $v$  in  $V$  loop
7.        $Q := Q \cup \{(z, x), v) | C_{zx} \in C\}$ 
8.        $D_x := D_x - v$ 
9.     end loop
10.    while  $Q \neq \{\}$  loop
11.       $\langle (x, y), a \rangle = \text{POP}(Q)$ 
12.       $V := \text{GetUnsupp}((x, y), a)$ 
13.       $Q := Q \cup \{(z, x), v) | C_{zx} \in C \wedge v \in V\}$ 
14.       $D_x := D_x - a$ 
15.    end loop
16.  end loop
17.  return P

```

Figure 2.6: AC5 algorithm.

the set  $A$ , an element is then removed from  $Q$  (line 11). Any values that are no longer supported in the domain of  $x$ , as a result of the value  $a$  being removed, are found via a call to the  $\text{GetUnsupp}((x, y), a)$  function (detailed below) (line 12). An element is then added to  $Q$  for each constraint arc that ends with  $x$  and each unsupported value (line 13) and all unsupported values are removed from the domain of  $x$  (line 14). Lines 10 to 15 are then repeated until  $Q$  is empty.

The implementation of the functions  $\text{GetUnsupp}((x, y))$  and  $\text{GetUnsupp}((x, y), a)$  (called on lines 5 and 12) is dependent on the class of constraint that the arc  $(x, y)$  represents. Some classes of constraints include *functional*, *anti-functional* and *monotonic*.

A constraint arc  $(x, y)$  is *functional* if for each value  $v_1 \in D_x$  there exists at most one value  $v_2 \in D_y$  such that  $(v_1, v_2) \in C_{xy}$ . For each value  $v_1 \in D_x$  the value  $v_2 \in D_y$  can be found that satisfies the constraint using the function  $f_{xy}(v_1)$ . For example, the  $C_{ab}$  constraint, from Figure 2.1,  $a = b + 2$  is a functional constraint and the function  $f_{ab}(v_1)$  will return the value  $v_1 - 2$ .

$\text{GetUnsupp}(x, y)$  detailed in Figure 2.7, cycles through each value  $v \in D_x$  (line 3). If  $f_{xy}(v) \notin D_y$  (line 4) then the value  $v$  is unsupported and thus added to the set  $A$  (line 5). Assuming that  $f_{xy}(v)$  can be computed in constant time,  $\text{GetUnsupp}(x, y)$  for functional constraints runs in  $O(d)$  time.

$\text{GetUnsupp}((x, y), v)$ , detailed in Figure 2.8, checks if  $f_{xy}(v) \in D_y$  (line 2). If so, be-



```

1. GetUnsupp(( $x, y$ ))
2.    $A := \{\}$ 
3.   for each  $v \in D_x$  loop
4.     if  $f_{xy}(v) \notin D_y$  then
5.        $A := A \cup \{v\}$ 
6.     end if
7.   end loop
8.   return  $A$ 

```

Figure 2.7: GetUnsupp(( $x, y$ )) method for functional constraints

```

1. GetUnsupp(( $x, y, v$ ))
2.   if  $f_{xy}(v) \in D_y$  then
3.     return  $f_{xy}(v)$ 
4.   else
5.     return  $\{\}$ 
6.   end if

```

Figure 2.8: GetUnsupp(( $x, y, v$ )) method for functional constraints

cause its only supporting value in  $D_x$  has been removed  $f_{xy}(v)$  is no longer supported. Assuming that  $f_{xy}(v)$  can be computed in constant time, GetUnsupp(( $x, y, v$ )) for functional constraints runs in  $O(1)$  time. Therefore, AC can be enforced on a CSP containing only *functional* constraints in  $O(ed)$  time.

A constraint arc ( $x, y$ ) is *anti-functional* if the negation of the constraint is functional, meaning that for each value  $v_1 \in D_x$  there exists at most one value  $v_2 \in D_y$  such that  $(v_1, v_2) \notin C_{xy}$ . For example, the  $C_{bc}$  ( $b \neq c$ ) constraint, from Figure 2.1, is an *anti-functional* constraint. The function  $f_{bc}(v_1)$  returns the single value that would not support  $v_1$  which, in this case, is  $v_1$ .

```

1. GetUnsupp(( $x, y$ ))
2.    $s := \text{SIZE}(D_y)$ 
3.    $m := \text{MIN}(D_y)$ 
4.   if  $(s = 1) \wedge (f_{xy}(m) \in D_x)$  then
5.     return  $f_{xy}(m)$ 
6.   else
7.     return  $\{\}$ 
8.   end if

```

Figure 2.9: GetUnsupp(( $x, y$ )) method for anti-functional constraints

In the GetUnsupp(( $x, y$ )) method for anti-functional constraints (Figure 2.9) the SIZE( $D_y$ ) method returns  $|D_y|$ , and MIN( $D_y$ ) returns the smallest value in  $D_y$ . All values

$v_1 \in D_y$  support all but one value  $v_2 \in D_x$ . The value  $v_2$  that  $v_1$  does not support is different for each  $v_1$ . Therefore, if  $D_y$  contains more than one value then all values in  $D_x$  are supported. If  $D_y$  does contain only one value (line 4) and the value  $f_{yx}(m) \in D_x$  (line 4) then the only unsupported value is  $f_{xy}(m)$ . Since this method contains no loops, and assuming  $f_{xy}(m)$  runs in constant time, then  $\text{GetUnsup}((x, y))$  for anti-functional constraints runs in  $O(1)$  time.

1. **GetUnsup** $((x, y), v)$
2.     **return** **GetUnsup** $((x, y))$

Figure 2.10:  $\text{GetUnsup}((x, y), v)$  method for anti-functional constraints

Because the  $\text{GetUnsup}((x, y))$  method runs in constant time, the method  $\text{GetUnsup}((x, y), v)$  simply calls it instead of repeating the same calculation. Therefore, the  $\text{GetUnsup}((x, y), v)$  method also runs in  $O(1)$  time. Thus, AC can be achieved, for a CSP containing only anti-functional constraints, in  $O(ed)$  time.

A constraint  $C_{xy}$  is *monotonic* if a value  $v_1 \in D_x$  has a supporting value  $v_2 \in D_y$ , where  $f_{xy}(v_2) = v_1$ , and  $v_1$  is also supported by all values in  $D_y$  that are greater than  $v_2$ <sup>1</sup>. Therefore, any value  $v_2 \in D_y$  such that  $f_{xy}(v_2) \geq v_1$  implies that  $(v_1, v_2)$  are mutually supportive with respect to  $C_{xy}$ . However,  $f_{xy}(v_2) < v_1$  implies that  $(v_1, v_2)$  are not mutually supportive with respect to  $C_{xy}$ . For example the  $C_{cd}$  ( $c \leq d - 2$ ) constraint, from Figure 2.1, is monotonic and the function  $f_{cd}(v)$  returns the value  $v - 2$ .

1. **GetUnsup** $((x, y))$
2.      $S := \{\}$
3.      $v := \text{MAX}(D_x)$
4.     **while**  $v > f_{xy}(\text{MAX}(D_y))$  **loop**
5.          $S := S \cup \{v\}$
6.          $v := \text{nextLargest}(v, D_x)$
7.     **end loop**
8.     **return**  $S$

Figure 2.11:  $\text{GetUnsup}((x, y))$  method for monotonic constraints

In the  $\text{GetUnsup}(x, y)$  method for monotonic constraints shown in Figure 2.11, the highest value in  $D_x$  is found (line 3). If the largest value in  $D_x$  is not supported by the largest value in  $D_y$  (line 4) then it is added to the unsupported values set (line 5). The remaining values in  $D_x$  are then checked in descending order, until either a value is found

<sup>1</sup>The variable domains are assumed to have a total ordering.

that is supported by the largest value in  $D_y$  or all values have been checked.

```

1. GetUnsupp(( $x, y$ ), $v$ )
2.   if  $v > \text{MAX}(D_y)$ 
3.     return GetUnsupp( $x, y$ )
4.   else
5.     return {}
6.   end if

```

Figure 2.12:  $\text{GetUnsupp}((x, y), v)$  method for monotonic constraints

The  $\text{GetUnsupp}((x, y), v)$  method shown in Figure 2.12 assumes that, prior to the value  $v$  being removed from  $D_y$ , all values in  $D_x$  were supported by the largest value in  $D_y$ , which would be the case after the set of unsupported values identified by the  $\text{GetUnsupp}(x, y)$  method have been removed from  $D_x$ . The removed value is then checked against the highest remaining value in  $D_y$ . If it is greater than the current largest value then the new set of unsupported values are found via a call to  $\text{GetUnsupp}(x, y)$ .

It is important to note that the discussed methods for *monotonic* constraints will only work with the  $(x, y)$  arc from a constraint  $C_{xy}$ . To process the  $(y, x)$  constraint arc we require the symmetric equivalent of the discussed methods. In this case, instead of checking the largest values from the domains the smallest values will be compared.

As with *functional* and *anti-functional* constraints a CSP containing only monotonic constraints can be made arc-consistent in  $O(ed)$  time. This is assuming that the variables are represented in such a way as to allow the bounds of a variable to be changed in constant time, such as the variable representation detailed in [96].

In 2005, Jean-Charles Régin proposed AC-\* [80] a configurable, generic and adaptive arc-consistency algorithm. In this publication, the author details the elements which make up each of the previously published arc-consistency algorithms and shows how AC-\* can be configured to use any combination of these elements. This algorithm can also be re-configured mid-search.

### 2.2.5 Constraint solvers

The early constraint solvers, such as CHIP [95], CLP [52], Sicstus [6] and Eclipse [7], were mostly written as extensions of the Prolog programming language. These solvers had a “black box” approach, meaning that the constraint implementations, search processes and propagation algorithms are hidden. This approach limits the user’s ability to take

advantage of problem specific knowledge to improve the constraint model.

More recent constraint solvers such as Ilog solver [3], Koalog solver [5], JChoco [4] and Gecode [1] take more of a “glass box” approach [78]. All these solvers are implemented as a library for an object-oriented programming language (Java, C++ or C#). By making use of inheritance, these constraint solvers provide the basic frame-work within which different components can be combined and configured, to construct a constraint model. The resulting constraint model can then be propagated by the solver’s built in propagation algorithm, which is based on the generic AC5 [96] arc-consistency algorithm. This type of frame-work allows users to implement their own constraints by providing a basic interface which can be extended to produce a constraint class. To implement a constraint in this way, the user is required to write methods that will be called during propagation. At least two methods are required to implement a constraint. One is called at the head of propagation and the other is called when the domain of one of the constrained variables is reduced. These methods will then query the variable domains and remove any inconsistent domain values by interacting with the variable objects directly. The solver may also require the user to state when the constraint is to be propagated, namely when a variable is instantiated (the variable domain is reduced to a singleton), when the bounds of a variable domain are altered, or when any domain reduction occurs.

Not all recent constraint solvers follow the “glass box” approach. In 2006, Gent et al. proposed Minion [41] a light-weight efficient solver implemented in C++. Minion takes the definition of a CSP as input, solves the problem then outputs the results. This solver has no provision for user-defined constraints.

### 2.2.6 Global constraints

Global constraints [19] are constraints with an arity  $n$  where  $n$  is a parameter. They are used to represent an entire problem or sub-problem in a single constraint. The main motivation behind global constraints is to improve either efficiency or the level of propagation attained. One such example is the AllDifferent constraint proposed by Régin [79]. The AllDifferent constraint posted over a set of variables  $X$  will ensure that all the variables in  $X$  are assigned different values. The same effect can be achieved by posting the set of constraints  $\{x_i \neq x_j | i \neq j, x_i \in X, x_j \in X\}$ . In this case Régin’s AllDifferent constraint will achieve a higher level of consistency over the variables. However, propagating Régin’s constraint has a higher time complexity than that of enforcing arc-consistency

over the set of not-equal constraints. Other propagation methods have been proposed for the AllDifferent constraint that have a lower time complexity, but enforce a lower level of consistency [71]. Other examples of global constraints include the flow constraint [23] written to help model the network flow problem, and the slide constraint [18] written to help model scheduling problems.

## 2.3 Stable matching problems

In this section, the classical stable marriage problem is defined along with an optimal algorithm that is guaranteed to find a solution. Generalisations of the problem are also given, which include: ties, incomplete preference lists, the Hospitals/Residents problem and the Stable Roommates problem.

### 2.3.1 The Stable Marriage problem

An instance of the Stable Marriage problem (SM) [36,49] consists of  $n$  men and  $n$  women. Each man ranks the  $n$  women into a strictly ordered preference list, and the women rank the men. An example of an SM instance of size  $n = 4$  can be seen in Figure 2.13. The *rank* function can be used to query the preference lists. For example,  $rank(m_2, w_1)$  will return the position of  $w_1$  in the preference list of  $m_2$ . From the instance shown in Figure 2.13,  $rank(m_2, w_1)$  will return the value 2. The aim is to produce a matching of men to women such that the matching is stable. A *matching* is a set  $M$  of (man,woman) pairs, such that each man and woman appear in exactly one pair. If the pair  $(m_i, w_j)$  appears in  $M$  then man  $m_i$  and woman  $w_j$  are said to be *matched* in  $M$ . A couple that are matched can also be referred to as *partners*. A matching  $M$  is said to be *stable* if no pair  $(m_i, w_j)$  exists such that both man  $m_i$  and woman  $w_j$  would prefer to be matched to one another than remain with their respective partners in  $M$ .

Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: w_1 w_3 w_2 w_4$	$w_1: m_1 m_3 m_2 m_4$
$m_2: w_4 w_1 w_2 w_3$	$w_2: m_2 m_4 m_1 m_3$
$m_3: w_1 w_4 w_3 w_2$	$w_3: m_3 m_4 m_2 m_1$
$m_4: w_3 w_4 w_2 w_1$	$w_4: m_1 m_3 m_4 m_2$

Figure 2.13: A stable marriage instance of size  $n = 4$ .

In 1962, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley [36] first introduced this problem and proved

that all problem instances admit at least one stable matching. This was done by describing an algorithm, referred to as the Gale/Shapley (GS) algorithm, which is guaranteed to find a stable matching for any given problem instance. Furthermore, this algorithm is known to be optimal [74]; it finds a stable matching in time linear in the size of the problem instance, i.e. in  $O(n^2)$  time [60]. The GS algorithm can be run with two different orientations. One favours the men and the other favours the women. This algorithm was later refined to give the Extended Gale/Shapley (EGS) algorithm [49].

Figure 2.14 shows the *man-oriented* version of the extended Gale/Shapley (EGS) algorithm. Initially, all men are added to the free list (line 1). An arbitrary man  $m$  is then picked from the free list and he makes a proposal to his most preferred woman  $w$  (line 3). If  $w$  was previously engaged (line 4) then her previous fiancé will be placed back in the free list (line 5). Man  $m$  and woman  $w$  will then be engaged (line 7). Then all men that appear after  $m$  in  $w$ 's preference list are removed (line 9) and  $w$  will also be removed from their preference lists (line 10). This is then repeated until the free list is empty (line 2).

```

1.  assign each person to be free
2.  while some man  $m$  is free loop
3.     $w :=$  first woman on  $m$ 's list
4.    if some man  $p$  is engaged to  $w$  then
5.      assign  $p$  to be free
6.    end if
7.    assign  $m$  and  $w$  to be engaged to each other
8.    for each successor  $p$  of  $m$  on  $w$ 's list loop
9.      delete  $p$  from  $w$ 's list
10.     delete  $w$  from  $p$ 's list
11.   end loop
12. end loop

```

Figure 2.14: The man-oriented Extended Gale/Shapley algorithm.

On termination of the EGS algorithm the preference lists will have been reduced to a *fixed point*, meaning that running the algorithm again over these reduced preference lists will not reduce them further. These reduced preference lists are known as the *MGS-lists* (the Man-oriented Gale/Shapley lists). If all men are matched to their first choice woman from the MGS-lists then the matching will be stable. The matching will also be *man-optimal* and *woman-pessimal*. This means that each man is matched to his best possible partner in any stable matching and each woman is matched to her worst possible partner in any stable matching. If the algorithm is run with the men and women swapped, giving the

woman-oriented EGS algorithm, then the reduced preference lists produced after applying this algorithm will be the *WGS-lists* (the Woman-oriented Gale/Shapley lists). If all the women are matched to their first choice in the WGS-lists then that matching will be the woman-optimal and man-pessimal stable matching. The intersection of the MGS-lists and the WGS-lists is known as the *GS-lists*. The GS-lists can also be found by applying the woman-oriented algorithm to the MGS-lists or the man-oriented algorithm to the WGS-lists. The GS-lists contain all possible stable matchings [37].

A full proof of correctness is without of the scope of this document, however, a brief justification of correctness is now given. If each man is matched to the first woman in their MGS-list then the matching will be a bijection. For this not to be the case then two men  $m_i$  and  $m_k$  must have the same woman  $w_j$  at the head of their MGS-list. Assuming that  $rank(w_j, m_i) < rank(w_j, m_k)$ , at some point  $m_i$  and  $w_j$  must have been engaged, at which time  $w_j$  would have been removed from  $m_k$ 's list, which is a contradiction. If  $m_i$  is matched to the first woman in his preference list  $w_j$ , then  $(m_i, w_k)$  will not form a blocking pair, where  $(k \neq j)$ . This is because if  $m_i$  prefers  $w_j$  to  $w_k$  then they cannot form a blocking pair or if  $m_i$  prefers  $w_k$  to  $w_j$  then  $w_k$  must have been removed from  $m_i$ 's list when she received a proposal from someone she preferred to  $m_i$ , meaning she must be matched to someone she prefers to  $m_i$ , and thus, they cannot form a blocking pair.

### 2.3.2 Incomplete preference lists

The Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete preference lists (SMI) is a generalisation of the classical stable marriage problem. By allowing preference lists to be incomplete, participants in a matching are allowed to express the fact that they would rather not have a partner than be matched to someone that has been omitted from their preference list. This generalisation requires an extension to the definitions of a matching and of stability. A matching is a set  $M$  of (man,woman) *acceptable* pairs, such that each man and woman appear in at most one pair. A pair  $(m_i, w_j)$  is acceptable iff  $m_i$  and  $w_j$  appear in each others preference lists. A matching  $M$  for an instance of SMI is stable iff it contains no blocking pair  $(m_i, w_j)$ . The pair  $(m_i, w_j)$  will form a blocking pair if it is acceptable,  $m_i$  is either unmatched in  $M$  or prefers  $w_j$  to his partner in  $M$  and  $w_j$  is either unmatched in  $M$  or prefers  $m_i$  to her partner in  $M$ . Note that, in SMI with the extended definition of stability, there is no longer any need to assume that the number of men and women are equal.

All instances of SMI admit at least one stable matching. However, this matching may not be complete, meaning that some participants may not be matched. It has been proven that the set of unmatched participants is the same for all stable matchings for a given instance of SMI [37].

A stable matching can be found for an instance of SMI in  $O(L)$  time by using the EGS algorithm, where  $L$  is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists.

### 2.3.3 Ties in preference lists

The Stable Marriage problem with Ties (SMT) allows participants in a matching to express indifference between two or more potential partners. This relaxation gives rise to three extensions of the classical definition of stability. In all three extensions a matching is stable iff it contains no blocking pair; the definitions differ in what constitutes a blocking pair.

The strictest definition of stability is *super-stability*, in which  $(m_i, w_j)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  iff  $m_i$  is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $w_j$  to his partner in  $M$  and  $w_j$  is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $m_i$  to her partner in  $M$ . Not all SMT instances admit a super-stable matching. For example, an instance with complete indifference, shown in Figure 2.15, where parentheses represent ties, would contain no super-stable matching. The existence of a super-stable matching in a given SMT instance can be determined in  $O(n^2)$  time [55].

Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: (w_1 w_2)$	$w_1: (m_2 m_1)$
$m_2: (w_1 w_2)$	$w_2: (m_2 m_1)$

Figure 2.15: An SMT instance with 2 men and 2 women.

A more relaxed definition of stability is *strong-stability*, in which  $(m_i, w_j)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  iff  $m_i$  (or  $w_j$ ) strictly prefers  $w_j$  (or  $m_i$ ) to their partner in  $M$  and  $w_j$  (or  $m_i$ ) is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $m_i$  (or  $w_j$ ) to her partner in  $M$ . Not all SMT instances admit a strongly-stable matching. For example, Figure 2.16 has two men and two women. In this instance there are two possible matchings, and both give rise to a blocking pair. In the matching  $\{(m_1, w_1), (m_2, w_2)\}$  the pair  $(m_2, w_1)$  would form a blocking pair. In the matching  $\{(m_1, w_2), (m_2, w_1)\}$  the pair  $(m_2, w_2)$  would form a blocking pair. The existence of a strongly-stable matching in a given SMT instance can be determined in  $O(n^3)$  time [89].



Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: w_1 w_2$	$w_1: m_2 m_1$
$m_2: (w_1 w_2)$	$w_2: m_2 m_1$

Figure 2.16: An SMT instance with 2 men and 2 women.

The third definition of stability is *weak-stability*, in which  $(m_i, w_j)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  only if both  $m_i$  and  $w_j$  strictly prefer each other to their partners in  $M$ . All instances of SMT admit at least one weakly-stable matching. A weakly-stable matching can be found in an SMT instance by arbitrarily breaking the ties and applying the EGS algorithm [49].

### 2.3.4 Ties and incomplete preference lists

The Stable Marriage problem with Ties and Incomplete preferences (SMTI) is a further generalisation of the classical stable marriage problem. To extend the definitions of super-stability, strong-stability and weak-stability to allow for incomplete preference lists, unmatched people need to be considered.

- Under super-stability, a pair  $(m_i, w_j)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  iff they are an acceptable pair,  $m_i$  is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $w_j$  to his partner in  $M$  or  $m_i$  is unmatched in  $M$  and  $w_j$  is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $m_i$  to her partner in  $M$  or  $w_j$  is unmatched in  $M$ .
- Under strong-stability, a pair  $(m_i, w_j)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  iff they are an acceptable pair,  $m_i$  (or  $w_j$ ) strictly prefers  $w_j$  (or  $m_i$ ) to their partner in  $M$  or  $m_i$  (or  $w_j$ ) is unmatched in  $M$  and  $w_j$  (or  $m_i$ ) is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $m_i$  (or  $w_i$ ) to her partner in  $M$  or  $w_j$  (or  $m_i$ ) is unmatched in  $M$ .
- Under weak-stability, a pair  $(m_i, w_j)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  iff they are an acceptable pair and both  $m_i$  and  $w_j$  strictly prefer each other to their partners in  $M$  or are unmatched in  $M$ .

A stable matching for such an instance under super-stability and strong-stability can be found in polynomial time [65] if such a matching exists. Under weak-stability a stable matching can be found by arbitrarily breaking the ties and applying the EGS algorithm. However, under weak-stability it is no longer the case that all stable matchings have the same size or the same set of participants matched. The SMTI instance given in Figure

2.17 admits two stable matchings. The first,  $\{(m_1, w_1)\}$ , has  $m_1$  and  $w_1$  matched to each other while  $m_2$  and  $w_2$  are unmatched. In the other matching,  $\{(m_1, w_2), (m_2, w_1)\}$ , all participants are matched.

Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: (w_1 w_2)$	$w_1: (m_1 m_2)$
$m_2: w_1$	$w_2: m_1$

Figure 2.17: An SMTI instance with 2 men and 2 women.

It can be advantageous in a matching scheme, that allows both ties and incomplete preferences, to find a weakly stable matching in which the maximum number of participants is matched. It has been proven [58,66] to be NP-hard to find a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching for an instance of SMTI.

### 2.3.5 Hospitals/Residents problem

The Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) [36]<sup>2</sup> is a many-to-one stable matching problem. There are a set of  $n$  residents (medical students) each wishing to be assigned to a post at one of  $m$  hospitals. Each resident ranks a subset of the hospitals into a strictly ordered preference lists, similarly, all hospitals will rank a subset of the residents. Each hospital  $h_j$  can have zero, one or more residents assigned to it up to a maximum of  $c_j$ , where  $h_j$  has  $c_j$  available posts. The objective is to find a matching of residents to hospitals such that each resident is matched to only one hospital, the hospital capacities are respected and the matching is stable. A matching  $M$  is stable if it contains no blocking pairs. A (resident,hospital) pair  $(r_i, h_j)$  form a blocking pair if the three following conditions are met:

- $(r_i, h_j)$  is not in  $M$  but is an acceptable pair.
- $r_i$  is unassigned in  $M$  or prefers  $h_j$  to its assigned hospital in  $M$ .
- either  $h_j$  has less than  $c$  residents assigned to it or  $h_j$  prefers  $r_i$  to at least one of its assigned residents in  $M$ .

Note that a special case of this problem, in which all hospital capacities equal one and  $n = m$ , is equivalent to SMI.

---

<sup>2</sup>referred to in this paper as the college admissions problem.

All instances of HR admit at least one stable matching. Two algorithms exist which can find a stable matching in an HR instance: The first is oriented toward the residents and the second toward the hospitals. Both algorithms return a stable matching in time linear in the problem size.

1. assign each resident to be free
2. assign each hospital to be totally unsubscribed
3. **while** some hospital  $h$  is undersubscribed  
     **and**  $h$ 's list contains a resident  $r$   
     not provisionally assigned to  $h$  **loop**
4.      $r :=$  first such resident on  $h$ 's list
5.     **if**  $r$  is already assigned to some hospital  $h'$  **then**
6.         break provisional assignment of  $r$  to  $h'$
7.     **end if**
8.     provisionally assign  $r$  to  $h$
9.     **for** each successor  $h'$  of  $h$  on  $r$ 's list **loop**
10.         delete  $h'$  from  $r$ 's list
11.         delete  $r$  from  $h'$ 's list
12.     **end loop**
13. **end loop**

Figure 2.18: The Hospital-oriented algorithm.

The *hospital-oriented* algorithm, shown in Figure 2.18, starts by assigning all residents to be free (line 1) and assigning all hospitals to be totally unsubscribed, meaning that all posts at all hospitals are assigned to be free (line 2). The main loop of this algorithm (line 3) will cycle if there exists some hospital  $h$  that is undersubscribed, meaning it has less than  $c$  residents provisionally assigned to it and a resident in its list that has not yet been offered a post at  $h$ . A resident  $r$  is then identified, where  $r$  is  $h$ 's favourite resident from its list, where  $r$  is yet to be offered a post at  $h$  (line 4). If that resident was previously assigned to some other hospital  $h'$  (line 5), then that assignment is broken (line 6). Resident  $r$  is then assigned to  $h$  (line 8), and all hospitals worse than  $h$  are removed from  $r$ 's list (line 10) and  $r$  from theirs (line 11). On termination of this algorithm all the unbroken assignments will constitute a stable matching. The stable matching returned by this algorithm will always be *hospital-optimal* meaning that all hospitals will be assigned their best possible set of residents from all stable matchings. Conversely the residents will all receive their worst possible posts from all stable matchings. The hospital-oriented runs in time linear in the size of the problem, i.e.  $O(L)$  time, where  $L$  is to sum of the lengths of the preference lists.

```

1.  assign each resident to be free
2.  assign each hospital to be totally unsubscribed
3.  while some resident  $r$  is free
      and  $r$  has a nonempty list loop
4.     $h :=$  first hospital on  $r$ 's list
5.    if  $h$  is fully subscribed then
6.       $r' :=$  worst resident provisionally assigned to  $h$ 
7.      assign  $r'$  to be free
8.    end if
9.    provisionally assign  $r$  to  $h$ 
10.   if  $h$  is fully subscribed then
11.      $s :=$  worst resident provisionally assigned to  $h$ 
12.     for each successor  $s'$  of  $s$  on  $h$ 's list loop
13.       delete  $s'$  from  $h$ 's list
14.       delete  $h$  from  $s'$ 's list
15.     end loop
16.   end if
17. end loop

```

Figure 2.19: The Resident-oriented algorithm.

The *resident-oriented* algorithm shown in Figure 2.19 starts by assigning all residents to be free (line 1) and assigning all hospital posts to be free (line 2). The main loop of this algorithm (line 3) will cycle if there exists some resident  $r$  that is free and has a non-empty preference list. Resident  $r$ 's favourite hospital  $h$  currently remaining in its list is found (line 4). If  $h$  is fully subscribed, meaning that it has  $c$  residents provisionally assigned to it, (line 5) then its least favourite resident that is currently assigned to it is assigned to be free (line 7) and  $r$  is assigned to  $h$  (line 9). If  $h$  is now fully subscribed (line 10) then all residents worse than  $h$ 's least favourite assigned resident (lines 11,12) must be removed from  $h$ 's list (line 13) and  $h$  must be removed from their list (line 14). As with the hospital-oriented algorithm, on termination of this algorithm all the unbroken assignments will constitute a stable matching. The stable matching returned by this algorithm will always be *resident-optimal*. This means that all residents will receive their best possible hospital posts from all stable matchings. The resident-oriented runs in time linear in the size of the problem, i.e.  $O(L)$  time, where  $L$  is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists.

A generalisation of HR is the Hospitals/Residents problem with ties (HRT). As with SMT, there are three different definitions of a blocking pair.

- Under super-stability, a pair  $(r, h)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  iff they are an acceptable pair,  $r$  is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $h$  to his assigned

hospital in  $M$  or  $r$  is unmatched in  $M$  and  $h$  is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $r$  to its worst assigned resident in  $M$  or  $h$  is not fully subscribed in  $M$ .

- Under strong-stability, a pair  $(r, h)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  iff they are an acceptable pair,  $r$  (or  $h$ ) strictly prefers  $h$  (or  $r$ ) to his assigned hospital (worst assigned resident) in  $M$  or  $r$  (or  $h$ ) is unmatched (not fully subscribed) in  $M$  and  $h$  (or  $r$ ) is either indifferent between or strictly prefers  $r$  (or  $h$ ) to its worst assigned resident (assigned hospital) in  $M$  or  $h$  (or  $r$ ) is not fully subscribed (unmatched) in  $M$ .
- Under weak-stability, a pair  $(r, h)$  forms a blocking pair in a matching  $M$  iff they are an acceptable pair,  $r$  strictly prefers  $h$  to his assigned hospital in  $M$  or is unmatched in  $M$ , and  $h$  strictly prefers  $r$  to its worst assigned resident in  $M$ , or is undersubscribed.

Under super-stability a stable matching can be found in  $O(L)$  time [54] and under strong-stability a matching can be found in  $O(cL)$  time [89], where  $c$  is the sum of all hospital capacities. Under weak-stability a stable matching can be found by arbitrarily breaking the ties and applying either the resident-oriented or hospital-oriented algorithms defined above.

HR is a “real world” problem handled by centralised matching schemes. Such matching schemes include the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States [73]. The NRMP has been in operation since 1952 and handles the annual allocation of around 31,000 residents to about 2,300 hospitals. Other matching schemes include the Canadian Resident Matching Service (CaRMS) [27] and the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [56].

### 2.3.6 Stable Roommates problem

The Stable Roommates problem (SR) [36] is a matching problem in which there is a single set of participants of even size. Each person wishes to be assigned a room, each room has a capacity of two, thus the set of participants must be split into pairs. Each person strictly ranks all others into a preference list. The objective is to find a matching  $M$  which is stable. A matching is a set of pairs (roommate, roommate), such that each participant appears in at most one pair, and the two roommates are distinct. A matching  $M$  is stable if it admits no blocking pair  $(r_i, r_k)$ . A pair  $(r_i, r_k)$  will form a blocking pair in  $M$  iff

$r_i$  and  $r_k$  are not assigned to each other in  $M$  and they either prefer each other to their respective assigned partners in  $M$  or are unmatched in  $M$ . Not all instances of SR admit a stable matching. For the SR instance in Figure 2.20, consider the three possible matchings  $\{(r_1, r_2), (r_3, r_4)\}$ ,  $\{(r_1, r_3), (r_2, r_4)\}$  and  $\{(r_1, r_4), (r_2, r_3)\}$ . Each contains a blocking pair,  $(r_2, r_3)$ ,  $(r_1, r_2)$  and  $(r_1, r_3)$  respectively.

$r_1$ :	$r_2$	$r_3$	$r_4$
$r_2$ :	$r_3$	$r_1$	$r_4$
$r_3$ :	$r_1$	$r_2$	$r_4$
$r_4$ :	$r_1$	$r_2$	$r_3$

Figure 2.20: An SR instance with 4 room-mates.

A special case of the SR problem in which all the participants can be split into two distinct sets, such that all participants in the same set find each other unacceptable, is equivalent to the stable marriage problem. There is an algorithm that can, in  $O(n^2)$  time, find a stable matching for a given stable roommates instance or prove that no stable matching exists [53]. This algorithm is split into two phases. The first is similar to the extended Gale/Shapley algorithm for the stable marriage problem shown in Figure 2.14. The second exploits structural properties of the problem to iteratively reduce the preference lists until either a solution is found, or it is proven that one does not exist. The algorithm as given here assumes that there is an even number of participants. The algorithm can be extended to except an odd number of participants [49].

1. assign each participant to be free
2. **while** some participant  $r$  is free **loop**
3.      $r' :=$  first participant on  $r$ 's list
4.     **if** some participant  $p$  is semi-engaged to  $r'$  **then**
5.         assign  $p$  to be free
6.     assign  $r$  to be semi-engaged to  $r'$
7.     **for** each successor  $p$  of  $r$  on  $r'$ 's list **loop**
8.         delete  $p$  from  $r'$ 's list
9.         delete  $r'$  from  $p$ 's list
10.        **if**  $p$ 's list is empty **then STOP**
11.     **end loop**
12. **end loop**

Figure 2.21: Phase one of the stable roommates algorithm.

In Figure 2.21, the first phase of the stable roommates algorithm is shown. Note the use of the term *semi-engaged*, as opposed to engaged, used in the EGS algorithm. This

is because, in this algorithm the semi-engaged relation is not symmetric. A participant  $r$  can be semi-engaged to some other participant  $r'$  while  $r'$  is still on the free list or semi-engaged to someone else. Initially all participant are added to the free list (line 1). An arbitrary participant  $r$  is then picked from the free list and his most preferred participant  $r'$  is identified (line 3). If some participant  $p$  was previously semi-engaged to  $r'$  (line 4) then that semi-engagement is broken and  $p$  is placed back in the free list (line 5). Participant  $r$  is assigned to be semi-engaged to  $r'$  (line 6). Then all participants worse than  $r$  are removed from  $r'$ 's list (line 8) and  $r'$  is also removed from their preference lists (line 9). If these deletions cause participant  $p$ 's list to be made empty then the algorithm will stop, and no stable matching exists (line 10). This is then repeated until the free list is empty (line 2). On termination of the first phase of this algorithm the preference lists will be reduced to a fixed point ready for the application of the second phase. Such a reduction can be seen in Figure 2.22. If the phase one reductions cause some participant's list to be reduced to an empty list then no stable matching exists for that instance. Alternatively, if these reductions cause all participant's lists to be reduced to a single entry then the remaining values constitute the unique stable matching for that problem instance. In either of these circumstances phase two need not be applied.

Before	After
$r_1: r_4 r_2 r_3$	$r_1: r_4 r_2 r_3$
$r_2: r_3 r_1 r_4$	$r_2: r_3 r_1 r_4$
$r_3: r_4 r_1 r_2$	$r_3: r_1 r_2$
$r_4: r_2 r_1 r_3$	$r_4: r_2 r_1$

Figure 2.22: An SR instance before and after a phase one reduction.

After an application of the phase one algorithm, the preference lists will have been reduced to a state referred to as the *phase 1 table*, shortened to *table*. A number of terms are now defined that are used to access elements of these tables.

- $f_T(r_i)$  refers to the first entry in  $r_i$ 's list in table  $T$ .
- $l_T(r_i)$  refers to the last entry in  $r_i$ 's list in table  $T$ .
- $s_T(r_i)$  refers to the second entry in  $r_i$ 's list in table  $T$  if one exists.
- $n_T(r_i)$  refers to  $l_T(s_T(r_i))$ .

The second phase of this algorithm continues to reduce the preference lists by finding

and removing *rotations*. A rotation  $P$  is a cyclic list of pairs of participants, which takes the form  $P = (p_0, q_0), (p_1, q_1), \dots, (p_{l-1}, q_{l-1})$ , where  $l$  is the length of the rotation. Each pair in the list  $(p_i, q_i)$ , has the property that  $q_i = f_T(p_i)$ . The relation between the pairs in the list is such that  $q_{i+1} = s_T(p_i)$ . The removal of a rotation from the table requires that for each  $(p_i, q_i)$  pair in the rotation, all participants that  $q_i$  likes less than  $p_{i-1}$  are removed from  $q_i$ 's preference list, and  $q_i$  is also removed from their lists. Details of how a rotation can be found are in [49].

1.   **while** some list in  $T$  has more than one entry **and**  
           no list in  $T$  empty list **loop**
2.       find a rotation  $P$
3.       remove  $P$  from  $T$
7.   **end loop**

Figure 2.23: Phase two of the stable roommates algorithm.

The second phase of the roommates algorithm is shown in Figure 2.23. While some participant has more than one list entry and no participants have an empty list this phase will continue (line 1). A rotation  $P$  is found (line 2) rotation  $P$  is removed from  $T$  (line 3). On termination of the second phase of this algorithm, the preference lists will be in one of two states. Either all participant's lists have been reduced to a single entry, which will constitute a stable matching, or some participant's list will have been reduced to the empty set, in which case no stable matching exists. This algorithm has been proven to run in  $O(n^2)$  time [49], for instances involving  $2n$  participants.

## 2.4 Constraint programming approaches to stable matching problems

In this section, we look at previously published constraint solutions to stable matching problems. The motivation for modelling these problems using constraint technology is to be able to take advantage of the inherent versatility of the general constraint framework. Having versatile models means that they can be easily extended to solve extensions of the original problem by adding additional constraints and/or variables. In this case the versatility of these constraint solutions allow several NP-hard variants of stable matching problems to be solved with the addition of simple side constraints. As demonstrated later in Chapter 6.



The constraint solutions considered here include optimal constraint models for the Stable Marriage problem, distributed constraint models for Stable Roommates and Stable Marriage and constraint solutions to the Hospitals/Residents problem. A selection of the stable marriage constraint models are then empirically compared to the algorithmic solution to this problem. It is assumed that all constraint models here have access to preference list information via the functions  $pref(i, j)$  and  $PL(i, k)$ . The function  $pref(i, j)$  will return the position of  $w_j$  in the preference list of  $m_i$ . The  $pref(i, j)$  function differs from the previously used  $rank(m_i, w_j)$  by the fact that  $pref(i, j)$  takes as arguments integer indexes, as opposed to people. The function  $PL(i, k)$  will return the integer index of the  $k^{th}$  element in  $m_i$ 's preference list. In this context the preference lists are a static representation of the problem instance, thus, they don't change during search. Both of these functions are assumed to know the gender of the arguments, and this assumption is made as a simplification to aid the clarity of explanations and pseudo code.

### 2.4.1 Constraint models for stable matching problems

In this subsection, the constraint models for stable matching problems that have appeared in the literature are detailed. The models are given in chronological order.

#### Refined inequalities for stable marriage

In 1999, Aldershof et al.[9] presented an approach for solving the stable marriage problem. The model consists of a vector of  $n$  boolean variables for each man<sup>3</sup>. The variable  $X_{ij}$  being assigned the value 1 signifies that man  $i$  is matched to woman  $j$ , if they are not matched to each other then the variable is assigned the value 0. The constraints for this model are expressed as a set of inequalities as shown in Figure 2.24.

$$\begin{array}{ll}
 1. & \sum_{j=1}^n X_{ij} \leq 1 \quad (1 \leq i \leq n) \\
 2. & \sum_{i=1}^n X_{ij} \leq 1 \quad (1 \leq j \leq n) \\
 3. & \sum_{k=1}^p X_{ik} + \sum_{l=1}^q X_{lj} + X_{ij} \geq 1 \quad \begin{array}{l} (p = pref(i, j) - 1, \\ q = pref(j, i) - 1, 1 \leq i, j \leq n) \end{array}
 \end{array}$$

Figure 2.24: Inequality constraints for the stable marriage problem.

<sup>3</sup>in the paper men are referred to as firms and women as workers.

In Figure 2.24, Constraint 1 states that each man must be matched to at most one woman. Similarly Constraint 2 states that each woman must be matched to at most one man. Constraint 3 can be split into three parts. The first summation will equal 1 if man  $i$  is matched to someone he prefers to woman  $j$ . The second summation will equal 1 if woman  $j$  is matched to someone she prefers to man  $i$  and  $X_{ij}$  will equal 1 if man  $i$  and woman  $j$  are matched to each other. Therefore, constraint 3 states that either man  $i$  and woman  $j$  are matched to each other, or at least one of them will be matched to a preferred partner. Aldershof et al. describe a specialised algorithm which both refines the constraints and reduces the variable domains.

- The set of constraints of type 3 are generated for each  $(i, j)$  pair such that either man  $i$  is woman  $j$ 's most preferred currently available partner or woman  $j$  is man  $i$ 's most preferred currently available partner. Note that if  $X_{ij}$  is assigned the value 0 then  $w_j$  is no longer an available partner for  $m_i$ .
- The full set of constraints of type 3 is then compared to those generated in the first step. For each  $(k, l)$  pair such that its associated constraint is dominated by a constraint from the first step, the dominated constraint is removed and the variable  $X_{kl}$  is set to 0. In this context we say that constraint  $A$  *dominates* constraint  $B$  iff the variables involved in constraint  $A$  are a subset of the variables involved in constraint  $B$ . If no such  $(k, l)$  pair is found, then the algorithm terminates.
- All variables that have been set to 0 are removed from all constraints and the algorithm restarts.

On termination this algorithm will leave the variable domains in an equivalent state to the GS-lists, such that  $X_{ij} = 0$  iff  $w_j$  is not in  $m_i$ 's GS-list. The authors make no time or space complexity arguments for this algorithm. However, the space complexity will be dominated by constraint 3. There are at most  $O(n^2)$  of these constraints each of which will constrain  $\Theta(n)$  variables. Therefore, the total space complexity will be  $O(n^3)$ . The time complexity will be dominated by the second step in the algorithm. A naive analysis shows that each dominance check will take at most  $O(n^2)$  time. Each of the  $\Theta(n)$  constraints generated in the first step will then have to be checked against each of the  $O(n^2)$  other constraints. Therefore, step two will require  $O(n^3)$  dominance checks and a total of  $O(n^5)$  time. In the worst case each iteration of the algorithm could reduce the problem by one

pair and thus the algorithm could iterate at most  $O(n^2)$  times, making the total worst case complexity for this algorithm  $O(n^7)$ .

However, by maintaining a smart data structure for the constraints, the complexity of the first run of the second step could be reduced to  $O(n^4)$ . By “repairing” the domination checks each time rather than restarting, subsequent runs of that step could reduced the complexity even further such that the first run of that step dominates the time complexity. Therefore the total run time for this algorithm could be  $O(n^4)$ . The authors do not claim to be able to find all stable matchings with these algorithms. However, it should be possible to incorporate this algorithm with a backtracking search to enumerate all solutions. The authors then go on to discuss an enumeration technique to generate a random stable matching. They also discuss how this model and algorithm can be extended to solve the NP-complete extension of HR where couples are allowed to submit joint preference lists.

### A constraint programming approach to the stable marriage problem

In 2001, Gent et al.[40] proposed two models to solve the stable marriage problem. The first was a simple model that represented each man as a single constrained integer variable  $x_i$  and each woman by a similar variable  $y_j$ . All variables have an initial domain of  $\{1 \dots n\}$ . The domain values represent people meaning that variable  $x_i$  being assigned the value  $j$  would signify that  $m_i$  was matched to  $w_j$ . This model has a constraint between each (man,woman) pair  $(x_i, y_j)$ . This constraint takes the form of an explicit set of disallowed pairs or forbidden tuples. These constraints are detailed in Figure 2.25.

$$1. \quad C_{ij} = \{(p, q) | p = PL(i, p') \wedge q = PL(j, q') \wedge p' > pref(i, j) \wedge q' > pref(j, i)\} \\ \cup \{(p, q) | p = j \wedge q \neq i\} \\ \cup \{(p, q) | p \neq j \wedge q = i\}$$

Figure 2.25: Constraints for the forbidden tuples stable marriage constraint model.

The set of tuples that make up the constraint detailed in Figure 2.25 contains two distinct types: the *unstable tuples* (line 1) and the *no-bijection tuples* (lines 2,3). The unstable tuples represent an assignment where this couple would rather be matched to each other than their assigned partners, thus forming a blocking pair. For example, the set of unstable tuples for the pair  $(m_1, w_2)$  from the SM instance in Figure 2.26 would be  $\{(4, 3), (4, 5), (5, 3), (5, 5)\}$ . The no-bijection tuples represent an assignment such that either the man is matched to the woman and the woman is matched to another man or the

woman is assigned to the man and the man is assigned to another woman. For example, the no-bijection tuples for the pair  $(m_1, w_2)$  from the SM instance in Figure 2.26 would be  $\{(2, 2), (2, 4), (2, 6), (2, 3), (2, 5), (1, 1), (3, 1), (6, 1), (4, 1), (5, 1)\}$ .

Men's lists	Women's lists	Men's lists	Women's lists
1: 1 3 6 2 4 5	1: 1 5 6 3 2 4	1: 1	1: 1
2: 4 6 1 2 5 3	2: 2 4 6 1 3 5	2: 2	2: 2
3: 1 4 5 3 6 2	3: 4 3 6 2 5 1	3: 4	3: 4 6
4: 6 5 3 4 2 1	4: 1 3 5 4 2 6	4: 6 5 3	4: 3
5: 2 3 1 4 5 6	5: 3 2 6 1 4 5	5: 5 6	5: 6 4 5
6: 3 1 2 6 5 4	6: 5 1 3 6 4 2	6: 3 6 5	6: 5 6 4

Figure 2.26: (a) An SM instance with 6 men and 6 women; (b) the corresponding GS-lists.

Each of the  $n$  men will share one of these constraints with each of the  $n$  women. Therefore,  $\Theta(n^2)$  of these constraints will be required to model an SM instance. Each constraint requires  $\Theta(n^2)$  space. Thus the space complexity of this model will be  $\Theta(n^4)$ . AC2001 [22] can enforce arc-consistency on a binary CSP with  $e$  constraint arcs and variables with domains of size  $d$  such as this in  $O(ed^2)$  time. Therefore, this model would require  $O(n^4)$  time to be made arc-consistent.

The authors show that the fixed point reached by enforcing AC on this model leaves the variable domains in an equivalent state to that of the GS-lists. This property can be exploited to enumerate all stable matchings in a failure free search by using a simple value ordering heuristic. A *failure free* search means that every leaf node of the search tree represents a solution and the search will never have to backtrack due to a bad search decision.

The second model has  $n$  boolean variables for each man and woman. If man variable  $x_{ij} = 1$  then man  $i$  will be matched to a woman no better than his  $j^{\text{th}}$  choice woman, and if  $x_{ij} = 0$  then man  $i$  will be matched to a woman he prefers to his  $j^{\text{th}}$  choice woman. The constraints for this model are shown in Figure 2.27.

Constraint 1 states that all men will not be matched to anyone better than their first choice. Constraint 3 ensures the bijection is enforced. For example, if  $x_{i,3} = 0$  this means that  $m_i$  will be matched to better than the third person in his preference list. It must then be the case that  $x_{i,4} = 0$  meaning that he is also matched to someone better than his fourth choice. Constraint 5 is also there to enforce the bijection. It ensures that if  $m_i$  is matched to someone no better than  $w_j$  and  $w_j$  is matched to someone better than  $m_i$  (thus not matched to  $m_i$ ) then  $m_i$  must also be matched to someone no better than the

1.	$x_{i1} = 1$	$(1 \leq i \leq n)$
2.	$y_{j1} = 1$	$(1 \leq j \leq n)$
3.	$x_{ip} = 0 \rightarrow x_{ip+1} = 0$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 2 \leq p \leq l_i^m)$
4.	$y_{jq} = 0 \rightarrow y_{jq+1} = 0$	$(1 \leq j \leq n, 2 \leq q \leq l_j^w)$
5.	$x_{ip} = 1 \wedge y_{jq} = 0 \rightarrow x_{ip+1} = 1$	$(1 \leq i, j \leq n, p = \text{pref}(i, j), q = \text{pref}(j, i))$
6.	$y_{jq} = 1 \wedge x_{ip} = 0 \rightarrow y_{jq+1} = 1$	$(1 \leq i, j \leq n, p = \text{pref}(i, j), q = \text{pref}(j, i))$
7.	$x_{ip} = 1 \rightarrow y_{jq+1} = 1$	$(1 \leq i, j \leq n, p = \text{pref}(i, j), q = \text{pref}(j, i))$
8.	$y_{jq} = 1 \rightarrow x_{ip+1} = 1$	$(1 \leq i, j \leq n, p = \text{pref}(i, j), q = \text{pref}(j, i))$

Figure 2.27: Constraints for the boolean stable marriage constraint model.

next woman after  $w_j$  in his preference list. Constraint 7 is the stability constraint. If  $m_i$  is matched to someone no better than  $w_j$  then  $w_j$  must not be matched to anyone worse than  $m_i$ . Constraints 2,4,6 and 8 are the female equivalents of 1,3,5 and 7 respectively. In a non-binary CSP with  $e$  constraints, variables with domains of size  $d$  and constraints of arity  $r$ , AC can be established in  $O(ed^r)$  time [20]. In this case, we have  $e = O(n^2)$ ,  $d = 2$  and  $r = 3$ ; therefore, AC can be established in  $O(n^2)$  time for this model. We have  $\Theta(n^2)$  variables and  $\Theta(n^2)$  constraints, so the space complexity of this model is also  $\Theta(n^2)$ . The authors show that enforcing AC on this model reduces the variables' domains to the equivalent to the bounds of the GS-lists, meaning that enforcing AC on this model is sufficient to find both the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings. Therefore, this encoding can be used to find a stable matching in time linear to the size of the problem input. Thus it is of optimal time complexity. Furthermore, the authors state that establishing and maintaining the bounds of the GS-lists throughout search is sufficient to find all stable matchings without failure due to a bad branching decision.

### **An empirical study of the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete lists**

In 2002, Gent and Prosser [44] extended the forbidden tuples constraint model proposed in 2001 [40] to solve the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete preference lists (SMTI). The authors present empirical results obtained by using this model to find the maximum and minimum cardinality stable matchings for randomly generated SMTI instances. Pseudo-code is given for an instance generator (detailed in appendix B.3) which generates problem instances for given probabilities for both the volume of ties and the incompleteness of the preference lists. This was then used to generate instances with a fixed probability of incompleteness while varying the probability of ties from 0 to 1. This

was done in an attempt to observe a phase transition as the problem changes from easy (with no ties) to hard (some ties) and back to easy again (complete indifference). However, this phase transition was not observed, and it was suggested that this may be due to the relatively small instances used ( $n = 10$ ). Memory constraints prevented these experiments being repeated with larger instance sizes. The authors also show how the constrainedness of an instance can be measured by using metrics described in [43]. In a separate paper the same authors show how an extension of the boolean model proposed in 2001 [40] can be extended to find stable matchings for SMTI instances using a 2SAT solver [45]. It is shown that this 2SAT solution can solve problem instances of size  $n = 100$  in a few seconds.

### Tractability by approximating constraint languages

In 2003, Green et al. [47] used stable marriage as an example of how the structure of a constraint satisfaction problem can influence its complexity. To aid this, the authors proposed a new constraint model for this problem. All previous constraint models represented a man/woman pair by either a variable or set of variables representing the men and a similar variable or set of variables representing the women. Constraints were then posted to ensure that the assignments of these variables were consistent with a matching. This means that if  $m_i$  were matched to  $w_j$  then  $w_j$  would also be matched to  $m_i$ . In this model, only the men's domains are directly represented. Each man  $m_i$  is represented by a variable  $x_i$ , with an initial domain of  $\{1 \dots n\}$ . The domain values represent people, meaning that if  $x_i$  were assigned the value  $j$  then this would represent  $m_i$  being matched to  $w_j$ . An extensional constraint is then added between each pair of variables  $(x_i, x_k)$ .

$$1. \quad C_{ik} = \{(j, l) | j \neq l, \text{pref}(l, i) < \text{pref}(l, k) \Rightarrow \text{pref}(i, j) < \text{pref}(i, l), \\ \text{pref}(j, k) < \text{pref}(j, i) \Rightarrow \text{pref}(k, l) < \text{pref}(k, j)\}$$

Figure 2.28: Constraints for the  $n$  variable stable marriage constraint model.

From Figure 2.28, a pair of values  $(j, l)$  is a valid assignment with respect to the constraint  $C_{ik}$  if three conditions are met. The first is that they do not represent the same woman. If  $w_l$  prefers  $m_i$  to  $m_k$  then  $m_i$  must prefer  $w_j$  to  $w_l$ . Finally, if  $w_j$  prefers  $m_k$  to  $m_i$  then  $m_k$  must prefer  $w_l$  to  $w_j$ . After enforcing arc-consistency over this model, the man-optimal stable matching can be found by matching each man to his most preferred partner remaining in his domain. Unlike previous constraint models it turns out that maintaining arc-consistency over this model is not sufficient to enumerate all stable matchings without

backtracking due to an incorrect decision.

This model requires  $\frac{n(n-1)}{2}$  such constraints to model the problem, each of which is of size  $\Theta(n^2)$ . This is an overall space complexity of  $\Theta(n^4)$ , the same as the forbidden tuples model proposed in 2001 [40]. However, in practical terms, it requires less than half the space to store the model which should yield improved performance.

### **Desk-mates (stable matching) with privacy of preferences, and a new distributed CSP framework**

In a workshop in 2004 and later in a conference in 2005, Silaghi et al. [82, 83] proposed a distributed constraint model DisWCSP that can be used to solve the stable desk-mates problem. This problem (more commonly known as the stable roommates problem) is a generalisation of the stable marriage problem. Here the problem has the added requirement that the participants' preference lists must remain private. This paper details a distributed constraint framework within which this problem can be solved. No complexity argument is given for this specific problem, but the framework has a worst case time complexity of  $O(n^{n+2})$ . In 2006 a follow up paper was published [10]. In this paper, this solution is parameterised to allow the level of privacy to be selected at runtime. The levels of privacy are measured by how much information about other people's preference lists can be gained from the messages being passed around as part of the distributed algorithm. It is shown that higher privacy requirements adversely affect the efficiency of the solution.

### **Modeling and solving the stable marriage problem using constraint programming**

In 2005, Manlove and O'Malley [67] proposed two new constraint models for the Stable Marriage problem which follow on from those proposed in 2001 [40]. The first model, referred to as the  $n + 1$ -valued encoding, has  $2n$  variables each with a domain of  $\{1 \dots n + 1\}$ . Here the domain values represent preferences rather than people. This means that if  $x_i$  were assigned the value 2, this would represent  $m_i$  being matched to the second person on his preference list. A variable being assigned the value  $n + 1$  indicates that the corresponding person is not matched. This model has  $\Theta(n^2)$  binary constraints, as shown in Figure 2.29.

Constraints 1 and 2 enforce stability over the model. Considering Constraint 1, if  $m_i$  (represented by variable  $x_i$ ) is to be matched to someone no better than woman  $w_j$

1.	$x_i \geq p \rightarrow y_j \leq q$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m, j = PL(i, p), q = pref(j, i))$
2.	$y_j \geq q \rightarrow x_i \leq p$	$(1 \leq j \leq n, 1 \leq q \leq l_j^w, i = PL(j, q), p = pref(i, j))$
3.	$y_j \neq q \rightarrow x_i \neq p$	$(1 \leq j \leq n, 1 \leq q \leq l_j^w, i = PL(j, q), p = pref(i, j))$
4.	$x_i \neq p \rightarrow y_j \neq q$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m, j = PL(i, p), q = pref(j, i))$

Figure 2.29: Constraints for the  $n+1$ -valued stable marriage constraint model.

(represented by variable  $y_j$ ) then  $w_j$  must not consider any man worse than  $m_i$ . Constraint 2 is similar, with the exception that the male and female roles are reversed. Constraints 3 and 4 ensure that the matching is a bijection. Constraint 3 states that if  $w_j$  is not matched to  $m_i$  then  $m_i$  must not be matched to  $w_j$ . Constraint 4 is similar, except the male and female roles are reversed. Constraints 3 and 4 could be combined to form a single constraint,  $x_i \neq q \leftrightarrow y_j \neq p$ . This would reduce the total number of constraints by twenty-five percent, however the model would still require  $\Theta(n^2)$  constraints.

Enforcing arc-consistency over an implication constraint such as these can be achieved in  $O(d)$  time, where  $d$  is the size of the variable's domain. For example, to propagate Constraint 1 we would first check if the condition  $x_i \geq p$  were true at the head of search, which can be done in  $O(1)$  time. This will then be rechecked each time a value is removed from the domain of  $x_i$ . If at any point the condition is found to be true then the second part of the constraint  $y_j \leq q$  will be enforced by removing all values from  $y_j$  which are greater than  $q$ , and this can be achieved in  $O(1)$  time. Due to the fact that this model contains  $\Theta(n^2)$  constraints and the variable domains are of size  $n$ , enforcing arc-consistency over this model can be achieved in  $O(n^3)$  time. As with the forbidden tuples constraint model proposed in 2001 [40], enforcing AC on this model reduces the variable domains to a state equivalent to the GS-lists produced by the EGS algorithm.

The second proposed model is a follow-on to the boolean encoding given in 2001 [40]. This model has  $2n^2$  variables:  $n$  for each man and woman and each has an initial domain of  $\{0, 1, 2, 3\}$ . Unlike a traditional constraint model each domain value has a specific meaning. The value  $0 \in x_{ij}$  means man  $m_i$  has not yet proposed to woman  $w_j$ . This value is removed when this proposal is made. The value  $2 \notin x_{ij}$  means woman  $w_j$  would be removed from man  $m_i$ 's preference list by the man-oriented EGS algorithm. The value  $3 \notin x_{ij}$  means woman  $w_j$  would be removed from man  $m_i$ 's preference list by the woman-oriented EGS algorithm. The value 1 is used as a dummy value to ensure that the variable domains are not reduced to the empty set since this would cause the constraint solver to fail and



backtrack unnecessarily. The constraints for this model are shown in Figure 2.30.

1.	$x_{i1} > 0$	$(1 \leq i \leq n)$
2.	$(x_{ip} \neq 2 \wedge x_{ip} > 0) \rightarrow x_{ip+1} > 0$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m - 1)$
3.	$x_{ip} > 0 \rightarrow y_{jq+1} \neq 2$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m)(*)$
4.	$y_{jq} \neq 2 \rightarrow y_{jq+1} \neq 2$	$(1 \leq j \leq n, 1 \leq q \leq l_j^w - 1)$
5.	$y_{jq} \neq 2 \rightarrow x_{ip} \neq 2$	$(1 \leq j \leq n, 1 \leq q \leq l_j^w)(\circ)$
6.	$y_{j1} > 0$	$(1 \leq j \leq n)$
7.	$(y_{jq} \neq 3 \wedge y_{jq} > 0) \rightarrow y_{jq+1} > 0$	$(1 \leq j \leq n, 1 \leq q \leq l_j^w - 1)$
8.	$x_{ip} \neq 3 \rightarrow x_{ip+1} \neq 3$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m - 1)$
9.	$y_{jq} > 0 \rightarrow x_{ip+1} \neq 3$	$(1 \leq j \leq n, 1 \leq q \leq l_j^w)(\circ)$
10.	$x_{ip} \neq 3 \rightarrow y_{jq} \neq 3$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m)(*)$
		$(*) j = PL(i, p), q = pref(j, i)$
		$(\circ) i = PL(j, q), p = pref(i, j)$

Figure 2.30: Constraints for the 4-valued stable marriage constraint model.

In this model, Constraints 1 to 5 simulate an application of the man-oriented EGS algorithm and Constraints 6 to 10 simulate an application of the woman-oriented EGS algorithm. Constraint 1 states that  $m_i$  must propose to his first choice partner. Constraint 2 states that, if  $m_i$  has been rejected by some woman that he has proposed to then he must propose to the next woman in his preference list. Constraint 3 states that if  $m_i$  has proposed to  $w_j$  then  $w_j$  must reject the next man after  $m_i$  from her preference list. If  $w_j$  has rejected her  $q^{th}$  choice man due to a proposal then she must also reject her  $(q + 1)^{th}$  choice man too, as stated by Constraint 4. If  $w_j$  rejects  $m_i$  then he must remove her from his list, as stated by Constraint 5. Constraints 6 to 10 work in the same way except the gender specific terms have been reversed.

The variable domains have a constant number of domain values, thus, each constraint can only be revised  $O(1)$  times and each constraint can be revised in  $O(1)$  time. Therefore, arc-consistency can be enforced over the  $\Theta(n^2)$  constraints in  $O(n^2)$  time. Unlike the 2001 boolean encoding [40], this model's arc-consistent domains are the equivalent of the full GS-lists.

The non-standard meanings of the variable domain values in this model prevent this model from being used within a standard search procedure to enumerate all stable matchings. This can easily be confirmed, since instantiating all the variables to the value 1 will not violate any of the constraints but will not constitute a stable matching. However, it is possible to enumerate all stable matchings by using the following search process:

- Choose an arbitrary value  $i$ , such that two variables  $x_{ik}$  and  $x_{il}$  exist, where  $\{2, 3\} \in$

$D_{ik}$  and  $\{2, 3\} \in D_{il}$  (meaning  $m_i$  has more than one woman remaining in his domain). If no such man exists then the current variable domains represent a stable matching.

- In the left branch of the search tree force  $m_i$  to be matched to his best remaining choice woman  $w_j$ . This is done by removing the value 3 from  $x_{ik+1}$  where  $k = \text{pref}(i, j)$ . Re-run the arc-consistency algorithm and choose another man.
- On backtracking remove  $w_j$  from the domain of  $m_i$ , by removing the value 2 from  $y_{jl}$  where  $k = \text{pref}(j, i)$ .

Another way to find all stable matchings with this model would be to add a variable  $x'_i$  for each  $m_i$ , along with the channelling constraints given in Figure 2.31. This new set of variables will then be used as the search variables for the problem. This will allow the search process total freedom to iterate over these variables using any standard search strategy.

1.	$x_{ip} \neq 2 \rightarrow x'_i \neq p$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m)$
2.	$x_{ip} \neq 3 \rightarrow x'_i \neq p$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m)$
3.	$x'_i = p \rightarrow x_{ip+1} \neq 3$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m)$
4.	$x'_i > p \rightarrow y_{jq} \neq 2$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^m, j = PL(i, p), q = \text{pref}(j, i))$

Figure 2.31: Channelling constraints for the 4-valued stable marriage constraint model.

In Figure 2.31 Constraints 1 and 2 state that if  $m_i$ 's  $p^{\text{th}}$  choice partner has been removed from his domain via either the male or female set of constraints then she will be removed from the domain of  $x'_i$ . If  $m_i$  is assigned his  $p^{\text{th}}$  choice partner via the  $x'_i$  variable, then Constraint 3 will remove 3 from the domain of  $x_{ip+1}$ . This will effectively remove all lesser women from his domain. If  $m_i$  is rejected by his previous favourite partner  $y_j$  via the  $x'_i$  variable, then Constraint 4 will force  $y_j$  to be matched to a better partner than  $m_i$ . Adding these constraints will not increase either the run time or space complexities of this model. However, they will increase the space requirements by around twenty-five percent and will probably increase the run time by a similar amount.

### Distributed stable matching problems

In 2005, Brito and Meseguer [25] proposed distributed constraint solutions for both the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. Their solutions for both problems

focus on maintaining the privacy of each participant’s preference list. These models extend the forbidden tuples model proposed by Gent et al. [40]. Each man and woman is represented by an agent. If two agents share a constraint (i.e. the represented participants are in each other’s preference lists) then each agent has its own partially complete version of the constraint. Each agent is only aware of the part of the constraint that can be constructed from the preference list of the participant it represents. These constraints are then propagated via a cut down version of a distributed forward checking algorithm previously proposed by the same authors [24]. The authors do not give a complexity argument for their solutions. However, they do give empirical results of some experiments comparing their model against a distributed version of the EGS algorithm. In 2006, a follow up paper was published [26] in which the authors show how this solution can be extended to solve the more general problem with ties and incomplete preference lists.

### **A constraint programming approach to the Hospitals/Residents problem**

In a workshop in 2005 and later in a conference in 2007, Manlove et al. [69, 70] presented three different approaches to solving the Hospitals/Residents problem within the constraint environment. For the first solution the authors show how a hospital  $h_j$  with a capacity  $c_j > 1$  can be “cloned” into  $c_j$  hospitals each with a capacity of 1. Using this technique any HR problem instance can be converted into a Stable Marriage instance. This will make the instance solvable by any stable marriage constraint model. Using this approach the preference lists in the resulting Stable Marriage instance would be a factor of  $c$  larger than those of the original Hospitals/Residents instance, which implies that this approach will require significantly more memory in order to find a solution.

The second solution is an extension of the  $n$ -valued stable marriage constraint model proposed in 2005 [67]. This model consists of  $n$  variables  $x_i$  one representing each of the  $n$  residents. Representing each of the  $m$  hospitals are  $c$  variables  $y_{j,1}$  to  $y_{j,c}$ . The domains of the resident variables represent preferences. This means that if  $x_i$  were assigned the value 3 this would represent resident  $i$  being matched to its third choice hospital. Each resident variable also initially has the value  $m + 1$  in its domain. Any resident assigned this value will be unmatched. Similarly the values in the hospitals’ variable domains also represent preferences in the same way and they have a similar value  $n + 1$  to represent a hospital post being unassigned. The constraints for this model are given in Figure 2.32.

Constraint 1 eliminates symmetric solutions by enforcing a total order on the posts for

1.	$y_{jk} < y_{jk+1}$	$(1 \leq j \leq m, 1 \leq k \leq c_j - 1)$
2.	$y_{jk} \geq q \rightarrow x_i \leq p$	$(1 \leq j \leq m, 1 \leq k \leq c_j, 1 \leq q \leq l_j^h)(\circ)$
3.	$x_i \neq p \rightarrow y_{jk} \neq q$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^r, 1 \leq k \leq c_j)(*)$
4.	$(x_i \geq p \wedge y_{jk-1} < q) \rightarrow y_{jk} \leq q$	$(1 \leq i \leq n, 1 \leq p \leq l_i^r, 1 \leq k \leq c_j)(*)$
5.	$y_{jc_j} < q \rightarrow x_i \neq p$	$(1 \leq j \leq m, c_j \leq q \leq l_j^h)(\circ)$
		$(\circ) i = PL(j, q), p = pref(i, j)$
		$(*) j = PL(i, p), q = pref(j, i)$

Figure 2.32: Constraints for the Hospitals/Residents Problem constraint model.

each hospital, meaning that hospital  $h_j$  must prefer the resident assigned to post  $y_{jk}$  to the resident assigned to post  $y_{jk+1}$ . Constraint 2 states that if one of hospital  $h_j$ 's posts is going to be assigned to a resident no better than resident  $r_i$  then resident  $r_i$  must not be assigned to a hospital worse than  $h_j$ . If a hospital  $h_j$  is removed from a resident  $r_i$ 's domain then Constraint 3 will remove resident  $r_i$  from the domain of all the variables representing hospital  $h_j$ . If resident  $r_i$  is to be assigned to a hospital no better than  $h_j$  and the hospital's  $k - 1^{th}$  post is going to be assigned to a better resident than  $r_i$  then Constraint 4 will ensure that hospital  $h_j$ 's  $k^{th}$  post is assigned to a resident no worse than  $r_i$ . Finally, Constraint 5 states that if hospital  $h_j$ 's last post is being assigned to a resident that is better than  $r_i$  then  $h_j$  will be removed from  $r_i$ 's domain. This constraint model consists of  $O(Lc)$  constraints, where  $L$  is the total combined length of the preference lists and  $c$  is the largest capacity of all the hospitals. The variable domains will initially be of size  $O(n + m)$ . Each of the constraints in Figure 2.32 can be revised in  $O(1)$  time. Therefore, enforcing arc-consistency over this model can be achieved in  $O(Lc(n + m))$  time.

The third solution is a specialised  $n$ -ary constraint written by the author and is given in detail in Chapter 5. Manlove et al. [69, 70] then go on to demonstrate the versatility of these constraint solutions by showing how they can be easily extended to solve harder variants of the problem. These extensions are covered in detail in Chapter 6.

### 2.4.2 Evaluating the constraint stable marriage solutions

A summary of the theoretical complexities of the stable marriage constraint models reviewed in this Section is shown in Table 2.1.

The time complexities of two of the constraint solutions to the Stable Marriage problem have been proven to equal that of the EGS algorithm (detailed in Figure 2.14). How-

Year	Model	Distributed	Complexity		Citation
			Time	Space	
1999	Refined Inequalities	No	$O(n^4)$	$O(n^3)$	[9]
2001	Forbidden Tuples	No	$O(n^4)$	$O(n^4)$	[40]
2001	Boolean Encoding	No	$O(n^2)$	$\Theta(n^2)$	[40]
2003	N-Variable encoding	No	$O(n^4)$	$O(n^4)$	[47]
2004	DisWCSP	Yes	$O(n^{n+2})$	-	[82]
2005	N-Valued Encoding	No	$O(n^3)$	$\Theta(n^2)$	[67]
2005	4-Valued Encoding	No	$O(n^2)$	$\Theta(n^2)$	[67]
2005	DisFC	Yes	-	-	[25]

Table 2.1: Summary of published constraint solutions to the stable marriage problem

ever, the EGS algorithm requires little memory for supporting data structures, unlike the constraint solutions which require a constraint model, variable domains and any data structures required by the underlying constraint solver. In practice, this will reduce the efficiency of the constraint solutions. An empirical study was undertaken to determine whether these theoretically optimal constraint solutions are in fact practical solutions when compared to the specialised algorithmic solutions.

The five models that can be modelled within a standard constraint toolkit, namely the forbidden tuples (FT) and boolean (Bool) models from 2001 [40], the n-Variable encoding (n-Var) from 2003 [47] and the n-valued (n-Val) and 4-Valued (4-Val) encodings from 2005 [67], were empirically compared to the EGS algorithm. All these encodings were implemented using the JSolver toolkit [2], i.e. the Java version of ILOG Solver. These experiments were run on a 3.2Ghz processor system with 2 Gb of random access memory, running Linux and Java2 SDK 1.5.0.3 with both the minimum and maximum heap sizes set to 1850 Mb. For each value of  $n$ , one thousand instances were randomly generated using the stable marriage instance generator detailed in Appendix B.1. For each instance, the time was recorded to generate the GS-lists (except for the Bool model which yields the bounds of the GS-lists) from the preference lists. For the constraint solutions, these times include the time to generate the constraints and variables, as well as any time required by the solver to initialise and enforce arc-consistency over the model to produce the equivalent of the GS-lists. The times for the EGS algorithm include the time to initialise the required data structures and run the man-oriented version of the algorithm to produce the MGS-lists. The woman-oriented version of the algorithm was then run over the MGS-lists to produce the GS-lists. The mean times to find the GS-lists are shown in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. An entry – denotes that an out-of-memory error occurred.

model	20	40	60	80	100
FT	0.431	1.851	7.352	-	-
n-Val	0.395	1.047	3.681	10.59	-
n-Val	0.317	0.358	0.431	0.532	0.698
4-Val	0.348	0.434	0.541	0.654	0.803
Bool	0.313	0.364	0.450	0.533	0.659
EGS	0.010	0.018	0.017	0.036	0.037

Table 2.2: Mean time to produce the GS-lists (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 20 to 100

From Table 2.2 it can be seen that for Stable Marriage instances ranging in size from 20 to 100, the EGS algorithm can find a stable matching one order of magnitude faster than any of the constraint solutions to the problem. It can also be seen that the relatively simple sub-optimal n-Val model out-performs the optimal 4-Val model (and to a lesser extent the bool model) for some instance sizes.

model	200	400	600	800	1000
n-Val	2.553	16.57	54.23	128.8	-
4-Val	2.566	12.81	-	-	-
Bool	2.123	11.18	32.56	-	-
EGS	0.021	0.073	0.126	0.175	0.278

Table 2.3: Mean time to produce the GS-lists (in seconds) for instances varying from 200 to 1000

It can be seen in Table 2.3 that, as the instance sizes increase to the range 200 to 1000, the performance gap between the constraint solutions to the algorithmic solutions increase to two orders of magnitude. Furthermore, the largest problem to be solved by a constraint solution was of size  $n = 800$ , which the EGS algorithm can solve in less than two tenths of a second. The sub-optimal  $O(n^3)$  time complexity of the n-Val model can be seen as its run times seem to be increasing faster than that of the 4-Val and Bool models. However, the relative simplicity of the n-Val model is reflected by the fact that it can solve larger problem instances than the other two constraint solutions.

### 2.4.3 Conclusion

Stable matching problems have been an active area of research within the constraint community for the last eight years. A summary of the published solutions can be found in Table 2.1. These problems have been used to illustrate the versatility of constraint

technology [62]. They have also been used as an example of how the structure of a constraint satisfaction problem can influence its complexity [47]. All the papers discussed here can be split into one of two sets. In [10, 25, 26, 82, 83] the aim was to find a stable matching in a distributed framework in which privacy of the participants' preference lists has to be maintained. In [40, 44, 67, 70] centralised constraint models were proposed that could be used within standard constraint solvers. The advantage of this approach is that side constraints can be added to allow richer problems to be solved. This lends this approach the versatility of the general architecture of a CSP. In [44] the authors demonstrate the versatility of the explicit constraint solution from [40] by extending it to finding stable matchings for instances of the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete preference lists. In [40, 67] the authors show that emulating the EGS algorithm can result in an optimal constraint model.

Empirical evidence, presented in the previous section, has shown that there is a significant performance gap between the constraint and algorithmic solutions to the Stable Marriage problem. The constraint solutions justify their usefulness by means of their versatility. As yet this has not been demonstrated. However, the constraint solutions would be more attractive if this performance gap could be reduced, whilst maintaining the beneficial attribute of versatility. To improve the performance of the constraint solutions the efficiency of propagation needs to be improved. A possible way to improve the efficiency of propagation is to write a specialised constraint to represent the problem. A side-effect of this is that the space required to store a specialised constraint model will be significantly less than a regular constraint model. This will result in significantly reduced model creation times as well as allowing the representation of significantly larger problem instances. To ensure the versatility of the solution, this specialised constraint will need to operate within a standard constraint solver. The next chapter presents such a solution.

## Chapter 3

# Specialised constraint models for the Stable Marriage problem

### 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, two new specialised constraints for the stable marriage problem are presented. Initially the constraint will be defined for the classical SM problem with  $n$  men,  $n$  women and complete preferences. Later it will be shown how these models can be extended to allow incomplete preference lists. The first is a binary constraint which acts over a single (man,woman) pair.  $O(n^2)$  of these constraints are required to model a stable marriage instance. The second is an  $n$ -ary constraint which can model a problem instance with a single constraint. When made arc-consistent both of these constraints reduce the problem to a state equivalent to that of the GS-lists. We prove that arc-consistency can be enforced over the  $n$ -ary constraint in  $O(n^2)$  time. This means that it can produce the GS-lists, and thus find a stable matching, in time linear in the size of the preference lists, which is optimal. Empirical results are then presented, in Section 3.4, which show that both constraints significantly improve on the performance of previous constraint solutions to this problem.

### 3.2 Specialised binary constraint (SM2)

A stable matching can be defined as a bijection of men to women such that no blocking pair exists. Therefore, an intuitive way to model this problem as a specialised constraint would be to have a constraint for each man/woman pair which ensures they do not become



a blocking pair or violate the bijection.

A specialised binary constraint (SM2) is now presented for the Stable Marriage problem [94]. This specialised constraint should be considered an object with attributes and methods which act upon it. We therefore present those attributes and methods.

### 3.2.1 The constraint model and supporting data structures

A constrained integer variable is associated with each man and each woman, such that,  $\{z_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\}$  corresponds to the set of men and  $\{z_j \mid n + 1 \leq j \leq 2n\}$  to the set of women. In Stable Marriage instance  $I$ ,  $m_i$  is represented by the variable  $z_i$  and  $w_j$  is represented by the variable  $z_{n+j}$ . For ease of explanation, the variables may be used in place of the person they represent. In general, a variable with an index  $i$  such as  $z_i$ , will represent a man and a variable with a  $j$  index will represent a woman. The variable domains are initialised to  $\{1 \dots n\}$ . The domain values represent preferences, such that variable  $z_k$  being assigned the value  $l$  represents the  $k^{\text{th}}$  person being married to their  $l^{\text{th}}$  choice of partner. The problem is represented in this way to help simplify the propagation of this constraint. Propagation occurs when it can be proven that a value cannot appear in any solution. There are two cases in which propagation can occur in this constraint. The first is if the lower bound of variable  $z_i$  which represents  $m_i$  (or  $w_{i-n}$ ) equals  $a$ , where  $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$  (or  $a = \text{rank}(w_{i-n}, m_k)$ ). In this case we must remove from the domain of  $z_{n+j}$  (or  $z_k$ ) the set  $R$  of values that represent men (or women) that  $w_j$  (or  $m_k$ ) ranks lower than  $m_i$  (or  $w_{i-n}$ ). This can be achieved by removing all domain values greater than  $\text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$  (or  $\text{rank}(m_k, w_{i-n})$ ) from the domain of  $z_{n+j}$  (or  $z_k$ ). This type of propagation can occur either at the head of propagation or when the lower bound of a variable changes. The second case when propagation occurs is when the value  $a$  is removed from the domain of  $z_i$  in which case, to ensure the bijection, the value  $b$  must be removed from the domain of  $z_k$ , where  $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_{k-n})$  and  $b = \text{rank}(w_{k-n}, m_i)$  (or  $a = \text{rank}(w_{i-n}, m_k)$  and  $b = \text{rank}(m_k, w_{i-n})$ ).

Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: w_1 w_3 w_2 w_4$	$w_1: m_1 m_3 m_2 m_4$
$m_2: w_4 w_1 w_2 w_3$	$w_2: m_2 m_4 m_1 m_3$
$m_3: w_1 w_4 w_3 w_2$	$w_3: m_3 m_4 m_2 m_1$
$m_4: w_3 w_4 w_2 w_1$	$w_4: m_1 m_3 m_4 m_2$

Figure 3.1: A stable marriage instance of size  $n = 4$ .

SM2 is a binary constraint which acts over a pair of variables  $(z_i, z_j)$ , which represents the pair  $(m_i, w_{j-n})$  in the matching. To model a stable marriage instance, using this constraint, will require one SM2 constraint for each (man,woman) pair  $(m_i, w_j)$ . Therefore, it requires  $\Theta(n^2)$  of these constraints to model any given stable marriage instance.

The SM2 constraint assumes that it has access to the following functions:

- $PL(k, a)$  where  $1 \leq k \leq 2n$  and  $1 \leq a \leq n$ , will return the index of the variable representing the  $a^{th}$  person in the preference list of the person represented by the variable  $z_k$ . For example, from the instance shown in Figure 3.1,  $PL(3, 2)$  will return 8. Because,  $z_8$  is the variable that represents  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  is the  $2^{nd}$  woman in  $m_3$ 's preference list. Similarly,  $PL(8, 2)$  will return 3.
- $pref(k, l)$  where  $1 \leq k, l \leq 2n$ , will return the rank of the person represented by variable  $z_l$  in the preference list of the person represented by  $z_k$ . For example, from the instance shown in Figure 3.1,  $pref(3, 8)$  will return 2, because,  $z_8$  is the variable that represents  $w_4$  and  $w_4$  is the  $2^{nd}$  woman in  $m_3$ 's preference list. Similarly,  $pref(8, 3)$  will also return 2. Because,  $m_3$  is the  $2^{nd}$  man in  $w_4$ 's preference list.
- $min(dom(x))$  will return the smallest value remaining in the domain of variable  $x$ .
- $setMax(dom(x), k)$ <sup>1</sup> will delete all values from the domain of variable  $x$  which are strictly greater than the value  $k$ .
- $delVal(dom(x), k)$  will delete the value  $k$  from the domain of variable  $x$ .

The  $min(dom(x))$ ,  $setMax(dom(x), k)$  and  $delVal(dom(x), k)$  functions are assumed to be supplied by the underlying constraint solver. This constraint is intended to be solver independent and thus no assumptions are made about the implementations of these methods. However, Van Hentenryck et al in Section 4 of their 1992 paper [96] detail an implementation of an integer domain in which all these functions can run in constant time. Therefore, for purposes of the complexity argument these functions are assumed to run in constant time.

Each SM2 constraint has the following attributes:

- $x$  : The local representation of the first constrained variable. For ease of explanation, we assume that  $x$  represents  $m_i$ .

---

<sup>1</sup>Note that this method does not necessarily change the upper bound of  $dom(x)$ . If the maximum value in  $dom(x)$  is less than  $k$  then this method will have no effect.

- $y$  : The local representation of the second constrained variable. For ease of explanation, we assume that  $x$  represents  $w_j$ .
- $xPy$  : The rank of the person represented by variable  $x$  in the preference list of the person represented by variable  $y$ .
- $yPx$  : The rank of the person represented by variable  $y$  in the preference list of the person represented by variable  $x$ .

The SM2 constraint is designed to operate within an AC5 style framework (Section 2.2). Therefore, to implement this constraint two methods are required, *init* and *remVal*. The *init* method is called to initiate the propagation. The *remVal* method is called when a domain value is removed from the domain of one of the constrained variables. These methods are detailed below:

```

1. init()
2.   if min(dom(x)) ≥ xPy then
3.     setMax(dom(y),yPx)
4.   end if
5.   if min(dom(y)) ≥ yPx then
6.     setMax(dom(x),xPy)
7.   end if

```

Figure 3.2: The *init* method of the SM2 constraint.

**init()** The *init()* method (Figure 3.2) is called to initiate the propagation. This method checks if  $m_i$  prefers  $w_j$  to any other woman in his domain (line 2). If so, then  $w_j$  must not consider any partner worse than  $m_i$  (line 3), otherwise,  $(m_i, w_j)$  may form a blocking pair. Symmetrically, it also checks if  $w_j$  prefers  $m_i$  to any other man in her domain (line 5) and acts accordingly (line 6). Domain reductions caused by this method are the equivalent of a proposal in the EGS algorithm (shown in Figure 2.14 in Section 2.4).

**remVal( $k, a$ )** The *remVal( $k, a$ )* method (Figure 3.3) is called when the value  $a$  has been removed from the domain of the  $k^{th}$  constrained variable. The code as stated assumes that  $k = 1$ , meaning that a value has been removed from the man variable  $x$ . If the removed value  $a$  equals  $m_i$ 's rank for  $w_j$  (line 2), this means that  $m_i$  can no longer be matched to  $w_j$ . To maintain the bijection,  $w_j$ 's rank for  $m_i$  is removed from  $w_j$ 's domain (line 3). This type of domain reduction is the equivalent of a rejection. If  $m_i$  prefers  $w_j$  to any

```

1. remVal( $k, a$ )
2.   if  $a = xPy$  then
3.     delVal(dom( $y$ ), $yPx$ )
4.   end if
5.   if  $\min(\text{dom}(x)) \geq xPy$  then
6.     setMax(dom( $y$ ), $yPx$ )
7.   end if

```

Figure 3.3: The *remVal* method of the SM2 constraint.

other woman in his current domain (line 5), then  $w_j$  must not consider any man she ranks lower than  $m_i$  (line 6). As with the *init* method, any domain reduction caused by line 5 is the equivalent of a proposal in the EGS algorithm. To complete this constraint we need to drop the assumption that  $k = 1$ . To do this a conditional statement should be added such that if  $k = 1$ , the above code is run. Alternately if  $k = 2$  then similar code is run in which the  $x$  and  $y$  terms and the  $xPy$  and  $yPx$  terms are swapped.

### 3.2.2 Complexity of SM2

Neither *init* nor *remVal* (as shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3) contains any loops and each uses only functions that are assumed to run in constant time, so both *init* and *remVal* run in  $O(1)$  time. During propagation the *init* method will be called at most once for each constraint, and the *remVal* method will be called at most once for each of the  $\Theta(n)$  values in the initial domains of the two constrained variables. Therefore, a single SM2 constraint will require at most  $O(n)$  time during propagation.  $\Theta(n^2)$  SM2 constraints are required to model a problem instance. Therefore, in the worst case it would take  $O(n^3)$  time to enforce arc-consistency over that model. Each SM2 constraint holds two integer variables to record the preferences and two references to the variables it constrains. Therefore, each constraint requires  $O(1)$  space. As it requires  $\Theta(n^2)$  SM2 constraints to model an instance of SM, the model would require  $\Theta(n^2)$  space.

### 3.2.3 Worked example

This section shows how a constraint model using this constraint would propagate the domains for the Stable Marriage instance shown in Figure 3.4. This is done to demonstrate the behaviour of the SM2 constraint, to highlight its inherent inefficiencies and provide a comparison for future more efficient solutions. In this walk-through, the constraints are referred to as  $C_{i,j}$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n < j \leq 2n$ ). A Java style attribute selector is used to indicate

to which constraint the method belongs. For example,  $C_{2,8}.init()$  indicates that a call to the  $init()$  method of the SM2 constraint which constrains the variables  $z_2(m_2)$  and  $z_8(w_4)$  was made. We use an AC5 style algorithm as detailed in Section 2.2.4. All method calls will be made via a first-in-first-out queue system. Whenever a method call needs to be made it will be added to the queue. Method calls will then be taken from the head of the queue and executed. This process will continue until the queue is empty.

Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: w_1 w_3 w_2 w_4$	$w_1: m_1 m_3 m_2 m_4$
$m_2: w_4 w_1 w_2 w_3$	$w_2: m_2 m_4 m_1 m_3$
$m_3: w_1 w_4 w_3 w_2$	$w_3: m_3 m_4 m_2 m_1$
$m_4: w_3 w_4 w_2 w_1$	$w_4: m_1 m_3 m_4 m_2$

Figure 3.4: A stable marriage instance of size  $n = 4$ .

$z_1$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_5$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
$z_2$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_6$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
$z_3$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_7$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
$z_4$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_8$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$

Figure 3.5: The initial variable domains

Figure 3.5 shows the initial variable domains. The first step of propagation is to place a call to  $init$  in the queue for each constraint. In Figure 3.6, all calls to  $init()$  are shown with the resulting domain reductions in Figure 3.7. The type of domain reduction is also indicated.  $P$  indicates a proposal and  $R$  indicates a rejection.

For each of the domain values removed in Figure 3.6, a set of  $n$  calls to  $remVal$ , one for each constraint associated with the reduced variable, will have been placed in the propagation queue. These calls and their subsequent domain reductions are shown in Figure 3.8 along with the resultant domains in Figure 3.9.

It should be noted that the resultant domain reductions caused by the calls to  $remVal$  detailed in Figure 3.8 are all rejections. This is because all the calls in Figure 3.8 were placed in the queue as a result of proposals, hence the values were removed via the  $setMax$  function. A new proposal can only be made when the lower bound of a variable's domain increases. Since the  $setMax$  function cannot alter the domain minimum without causing a domain to be reduced to the empty set, it cannot cause additional proposals. Each domain reduction in Figure 3.8 would then cause an additional set of  $n$  calls to  $remVal$  to be placed in the propagation queue. These calls are shown in Figure 3.10 and the resulting

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C_{1,5}.init()$	$(z_1, \{2, 3, 4\})$ $(z_5, \{2, 3, 4\})$	P P
2	$C_{1,6}.init()$		
3	$C_{1,7}.init()$		
4	$C_{1,8}.init()$		
5	$C_{2,5}.init()$		
6	$C_{2,6}.init()$	$(z_2, \{4\})$	P
7	$C_{2,7}.init()$		
8	$C_{2,8}.init()$		
9	$C_{3,5}.init()$		
10	$C_{3,6}.init()$		
11	$C_{3,7}.init()$	$(z_3, \{4\})$	P
12	$C_{3,8}.init()$		
13	$C_{4,5}.init()$		
14	$C_{4,6}.init()$		
15	$C_{4,7}.init()$	$(z_7, \{3, 4\})$	P
16	$C_{4,8}.init()$		

Figure 3.6: Calls made to *init*, where P indicates that the domain reduction was equivalent to a proposal.

$z_1$	$\{1\}$	$z_5$	$\{1\}$
$z_2$	$\{1, 2, 3\}$	$z_6$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
$z_3$	$\{1, 2, 3\}$	$z_7$	$\{1, 2\}$
$z_4$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_8$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$

Figure 3.7: The variable domains after the calls to *init* detailed in Figure 3.6

domains are shown in Figure 3.11.

In Figure 3.10 all domain reductions are proposals. This is because all the calls to *remVal* processed in Figure 3.10 were placed in the propagation queue as a result of a rejection (as shown in Figure 3.8). In a rejection,  $m_i$ 's preference for  $w_j$  is removed from the domain of  $x$  as a result of a call to *remVal*(2,  $k$ ), where  $k$  equals  $w_j$ 's preference for  $m_i$ . Therefore, a rejection could not directly cause another rejection. This is because the only value that could be removed via a rejection must have already been removed to cause the initial domain reduction. Each domain reduction in Figure 3.10 would then cause an additional set of  $n$  calls to *remVal* to be placed in the propagation queue, these calls are shown in Figure 3.12 along with the resultant domains in Figure 3.13.

As can be seen in Figures 3.8, 3.10 and 3.12, the set of  $n$  calls to *remVal* for each domain reduction results in at most one further domain reduction. This will always be the case, assuming there are no additional side constraints. A value  $v_1$  being removed

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C_{1,5}.remVal(2, 2)$		
2	$C_{2,5}.remVal(2, 2)$		
3	$C_{3,5}.remVal(2, 2)$	$(z_3, \{1\})$	R
4	$C_{4,5}.remVal(2, 2)$		
5	$C_{1,5}.remVal(2, 3)$		
6	$C_{2,5}.remVal(2, 3)$	$(z_2, \{2\})$	R
7	$C_{3,5}.remVal(2, 3)$		
8	$C_{4,5}.remVal(2, 3)$		
9	$C_{1,5}.remVal(2, 4)$		
10	$C_{2,5}.remVal(2, 4)$		
11	$C_{3,5}.remVal(2, 4)$		
12	$C_{4,5}.remVal(2, 4)$	$(z_4, \{4\})$	R
13	$C_{1,5}.remVal(1, 2)$		
14	$C_{1,6}.remVal(1, 2)$		
15	$C_{1,7}.remVal(1, 2)$		
16	$C_{1,8}.remVal(1, 2)$		
17	$C_{1,5}.remVal(1, 3)$		
18	$C_{1,6}.remVal(1, 3)$	$(z_6, \{3\})$	R
19	$C_{1,7}.remVal(1, 3)$		
20	$C_{1,8}.remVal(1, 3)$		
21	$C_{1,5}.remVal(1, 4)$		
22	$C_{1,6}.remVal(1, 4)$		
23	$C_{1,7}.remVal(1, 4)$		
24	$C_{1,8}.remVal(1, 4)$	$(z_8, \{1\})$	R
25	$C_{2,5}.remVal(1, 4)$		
26	$C_{2,6}.remVal(1, 4)$		
27	$C_{2,7}.remVal(1, 4)$		
28	$C_{2,8}.remVal(1, 4)$		
29	$C_{3,5}.remVal(1, 4)$		
30	$C_{3,6}.remVal(1, 4)$	$(z_6, \{4\})$	R
31	$C_{3,7}.remVal(1, 4)$		
32	$C_{3,8}.remVal(1, 4)$		
33	$C_{1,7}.remVal(2, 4)$		
34	$C_{2,7}.remVal(2, 4)$		
35	$C_{3,7}.remVal(2, 4)$		
36	$C_{4,7}.remVal(2, 4)$		
37	$C_{1,7}.remVal(2, 3)$		
38	$C_{2,7}.remVal(2, 3)$		
39	$C_{3,7}.remVal(2, 3)$		
40	$C_{4,7}.remVal(2, 3)$		

Figure 3.8: Calls made to *remVal* as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.6, where R indicates that the domain reduction was equivalent to a rejection.

from the domain of  $z_i$ , as a result of a proposal, can only cause the removal of the value  $v_2$  from  $z_j$ , where  $j = PL(i, v_1)$  and  $v_2 = pref(j, i)$ . A value  $v_1$  being removed from the domain of  $z_i$ , as a result of a rejection, can only cause a reduction in the domain of  $z_j$ , where  $j = PL(i, min(z_i))$ . No other proposals will have an effect, because any woman  $z_l$  that  $z_i$  prefers to  $z_j$  will have already rejected him. Therefore, the largest value in her

$z_1$	$\{1\}$	$z_5$	$\{1\}$
$z_2$	$\{1, 3\}$	$z_6$	$\{1, 2\}$
$z_3$	$\{2, 3\}$	$z_7$	$\{1, 2\}$
$z_4$	$\{1, 2, 3\}$	$z_8$	$\{2, 3, 4\}$

Figure 3.9: The variable domains after the calls to *remVal* detailed in Figure 3.8

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C_{2,5}.remVal(1, 2)$		
2	$C_{2,6}.remVal(1, 2)$		
3	$C_{2,7}.remVal(1, 2)$		
4	$C_{2,8}.remVal(1, 2)$		
5	$C_{3,5}.remVal(1, 1)$		
6	$C_{3,6}.remVal(1, 1)$		
7	$C_{3,7}.remVal(1, 1)$		
8	$C_{3,8}.remVal(1, 1)$	$(z_8, \{3, 4\})$	P
9	$C_{4,5}.remVal(1, 4)$		
10	$C_{4,6}.remVal(1, 4)$		
11	$C_{4,7}.remVal(1, 4)$		
12	$C_{4,8}.remVal(1, 4)$		
13	$C_{1,6}.remVal(2, 3)$		
14	$C_{2,6}.remVal(2, 3)$		
15	$C_{3,6}.remVal(2, 3)$		
16	$C_{4,6}.remVal(2, 3)$		
17	$C_{1,8}.remVal(2, 1)$		
18	$C_{2,8}.remVal(2, 1)$		
19	$C_{3,8}.remVal(2, 1)$	$(z_3, \{3\})$	P
20	$C_{4,8}.remVal(2, 1)$		
21	$C_{1,6}.remVal(2, 4)$		
22	$C_{2,6}.remVal(2, 4)$		
23	$C_{3,6}.remVal(2, 4)$		
24	$C_{4,6}.remVal(2, 4)$		

Figure 3.10: Calls made to *remVal* as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.8

domain will already be less than her preference for  $z_i$ . In this case, more than one proposal could occur during the propagation of a single domain reduction. However the number of effective proposals will be at most one more than the number of domain values removed. Therefore, each domain reduction can result in up to  $n - 1$  redundant calls. Figure 3.14 shows the calls to *remVal* resulting from the domain reductions in Figure 3.12 along with the resultant domains in Figure 3.15.

Figure 3.16 shows the final calls to *remVal* resulting from the domain reductions in Figure 3.14. Figure 3.17 shows the variable domains after propagation. Figure 3.18 shows the unique stable matching the resulting variable domains represent.



$z_1$	$\{1\}$	$z_5$	$\{1\}$
$z_2$	$\{1, 3\}$	$z_6$	$\{1, 2\}$
$z_3$	$\{2\}$	$z_7$	$\{1, 2\}$
$z_4$	$\{1, 2, 3\}$	$z_8$	$\{2\}$

Figure 3.11: The variable domains after the calls to *remVal* detailed in Figure 3.10

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C_{1,8}.remVal(2, 3)$		
2	$C_{2,8}.remVal(2, 3)$		
3	$C_{3,8}.remVal(2, 3)$		
4	$C_{4,8}.remVal(2, 3)$	$(z_4, \{2\})$	R
5	$C_{1,8}.remVal(2, 4)$		
6	$C_{2,8}.remVal(2, 4)$	$(z_2, \{1\})$	R
7	$C_{3,8}.remVal(2, 4)$		
8	$C_{4,8}.remVal(2, 4)$		
9	$C_{3,5}.remVal(1, 3)$		
10	$C_{3,6}.remVal(1, 3)$		
11	$C_{3,7}.remVal(1, 3)$	$(z_7, \{1\})$	R
12	$C_{3,8}.remVal(1, 3)$		

Figure 3.12: Calls made to *remVal* as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.10

$z_1$	$\{1\}$	$z_5$	$\{1\}$
$z_2$	$\{3\}$	$z_6$	$\{1, 2\}$
$z_3$	$\{2\}$	$z_7$	$\{2\}$
$z_4$	$\{1, 3\}$	$z_8$	$\{2\}$

Figure 3.13: The variable domains after the calls to *remVal* detailed in Figure 3.12

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C_{4,5}.remVal(1, 2)$		
2	$C_{4,6}.remVal(1, 2)$		
3	$C_{4,7}.remVal(1, 2)$		
4	$C_{4,8}.remVal(1, 2)$		
5	$C_{2,5}.remVal(1, 1)$		
6	$C_{2,6}.remVal(1, 1)$	$(z_6, \{2\})$	P
7	$C_{2,7}.remVal(1, 1)$		
8	$C_{2,8}.remVal(1, 1)$		
9	$C_{1,7}.remVal(2, 1)$		
10	$C_{2,7}.remVal(2, 1)$		
11	$C_{3,7}.remVal(2, 1)$		
12	$C_{4,7}.remVal(2, 1)$	$(z_4, \{3\})$	P

Figure 3.14: Calls made to *remVal* as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.12

$z_1$	$\{1\}$	$z_5$	$\{1\}$
$z_2$	$\{3\}$	$z_6$	$\{1\}$
$z_3$	$\{2\}$	$z_7$	$\{2\}$
$z_4$	$\{1\}$	$z_8$	$\{2\}$

Figure 3.15: The variable domains after the calls to *remVal* detailed in Figure 3.14

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C_{1,6}.remVal(2, 2)$		
2	$C_{2,6}.remVal(2, 2)$		
3	$C_{3,6}.remVal(2, 2)$		
4	$C_{4,6}.remVal(2, 2)$		
5	$C_{4,5}.remVal(1, 3)$		
6	$C_{4,6}.remVal(1, 3)$		
7	$C_{4,7}.remVal(1, 3)$		
8	$C_{4,8}.remVal(1, 3)$		

Figure 3.16: Calls made to *remVal* as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.14

$z_1$	$\{1\}$	$z_5$	$\{1\}$
$z_2$	$\{3\}$	$z_6$	$\{1\}$
$z_3$	$\{2\}$	$z_7$	$\{2\}$
$z_4$	$\{1\}$	$z_8$	$\{2\}$

Figure 3.17: The variable domains after the calls to *remVal* detailed in Figure 3.16

Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: w_1$	$w_1: m_1$
$m_2: w_2$	$w_2: m_2$
$m_3: w_4$	$w_3: m_4$
$m_4: w_3$	$w_4: m_3$

Figure 3.18: The unique stable matching for the stable marriage instance given in Figure 3.4.

### 3.2.4 The inherent inefficiency of SM2

In Section 3.2.2, it was shown that when using the SM2 constraint to model an instance of the Stable Marriage problem, it requires suboptimal  $O(n^3)$  time to enforce arc-consistency over that model. The inefficiency can be seen in the worked example. Each value removed from a variable's domain results in  $n$  calls to the *remVal* method, one for each of the  $n$  constraints associated with the variable in question. Of these  $n$  calls, at most two of them will cause a further domain reduction.

Therefore, to improve on the complexity of this constraint we need to spend no more than  $O(1)$  time per removed domain value. To achieve this, no more than  $O(1)$  constraints can act over each variable. Therefore, there must be a single  $n$ -ary constraint constraining all variables. Such a constraint is now presented.

## 3.3 Specialised $n$ -ary constraint (SMN)

A specialised  $n$ -ary constraint (SMN) for the Stable Marriage problem is now presented [93]. SMN is designed to improve on the time complexity of the SM2 constraint presented in Section 3.2. The space complexity is the same as that of the SM2 constraint, but by reducing the number of constraints from  $\Theta(n^2)$  to one, this constraint solution is significantly more space efficient. The SMN constraint will enforce the same level of consistency as SM2. This means that, unlike most  $n$ -ary constraints, SMN will not enforce generalised arc-consistency. It achieves only arc-consistency, meaning that the propagation achieved by this constraint is equivalent to that achieved by a clique of binary constraints, which is described in more detail later in this section. It will be proven that enforcing this level of consistency will reduce the variable domains to a state equivalent to that of the GS-lists as produced by the EGS algorithm (as described in Section 2.4). Therefore, enforcing arc-consistency using this constraint will be sufficient to find a stable matching for a given stable marriage instance. Furthermore, it will be proven that maintaining arc-consistency with SMN as part of a standard backtracking search, using a smallest first value ordering heuristic, is sufficient to enumerate all stable matchings in a failure free manner. SMN will be shown to run in  $O(n^2)$  time, which is linear in the size of the preference lists and therefore optimal. Empirical evidence will also be given that shows that SMN runs significantly faster than all previously published constraint models for the Stable Marriage problem. Furthermore, evidence shows that for large instances the run time of SMN is

within a factor of four of that required by the EGS algorithm.

### 3.3.1 The constraint: methods and data structures

A constrained integer variable  $z$  is associated with each man and each woman as with the SM2 constraint, such that  $\{z_i \mid 1 \leq i \leq n\}$  corresponds to the set of men and  $\{z_i \mid n+1 \leq i \leq 2n\}$  to the set of women in a given stable marriage instance  $I$ . The values in the domain of a variable correspond to preferences and are in the range 1 to  $n$ , such that if variable  $z_i$  is assigned the value  $k$  this corresponds to the  $i^{\text{th}}$  man (or  $(i-n)^{\text{th}}$  woman) being married to his (or her)  $k^{\text{th}}$  choice of partner. If this constraint were implemented in a Java based constraint solver then the constructor to create an SMN constraint may look like  $SMN(z, mpl, wpl)$ , where  $z$  is an array of constrained integer variables,  $mpl$  is a 2 dimensional integer array representing the male preference lists and  $wpl$  is a 2 dimensional integer array representing the female preference lists.

The SMN constraint assumes that it has access to the following functions:

- $PL(k, a)$  where  $1 \leq k \leq 2n$  and  $1 \leq a \leq n$ , will return the index of the variable representing the  $a^{\text{th}}$  person in the preference list of the person represented by the variable  $z_k$ .
- $pref(k, l)$  where  $1 \leq k, l \leq 2n$ , will return the rank of the person represented by variable  $z_l$  in the preference list of the person represented by  $z_k$ .
- $min(dom(x))$  will return the smallest value remaining in the domain of variable  $x$ .
- $setMax(dom(x), k)$  will delete all values from the domain of variable  $x$  which are strictly greater than the value  $k$ .
- $delVal(dom(x), k)$  will delete the value  $k$  from the domain of variable  $x$ .

SMN is an  $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint that acts over  $2n$  variables, which represent  $n$  men and  $n$  women, and has the following attributes:

- $z$  is a set of  $2n$  constrained integer variables representing the  $n$  men and  $n$  women that are constrained.
- $\check{z}$  is a set of  $2n$  reversible integer variables containing the previous lower bounds of all  $z$  variables, where  $\check{z}_i$  will hold the previous lower bound of variable  $z_i$ . All are initially set to 0. Reversible means that, on backtracking the values in  $\check{z}$  are restored.

The two methods required to propagate this constraint *init* and *remVal* are now described, as well as the auxiliary procedure *stable*. The

1. `remVal( $i, a$ )`
2.      `$j := \text{PL}(i, a)$`
3.     `delVal( $\text{dom}(z_j), \text{pref}(j, i)$ )`
4.     **if**  `$a = \check{z}_i$`  **then**
5.         `stable( $i$ )`
6.     **end if**

Figure 3.19: The *remVal* method of the SMN constraint.

**remVal( $i, a$ )** The method detailed in Figure 3.19 is called when the value  $a$  has been removed from the domain of variable  $z_i$ . This method could be called for  $1 \leq i \leq 2n$ , meaning that the value  $a$  was removed from the domain of a variable representing either a man or woman. However, to simplify the description, it will be assumed that  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , thus,  $z_i$  will represent a man. When man  $m_i$  no longer finds his  $a^{\text{th}}$  choice of person  $w_{j-n}$  acceptable then  $w_{j-n}$  should also find  $m_i$  unacceptable. Consequently,  $w_{j-n}$ 's rank for  $m_i$  is removed from the domain of  $z_j$  (lines 2 and 3). These steps, 2 and 3, maintain the bijection between a man and a woman. Stability is addressed in steps 4 and 5. Line 4 checks to see if the removed value  $a$  is equal to the previous lower bound of  $z_i$ , i.e.  $\check{z}_i$ , meaning that  $m_i$  has been rejected by his previous favourite woman. If this is the case, we must prevent any person that  $m_i$  prefers to his current lower bound from considering a partner worse than  $m_i$ , and this is handled via the *stable( $i$ )* procedure. In step 3 a value may be removed from  $\text{dom}(z_j)$  which will eventually result in a call being made to *remVal( $j, \text{pref}(j, i)$ )*. This call will be made under the condition that  $\text{pref}(j, i) \in \text{dom}(z_j)$  when the call to *remVal( $i, a$ )* was made.

1. `stable( $i$ )`
2.     **for**  `$k := \check{z}_i + 1$`  **to**  `$\text{min}(\text{dom}(z_i))$`  **loop**
3.          `$j := \text{PL}(i, k)$`
4.         `setMax( $\text{dom}(z_j), \text{pref}(j, i)$ )`
5.     **end loop**
6.      `$\check{z}_i := \text{min}(\text{dom}(z_i))$`

Figure 3.20: The *stable* function of the SMN constraint.

**stable(i)** This procedure is called when the lower bound of  $dom(z_i)$  increases or when the constraint is initially created. To simplify the description, it will be assumed that  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , thus,  $z_i$  will represent a man. Previously, the lower bound was  $\check{z}_i$  but now it has increased to  $min(dom(z_i))$ . Therefore, all people corresponding to preferences in the range  $\check{z}_i + 1$  to  $min(dom(z_i))$  may no longer consider a match worse than  $m_i$ , otherwise a blocking pair may occur. The loop in lines 2 to 5 iterates over the domain values removed from the lower bound of  $z_i$ . It finds the person that corresponds to the removed domain value (line 3) and then prevents that person from considering any potential match worse than  $m_i$  (line 4).  $\check{z}_i$  is then updated with the new lower bound of  $z_i$  (line 6). In line 4 the call to *setMax* may remove values from the domain of  $z_j$  and this in turn will generate calls to *remVal*, meaning that *remVal* and *stable* are mutually recursive. Note that if the assumption was made that SMN had exclusive access to the domains of the  $z$  variables then the loop on line 2 would not be necessary. It would be sufficient to call *setMax*( $dom(z_j), pref(j, i)$ ), where  $j := PL(i, min(dom(z_i)))$ . However, such an assumption was not made. The constraint as written will maintain consistent domains when arbitrarily domain reduction occurs at any point during propagation. Assuming that the appropriate calls to *remVal* are triggered by these domain reductions.

```

1. init()
2.   for i := 1 to 2n loop
3.     stable(i);
4.   end loop;

```

Figure 3.21: The *init* method of the SMN constraint.

**init()** The *init* method is called at the head of propagation and is simply a call to *stable* for each of the  $2n$  people. In the initial call to *stable(i)*,  $\check{z}_i$  will equal 0. Consequently, man  $m_i$  (or woman  $w_{i-n}$ ) will make a proposal to his (or her) most preferred woman  $w_{j-n}$  (or man  $m_j$ ) (lines 3 and 4 of procedure *stable*) removing all less preferred partners from the domain of  $z_j$ . These domain removals may generate calls to *remVal* and, thus, as a result a cascade of propagations may occur. The call to *init* is equivalent to an application of the man and woman oriented versions of the EGS algorithm, as proven in Section 3.3.4.

### 3.3.2 Enhancing the model for incomplete lists

This encoding can be extended to handle incomplete preference lists. For an SMI instance of size  $n$ , the value  $n+1$  is introduced into the domain of each of the  $z$  variables. A variable being assigned the value  $n+1$  indicates that the corresponding person is unmatched. The method  $remVal(i, a)$  will need to be modified as follows: lines 2 and 3 are performed conditionally if  $a \leq n$ . Similarly, lines 3 and 4 of the  $stable(i)$  procedure are performed conditionally if  $k \leq n$ . Altering the constraint and model in this way will add a potential  $O(n)$  calls to  $remVal$ ; none of which will cause further propagation. This extension will not alter the complexity of these methods.

### 3.3.3 Arc-consistency in the model

The correctness of SMN is now proven by showing that after propagation all remaining domain values represent the unique maximal set of arc-consistent domain values. A definition is given for what it means for a domain value to be arc-consistent with respect to the SMN constraint. It is then proven that all domain values that remain after propagation will be arc-consistent with respect to this definition and any removed domain values will be arc-inconsistent.

**Definition 1.** *A constraint model that uses the SMN constraint is arc-consistent iff*

$$\forall i \in [1 \dots 2n], \forall a \in dom(z_i),$$

$$\forall k \in [1 \dots 2n], i \neq k, \exists b \in dom(z_k), SMN-consistent((z_i, a), (z_k, b))$$

**Definition 2.**

1.  $SMN-consistent((z_i, a), (z_k, b)) \Leftrightarrow$
2.  $(1 \leq i \leq n \wedge 1 \leq k \leq n \wedge PL(i, a) \neq PL(k, b)) \vee$
3.  $(n < i \leq 2n \wedge n < k \leq 2n \wedge PL(i, a) \neq PL(k, b)) \vee$
4.  $(1 \leq i \leq n \wedge n < k \leq 2n \wedge$
5.  $((PL(i, a) = k \wedge PL(k, b) = i) \vee$
6.  $(pref(i, k) > a \wedge PL(k, b) \neq i) \vee$
7.  $(PL(i, a) \neq k \wedge pref(k, i) > b)) \vee$
8.  $(n < i \leq 2n \wedge 1 \leq k \leq n \wedge$
9.  $((PL(i, a) = k \wedge PL(k, b) = i) \vee$
10.  $(pref(i, k) > a \wedge PL(k, b) \neq i) \vee$
11.  $(PL(i, a) \neq k \wedge pref(k, i) > b))$

For a value  $a$  in the domain of  $z_i$  to be arc-consistent with respect to the SMN constraint there needs to be at least one supporting value in all other variable domains. A value  $b$  in the domain of  $z_k$  supports the value  $a$  in the domain of  $z_i$  (line 1) if the simultaneous assignments  $(z_i, a)$  and  $(z_k, b)$  are consistent and therefore do not violate the SMN constraint. The definition of a consistent pair of assignments is dependent on the gender of the people that the variables  $z_i$  and  $z_k$  represent. If both are male then the values  $a$  and  $b$  must represent different women (line 2), otherwise the bijection will not be maintained (similarly if the two variables both represent women (line 3)). If the two variables represent one of each gender (line 4 or 8) then consistent assignments must respect both stability and the bijection. In this case, either  $z_i$  and  $z_k$  are matched to each other (line 5 or 9),  $z_i$  prefers their partner to  $z_k$  (line 6 or 10) or  $z_k$  prefers their partner to  $z_i$  (line 7 or 11).

To prove that SMN produces the unique maximal set of arc-consistent domain values, we need to prove that any value removed does not belong to this set. Therefore, any domain values removed by SMN must be arc-inconsistent. For a value  $a$  in the domain of  $z_i$  to be arc-inconsistent there must exist a variable  $z_k$  that does not contain any supporting values for  $a$ . This is formally stated in Definition 3.

**Definition 3.** *The value  $a$  is arc-inconsistent with respect to variable  $z_i$  if*

$$\exists k \in [1 \dots 2n], \forall b \in \text{dom}(z_k), \neg \text{SMN-consistent}((z_i, a), (z_k, b)).$$

To aid future proofs, first a lemma is presented which states that if  $\text{dom}(z_i)$  has been reduced to a single value  $a$  then  $\text{dom}(z_{n+j})$  will also be reduced to a single value  $b$ , where  $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)^2$  and  $b = \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$ . This means that, if  $m_i$  has been assigned to  $w_j$  then the bijection will be maintained, as  $w_j$  will also be assigned to  $m_i$ . To prove this lemma, the two possible contradictions are disproved; the first where  $b \notin \text{dom}(z_{n+j})$  and the second where  $|\text{dom}(z_{n+j})| > 1$ . This lemma will then be used to prove two theorems. The first states that any domain value remaining after propagation is arc-consistent. In this proof, it is assumed that  $z_i$  is male, and the two possible cases where  $z_k$  is either male or female are considered. When considering  $z_k$  to be male, it is assumed that  $\text{dom}(z_k)$  has been reduced to a single value  $\text{rank}(m_k, w_j)$ , where  $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$ , and this is shown to be a contradiction. When considering  $z_k$  to be female ( $w_j$ ) the three possible cases are considered;  $a < \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$ ,  $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$  and  $a > \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$ . In each case, a proof by contradiction is used, which shows that the required value  $b$  exists in

---

<sup>2</sup>Note that  $\text{rank}(m_i, w_j) = \text{pref}(i, j + n)$ .



$dom(z_k)$ . The second theorem states that any domain value that has been removed is not arc-consistent. This is proved by considering two possible causes of such a deletion (via a call to *remVal* or *stable*) and showing in each case that an arbitrary removed value is not arc-consistent.

**Lemma 1.** *Let  $I$  be an instance of SM and let  $J$  be a CSP instance obtained by using the SMN constraint. If after propagation in  $J$  the domain of  $z_i$  has been reduced to a single value  $a$ , then the domain of  $z_{n+j}$  will also have been reduced to a single value  $b$ , where  $a = rank(m_i, w_j)$  and  $b = rank(w_j, m_i)$ .*

**Proof.** A proof by contradiction is used. Consider the two possible cases, the first where  $b \notin dom(z_{n+j})$  and the second where  $|dom(z_{n+j})| > 1$ .

- Case (i). Assume  $b \notin dom(z_{n+j})$ . Then when that domain value was removed the call *remVal*( $n + j, b$ ) must have been made. In that call, the value  $a$  would have been removed from  $dom(z_i)$  which is a contradiction.
- Case (ii). Assume  $|dom(z_{n+j})| > 1$  and, by Case (i),  $b \in dom(z_{n+j})$ .

There must have been a call to *stable*( $i$ ) when  $min(dom(z_i)) = a$ , as  $a$  is the only value remaining in  $dom(z_i)$ . This call will have been made either at the head of search via the *init*() method, if  $rank(m_i, w_j) = 1$ , or via a call to *remVal*( $i, c$ ), where  $c < a$  and  $c$  was the lower bound of  $dom(z_i)$  when the previous call to *stable*( $i$ ) was made. In that call to *stable*( $i$ ), all values greater than  $rank(w_j, m_i)$  will have been removed from  $dom(z_{n+j})$ . Because  $|dom(z_{n+j})| > 1$  we know that  $min(dom(z_{n+j})) < b$ . This means that  $m_i$  is not the most preferred man remaining in  $w_j$ 's domain.

When all values other than  $a$  were removed from  $dom(z_i)$ , a call would have been made to *remVal*( $i, d$ ), where  $d = rank(m_i, w_l)$ , for each  $l$  such that  $l \neq j$  and  $1 \leq l \leq n$ . In these calls  $rank(w_l, m_i)$  will have been removed from  $dom(z_{n+l})$ , effectively removing  $m_i$  from the preference list of  $w_l$ . Therefore, we know that  $m_i$  is not the most preferred man remaining in the domain of any woman.

Because there are  $n$  men and  $n$  women it can be inferred that there must exist two women  $w_f$  and  $w_g$  such that  $min(dom(z_{n+f})) = rank(w_f, m_e)$  and  $min(dom(z_{n+g})) = rank(w_g, m_e)$ . We assume that  $rank(m_e, w_f) < rank(m_e, w_g)$ . A call will have been made to *stable*( $n + f$ ) when  $min(dom(z_{n+f})) = rank(w_f, m_e)$ , either via the *init*() method if  $rank(w_f, m_e) = 1$ , or via a call to *remVal*( $n + f, c$ ) where

$c < \text{rank}(w_f, m_e)$  and  $c = \check{z}_{n+f}$ . When this call to  $\text{stable}(n+f)$  was made, all values greater than  $\text{rank}(m_e, w_f)$  will have been removed from  $\text{dom}(z_e)$ , including  $d = \text{rank}(m_e, w_g)$ . The resulting call to  $\text{remVal}(e, d)$  will then have removed  $\text{rank}(w_g, m_e)$  from  $\text{dom}(z_{n+g})$  which is a contradiction.  $\square$

The following theorem states that all domain values remaining after propagating SMN are arc-consistent.

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $I$  be an instance of SM, and let  $J$  be a constraint model of SM instance  $I$  that uses the SMN constraint. Then the domains remaining after propagation in  $J$  will be arc-consistent (as defined in Definition 1).*

**Proof.** We will consider only the case where  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , meaning that  $z_i$  represents  $m_i$ . Note that a proof can be obtained for the female variables by swapping the gender specific terms and adjusting subscripts as appropriate. We assume that  $a$  is an arbitrary value such that  $a \in \text{dom}(z_i)$  after propagation in  $J$ . We then confirm that  $a$  is arc-consistent by proving the existence of the value  $b$ , where  $b \in \text{dom}(z_k)$  and  $k$  is some arbitrary value in the range  $1 \dots 2n$  excluding  $i$ .

First, consider the case where  $1 \leq k \leq n$ , meaning that  $z_k$  represents  $m_k$ . In this case a consistent assignment means  $m_i$  and  $m_k$  are not matched to the same woman. In SMN this means that  $PL(i, a) \neq PL(k, b)$  where  $z_i$  and  $z_k$  have been assigned the values  $a$  and  $b$  respectively. Therefore,  $b$  must not equal  $\text{rank}(m_k, w_j)$  where  $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$ .

A proof by contradiction is used. Assume  $b = \text{rank}(m_k, w_j)$  where  $n+j = PL(i, a)$ ,  $b \in \text{dom}(z_k)$  and  $|\text{dom}(z_k)| = 1$ . From Lemma 1 we know that  $c$  is the only value in  $\text{dom}(z_{n+j})$ , where  $c = \text{rank}(w_j, m_k)$ . Therefore, the value  $d$ , where  $d = \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$ , must have been removed from  $\text{dom}(z_{n+j})$  which would have caused a call to be made to  $\text{remVal}(n+j, d)$ . In that call  $\text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$  would have been removed from  $\text{dom}(z_i)$ , which is a contradiction.

Now consider the case where  $n < k \leq 2n$  meaning that  $z_k$  represents  $w_{k-n}$ . For simplicity we will now refer to  $w_{k-n}$  as  $w_j$ . In this case, a consistent assignment means that if  $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$  then  $b = \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$  or if  $a > \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$  then  $b < \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$  otherwise if  $a < \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$  then  $b \neq \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$ . A proof by contradiction is now used for each case individually.

- $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$ . Assume  $b = \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$  and  $b \notin \text{dom}(z_k)$ . When  $b$  was removed from  $\text{dom}(z_k)$  a call would have been made to  $\text{remVal}(k, b)$ . In that call, the value

$rank(m_i, w_j)$  will have been removed from  $dom(z_i)$  which is a contradiction.

- $a > rank(m_i, w_j)$ . Assume  $min(dom(z_k)) = rank(w_j, m_i)$ . A call to  $stable(k)$  will have been made while  $min(dom(z_k)) = rank(w_j, m_i)$  either via the  $init()$  method, if  $1 = rank(w_j, m_i)$ , or via a call to  $remVal(k, b)$ , where  $b < rank(w_j, m_i)$  and  $b = \check{z}_k$ . When this call to  $stable(k)$  was made all values greater than  $rank(m_i, w_j)$  would have been removed from  $dom(z_i)$ , including  $a$ , which is a contradiction.
- $a < rank(m_i, w_j)$ . Assume  $b = rank(w_j, m_i)$ ,  $b \in dom(z_k)$  and  $|dom(z_k)| = 1$ . From Lemma 1 we know that  $dom(z_i)$  must contain only  $rank(m_i, w_j)$ , which is a contradiction.  $\square$

Theorem 3 below states that all values removed during the propagation of SMN are arc-inconsistent.

**Theorem 3.** *Let  $I$  be an instance of SM and let  $J$  be a constraint model of SM instance  $I$  that uses the SMN constraint. If SMN removes some value  $v$  from  $dom(z_i)$  then that value is arc-inconsistent as defined in Definition 3.*

**Proof.** We will consider only the case where  $1 \leq i \leq n$  meaning that  $z_i$  represents  $m_i$ . A proof can be obtained for the female variables by swapping the gender terms and adjusting subscripts as appropriate.

The two possible causes of  $v$  being removed from  $dom(z_i)$ , line 3 of  $remVal$  or line 4 of  $stable$ , are considered.

For  $v$  to be removed via a call to  $remVal(n + j, a)$ , then  $a$  must have been removed from  $dom(n + j)$ , where  $v = rank(m_i, w_j)$  and  $a = rank(w_j, m_i)$ . In this call,  $v$  would have been removed from  $dom(z_i)$ . If  $v$  were not removed and the assignment  $z_i = v$  was made then this would mean that  $m_i$  was matched to  $w_j$  but  $w_j$  was not matched to  $m_i$ , which is arc-inconsistent.

For  $v$  to be removed via a call to  $stable(n + j)$ , then  $min(dom(z_{n+j})) \geq rank(w_j, m_i)$  and  $v > rank(m_i, w_j)$ . Therefore, we know  $w_j$  would rather be matched to  $m_i$  than any man remaining in her domain. If the assignment  $z_i = v$  were made then  $(m_i, w_j)$  would be a blocking pair and therefore arc-inconsistent.  $\square$

**Theorem 4.** *Let  $I$  be an instance of SM and let  $J$  be a constraint model of SM instance  $I$  that uses the SMN constraint. After propagation in  $J$  the resultant variable domains will represent the unique maximal set of arc-consistent domain values.*

**Proof.** This follows from Theorems 2 and 3. From Theorem 2, it is known that all remaining domain values after propagating SMN are arc-consistent. From Theorem 3, it is known that all domain values that are removed as a result of propagating SMN are arc-inconsistent. This then implies that after propagating SMN the remaining domain values represent the unique maximal set of arc-consistent domain values.  $\square$

### 3.3.4 Properties of SMN

As previously stated, unlike most  $n$ -ary constraints, SMN enforces only arc-consistency. The reason for this is that, in 2001, Gent et al.[40] proved that enforcing arc-consistency over a constraint representation of a stable marriage problem was sufficient to produce the equivalent of the GS-lists, and therefore to find a stable matching. Furthermore, they proved that, under certain conditions, all stable matchings can be enumerated without having to backtrack due to an incorrect decision (i.e. failure-free enumeration). In this section, it is proven that SMN has the same properties as the model proposed by Gent et al.

To prove this it is first shown that the resultant variable domains after propagating SMN are equivalent to the GS-lists. A generalised proof is then given which shows that the GS-lists of an SMI instance can be split into two distinct sets of lists such that all stable matchings contained in the original SMI instance exist in one of these two new sets of list. Both of these sets of lists will contain at least one solution. A further proof then goes on to state that using the standard branching technique of choosing an arbitrary variable with a domain size greater than one and instantiating it to the smallest value in that domain for the left branch, then removing that value for the right branch, will result in the variable domains being equivalent to the two sets of lists. Therefore, branching in this way will result in at least one solution at each branch of the search tree.

It is now shown that, given a constraint model  $J$  consisting of SMN which models a given SMI instance  $I$ , the domains of the variables in  $J$ , following propagation, correspond to the GS-lists of  $I$ , where  $w_j \in GS(m_i)$  indicates that  $w_j$  is in the GS-list of  $m_i$ . That is, we prove that,  $\forall i, j \in [1 \dots n], w_j \in GS(m_i) \Leftrightarrow rank(m_i, w_j) \in dom(z_i)$ , and similarly  $\forall j, i \in [1 \dots n], m_i \in GS(w_j) \Leftrightarrow rank(w_j, m_i) \in dom(z_{n+j})$ . The proof is presented using two lemmas. The first lemma shows that the arc-consistent domains are equivalent to subsets of the GS-lists. This is done by proving that the deletions made by the EGS algorithm applied to  $I$  are correspondingly made during propagation in  $J$ . The second

lemma shows that the GS-lists of  $I$  correspond to a subset of the domains remaining after propagation in  $J$ . This is done by proving that no values in the GS-lists for  $I$  could be removed by SMN<sup>3</sup>. Note that  $l_i^m$  denotes the length of  $m_i$ 's preference list, and  $l_j^w$  the length of  $w_j$ 's list.

**Lemma 5.** *For any given  $i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ), let  $p$  be an integer ( $1 \leq p \leq l_i^m$ ) such that  $p \in \text{dom}(z_i)$  after propagating SMN. Then woman  $w_j$ , where  $p = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$ , belongs to the GS-list of  $m_i$ . An equivalent result holds for the women.*

**Proof.** The GS-lists are constructed as a result of the deletions made by the EGS algorithm applied to  $I$ . We show that the corresponding deletions are made to the relevant variables' domains during propagation of SMN. In the following proof, only deletions made by the man-oriented EGS algorithm are considered. A similar argument can be used to prove the result for an execution of the woman oriented EGS algorithm.

We prove the following fact by induction on the number of proposals  $k$  during an execution  $E$  of the EGS algorithm. If proposal  $k$  consists of  $m_i$  proposing to  $w_j$ , where  $p = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j)$  and  $q = \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$ , then  $\min(\text{dom}(z_i)) \geq p$ ,  $\max(\text{dom}(z_{n+j})) \leq q$  and for each  $m_t$  such that  $s = \text{rank}(w_j, m_t)$  and  $(q < s \leq l_j^w)$ ,  $r \notin \text{dom}(z_t)$ , where  $r = \text{rank}(m_t, w_j)$ .

First, consider the base case where  $k = 1$ . It must be the case that  $p = 1$ , since  $1 = \min(\text{dom}(z_i))$ . The procedure call  $\text{stable}(i)$ , made by the  $\text{init}()$  method, will remove all values greater than  $q$  from  $\text{dom}(z_{n+j})$ , where  $q = \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$ , making  $\max(\text{dom}(z_{n+j})) \leq q$ . These domain reductions will in turn cause calls to  $\text{remVal}(n+j, s)$  to be placed in the propagation queue for each  $s$  such that  $(q < s \leq l_j^w)$ . In each call to  $\text{remVal}(n+j, s)$ ,  $r$  will be removed from  $\text{dom}(z_t)$ , where  $s = \text{rank}(w_j, m_t)$  and  $r = \text{rank}(m_t, w_j)$ .

Now consider  $k = c > 1$ , we assume that the result holds for  $k < c$ . We consider the cases where  $p = 1$  and  $p > 1$ .

- Case (i). For  $p = 1$  the proof is similar to that of the base case.
- Case (ii). Suppose that  $p > 1$ . Let  $w_l$  be any woman such that  $r = \text{rank}(m_i, w_l)$  and  $r < p$ .  $w_l$  must have been deleted from  $m_i$ 's list by the man-oriented EGS algorithm.

Next, assume  $s_1 = \text{rank}(w_l, m_i)$ . Then  $m_i$  was deleted from  $w_l$ 's preference list

---

<sup>3</sup>These proofs are adaptations of proofs given for Lemmas 1 and 2 in Section 3 of [40]. Both proofs start by showing how the EGS algorithm removes a value and then how each of the respective constraint solutions also removes the equivalent values from the appropriate domains. The proofs given here differ in the section detailing how the equivalent values are removed as a result of the constraint model.

because she received a proposal from a man  $m_v$  whom she prefers to  $m_i$ , where  $s_2 = \text{rank}(w_l, m_v)$  and  $s_2 < s_1$ . Since  $m_v$  proposed to  $w_l$  before the  $c^{\text{th}}$  proposal, we know  $\max(\text{dom}(z_{n+l})) \leq s_2$ , therefore,  $s_1 \notin \text{dom}(z_{n+l})$  and  $r \notin \text{dom}(z_i)$ . The argument made for  $w_l$  can be made for any woman whom  $m_i$  prefers to  $w_j$ , hence  $r \notin \text{dom}(z_i)$  for  $1 \leq r < p$ , therefore,  $\min(\text{dom}(z_i)) \geq p$ . Before  $\min(\text{dom}(z_i))$  became greater than or equal to  $r$ , there must have been a value  $s \in \text{dom}(z_i)$  such that  $s < r$  and prior to its removal  $s = \min(\text{dom}(z_i))$ . When  $s$  was removed, a call to  $\text{remVal}(i, s)$  was made. In that call to  $\text{remVal}(i, s)$ , the  $\text{stable}(i)$  procedure will have been called. The rest of the proof is then similar to that of the base case.  $\square$

**Lemma 6.** *For each  $i$  ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ), define a domain of values  $\text{domGS}(z_i)$  which is a subset of the initial values in  $\text{dom}(z_i)$  before propagation as follows:  $\text{domGS}(z_i) = \{\text{rank}(m_i, w_j) : w_j \in \text{GS}(m_i)\}$ . The domain of each  $z_{n+j}$  ( $1 \leq j \leq n$ ) is defined analogously. Enforcing arc-consistency over SMN could not cause an arbitrary value  $v$  to be removed from some variable's domain  $\text{dom}(z_k)$  if  $v \in \text{domGS}(z_k)$ .*

**Proof.** A proof by contradiction is used. Assume that the value  $v$ , (where  $v \in \text{domGS}(z_k)$ ) is the first such value to be removed, by enforcing arc-consistency over SMN, from  $\text{dom}(z_k)$ . Therefore, prior to the removal of  $v$ , all values in  $\text{domGS}(z_k)$  exist in  $\text{dom}(z_k)$ . Furthermore, it is assumed that prior to the removal of  $v$ ,  $\text{domGS}(z_k) = \text{dom}(z_k)$  (from Lemma 5).

A domain reduction in SMN can only occur via a call to  $\text{remVal}(i, a)$  or via a call to  $\text{stable}(i)$ . These two cases are now considered.

First, consider the case where  $v$  was removed from  $\text{dom}(z_k)$  via a call to  $\text{stable}(i)$ . Only the  $z_i$  variables are considered, where ( $1 \leq i \leq n$ ), however, a similar proof can be made for the  $z_j$  variables ( $n+1 < j \leq 2n$ ). A call to  $\text{stable}(i)$  will remove all values greater than  $q$ , where  $q = \text{rank}(w_j, m_i)$ , from  $\text{dom}(z_{n+l})$  for each  $l$  such that ( $1 \leq s \leq \min(\text{dom}(z_i))$ ) and  $s = \text{rank}(m_i, w_l)$ . Therefore,  $\max(\text{dom}(z_{n+l})) \leq q$ . For  $\text{stable}(i)$  to remove the value  $v$  from  $\text{dom}(z_k)$ , it must be the case that  $n < k \leq 2n$ ,  $\text{rank}(m_i, w_{k-n}) \leq \min(\text{domGS}(z_i))$  and  $v > \text{rank}(w_{k-n}, m_i)$ . If  $\text{rank}(m_i, w_{k-n}) \leq \min(\text{domGS}(z_i))$  it must be the case that  $\max(\text{domGS}(z_k)) \leq \text{rank}(w_{k-n}, m_i)$ , otherwise  $(m_i, w_{k-n})$  would form a blocking pair in any potential matching. Therefore,  $v \notin \text{domGS}(z_k)$  which, is a contradiction.

Now consider the case where  $v$  was removed from  $\text{dom}(z_k)$  via a call to  $\text{remVal}(i, a)$ . The call  $\text{remVal}(i, a)$  must have been made when  $a$  was removed from  $\text{dom}(z_i)$ . From our previous assumption, we know that  $a \notin \text{domGS}(z_i)$ . If  $a \notin \text{domGS}(z_i)$  then  $v \notin$

$\text{domGS}(z_k)$ , where  $a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_{k-n})$  and  $v = \text{rank}(w_{k-n}, m_i)$ , which is a contradiction.

□

The two lemmas above lead to the following theorem.

**Theorem 7.** *Let  $I$  be an instance of SM and let  $J$  be a CSP instance obtained by the SMN constraint. Then the domains remaining after propagation in  $J$  correspond to the GS-lists of  $I$  in the following sense: for any  $i, j (1 \leq i, j \leq n)$ ,  $w_j \in \text{GS}(m_i)$  if and only if  $p \in \text{dom}(z_i)$ , and similarly  $m_i \in \text{GS}(w_j)$  if and only if  $q \in \text{dom}(z_{n+j})$ , where  $\text{rank}(m_i, w_j) = p$  and  $\text{rank}(w_j, m_i) = q$ .*

A lemma is now given that will later be used to help prove that SMN can find all stable matchings without failure as a result of a bad search decision. This lemma states that, given the GS-lists of an SMI instance  $I$ , two new SMI instances  $I'_1$  and  $I'_2$  can be created. This is done by selecting some man  $m_i$  that has more than one woman remaining in his preference list. The SMI instance  $I'_1$  is the same as the instance described by the GS-lists except that all but  $m_i$ 's favourite woman have been removed from his preference list, and him from their preference lists.  $I'_2$  is the same except that  $m_i$ 's favourite woman has been removed from his preference list and he has been removed from her list, and the rest remain. This Lemma states that all stable matchings in  $I$  can be found in either  $I'_1$  or  $I'_2$  with no repeats<sup>4</sup>. In this lemma the term  $PL(m_i)$  is used to reference the preference list of  $m_i$ .

**Lemma 8.** *Let  $I$  be an instance of SMI and let  $I'$  be an SMI instance derived from the GS-lists of  $I$ . If in  $I'$  there exists some  $m_i$  who has more than one entry in his preference list, two SMI instances  $I'_1$  and  $I'_2$  can be derived, where  $I'_1$  is the same as  $I'$  except that  $PL(m_i)$  contains only  $m_i$ 's first choice woman  $w_j$ , and  $I'_2$  is the same as  $I'$  except that  $w_j$  has been removed from  $PL(m_i)$ . These instances will then have the following properties:*

- (i) *Any matchings that are stable in  $I'_1$  or  $I'_2$  will also be stable in  $I$ .*
- (ii)  *$I'_1$  and  $I'_2$  share no common matchings.*
- (iii) *All stable matchings in  $I$  are stable in either  $I'_1$  or  $I'_2$ .*

---

<sup>4</sup>The proof for this lemma is an adaptation of Theorem 5 in Section 2.1 of [68]. The original proof showed that a constraint encoding could find all stable matchings without failure as a result of a bad decision. In this adaptation the proof is generalized by removing all references to the constraint encoding.

**Proof.** (i) By standard properties of the GS-lists, any stable matching in  $I'$  is also stable in  $I$ .

First, consider instance  $I'_1$ . We verify that any stable matching  $M$  in  $I'_1$  is stable in  $I'$ . Suppose that the pair  $(m, w)$  blocks the matching  $M$  in  $I'$ . If  $w \in PL(m)$  in  $I'_1$ , then  $(m, w)$  blocks the matching  $M$  in  $I'_1$ , so  $(m, w)$  must have been deleted from  $I'$ . Hence,  $(m, w) = (m_i, w_l)$  for some  $w_l$  such that  $rank(m_i, w_l) > rank(m_i, m_j)$ . Now suppose that  $M'$  denotes the man-optimal stable matching in  $I$ . Then  $(m_i, w_j) \in M'$  and it may be verified that  $M'$  is also stable in  $I'_1$ . Since the same set of men and women are matched in all stable matchings in  $I'_1$  [37],  $m_i$  is matched in  $M$ . In particular,  $(m_i, w_j) \in M$  as  $w_j$  is the only woman in  $m_i$ 's list in  $I'_1$ . Hence,  $(m, w) = (m_i, w_l)$  cannot block  $M$  in  $I'$  after all, as  $m_i$  prefers  $w_j$  to  $w_l$ . Thus  $M$  is stable in  $I$ .

Next consider  $I'_2$ . We verify that any stable matching  $M$  in  $I'_2$  is stable in  $I'$ . Suppose that  $(m, w)$  blocks  $M$  in  $I'$ . If  $(m, w) \neq (m_i, w_j)$  then  $(m, w)$  blocks  $M$  in  $I'_2$  so we assume  $(m, w) = (m_i, w_j)$ . In  $I'$ , both  $m_i$  and  $w_j$  must have lists of length greater than one (by the qualifying condition). Therefore,  $w_j$  is matched in the man-pessimal stable matching for instance  $I$ , which is stable in  $I'_2$ . Since the same set of men and women are matched in all stable matchings in  $I'_2$  [37],  $w_j$  is matched in  $M$ . In particular,  $w_j$  prefers her partner in  $M$  to  $m_i$ , so that  $(m_i, w_j)$  cannot block  $M$  in  $I'$ . Thus,  $M$  is stable in  $I'$  and hence by the induction hypothesis  $M$  is also stable in  $I$ .

(ii) In all stable matchings in  $I'_1$ ,  $m_i$  will be matched to  $w_j$  (as above). Because in  $I'_2$   $w_j \notin PL(m_i)$  it follows that  $I'_1$  and  $I'_2$  share no common matchings.

(iii) We now show that any stable matching  $M_1$  in  $I'$ , such that  $(m_i, w_j) \in M_1$ , will also be a stable matching in  $I'_1$  and any stable matching  $M_2$  in  $I'$ , such that  $(m_i, w_j) \notin M_2$ , will also be a stable matching in  $I'_2$ .

First consider instance  $I'_1$ . For  $M_1$  to be a stable matching in  $I'$  but not in  $I'_1$ , either some pair  $(m_k, w_l) \in M_1$  was removed from  $I'_1$  or a blocking pair exists in  $I'_1$  which does not exist in  $I'$ . The only pairs to be removed from  $I'_1$  involve  $m_i$  and, as we know  $(m_i, w_j) \in M_1$ , none of the removed pairs could be in  $M_1$ . As no pairs were added to  $I'_1$ , so no blocking pairs could have been introduced.

Now consider  $I'_2$ . For  $M_2$  to be a stable matching in  $I'$  but not in  $I'_2$ , either some pair  $(m_k, w_l) \in M_2$  was removed from  $I'_2$  or a blocking pair exists in  $I'_2$  which does not exist in  $I'$ . The only pair to be removed from  $I'_2$  is  $(m_i, m_j)$  and, it is known that  $(m_i, w_j) \notin M_2$ , so none of the removed pairs could be in  $M_2$ . No pairs were added to  $I'_2$ , and therefore,



no blocking pairs could have been introduced.  $\square$

**Theorem 9.** *Let  $I$  be an instance of SMI and let  $J$  be a CSP instance obtained using the SMN constraint. Then the following search process enumerates all solutions in  $I$  without repetition and without ever failing due to an inconsistency:*

- *the  $init()$  method is called as a preprocessing step. Values removed as a result of this call will cause a call to the  $remVal(i, a)$  method.*
- *if all domains are arc-consistent and some variable  $z_i$  has two or more values in its domain, then the search proceeds by setting  $z_i$  to the minimum value  $p$  in its domain. Each domain value removed as a result of this instantiation will result in a call to the  $remVal(i, a)$  method which will re-establish arc-consistency. On backtracking, the value  $p$  is removed from the domain of  $z_i$ . This action will result in the call  $remVal(i, p)$  which will re-establish arc-consistency.*
- *when a solution is found it is reported and backtracking is forced.*

**Proof.** From Theorem 7 we know that a call to the  $init()$  method will reduce the variable domains to the equivalent of the GS-lists of  $I$ . By setting  $z_i$  to the minimum value  $p$  in its domain, an independent subproblem will be produced which is equivalent to  $I'_1$  from Lemma 8. On backtracking, removing the value  $p$  from the domain of  $z_i$  will produce an independent subproblem which is equivalent to  $I'_2$  from Lemma 8. As both  $I'_1$  and  $I'_2$  contain all solutions in  $I$  without repetition and as they both contain at least one stable matching, this decision can never cause a failure.  $\square$

The technique detailed here to enumerate all stable matchings will not match the optimal worst case time complexity of the algorithm proposed by Gusfield [48], which can enumerate all stable matchings for a given stable marriage instance in  $O(m + kn)$  time, where  $m$  is the sum of the lengths of the preference lists,  $k$  is the number of stable matchings in the instance and  $n$  is the number of participants. However, this specialised constraint solution is significantly easier to implement. Furthermore, empirical analysis (shown later in Figure 3.42) suggests that the average case time complexity for finding all solutions with the specialised constraint model matches the worst case complexity of Gusfield's algorithm.

### 3.3.5 Complexity of the model

AC can be enforced using this constraint in  $O(n^2)$  time which, because the preference lists are of size  $O(n^2)$ , is optimal for this problem [49]. Each of the two methods and one auxiliary procedure are examined individually, it is stated how often each can be called and the complexity of each call.

The *init()* method is only called once, at the head of search. It contains a single for loop that cycles  $2n$  times and each iteration makes a call to the *stable(i)* procedure. Due to this call to *stable(i)* being made at the head of search  $\check{z}_i$  will equal  $\min(\text{dom}(z_i))$ . Therefore, the loop in *stable(i)* (lines 2 to 5) will cycle only once and the time complexity of each call to *stable(i)* will be  $O(1)$  (because at this point  $\check{z}_i = \min(\text{dom}(z_i))$ ). These calls to *stable(i)* may cause domain reductions which will in turn cause calls to *remVal(i, a)*.

The *remVal(i, a)* method can be called at most once for each potential combination of  $i$  and  $a$ . *remVal(i, a)* contains no loops. Thus, with the exception of the possible call to the *stable(i)* procedure, which will be addressed below, *remVal(i, a)* runs in  $O(1)$  time<sup>5</sup>. There are  $O(n)$  potential values for  $i$  and  $O(n)$  potential values for  $a$ . Thus, the total time complexity for all possible calls to *remVal* will be  $O(n^2)$ .

The *stable(i)* procedure is called via the *remVal(i, a)* method when the lower bound of  $\text{dom}(z_i)$  changes, or via the *init()* method at the head of search. The run time complexity of *stable(i)* is dependent on the difference between the previous lower bound  $\check{z}_i$  and the new lower bound of  $\text{dom}(z_i)$ . If the lower bound of  $\text{dom}(z_i)$  has increased by  $k$  then the while loop in *stable(i)* will cycle  $k+1$  times, thus *stable(i)* will run in  $O(k)$  time. However, the total time complexity of all calls to *stable(i)* for a fixed value of  $i$  is bounded by the length of the preference list of  $z_i$ , i.e.  $O(n)$ . There are  $O(n)$  potential values for  $i$ . Hence, the total time complexity for all possible calls to *stable* will be  $O(n^2)$ . Therefore, the total time complexity of the single call to *init()* (which will result in the variable domains being arc-consistent) will be  $O(n^2)$ .

### 3.3.6 Worked example

This section presents an example of how a constraint model using the SMN constraint would propagate the domains for the stable marriage instance shown in Figure 3.22 (which is the same instance as given in Figure 3.4). In this walk-through, the constraint is referred

---

<sup>5</sup>Van Hentenryck et al in Section 4 of their 1992 paper [96] detail an implementation of an integer domain in which all the functions used here run in constant time.

to as  $C$  and a Java style attribute selector is used to indicate which of the constraint's methods or functions is being run. An AC5 style environment, as detailed in Chapter 2.2, is used.

Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: w_1 w_3 w_2 w_4$	$w_1: m_1 m_3 m_2 m_4$
$m_2: w_4 w_1 w_2 w_3$	$w_2: m_2 m_4 m_1 m_3$
$m_3: w_1 w_4 w_3 w_2$	$w_3: m_3 m_4 m_2 m_1$
$m_4: w_3 w_4 w_2 w_1$	$w_4: m_1 m_3 m_4 m_2$

Figure 3.22: A stable marriage instance of size  $n = 4$ .

$z_1$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_5$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
$z_2$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_6$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
$z_3$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_7$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$
$z_4$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$	$z_8$	$\{1, 2, 3, 4\}$

Figure 3.23: The initial variable domains

Figure 3.23 shows the initial variable domains. The first step of propagation is to place a call to  $init()$  in the queue. This will in turn make a call to  $stable$  for each participant. In Figure 3.24, the call to  $init()$  and the subsequent calls to  $stable$  are shown along with the resulting domain reductions. The type of domain reduction is also indicated. As before,  $P$  indicates a proposal and  $R$  indicated a rejection.

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C.init()$		
2	$C.stable(1)$	$(z_5, \{2, 3, 4\})$	P
3	$C.stable(2)$		
4	$C.stable(3)$		
5	$C.stable(4)$	$(z_7, \{3, 4\})$	P
6	$C.stable(5)$	$(z_1, \{2, 3, 4\})$	P
7	$C.stable(6)$	$(z_2, 4)$	P
8	$C.stable(7)$	$(z_3, 4)$	P
9	$C.stable(8)$		

Figure 3.24: Calls made to the auxiliary procedure  $stable$ , called from the  $init()$  method at the head of propagation.

Figure 3.26 shows the set of calls to  $remVal$  resulting from the domain reductions in 3.24. Figure 3.8 shows that for the SM2 constraint the same set of domain reductions caused forty calls to  $remVal$  of which only six caused further domain reductions. In

$z_1$	{1}	$z_5$	{1}
$z_2$	{1, 2, 3}	$z_6$	{1, 2, 3, 4}
$z_3$	{1, 2, 3}	$z_7$	{1, 2}
$z_4$	{1, 2, 3, 4}	$z_8$	{1, 2, 3, 4}

Figure 3.25: The variable domains after the calls to *stable* detailed in Figure 3.24

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	<i>C.remVal</i> (5, 2)	( $z_3, 1$ )	R
2	<i>C.remVal</i> (5, 3)	( $z_2, 2$ )	R
3	<i>C.remVal</i> (5, 4)	( $z_4, 4$ )	R
4	<i>C.remVal</i> (7, 3)		
5	<i>C.remVal</i> (7, 4)		
6	<i>C.remVal</i> (1, 2)		
7	<i>C.remVal</i> (1, 3)	( $z_6, 3$ )	R
8	<i>C.remVal</i> (1, 4)	( $z_8, 1$ )	R
9	<i>C.remVal</i> (2, 4)		
10	<i>C.remVal</i> (3, 4)	( $z_6, 4$ )	R

Figure 3.26: Calls made to *remVal* as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.24

Figure 3.26 it can be seen that with SMN only ten calls to *remVal* were made, which is a reduction of the number of redundant calls by thirty.

Figure 3.34 shows the final calls to *remVal* resulting from the domain reductions in Figure 3.32. Figure 3.35 shows the variable domains after propagation and Figure 3.36 shows the unique stable matching the resulting variable domains represent.

$z_1$	{1}	$z_5$	{1}
$z_2$	{1, 3}	$z_6$	{1, 2}
$z_3$	{2, 3}	$z_7$	{1, 2}
$z_4$	{1, 2, 3}	$z_8$	{2, 3, 4}

Figure 3.27: The variable domains after the calls to *remVal*() detailed in Figure 3.26

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C.remVal(3,1)$		
2	$C.stable(3)$	$(z_8, \{3,4\})$	P
3	$C.remVal(2,2)$		
4	$C.remVal(4,4)$		
5	$C.remVal(6,3)$		
6	$C.remVal(8,1)$		
7	$C.stable(8)$	$(z_3,3)$	P
8	$C.remVal(6,4)$		

Figure 3.28: Calls made to  $remVal$  as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.26

$z_1$	$\{1\}$	$z_5$	$\{1\}$
$z_2$	$\{1,3\}$	$z_6$	$\{1,2\}$
$z_3$	$\{2\}$	$z_7$	$\{1,2\}$
$z_4$	$\{1,2,3\}$	$z_8$	$\{2\}$

Figure 3.29: The variable domains after the calls to  $remVal()$  detailed in Figure 3.28

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C.remVal(8,3)$	$(z_4,2)$	R
2	$C.remVal(8,4)$	$(z_2,1)$	R
3	$C.remVal(3,3)$	$(z_7,1)$	R

Figure 3.30: Calls made to  $remVal()$  as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.28

$z_1$	$\{1\}$	$z_5$	$\{1\}$
$z_2$	$\{3\}$	$z_6$	$\{1,2\}$
$z_3$	$\{2\}$	$z_7$	$\{2\}$
$z_4$	$\{1,3\}$	$z_8$	$\{2\}$

Figure 3.31: The variable domains after the calls to  $remVal()$  detailed in Figure 3.30

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	$C.remVal(4,2)$		
2	$C.remVal(2,1)$		
3	$C.stable(2)$	$(z_6,2)$	P
4	$C.remVal(7,1)$		
5	$C.stable(7)$	$(z_4,3)$	P

Figure 3.32: Calls made to  $remVal()$  as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.30

$z_1$	{1}	$z_5$	{1}
$z_2$	{3}	$z_6$	{1}
$z_3$	{2}	$z_7$	{2}
$z_4$	{1}	$z_8$	{2}

Figure 3.33: The variable domains after the calls to *remVal()* detailed in Figure 3.14

	method	Unsupported values	type
1	<i>C.remVal(6,2)</i>		
2	<i>C.remVal(4,3)</i>		

Figure 3.34: Calls made to *remVal()* as a result of the domain reductions detailed in Figure 3.32

$z_1$	{1}	$z_5$	{1}
$z_2$	{3}	$z_6$	{1}
$z_3$	{2}	$z_7$	{2}
$z_4$	{1}	$z_8$	{2}

Figure 3.35: The variable domains after the calls to *remVal()* detailed in Figure 3.34

Men's lists	Women's lists
$m_1: w_1$	$w_1: m_1$
$m_2: w_2$	$w_2: m_2$
$m_3: w_4$	$w_3: m_4$
$m_4: w_3$	$w_4: m_3$

Figure 3.36: The unique stable matching for the stable marriage instance given in Figure 3.22.

### 3.4 Computational experience

A major part of the thesis statement is that a specialised constraint solution can significantly outperform standard toolkit solutions. This section presents experiments that were run to empirically compare the performance of the specialised constraints detailed in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 with the toolbox constraint solutions detailed in Section 2.4. The constraint solutions compared were: forbidden tuples (FT) and boolean (Bool) models from 2001 [40], the n-Variable encoding (n-Var) from 2003 [47], and the n-valued (n-Val) and 4-Valued (4-Val) Encodings from 2005 [67]. A summary of the time and space complexities of these models is shown in Table 3.1.

model	FT	Bool	n-Var	n-Val	4-Val	SM2	SMN
Time	$O(n^4)$	$O(n^2)$	$O(n^4)$	$O(n^3)$	$O(n^2)$	$O(n^3)$	$O(n^2)$
Space	$O(n^4)$	$\Theta(n^2)$	$O(n^4)$	$\Theta(n^2)$	$\Theta(n^2)$	$\Theta(n^2)$	$\Theta(n^2)$

Table 3.1: Summary of time and space complexities

All these encodings were implemented using the JSolver toolkit [2], i.e. the Java version of ILOG Solver. In total these experiments took in excess of 110 CPU hours to run on a 3.2Ghz processor system with 2 Gb of random access memory, running Linux and Java SDK 1.5.0.3 with an increased heap size of 1850 Mb.

To ensure a consistent set of data for use in the experiments, three sets of stable marriage instances were randomly generated by the random stable marriage instance generator detailed in Appendix B.1. Each set of problem instances was generated with complete preference lists and stored on a hard disc, and the same instances were used for each model. The instance and sample sizes for each set are given in Table 3.2.

$n$	increment size	sample size
10...100	10	1000
100...1000	100	1000
1000...8000	1000	20

Table 3.2: Data Set Sizes

The results obtained from these experiments are now presented in the following categories: the time taken to generate the constraint models (Section 3.4.1), the time taken to enforce arc-consistency on the constraint model (Section 3.4.2) and the time taken to find all stable matchings for the given instance (Section 3.4.3).

### 3.4.1 Model creation time

Before solving a problem, a constraint solver tool kit must first create a representation of the problem. This data structure is referred to as a constraint model. Included in the model creation time is both the time to construct the constraints and variables along with any time required by the underlying solver to initialise its internal data structures. More elaborate constraint models can take a significant time to construct, and therefore, have a negative effect on the overall solution time of the problem. For this reason, the time to construct the constraint model for each problem instance was measured and recorded. These times will also include the time used by the solver to initialise its own data structures required to perform search as well as the actual constraint model. The range of times recorded for a given model and instance size was very small. Therefore, only the mean model creation times are displayed. This small range is due to the fact that the model creation time is affected only by the size of the problem and not its difficulty. All reported times exclude the time taken to read the problem instance from the disk. The EGS algorithm has no significant model or data structures to initialise so it has not been included in these results. Note that the entry '-' indicates that an out-of-memory error occurred.

model	20	40	60	80	100
FT	0.319	1.573	6.734	-	-
Bool	0.257	0.271	0.305	0.316	0.334
n-Var	0.299	0.842	3.230	9.701	-
n-Val	0.308	0.333	0.354	0.381	0.431
4-Val	0.259	0.275	0.326	0.343	0.359
SM2	0.235	0.244	0.233	0.233	0.236
SMN	0.238	0.234	0.226	0.225	0.224

Table 3.3: Mean model creation time (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying in size from 20 to 100

Table 3.3 shows that the FT model with its sub-optimal space complexity of  $O(n^4)$  severely limits the size of problems that it can solve, relative to the other models. Despite having the same  $O(n^4)$  space complexity as the FT model, the more compact n-Var can model slightly larger problems.

In Table 3.4 it can be seen that the specialised constraint models can be constructed significantly faster and can model significantly larger instances than the toolbox constraint models. There are two possible explanations for this outcome, the first being that the toolbox constraint models use significantly more constraints. Bool uses  $2n + 6n^2$  con-



model	200	400	600	800	1000
Bool	0.546	1.451	2.972	-	-
n-Val	0.691	1.786	3.672	6.373	-
4-Val	0.619	1.738	-	-	-
SM2	0.259	0.327	0.440	0.581	0.774
SMN	0.223	0.227	0.228	0.228	0.229

Table 3.4: Mean model creation time (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 200 to 1000

straints, 4-Val uses approximately  $2n + 8n^2$  constraints and n-Val uses approximately  $4n^2$  constraints, as compared to the  $n^2$  constraints used in the SM2 model and the single constraint used in the SMN model. The second explanation is due to the difference between optimal constraint encodings (Bool and 4-Val) and the specialised constraints. Both the Bool and 4-Val encodings use  $2n^2$  variables compared to the  $2n$  variables used by SM2 and SMN. Despite the fact that the variable domains in Bool and 4-Val are of constant size, two or four respectively, as compared to the variables used by SM2 and SMN which are of size  $n$ . This is because there is no significant difference in the time to create and the space to store variables with significantly different domain sizes (assuming the domain values are all consecutive). This is because any consecutive integer domain can be represented by simply recording its bounds. Therefore, only two integers are required to store the initial domain. To test this hypothesis a series of experiments were run in which only the variables required for each of the models were created for different values of  $n$ . When  $n = 1300$  the Bool encoding ran out of memory creating the  $2 * 1300^2$  variables whereas the  $2 * 1300$  variable required by the SM2 and SMN encoding could be constructed in less than 0.25 seconds. During search, if a value is removed from the interior of an integer variable's domain, the domain can no longer be defined as a single range. Therefore, the memory required to store this variable will increase. This is probably the reason why the sub-optimal n-Val encoding can model larger problem instances than the two optimal toolbox constraint encodings.

model	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
SM2	0.774	4.598	-	-	-	-	-	-
SMN	0.229	0.235	0.232	0.237	0.314	0.398	0.572	0.417

Table 3.5: Average model creation time (in seconds) for 20 instances varying from 1000 to 8000

Table 3.5 shows that the relatively large number of constraints required by the SM2 model restricts the instance size it can solve, whereas, the SMN model can model considerably larger instance sizes without difficulty. Note also the anomaly where  $n = 7000$ ; the time required to create the SMN model is greater than that when  $n = 8000$ . This is likely a result of the small sample size of twenty for the problem instances in the range 2000 to 8000. A larger sample size would probably see this anomaly disappear. We also see in Tables 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 that the SMN model creation time only varies by 0.014 for instance sizes ranging from 20 to 4000. This is probably due to the fact that the model includes only one constraint. The only significant change as  $n$  increases, for the SMN model, is the number of variables required. The time to generate the SMN model for instance sizes ranging from 20 to 4000 is so small, it is assumed that generating this number of variables is insignificant when compared to the time overhead required by the underlying solver to initiate its internal data structures. This overhead is estimated to be around 0.2 seconds.

### 3.4.2 Enforcing arc-consistency

All constraint models included in this study share the property that enforcing arc-consistency is sufficient to find a solution. For this reason, the time to enforce arc-consistency over a pre-constructed constraint model was measured and recorded. The range of times recorded for a given model and instance size was significant. Therefore, the minimum, maximum and mean values are given for each data set. Note that the entry ‘-’ indicates that an out-of-memory error occurred.

From Table 3.6, it can be seen that enforcing arc-consistency over a pre-constructed constraint model can be achieved in under half a second for all instances where  $n \leq 100$ . This shows that the time to find a solution for instances of this size is dominated by the time to create the initial constraint model. For the SMN constraint and to a lesser extent the SM2 constraint, it can be seen that, as  $n$  increases, the maximum time taken to enforce arc-consistency over a model actually decreases. This could be an indication that a sample size of 1000 was sufficient to find a problem instance, out of the  $n!^{2n}$  possible instances generated by the instance generator, which was close to the worst case for the smaller instance sizes. However, for the larger instances, the sample size was insufficient to find an instance that was sufficiently close to the worst case. It may be the case that the harder instances are rarer for the larger instances.

In Table 3.7, it appears that, for instances in the range  $200 \leq n \leq 1000$ , the difference

model	type	20	40	60	80	100
FT	Min	0.098	0.235	0.533	-	-
	Mean	0.111	0.277	0.617	-	-
	Max	0.247	0.407	1.289	-	-
Bool	Min	0.071	0.101	0.145	0.201	0.259
	Mean	0.075	0.119	0.169	0.222	0.293
	Max	0.092	0.129	0.180	0.239	0.315
n-Var	Min	0.091	0.182	0.375	0.738	-
	Mean	0.096	0.204	0.451	0.892	-
	Max	0.103	0.238	0.554	1.100	-
n-Val	Min	0.026	0.048	0.079	0.118	0.170
	Mean	0.028	0.051	0.092	0.135	0.200
	Max	0.031	0.057	0.104	0.152	0.228
4-Val	Min	0.100	0.181	0.247	0.325	0.425
	Mean	0.106	0.184	0.252	0.333	0.438
	Max	0.111	0.195	0.258	0.345	0.451
SM2	Min	0.040	0.070	0.078	0.090	0.103
	Mean	0.050	0.074	0.084	0.098	0.116
	Max	0.185	0.191	0.133	0.111	0.170
SMN	Min	0.030	0.039	0.051	0.056	0.063
	Mean	0.034	0.048	0.054	0.059	0.069
	Max	0.171	0.163	0.102	0.068	0.079

Table 3.6: Time to enforce arc consistency over a pre-constructed constraint model (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 20 to 100

in time taken to enforce arc-consistency over the easiest and the hardest of the instances, is not significantly different in most cases. The mean time sits roughly in the middle of the maximum and minimum times with about a 10% to 15% gap between the mean and either extreme. This suggests that there are not any significantly harder instances of this problem at this size, but the sample size of 1000 used here is not large enough to confirm this. Comparing the n-Val and 4-Val models, the more memory efficient suboptimal n-Val encoding can solve most instances faster than optimal 4-Val and can also solve larger instances. A sharp increase in the times of the the n-Val encoding can be seen, reflecting its  $O(n^3)$  time complexity. It would be expected that, if sufficient memory were available, the 4-Val encoding would not have such a sharp increase and, thus, would perform better on larger instances than the n-Val encoding. We see an indication that this is the case when  $n = 400$ , which is just before the memory requirements of 4-Val exceed the available memory.

In Table 3.8, for the range  $1000 \leq n \leq 8000$ , the SM2 results reflect its  $O(n^3)$  time complexity, and its higher memory required to store the  $O(n^2)$  constraints. As the size of

model	type	200	400	600	800	1000
Bool	Min	0.737	2.741	6.106	-	-
	Mean	0.889	3.397	7.700	-	-
	Max	0.989	3.855	8.729	-	-
n-Val	Min	0.833	5.837	19.12	44.40	-
	Mean	0.968	6.433	20.72	48.42	-
	Max	1.091	7.075	22.76	52.44	-
4-Val	Min	1.310	5.025	-	-	-
	Mean	1.351	5.136	-	-	-
	Max	1.392	5.339	-	-	-
SM2	Min	0.241	0.825	1.935	3.549	5.593
	Mean	0.273	0.953	2.192	4.011	6.393
	Max	0.309	1.122	2.579	4.699	7.618
SMN	Min	0.097	0.196	0.380	0.690	1.084
	Mean	0.100	0.205	0.397	0.715	1.120
	Max	0.110	0.217	0.447	0.745	1.157

Table 3.7: Time to enforce arc consistency over a pre-constructed constraint model (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 200 to 1000

model	type	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
SM2	Min	5.593	25.90	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mean	6.393	26.87	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Max	7.618	29.50	-	-	-	-	-	-
SMN	Min	1.084	4.501	12.73	20.28	37.49	60.25	84.56	130.4
	Mean	1.120	4.572	13.15	20.56	38.44	61.10	86.37	132.7
	Max	1.157	4.671	13.60	21.06	39.26	62.17	87.50	134.3

Table 3.8: Time to enforce arc consistency over a pre-constructed constraint model (in seconds) for 20 instances varying from 1000 to 8000

the problem instances increases, the range of times recorded is decreasing. In Table 3.8, the difference between the mean time and either extreme is less than 2% when  $n = 8000$ .

Plotting the recorded times for SMN to enforce arc-consistency over a pre-constructed constraint model, as shown in Figure 3.37, results in a relatively smooth curve. This was unexpected due to the small sample size of twenty used for these instance sizes.

The EGS algorithm does not require a constraint model or any significant preparation before solving a problem. Therefore, to compare the performance of EGS with the constraint models fairly, the times need to be taken from a common start state to a common end state. Therefore, we compare the times to construct and enforce arc-consistency over each of the constraint models with the time to initialise any supporting data structures then produce the GS-lists using the EGS algorithm.




Figure 3.37: Minimum mean and maximum times for SMN to enforce arc consistency over a pre-constructed constraint model, where  $n$  is plotted on the x axis and time in seconds is plotted on the y axis.

model	20	40	60	80	100
FT	0.431	1.851	7.351	-	-
Bool	0.332	0.390	0.475	0.539	0.628
n-Var	0.395	1.047	3.681	10.59	-
n-Val	0.337	0.385	0.446	0.517	0.631
4-Val	0.366	0.460	0.578	0.676	0.797
SM2	0.286	0.318	0.318	0.332	0.353
SMN	0.272	0.282	0.281	0.285	0.294
EGS	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.010

Table 3.9: The Mean time to find the GS-lists(or equivalent) (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 20 to 100

As expected, Table 3.9 shows that the EGS algorithm can produce the GS-lists significantly faster than any of the constraint solutions. On average the EGS algorithm can solve the instances at least an order of magnitude faster than the fastest constraint solution. This is because the EGS algorithm does not require any complex data structures and is not subject to the overhead of the constraint solver toolkit, as the rest of the solutions here are. This is the consequence of the generality of the constraint programming approach. It is important to remember that the constraint solutions are significantly more versatile than the pure algorithmic solution, and this will be demonstrated later in Chapter 6.

In Table 3.10 the EGS algorithm dominates the performance of the other solutions. However, as the significance of the constraint solver toolkit overhead diminishes, the difference between the SMN constraint and the algorithm reduces to less than an order of

model	200	400	600	800	1000
Bool	1.436	4.848	10.67	-	-
n-Val	1.659	8.219	24.39	54.79	-
4-Val	1.971	6.875	-	-	-
SM2	0.533	1.281	2.633	4.592	7.167
SMN	0.324	0.433	0.625	0.943	1.350
EGS	0.014	0.039	0.099	0.150	0.233

Table 3.10: The Mean time to find the GS-lists(or equivalent) (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 200 to 1000




Figure 3.38: Mean time in seconds to find the GS-lists. Where  $n$  is plotted on the x axis and time in seconds is plotted on the y axis.

magnitude, when  $n > 600$ .

model	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
SM2	7.167	31.47	-	-	-	-	-	-
SMN	1.350	4.808	13.38	20.80	38.75	61.49	86.94	133.1
EGS	0.233	1.093	3.073	6.206	10.59	16.30	23.69	32.46

Table 3.11: The Mean time to find the GS-lists(or equivalent) (in seconds) for 20 instances varying from 1000 to 8000

Table 3.11 shows SMN can, on average, find the GS-lists in roughly a factor of four of the time of the EGS algorithm. However, the rate of growth of the times for the EGS algorithms is super-quadratic, rather than the expected quadratic. This strongly suggests that the implementation of the EGS algorithm used here was sub-optimal.

### 3.4.3 Time for finding all solutions

The time to find all solutions includes the time to create the model, enforce arc-consistency and then enumerate all stable matchings for the given problem instance. All of these times exclude the time taken to read the problem instance from the disk. The entry '-' indicates an out-of-memory error occurred. In this section the EGS algorithm is not included, because it requires a non-trivial extension of the algorithm to allow it to find all stable matchings for a given instance.

model	type	20	40	60	80	100
FT	Min	0.402	1.819	7.477	-	-
	Mean	0.443	1.980	7.787	-	-
	Max	0.572	2.163	8.989	-	-
Bool	Min	0.327	0.386	0.476	0.553	0.665
	Mean	0.343	0.415	0.529	0.658	0.857
	Max	0.502	0.562	0.702	0.986	1.594
n-Var	Min	0.393	1.059	3.848	10.51	-
	Mean	0.424	1.338	4.926	17.97	-
	Max	0.452	1.830	6.122	25.25	-
n-Val	Min	0.332	0.382	0.453	0.528	0.667
	Mean	0.344	0.412	0.501	0.624	0.818
	Max	0.488	0.563	0.617	0.781	1.152
4-Val	Min	0.304	0.363	0.458	0.520	0.612
	Mean	0.328	0.395	0.507	0.618	0.771
	Max	0.478	0.591	0.635	0.904	1.427
SM2	Min	0.259	0.301	0.320	0.346	0.379
	Mean	0.285	0.339	0.357	0.407	0.481
	Max	0.419	0.463	0.453	0.597	0.671
SMN	Min	0.245	0.263	0.274	0.286	0.298
	Mean	0.269	0.291	0.300	0.307	0.312
	Max	0.393	0.519	0.349	0.720	0.472

Table 3.12: The minimum, mean and maximum times to find all solutions (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 20 to 100

In Table 3.12, there are two anomalous entries. The maximum times for SMN to find all solutions for instances of size 40 and 80 are each higher than the maximum times to find all solutions for problems of size 60 and 100, respectively. This is partially reflected in the times for SM2 when  $n = 40$ , but not to the same extent. The cause of this is not currently known.

Comparing the time to find all solutions for instances of size  $100 \leq n \leq 1000$  (Table 3.13) with the time to enforce arc-consistency for the same set of instances (Table 3.10) it can be seen that, for the SMN constraint, the time to find all stable matchings is dominated

model	type	200	400	600	800	1000
Bool	Min	1.916	8.017	38.31	-	-
	Mean	3.216	19.54	72.32	-	-
	Max	9.654	55.09	196.5	-	-
n-Val	Min	2.139	11.51	37.47	86.59	-
	Mean	2.930	16.88	49.23	107.1	-
	Max	5.155	24.52	71.05	149.6	-
4-Val	Min	1.632	6.354	-	-	-
	Mean	2.570	13.62	-	-	-
	Max	6.672	36.36	-	-	-
SM2	Min	0.854	3.145	10.96	21.94	36.78
	Mean	1.315	6.294	17.74	37.03	63.24
	Max	2.726	10.57	31.48	94.04	114.8
SMN	Min	0.345	0.492	0.827	1.332	1.963
	Mean	0.365	0.575	0.971	1.648	2.539
	Max	0.417	0.707	1.763	3.252	3.414

Table 3.13: The mean time to find all solutions (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 200 to 1000

by the time to initially enforce arc-consistency over the model. When  $n = 200$  the time to initially enforce arc-consistency is roughly 90% of the time to find all stable matchings. When  $n = 1000$  it is closer to 50% of the time. The time to enforce arc-consistency is less significant for the Bool and SM2 models. This is probably a reflection of their higher memory requirements (and the higher time complexity for SM2).

model	type	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
SM2	Min	36.78	282.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Mean	63.24	375.7	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Max	114.8	593.5	-	-	-	-	-	-
SMN	Min	1.963	8.884	24.00	43.62	81.09	112.9	166.8	242.4
	Mean	2.539	10.84	29.33	51.28	88.86	128.7	190.9	279.9
	Max	3.414	14.81	36.94	64.66	100.3	150.6	220.3	353.7

Table 3.14: Average time to find all solutions (in seconds) for 20 instances varying in size from 1000 to 8000

By comparing the time to find all solutions for instances of size  $1000 \leq n \leq 8000$  (Table 3.14) with the time to enforce arc-consistency for the same set of instances (Table 3.11) it can be seen that a significant proportion of the time to find all stable matchings, with SMN, is taken up by enforcing arc-consistency. Where  $2000 \leq n \leq 8000$  the time to enforce arc-consistency is roughly 50% of the time to find all stable matchings.



### 3.4.4 The number of solutions

	20	40	60	80	100
Max	26	112	128	228	366
Mean	6	16	26	40	52
Min	1	1	2	2	7

Table 3.15: Maximum, Mean and Minimum numbers of solutions found for 1000 instances varying in size from 20 to 100




Figure 3.39: Maximum, Mean and Minimum numbers of solutions found for 1000 instances varying in size from 10 to 100, where  $n$  is plotted on the x axis and the number of solutions is plotted on the y axis.

	200	400	600	800	1000
Max	767	1292	2334	7160	7484
Mean	140	332	558	821	1062
Min	29	62	138	192	276

Table 3.16: Maximum, Mean and Minimum numbers of solutions found for 1000 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

The number of solutions found for each SM instance was also recorded. Looking at the number of solutions in all instances (Tables 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17) it can be seen that the average number of solutions is increasing faster than  $n$ . The averages for instances of size  $n = 2000 \dots 8000$  fluctuate more than expected. This is probably a result of the low sample size for that range of instance sizes.




Figure 3.40: Maximum, Mean and Minimum numbers of solutions found for 1000 instances varying in size from 100 to 1000, where  $n$  is plotted on the x axis and the number of solutions is plotted on the y axis.

	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
Max	7484	6713	7004	17856	14165	17727	27250	57942
Mean	1062	2461	3683	6866	6956	9262	14207	15460
Min	276	960	1486	2884	4023	4098	5855	3987

Table 3.17: Maximum, Mean and Minimum numbers of solutions found for 20 instances varying in size from 1000 to 8000




Figure 3.41: Maximum, Mean and Minimum numbers of solutions found for 20 instances varying in size from 1000 to 8000, where  $n$  is plotted on the x axis and the number of solutions is plotted on the y axis.

Comparing Tables 3.14 and 3.11, it can be seen that finding all stable matchings after the problem is made arc-consistent, when  $n = 8000$ , takes roughly the same time as it takes to enforce arc-consistency. It takes, in the worst case  $O(n^2)$  time to enforce arc-consistency. The instances have on average roughly  $2n$  solutions. This gives rise to the following conjecture about a constraint model that uses the SMN constraint. After arc-consistency has been enforced on the constraint model, all stable matchings can be enumerated on average in  $O(n * s)$  time, where  $s$  is the number of stable matchings. To test this conjecture  $\frac{T}{n * A}$  was plotted against  $n$  in a graph, where  $T$  is the average time to enumerate all stable matchings after enforcing arc-consistency, and  $A$  is the average number of stable matchings in a stable marriage instance of size  $n$ .




Figure 3.42: Mean time to find all solutions divided by the average number of solutions  $\times n$  plotted on the y axis, against  $n$  on the x axis.

The graph, shown in Figure 3.42, illustrates that when  $n > 200$  the line stabilises and appears to remain constant, thus, supporting the conjecture that on average SMN can enumerate all stable matchings after enforcing arc-consistency in  $O(n * s)$  time, where  $s$  is the total number of stable matchings.

### 3.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, two specialised constraints SM2 and SMN have been presented for the Stable Marriage problem. It has been shown that propagating SMN will reduce the constrained variables to an arc-consistent state. This has been proven to be equivalent to the GS-lists as produced by the EGS algorithm. This constraint can also be used to find all

stable matchings for a given stable marriage instance as part of a failure free search process. Empirical evidence has shown that both SM2 and SMN run significantly faster than previously published toolbox constraint solutions to this problem. Furthermore, for stable marriage instances where  $n$  is between 2000 and 8000, SMN can find the equivalent of the GS-lists within a factor of four of the time of the implementation of the EGS algorithm used for these experiments.

## Chapter 4

# Specialisations of SMN

### 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, two further specialisations of the  $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint (SMN), detailed in Chapter 3, are proposed. Both of these specialisations attempt to reduce the memory requirements of the model. The first specialisation reduces the level of propagation such that no internal domain value will be removed. This is done so that during search the variable domains can be represented as a range, thus, reducing memory requirements. The second specialisation reduces the number of variables by modelling only the male preference lists. Empirical results are then given which show the performance increases gained as a result of these specialisations.

### 4.2 Bound $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint BSMN

In Section 3.4.1, it was shown that using  $O(n)$  variables of size  $n$ , instead of  $O(n^2)$  variables of size 2, allows larger problems to be modelled. This is because large consecutive variable domains can be represented as a range. Thus, a domain of any size can be stored using only two integers. If values are removed from the interior of the variable domains then they can no longer be represented as a single range of values. Therefore, the memory requirements to store these domains will increase. These increasing memory requirements during search could cause either the system to slow down while it manages the extra memory requirements or cause the search to fail due to the memory requirements exceeding the available resources. Therefore, it would be advantageous if the propagation could be restricted in such a way as to guarantee that no interior domain values will be removed.

In the SMN constraint, there are only two functions that can cause a variable reduction, the *setMax* function called in the *stable* procedure and the *delVal* function called from the *remVal* method. The *setMax* function can never remove an interior domain value and thus does not need to be altered. Therefore, the only function call that could remove an interior domain value is the *delVal* function call. This function is called to remove  $w_j$ 's preference for  $m_i$  from the domain of  $z_{j+n}$ . This call is only made after  $m_i$ 's preference for  $w_j$  has been removed from the domain of  $z_i$ . This means that  $w_j$  has been removed from  $m_i$ 's domain and  $m_i$  is, therefore, rejecting  $w_j$ . The only subsequent propagation this could cause would be if  $m_i$  was  $w_j$ 's previous favourite. This would force  $w_j$  to make a new proposal to her next favourite man. To ensure that no internal domain values are removed, the *delVal* function should be called only on the condition that the value to be removed is the current lowest value in the domain from which it will be removed. This will preserve the sequence of proposals but prevent any internal domain value from being removed. As a result, when the lower bound of a variable  $z_i$ 's domain increases and a new proposal needs to be made, the new lower bound of  $z_i$ 's domain may represent a person that has already rejected  $m_i$ . This can be resolved in the *stable* procedure by checking if the new lower bound is available or not. The Bound Stable Marriage  $n$ -ary constraint (BSMN) is now described.

The BSMN constraint assumes that it has access to the following functions:

- $PL(k, a)$  where  $1 \leq k \leq 2n$  and  $1 \leq a \leq n$ , will return the index of the variable representing the  $a^{th}$  person in the preference list of the person represented by the variable  $z_k$ .
- $pref(k, l)$  where  $1 \leq k, l \leq 2n$ , will return the rank of the person represented by variable  $z_l$  in the preference list of the person represented by  $z_k$ .
- $min(dom(x))$  will return the smallest value remaining in the domain of variable  $x$ .
- $setMax(dom(x), k)$  will delete all values from the domain of variable  $x$  which are strictly greater than the value  $k$ .
- $delVal(dom(x), k)$  will delete the value  $k$  from the domain of variable  $x$ .

BSMN is an  $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint that acts over  $2n$  variables, which represent  $n$  men and  $n$  women, and has the following attributes:

- $z$  is a set of  $2n$  constrained integer variables representing the  $n$  men and  $n$  women that are constrained.
- $\check{z}$  is a set of  $2n$  reversible integer variables containing the previous lower bounds of all  $z$  variables, where  $\check{z}_i$  will hold the previous lower bound of variable  $z_i$ . All are initially set to 1.

```

1. init()
2.   for  $i := 1$  to  $2n$  loop
3.      $j := \text{PL}(i, 1)$ 
4.     setMax(dom( $z_j$ ), pref( $j, i$ ))
5.   end loop

```

Figure 4.1: The *init* method of the BSMN constraint.

**init()** At the head of propagation, the *init* method (Figure 4.1) is called to initiate the propagation. Unlike the original SMN constraint the initial proposals are handled directly by the *init* method, instead of making a call to the *stable* procedure. This change has been made to simplify the *stable* procedure by allowing it to be called only when the lower bound of  $z_i$  changes. The new *init* method cycles through each participant (line 2), finding their favourite potential match (line 3), and proposes to them (line 4).

```

1. remVal( $i, a$ )
2.    $j := \text{PL}(i, a)$ 
3.   if min(dom( $z_j$ )) = pref( $j, i$ ) then
4.     delVal(dom( $z_j$ ), pref( $j, i$ ))
5.   end if
6.   if  $a = \check{z}_i$  then
7.     stable( $i$ )
8.   end if

```

Figure 4.2: The *remVal* method of the BSMN constraint.

**remVal( $i, a$ )** The *remVal*( $i, a$ ) method (Figure 4.2) is called when the value  $a$  is removed from the domain of  $z_i$ . The woman  $w_j$  that the value  $a$  represents is found (line 2). If  $m_i$  was  $w_j$ 's previous favourite man (line 3) then  $w_j$ 's preference for  $m_i$  is removed from the domain of  $z_{j+n}$  (line 4). If  $w_j$  was  $m_i$ 's previous favourite woman (line 6), then  $m_i$  must make a new proposal, which is handled by the auxiliary procedure *stable* (line 7).

```

1. stable( $i$ )
2.   while  $\check{z}_i \neq \min(\text{dom}(z_i))$  loop
3.      $\check{z}_i := \check{z}_i + 1$ 
4.      $j := \text{PL}(i, \check{z}_i)$ 
5.     setMax( $\text{dom}(z_j), \text{pref}(j, i)$ )
6.     if  $\text{pref}(j, i) > \max(\text{dom}(z_j))$  then
7.       remValue( $\text{dom}(z_i), \text{pref}(i, j)$ )
8.     end if
9.   end loop

```

Figure 4.3: The *stable* function of the BSMN constraint.

**stable( $i$ )** The *stable*( $i$ ) procedure (Figure 4.3) is called via the *remVal*( $i, a$ ) method when the lower bound of  $z_i$  increases. While  $m_i$ 's previous favourite has been removed from his domain (line 2) then a new proposal needs to be made.  $\check{z}_i$  is incremented (line 3) and  $m_i$ 's favourite match, that he has not yet proposed to,  $w_j$  is found (line 4) and proposed to (line 5). If  $m_i$  has previously been removed from  $w_j$ 's domain (line 6), then  $w_j$  will be removed from  $m_i$ 's domain. This is then repeated until a woman is found that still has  $m_i$  in her domain (line 2).

The conditional statement on line 6 in Figure 4.3 makes the assumption that all domain reductions will be restricted to the bounds of the variables and no interior values can be removed. If side constraints were to be added to this model that assumption may prove to be false. In this case, the condition in the if statement on line 6 could be changed to “ $\text{pref}(j, i) \notin \text{dom}(z_j)$ ”. However, if such side constraints were added then the property of consecutive domains may be lost.

The level of propagation enforced by the BSMN constraint will be equivalent to that of the optimal Bool constraint model proposed in 2001 [40] and detailed in Section 2.4.

### 4.2.1 Complexity of BSMN

The *init* method will be called once at the head of propagation. It will cycle  $2n$  times, each iteration will run in constant time, making the time complexity of a call to *init*  $O(n)$ . The *remVal* method is called each time a domain value is removed, thus can be called at most  $2n^2$  times. This method has no loops and, excluding the call to *stable* (which will be handled separately), will run in constant time, making the worst case time complexity for the total set of calls to *remVal*  $O(n^2)$ . The auxiliary function *stable*( $i$ ) is called via the *remVal* method. It can be called at most  $n$  times for each of the  $2n$  values of  $i$ .



There is a single loop in this method. During each iteration of this loop, the value of  $\tilde{z}_i$  is incremented by one. The loop terminates when  $\tilde{z}_i$  equals the smallest value in the domain of  $z_i$ . The largest value in the domain of  $z_i$  is  $n$ ; therefore, during propagation this loop can cycle at most  $n$  times for a fixed value of  $i$ . There are  $2n$  possible values for  $i$ . This means that the combined worst case time complexity of all possible calls to *stable* will be  $O(n^2)$ . Therefore, the worse case time complexity to propagate this constraint is  $O(n^2)$ .

#### 4.2.2 Empirical comparison

This constraint was implemented and used to solve the set of instances used in the empirical study presented in Section 3.4.

model	type	20	40	60	80	100
SMN	Min	0.249	0.257	0.271	0.279	0.287
	Mean	0.272	0.282	0.281	0.285	0.294
	Max	0.392	0.389	0.363	0.424	0.349
BSMN	Min	0.279	0.286	0.291	0.297	0.301
	Mean	0.283	0.294	0.299	0.304	0.309
	Max	0.294	0.525	0.428	0.555	0.520
EGS	Min	0.006	0.007	0.009	0.009	0.010
	Mean	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.010
	Max	0.086	0.093	0.178	0.091	0.021

Table 4.1: The Mean time to find the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 20 to 100

From Table 4.1, the mean time for BSMN to enforce arc-consistency is slightly higher than that of SMN; the difference is within two hundredths of a second. The time difference is probably a reflection that, at these instance sizes, the extra checks required by BSMN are more expensive than the benefits gained by its lower memory requirements. The maximum time for BSMN appears to be significantly higher than SMN (except when  $n = 20$ ). This is probably a result of instances that yield only one stable matching. Such instances will cause BSMN to do the maximum number of extra checks.

Table 4.2 shows that as the instance sizes increase, the benefits of the reduced memory requirements increase. The time required by BSMN is growing more slowly than that of SMN.

In Table 4.3, it can be seen that as the instance sizes continue to increase, so too does the benefit of the reduced memory requirements. For the larger instances, BSMN can enforce arc-consistency in half the time required by SMN. More significantly, BSMN can

model	type	200	400	600	800	1000
SMN	Min	0.319	0.423	0.608	0.918	1.315
	Mean	0.324	0.433	0.625	0.943	1.350
	Max	0.349	0.754	1.169	1.044	1.425
BSMN	Min	0.329	0.383	0.474	0.626	0.812
	Mean	0.334	0.390	0.489	0.649	0.846
	Max	0.340	0.402	0.561	0.773	0.990
EGS	Min	0.013	0.037	0.078	0.142	0.224
	Mean	0.014	0.039	0.099	0.150	0.233
	Max	0.087	0.261	0.376	1.121	1.019

Table 4.2: The Mean time to find the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 200 to 1000

model	type	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
SMN	Min	1.315	4.737	12.97	20.51	37.96	60.64	85.13	131.0
	Mean	1.350	4.808	13.38	20.80	38.75	61.49	86.94	133.1
	Max	1.425	4.911	13.84	21.30	39.51	62.55	87.97	134.7
BSMN	Min	0.812	2.653	5.984	10.99	18.12	27.80	39.06	51.86
	Mean	0.846	2.688	6.222	11.38	18.52	28.33	40.09	55.01
	Max	0.990	2.767	6.454	11.82	18.98	29.38	40.96	92.41
EGS	Min	0.224	1.078	3.026	6.120	10.45	16.14	23.40	32.00
	Mean	0.233	1.093	3.073	6.206	10.59	16.30	23.69	32.46
	Max	1.019	1.115	3.187	6.317	10.83	16.60	23.83	33.72

Table 4.3: The Mean time to find the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings (in seconds) for 20 instances varying from 1000 to 8000

enforce arc-consistency and thus find both the male and female optimal stable matchings in less than twice the time required by the EGS algorithm.

When  $n$  is in the range of 20 to 100, the time to find all solutions with BSMN is not significantly different to that of SMN. Table 4.4 shows that, for this range, BSMN can find all stable matchings within three hundredths of a second of the time of SMN.

From Table 4.5 it can be seen that the difference between the minimum and maximum times to find all solutions with BSMN is increasing with  $n$ . This is an indication of the lower level of consistency enforced by BSMN. Each interior value that the BSMN constraint does not remove, that would have been removed via the SMN constraint, will have to be removed at some point during the search process, as it does not appear in any solution. This will then cause the same value to be removed multiple times during the search, thus reducing its efficiency. The more solutions an instance contains the bigger the search tree and the greater impact this inefficiency will have. This is the likely cause of the larger

model	type	20	40	60	80	100
SMN	Min	0.245	0.263	0.274	0.286	0.298
	Mean	0.269	0.291	0.300	0.307	0.312
	Max	0.393	0.519	0.349	0.720	0.472
BSMN	Min	0.275	0.290	0.302	0.305	0.317
	Mean	0.284	0.310	0.324	0.333	0.345
	Max	0.344	0.528	0.421	0.413	0.459

Table 4.4: The maximum, mean, and minimum times to find all solutions (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 20 to 100

model	type	200	400	600	800	1000
SMN	Min	0.345	0.492	0.827	1.332	1.963
	Mean	0.365	0.575	0.971	1.648	2.539
	Max	0.417	0.707	1.763	3.252	3.414
BSMN	Min	0.370	0.505	0.905	1.387	1.944
	Mean	0.412	0.710	1.268	2.106	3.233
	Max	0.542	1.093	2.049	6.030	5.580

Table 4.5: The mean time to find all solutions (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 200 to 1000

range of times for BSMN compared to SMN.

model	type	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
SMN	Min	1.963	8.884	24.00	43.62	81.09	112.9	166.8	242.4
	Mean	2.539	10.84	29.33	51.28	88.86	128.7	190.9	279.9
	Max	3.414	14.81	36.94	64.66	100.3	150.6	220.3	353.7
BSMN	Min	1.944	9.557	30.57	52.11	87.35	122.9	190.0	257.3
	Mean	3.233	14.33	39.58	68.68	105.5	158.2	245.1	331.0
	Max	5.580	21.86	54.30	99.43	127.4	206.5	321.7	444.3

Table 4.6: Average time to find all solutions (in seconds) for 20 instances varying in size from 1000 to 8000

Table 4.6 shows the large range of times recorded for the instances in the range 1000 to 8000. As with the results from the instances of size 200 to 1000, it can be seen that the range of times was larger for BSMN than SMN.

From these empirical results it can be seen that, by ensuring no interior domain values are removed, we can significantly improve the time to enforce arc-consistency and thus find a stable matching. This significantly reduces the performance gap between the EGS algorithm and the constraint solutions. The performance increase comes at a cost as it takes slightly longer when finding all stable matchings. If side constraints were added to this model that removed interior domain values then, depending how the solver represented

the variable domains, the performance may be adversely effected. If the solver represents only the bounds of the variable domains then any attempt to remove any inconsistent interior domain values will have no effect. In this case the propagation will be deferred until the inconsistent value is one of the bounds of the variable, at which time the value will be removed. This approach will not adversely effect the runtime of the BSMN constraint. However, it may reduce the level of consistency attained by the side constraints, which may adversely effect the runtime. Alternately, the solver may allow side constraints to remove interior values, which will nullify the benefits gained by BSMN and, thus, adversely effect the runtime. These restriction will reduce the versatility of this constraint and, therefore, its usefulness.

### 4.3 Compact $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint CSMN

In 2003, Green et al [47] proposed an extensional constraint model for the Stable Marriage problem that used only  $n$  variables with domains of length  $n$ , as opposed to all other published constraint models to date that use either  $2n$  or  $2n^2$  variables. Using only  $n$  variables will halve the number of possible domain reductions as well as significantly reduce the memory requirements. Assuming that the effort to propagate each domain reduction is not double that of other models, such a model should yield a significant performance improvement. The compact  $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint (CSMN) is a specialised constraint which acts over  $n$  variables. Enforcing arc-consistency over a constraint model using CSMN will result in the variable domains representing the male side of the GS-lists. From these domains, the full GS-lists can easily be constructed.

A constraint model using the SMN constraint uses a set of  $n$  variables to represent the men and another set of  $n$  variables to represent the women. In a constraint model using the CSMN constraint, given the domains of the male variables and the female preference lists the domains of the female variables can be calculated. For example, if woman  $w_j$  is in the domain of man  $m_i$  then  $m_i$  must be in the domain of  $w_j$ . More formally, if  $a \in dom(z_i)$  and  $n + j = PL(i, a)$  then  $b \in dom(z_{n+j})$  where  $i = PL(n + j, b)$ . The CSMN constraint eliminates this duplication by representing only the male domains. If this constraint were implemented in a Java based constraint solver then the constructor to create a CSMN constraint may look like  $CSMN(z, mpl, wpl)$ , where  $z$  is an array of constrained integer variables,  $mpl$  is a 2 dimensional integer array representing the male preference lists and

$wpl$  is a 2 dimensional integer array representing the female preference lists.

A compact  $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint (CSMN) is an object that acts over  $n$  variables, and has the following attributes:

- $z$  is an array of  $n$  constrained integer variables representing the  $n$  men that are constrained.
- $\check{z}_i$  where  $1 \leq i \leq n$ , is an array of  $n$  reversible integer variables containing the previous lower bounds of all  $z$  variables. All are initially set to 1.
- $\check{z}_j$  where  $n < j \leq 2n$ , is an array of  $n$  reversible integer variables containing  $w_j$ 's preference for the last man that  $w_j$  proposed to. All are initially set to 1.
- $\vec{z}_j$  where  $n < j \leq 2n$ , is an array of  $n$  reversible integer variables containing  $w_j$ 's preference for the most preferred man that has proposed to  $w_j$ . All are initially set to  $n$ .

```

1. init()
2.   for i := 1 to n loop
3.     stable_m(i)
4.   end loop
5.   for j := 1 to n loop
6.     stable_w(n + j)
7.   end loop

```

Figure 4.4: The *init* method of the CSMN constraint.

**init()** The *init()* method shown in Figure 4.4 is called at the head of search to initialise the CSMN constraint. For each man  $m_i$  (line 2), a call will be made to the *stable\_m(i)* function to handle the proposals (line 3). Similarly, a call for each the woman  $w_j$  (line 4) will be made to *stable\_w(n + j)*.

**remVal( $i, a$ )** The *remVal( $i, a$ )* method given in Figure 4.5 will be called when the domain value  $a$  has been removed from the domain of variable  $z_i$ . If the removed value represented  $m_i$ 's previous favourite woman (line 2), then  $m_i$  must propose to his new favourite woman via the *stable\_m(i)* function (line 3). If  $m_i$  was the previous favourite man of the woman  $w_j$  represented by the domain value  $a$  (line 6), then  $w_j$  must propose to her new favourite man via the *stable\_w(j)* function (line 7).

```

1. remVal( $i, a$ )
2.   if  $a = \tilde{z}_i$  then
3.     stable_m( $i$ )
4.   end if
5.    $j := \text{PL}(i, a)$ 
6.   if  $i = \text{PL}(j, \tilde{z}_j)$  then
7.     stable_w( $j$ )
8.   end if

```

Figure 4.5: The *remVal* method of the CSMN constraint.

```

1. stable_m( $i$ )
2.   for  $k = \tilde{z}_i$  to  $\min(\text{dom}(z_i))$  loop
3.      $j := \text{PL}(i, k)$ 
4.     for  $l = \text{pref}(j, i) + 1$  to  $\tilde{z}_j$  loop
5.        $b := \text{PL}(j, l)$ 
6.       delVal( $\text{dom}(z_b), \text{pref}(b, j)$ )
7.     end loop
8.      $\tilde{z}_j := \min(\tilde{z}_j, \text{pref}(j, i))$ 
9.   end loop
10.   $\tilde{z}_i := \min(\text{dom}(z_i))$ 

```

Figure 4.6: The *stable\_m(i)* function of the CSMN constraint.

**stable\_m( $i$ )** The *stable\_m(i)* function shown in Figure 4.6 can be called to make an initial proposal for  $m_i$  via the *init()* method or to make a new proposal after being rejected by a previous fiancée via the *remVal( $i, a$ )* method. For each woman  $w_j$  that  $m_i$  has not yet proposed to and that  $m_i$  prefers to all other women in his domain (lines 2,3), a proposal will be made. Note that if the assumption was made that CSMN has exclusive access to the  $z$  variable domains then a proposal need only be made to  $m_i$ 's current favourite woman. When  $w_j$  receives a proposal from  $m_i$  she will be removed from the domains of all men worse than  $m_i$  (lines 4 to 7). After each such proposal the  $\tilde{z}_j$  variable, which holds  $w_j$ 's current best proposal, will be updated (line 8). Finally, the  $\tilde{z}_i$  variable will be updated.

**stable\_w( $j$ )** The *stable\_w(j)* function shown in Figure 4.7 can be called to make an initial proposal for  $w_{j-n}$  via the *init()* method or to make a new proposal after being rejected by a previous fiancé via the *remVal( $i, a$ )* method. Woman  $w_{j-n}$ 's previous favourite man  $m_i$  is found (line 5) and all women worse than  $w_{j-n}$  are removed from his domain (line 6). If the value corresponding to  $w_{j-n}$  is still in  $m_i$ 's domain (line 7) then the loop is terminated (line 8). If  $w_{j-n}$  has been removed from  $m_i$ 's domain then we look for  $w_{j-n}$ 's

```

1. stable_w(j)
2.   notDone := true
3.   while notDone loop
4.     if  $\check{z}_j \leq \bar{z}_j$  then
5.        $i := \text{PL}(j, \check{z}_j)$ 
6.        $\text{setMax}(\text{dom}(z_i), \text{pref}(i, j))$ 
7.       if  $\text{pref}(i, j) \in \text{dom}(z_i)$  then
8.         notDone := false
9.       else  $\check{z}_j := \check{z}_j + 1$ 
10.      end if
11.     else notDone := false
12.     end if
13.   end loop

```

Figure 4.7: The *stable\_w(j)* function of the CSMN constraint.

next favourite man (line 9) and  $w_{j-n}$  proposes to him. This is then repeated until either a man is found with  $w_{j-n}$  still in his domain (line 8) or there are no more eligible men (lines 4 and 11).

### 4.3.1 Complexity of CSMN

The *init* method will be called once at the head of propagation. It will cycle  $2n$  times, each iteration (excluding the calls to *stable<sub>m</sub>* and *stable<sub>w</sub>* which will be handled separately) will run in constant time, making the time complexity of a call to *init*  $O(n)$ .

The *remVal* method is called each time a domain value is removed, thus can be called at most  $n^2$  times. This method has no loops and, excluding the calls to *stable<sub>m</sub>* and *stable<sub>w</sub>* (which will be handled separately), will run in constant time, making the worst case time complexity for the total set of calls to *remVal*  $O(n^2)$ .

The auxiliary function *stable<sub>m</sub>(i)* is called via the *remVal* and *init* methods. It can be called at most  $n$  times for each of the  $n$  values of  $i$ . There is a nested loop in this function. The number of times the inner loop will cycle is dependant on  $j$  and  $\bar{z}_j$ . Because  $\bar{z}_j$  is initialised to  $n$  and can only decrease during propagation to a possible minimum value of 1, for all possible calls to *stable<sub>m</sub>(i)* for all possible values  $i$  and a fixed value of  $j$  the total number of cycles of the inner loop is in the worst case  $O(n)$ . As there are  $n$  possible values for  $j$  and the inner loop runs in constant time, in the worst case the total time required by the inner loop, summed over all values of  $i$  and  $j$ , will be  $O(n^2)$ . For each call to *stable<sub>m</sub>(i)* for a fixed  $i$  the outer loop will cycle a number of times equal to the difference between  $\check{z}_i$  and  $\min(\text{dom}(z_i))$ . At the end of each loop  $\check{z}_i$  is made equal to  $\min(\text{dom}(z_i))$ . As  $\check{z}_i$  is

initialised to 1 and  $\min(\text{dom}(z_i))$  will never be greater than  $n$ , in the worst case the total number of possible cycles of the outer loop in  $\text{stable}_m(i)$  for a fixed  $i$  will be  $O(n)$ . As there are  $n$  possible values for  $i$  and the outer loop runs in constant time (excluding the inner loop), in the worst case the total time required by the outer loop, summed over all values of  $i$ , will be  $O(n^2)$ . Therefore, in the worst case, all possible calls to  $\text{stable}_m(i)$  will run in  $O(n^2)$  time.

The auxiliary function  $\text{stable}_w(j)$  is called via the *remVal* and *init* methods. It can be called at most  $n$  times for each of the  $n$  values of  $j$ . This function contains a single loop which will cycle a number of times dependant on  $\check{z}_j$ . Each time the loop cycles  $\check{z}_j$  will increase by 1, up to a maximum of  $n$  times. Therefore, for a fixed value of  $j$  the loop can, in the worst case, cycle  $O(n)$  times for all possible calls to  $\text{stable}_w(j)$ . As there are  $n$  possible values for  $j$  and the loop runs in constant time, in the worst case the total time required by the loop, summed over all values of  $i, j$ , will be  $O(n^2)$ . Therefore, in the worst case, all possible calls to  $\text{stable}_w(j)$  will run in  $O(n^2)$  time.

Therefore, the worst case time complexity to propagate the CSMN constraint is  $O(n^2)$ .

### 4.3.2 Empirical results

The CSMN constraint was implemented and used to solve the same set of instances as used in the empirical study shown in Section 3.4.

model	type	20	40	60	80	100
SMN	Min	0.249	0.257	0.271	0.279	0.287
	Mean	0.272	0.282	0.281	0.285	0.294
	Max	0.392	0.389	0.363	0.424	0.349
BSMN	Min	0.279	0.286	0.291	0.297	0.301
	Mean	0.283	0.294	0.299	0.304	0.309
	Max	0.294	0.525	0.428	0.555	0.520
CSMN	Min	0.286	0.295	0.310	0.315	0.318
	Mean	0.290	0.299	0.315	0.319	0.323
	Max	0.375	0.306	0.403	0.405	0.422
EGS	Min	0.006	0.007	0.009	0.009	0.010
	Mean	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.010	0.010
	Max	0.086	0.093	0.178	0.091	0.021

Table 4.7: The Mean time to find the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 20 to 100

From Table 4.7, it can be seen that for instances where  $n \leq 100$  the extra work required to propagate CSMN outweighs the benefits gained from the smaller model size.



model	type	200	400	600	800	1000
SMN	Min	0.319	0.423	0.608	0.918	1.315
	Mean	0.324	0.433	0.625	0.943	1.350
	Max	0.349	0.754	1.169	1.044	1.425
BSMN	Min	0.329	0.383	0.474	0.626	0.812
	Mean	0.334	0.390	0.489	0.649	0.846
	Max	0.340	0.402	0.561	0.773	0.990
CSMN	Min	0.353	0.438	0.589	0.821	1.152
	Mean	0.364	0.448	0.603	0.847	1.189
	Max	0.458	0.543	0.680	0.950	1.381
EGS	Min	0.013	0.037	0.078	0.142	0.224
	Mean	0.014	0.039	0.099	0.150	0.233
	Max	0.087	0.261	0.376	1.121	1.019

Table 4.8: The Mean time to find the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 200 to 1000

Table 4.8 shows that for the range  $200 \leq n \leq 1000$  CSMN can be made arc-consistent faster than the original SMN constraint. The time saved by the lower space requirements and the reduced number of reductions by the BSMN constraint gives greater performance benefits than the compact model of the CSMN constraint.

model	type	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
SMN	Min	1.315	4.737	12.97	20.51	37.96	60.64	85.13	131.0
	Mean	1.350	4.808	13.38	20.80	38.75	61.49	86.94	133.1
	Max	1.425	4.911	13.84	21.30	39.51	62.55	87.97	134.7
BSMN	Min	0.812	2.653	5.984	10.99	18.12	27.80	39.06	51.86
	Mean	0.846	2.688	6.222	11.38	18.52	28.33	40.09	55.01
	Max	0.990	2.767	6.454	11.82	18.98	29.38	40.96	92.41
CSMN	Min	1.152	4.121	9.463	17.65	28.61	54.15	64.63	105.2
	Mean	1.189	4.192	9.825	17.94	29.45	54.80	65.60	106.6
	Max	1.381	4.316	12.50	18.23	30.48	55.96	66.61	115.3
EGS	Min	0.224	1.078	3.026	6.120	10.45	16.14	23.40	32.00
	Mean	0.233	1.093	3.073	6.206	10.59	16.30	23.69	32.46
	Max	1.019	1.115	3.187	6.317	10.83	16.60	23.83	33.72

Table 4.9: The Mean time to find the man-optimal and woman-optimal stable matchings (in seconds) for 20 instances varying from 1000 to 8000

It can be seen in Table 4.9 that in the range  $1000 \leq n \leq 8000$ , as with the previous ranges, the CSMN constraint slightly improves on the performance of the SMN constraint, but the BSMN constraint model still dominates when finding a single stable matching.

Similar to finding the equivalent of the GS-lists, Table 4.10 shows that when finding all stable matchings, the SMN constraint runs faster on instances where  $n \leq 100$  than

model	type	20	40	60	80	100
SMN	Min	0.245	0.263	0.274	0.286	0.298
	Mean	0.269	0.291	0.300	0.307	0.312
	Max	0.393	0.519	0.349	0.720	0.472
BSMN	Min	0.275	0.290	0.302	0.305	0.317
	Mean	0.284	0.310	0.324	0.333	0.345
	Max	0.344	0.528	0.421	0.413	0.459
CSMN	Min	0.281	0.293	0.310	0.319	0.325
	Mean	0.286	0.304	0.328	0.339	0.350
	Max	0.373	0.466	0.391	0.368	0.460

Table 4.10: The maximum, mean, and minimum times to find all solutions (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 20 to 100

both the BSMN and CSMN constraints, with the exception of a few hard instances when  $n = 40$ ,  $n = 80$  and  $n = 100$ .

model	type	200	400	600	800	1000
SMN	Min	0.345	0.492	0.827	1.332	1.963
	Mean	0.365	0.575	0.971	1.648	2.539
	Max	0.417	0.707	1.763	3.252	3.414
BSMN	Min	0.370	0.505	0.905	1.387	1.944
	Mean	0.412	0.710	1.268	2.106	3.233
	Max	0.542	1.093	2.049	6.030	5.580
CSMN	Min	0.379	0.498	0.749	1.113	1.565
	Mean	0.400	0.559	0.848	1.304	1.970
	Max	0.561	0.852	1.242	2.086	2.675

Table 4.11: The mean time to find all solutions (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying from 200 to 1000

It can be seen in Table 4.11 that as the instance sizes grow to  $200 \leq n \leq 1000$ , the benefits of the reduced size of the CSMN constraint model start to be seen. Not only does the CSMN constraint find all the solutions faster on average, it is also significantly more predictable as it has a much smaller range of times than the other two constraints. During search, the constraint solver needs to track state changes as branching decisions are made so that, when backtracking, the previous state can be restored. The CSMN constraint requires half the variables of either of the other two constraints, thus the time to store and restore the state of the model during search will be significantly reduced. This benefit will have a greater effect as the number of solutions increases, hence the CSMN constraint has a smaller range of times.

As the instance sizes grow, Table 4.12 shows that the trend continues. This indicates

model	type	1000	2000	3000	4000	5000	6000	7000	8000
SMN	Min	1.963	8.884	24.00	43.62	81.09	112.9	166.8	242.4
	Mean	2.539	10.84	29.33	51.28	88.86	128.7	190.9	279.9
	Max	3.414	14.81	36.94	64.66	100.3	150.6	220.3	353.7
BSMN	Min	1.944	9.557	30.57	52.11	87.35	122.9	190.0	257.3
	Mean	3.233	14.33	39.58	68.68	105.5	158.2	245.1	331.0
	Max	5.580	21.86	54.30	99.43	127.4	206.5	321.7	444.3
CSMN	Min	1.565	7.042	17.12	34.25	57.06	92.06	123.5	179.5
	Mean	1.970	8.444	21.19	40.51	62.62	104.1	144.1	206.9
	Max	2.675	11.71	26.24	48.27	70.24	118.4	171.6	255.8

Table 4.12: Average time to find all solutions (in seconds) for 20 instances varying in size from 1000 to 8000

that CSMN is more efficient at finding all stable matchings than the other two constraints.

## 4.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, two further specialisations of the SMN constraint are proposed, BSMN and CSMN. It has been shown that, by ensuring no interior domain values are removed, the BSMN constraint is more memory efficient. It has been shown that, for larger instances, it can find the bounds of the GS-lists, and thus a stable matching, within a factor of two of the time required by the EGS algorithm. The CSMN constraint has shown that using a compact model with only  $n$  variables can make the search process more efficient, thus reducing the time to find all stable matchings. However, the benefits seen in the BSMN and CSMN constraints come at a cost in the form of reduced versatility. Any side constraints added to the BSMN must not remove interior domain values or the benefit of this constraint will be lost. Any side constraints added to the CSMN constraint model will not have direct access to the female domains. This may require additional variables to be added to be able to express a variation on the original problem. This in turn will reduce the advantages gained by the compact model. Therefore, in terms of versatility, the SMN constraint is still superior to these two specialisations.

## Chapter 5

# A specialised constraint model for the Hospitals/Residents problem

### 5.1 Introduction

The classical Hospitals/Residents problem (HR) [36] is a generalisation of the Stable Marriage problem. An HR instance involves a set of  $n$  residents  $R = \{r_1 \dots r_n\}$  and a set of  $m$  hospitals  $H = \{h_1 \dots h_m\}$ . Each resident  $r_i$  ranks in order of preference a subset of the hospitals. Each hospital  $h_j$  has an associated capacity  $c_j$ , such that  $h_j$  can have at most  $c_j$  residents assigned to it. Each hospital  $h_j$  ranks in order of preference all residents who have  $h_j$  in their preference list. The objective is to find a matching of residents to hospitals such that each resident is matched to at most one hospital, the hospital capacities are respected and the matching is stable. A matching  $M$  is stable if it contains no blocking pairs. A (resident,hospital) pair  $(r_i, h_j)$  form a blocking pair if both  $r_i$  and  $h_j$  improve their assignments by being matched to each other. This problem is described in more detail in Section 2.3.5.

In this chapter, a specialised  $n$ -ary constraint HRN is introduced which can be used to model and solve Hospitals/Residents problem instances. A constraint model using HRN can be made arc-consistent in  $O(Lc)$  time, where  $L$  is the sum of the lengths of all the residents' preference lists and  $c$  is the largest of all the hospital capacities. It is conjectured that enforcing arc-consistency over such a model is sufficient to find both the hospital-optimal and resident-optimal stable matching. Empirical evidence is then given to show that this constraint can solve large instances in a reasonable time.

## 5.2 Specialised $n$ -ary Hospitals/Residents constraint (HRN)

HRN [70] is a specialised  $n$ -ary constraint which represents an instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem as a single constraint. Strictly speaking the arity of HRN is  $n + m$ , but for simplicity it is referred to as an  $n$ -ary constraint. This constraint acts over two arrays of constrained integer variables,  $x_1 \dots x_n$ , representing the residents, and  $y_1 \dots y_m$ , representing the hospitals. Each resident variable  $x_i$  has an initial domain of  $\{1 \dots m\}$ . Domain values represent preferences, meaning that if the variable  $x_i$  were assigned the value  $v$  this would represent resident  $r_i$  being assigned to its  $v^{\text{th}}$  choice hospital. Similarly, each hospital variable  $y_j$  has an initial domain of  $\{1 \dots n\}$ , with domain values representing preferences in the same way. In this model only the resident variables are search variables, meaning that a solution will require all resident variables to be reduced to a single domain value. However, the hospital variables may still have more than one value remaining in their domains. This allows a hospital to be represented by a single variable, while still allowing it to be matched to more than one resident.

### 5.2.1 The Constraint

For ease of explanation it is assumed that the problem instances this constraint will be used to solve will have sufficient capacity in the hospitals to place all residents, and that all residents will have complete preference lists. This means that all residents will be matched in all stable matchings. In Section 5.2.2, it will be shown how this assumption can be dropped.

The HRN constraint assumes that it has access to the following functions:

- $PL\_R(k, a)$  will return the index of the variable representing the  $a^{\text{th}}$  hospital in the preference list of resident  $r_k$ .
- $PL\_H(k, a)$  will return the index of the variable representing the  $a^{\text{th}}$  resident in the preference list of hospital  $h_k$ .
- $pref\_R(i, j)$  will return the rank of hospital  $h_j$  in the preference list of resident  $r_i$ .
- $pref\_H(j, i)$  will return the rank of resident  $r_i$  in the preference list of hospital  $h_j$ .
- $min(dom(x))$  will return the smallest value remaining in the domain of variable  $x$ .

- $setMax(dom(x), k)$  will delete all values from the domain of variable  $x$  which are strictly greater than the value  $k$ .
- $delVal(dom(x), k)$  will delete the value  $k$  from the domain of variable  $x$ .
- $getNextHigher(dom(x), k)$  will return the smallest value in the domain of variable  $x$  that is strictly greater than the value  $k$ ; if no such value exists then this function returns  $k$ .
- $swap(x, y)$  swaps the values of the integer variables  $x$  and  $y$ .

The HRN constraint acts over a set of resident variables and a set of hospital variables, and has the following attributes:

- $x$  is a set of constrained integer variables representing the residents, such that resident  $r_i$  is represented by  $x_i$ .
- $y$  is a set of constrained integer variables representing the hospitals, such that hospital  $h_j$  is represented by  $y_j$ .
- $c$  is a set of integer constants containing the capacity of each hospital.
- $\tilde{x}$  is a set of  $n$  reversible integer variables containing the previous lower bounds of all  $x$  variables. All are initially set to 0. On backtracking the values in  $\tilde{x}$  are restored by the solver.
- $\tilde{y}$  is a set of  $m$  reversible integer variables containing the value that represents the least favourite resident to be offered a place at the hospital. For hospital  $h_j$ ,  $\tilde{y}_j$  will equal the  $c_j^{th}$  lowest value in  $dom(y_j)$ . All are initially set to 0. On backtracking the values in  $\tilde{y}$  are restored by the solver.
- $post$  is an  $m \times c$  array of reversible integer variables that store the applications received by each hospital.  $post_j$  is an array of length  $c_j$  which contains an ordered list of the best proposals received by hospital  $h_j$ .  $post_{ja}$  contains hospital  $y_j$ 's preference for the  $a^{th}$  best resident to apply to hospital  $h_j$ . All of the  $post$  variables are initialised to  $maxInt$ .

As with previous constraints, the HRN constraint is designed to operate within an AC5 like environment (as detailed in Section 2.2). This means that a method is required

that will be called on initialisation at the head of propagation, and another method for when a domain value is removed. These methods are detailed below.

```

1. init()
2.   for  $i := 1$  to  $n$  loop
3.      $\text{apply}(i)$ 
4.   end loop
5.   for  $j := 1$  to  $m$  loop
6.      $\text{offer}(j)$ 
7.   end loop

```

Figure 5.1: The `init()` method.

**init()** The `init()` method (Figure 5.1) is called at the head of search to initialise the HRN constraint. Each resident (line 2) will apply to their favourite hospital, via a call to the `apply(i)` function. Similarly, each hospital  $h_j$  (line 5) will make offers to the first  $c_j$  residents in its domain, via a call to the `offer(j)` function (line 6).

```

1.  $\text{remVal\_R}(i, a)$ 
2.    $j := \text{PL\_R}(i, a)$ 
3.    $\text{delVal}(\text{dom}(y_j), \text{pref\_H}(j, i))$ 
4.   if  $a = \tilde{x}_i$  then
5.      $\text{apply}(i)$ 
6.   end if

```

Figure 5.2: The `remVal_R(i, a)` method for resident variables.

**remVal\_R(i, a)** The `remVal_R(i, a)` method, shown in Figure 5.2, is called when the value  $a$  is removed from the domain of the resident variable  $x_i$ . The hospital  $h_j$  that the removed value  $a$  corresponds to is found (line 2) and  $h_j$ 's preference for  $r_i$  is then removed from the domain of  $y_j$  (line 3). If the removed value was the previous lower bound for  $x_i$  (line 4) then  $r_i$  must apply to its new favourite hospital. This is done via a call to the auxiliary function `apply(i)` (line 5).

**remVal\_H(j, a)** The `remVal_H(j, a)` method, shown in Figure 5.3, is called when a value  $a$  is removed from the domain of a hospital variable  $y_j$ . The resident  $r_i$  that the removed value  $a$  corresponds to is found (line 2) and  $r_i$ 's preference for  $h_j$  is then removed from the domain of  $x_i$  (line 3). If  $h_j$  has previously offered a place to  $r_i$  (line 4), then

```

1. remVal_H( $j, a$ )
2.    $i := PL\_H(j, a)$ 
3.   delVal(dom( $x_i$ ), pref_R( $i, j$ ))
4.   if  $a \leq \check{y}_j$  then
5.     offer( $j$ )
6.   end if

```

Figure 5.3: The `remVal_H( $j, a$ )` method for hospital variables.

$h_j$  may offer a place to a new resident. This is done via a call to the auxiliary function `offer( $j$ )` (line 5).

```

1. apply( $i$ )
2.   for  $k := \check{x}_i + 1$  to min(dom( $x_i$ )) loop
3.      $j := PL\_R(i, k)$ 
4.     apply( $j$ , pref_H( $j, i$ ))
5.     if  $post_{jc_j} < maxInt$  then
6.       setMax(dom( $y_j$ ),  $post_{jc_j}$ )
7.     end if
8.   end loop
9.    $\check{x}_i := \min(\text{dom}(x_i))$ 

```

Figure 5.4: The `apply( $i$ )` function.

**apply( $i$ )** The `apply( $i$ )` function (Figure 5.4) can be called by either the `init()` method or the `remVal_R( $i, a$ )` methods. This function is the residents' equivalent of the `stable( $i$ )` function in the SMN constraint from Section 3.3. Resident  $r_i$  will apply to each hospital  $h_j$ , such that  $r_i$  prefers  $h_j$  to any other in its domain and  $r_i$  has not previously applied to  $h_j$  (line 2), note that if the assumption was made that HRN has exclusive access to the variable domains then only a single application to the new current favourite hospital need be made. First the hospital to be applied to,  $h_j$ , is found (line 3), then resident  $r_i$  makes an application to hospital  $h_j$  via a call to the `apply( $j, a$ )` function (line 4). If  $c_j$  applications have been made to hospital  $h_j$  (line 5) then  $h_j$  must not consider any resident worse than its  $c_j^{\text{th}}$  favourite applicant (line 6).  $\check{x}_i$  is then updated with the current lower bound of  $x_i$  (line 9).

**apply( $j, a$ )** The `apply( $j, a$ )` function (Figure 5.5) is called by the `apply( $i$ )` function. It is called when resident  $r_i$  makes an application to hospital  $h_j$  (where  $i = PL(j, a)$ ). `apply( $j, a$ )` maintains the array `post $_j$` , which contains  $h_j$ 's preferences for the  $c_j$  most



```

1. apply( $j, a$ )
2.   for  $k := 1$  to  $c_j$  loop
3.     if  $post_{jk} > a$  then
4.       swap( $post_{jk}, a$ )
5.     end if
6.   end loop

```

Figure 5.5: The  $apply(j, a)$  function.

preferred residents that have applied to  $h_j$ . Each element in  $post_j$  is cycled through (line 2). If the current value held in  $post_{jk}$  is greater than  $a$  (line 3) then the value of  $a$  and  $post_{jk}$  are swapped (line 4), meaning that  $post_{jk}$  will become equal to  $a$  and  $a$  will be given the previous value held in  $post_{jk}$ . This is then repeated for the rest of the  $post_j$  variables, effectively shuffling the values down the line to reorder the list as required.

```

1. offer( $j$ )
2.    $k := \min(\text{dom}(y_j))$ 
3.   for  $a := 1$  to  $c_j$  loop
4.      $i := \text{PL\_H}(j, k)$ 
5.     setMax( $\text{dom}(x_i), \text{pref\_R}(i, j)$ )
6.      $\check{y}_j := k$ 
7.      $k := \text{getNextHigher}(\text{dom}(y_j), k)$ 
8.   end loop

```

Figure 5.6: The  $offer(j)$  function.

**offer( $j$ )** The  $offer(j)$  function (Figure 5.6) is called by either the  $init()$  method or the  $remVal\_H(j, a)$  method. This function is the hospitals' equivalent of the  $stable(i)$  function in the SMN constraint from Section 3.3. Hospital  $h_j$ 's most preferred resident  $r_i$  is found (lines 2 and 4),  $r_i$ 's preference for all hospitals worse than  $h_j$  are then removed from  $\text{dom}(x_i)$  (line 5). Hospital  $h_j$ 's next favourite resident is then found (line 7). This is then repeated  $c_j$  times (line 3) at which point the top  $c_j$  residents in  $h_j$ 's current domain will have received an offer. On termination of this function,  $\check{y}_j$  will be made equal to  $h_j$ 's preference for the least preferred resident that received a proposal (line 6).

## 5.2.2 Enhancing the model for incomplete lists

Until now, the methods described to implement the HRN constraint have assumed that the preference lists are complete and that there are sufficient hospital places for all residents.

However, HRN can easily be extended to allow incomplete preference lists and insufficient hospital places for all residents. This is achieved in much the same way as the SMN constraint from Section 3.3.2. The value  $m + 1$  will be added to the initial domain of each  $x$  variable. The variable  $x_i$  being assigned the value  $m + 1$  will signify that  $r_i$  is unmatched. Similarly, the value  $n + 1$  will be added to the initial domains of each  $y$  variable; the value  $n + 1$  remaining in the domain of  $y_j$  indicates that  $h_j$  may be assigned less than  $c_j$  residents. Additionally, the  $remVal\_R(i, a)$  and  $remVal\_H(j, a)$  methods will not act if  $a$  is greater than  $m$  or  $n$  respectively, and lines 4 and 5 in the  $offer(j)$  function will be run under the condition that  $k \leq n$ . These extensions will not affect either the time or space complexity of this constraint. This extension can also be used to model problem instances with complete preference lists in which the hospitals have insufficient capacities to accommodate all residents.

### 5.2.3 Complexity of HRN

The  $init()$  method will be called once and contains two loops, which cycle  $n$  and  $m$  times and make calls to  $apply(i)$  and  $offer(j)$  respectively. Therefore, excluding the calls to  $apply(i)$  and  $offer(j)$  (which will be handled separately) the  $init()$  method will run in  $O(n + m)$  time. Neither of the two  $remVal$  methods contains loops and each can be called at most once for each value removed from a variable domain. Therefore, excluding the calls made to  $apply(i)$  and  $offer(j)$  (which will be handled separately) the total runtime complexity of all calls to the two  $remVal$  methods will be  $O(L)$ , where  $L$  is the sum of the lengths of all the resident's preference lists. For each of the  $m$  values of  $j$  the  $offer(j)$  auxiliary function will be called once via the  $init()$  method and at most once via the  $remVal\_H(j, a)$  method for each time a resident that previously received an offer was removed from the domain of  $h_j$ . This method contains one loop which will cycle  $c_j$  times. In the worst case, this method could be called once for each value in the domain of each hospital variable, meaning that the worst case runtime complexity of all possible calls to  $offer(j)$  for all values of  $j$  will be  $O(Lc)$ . The  $apply(i)$  method makes a call to its own auxiliary function  $apply(j, a)$  which will run in  $O(c_j)$  time, making the total runtime complexity of all possible calls to  $apply(i)$  for all values of  $i$ ,  $O(Lc)$ . Therefore, the total worst case complexity to propagate a constraint model using the HRN constraint will be  $O(Lc + n + m)$ . As  $Lc$  will always dominate  $n + m$ , this will be dropped making the overall complexity  $O(Lc)$ .

The space complexity of this encoding is dominated by the data structures used by the  $pref\_R(i, j)$  and  $pref\_H(j, i)$  functions, which is  $O(nm)$ .

### 5.2.4 Optimisations

The HRN constraint as proposed above can be implemented in a different way either to optimise the constraint with respect to space or time. In both cases the optimisation comes at a cost. The time optimisation will increase the memory requirements, while the space optimisation will increase the time complexity of the model.

#### Time for space

By retaining more information about residents that apply to hospitals, the  $apply(j, a)$  and  $offer(j)$  auxiliary functions can be re-written so that the combined time complexity of all possible calls is reduced to  $O(L)$  time instead of its original  $O(Lc)$  time. However, the time required to initialise the variables necessary to achieve this will make the overall time complexity  $\Theta(mn)$ .

To achieve this, the original  $apply(i)$  and  $apply(j, a)$  functions and the *post* variables will be replaced. The *post* variables will be replaced by two new integer arrays *numAps* and *worstAp* (both initialised to 0) along with a 2 dimensional array of boolean variables of size  $m \times n$  named *apps* (also initialised to 0). All these new variables will be reversible, information on previous values for these variables will be held by the solver and on backtracking the variables will be returned to their previous states. The new  $apply(i)$  and  $apply(j, a)$  functions are given below in Figures 5.7 and 5.8.

```

1. apply(i)
2.   for  $k := \tilde{x}_i + 1$  to  $\min(\text{dom}(x_i))$  loop
3.      $j := \text{PL\_R}(i, k)$ 
4.     apply(j, pref_H(j, i))
5.     if  $\text{numAps}_j \geq c_j$  then
6.       setMax( $\text{dom}(y_j)$ ,  $\text{worstAp}_j$ )
7.     end if
8.   end loop
9.    $\tilde{x}_i := \min(\text{dom}(x_i))$ 

```

Figure 5.7: The  $apply(i)$  function.

**apply(i)** The changes to the  $apply(i)$  function, as shown in Figure 5.7, are on lines 5 and 6. If the number of applications received by hospital  $h_j$  is greater than or equal to

its capacity (line 5) then any resident less preferred than the  $c_j^{th}$  best applicant can be removed from  $h_j$ 's domain (line 6).

```

1. apply( $j, a$ )
2.    $apps_{ja} := 1$ 
3.   if  $numAps_j < c_j$  then
4.      $worstAps_j := \max(\{a, worstAps_j\})$ 
5.      $numAps_j := numAps_j + 1$ 
6.   else if  $a < worstAps_j$  then
7.     do  $worstAps_j := worstAps_j - 1$  while  $apps_{j, worstAps_j} \neq 1$ 
8.   end if

```

Figure 5.8: The  $apply(j, a)$  function.

**apply( $j, a$ )** The  $apply(j, a)$  method, shown in Figure 5.8, first sets the  $apps_{ja}$  variable to 1 (line 2). This records the fact that  $h_j$  has received an application from its  $a^{th}$  favourite resident. If  $h_j$  has received less than  $c_j$  applications (line 3) then the new applicant is compared to the worst current applicant. If the new applicant is worse, then  $worstAps_j$  will be updated (line 4), and  $numAps_j$  will be updated (line 5). If more than  $c_j$  applications have been received and the current application is better than the previous  $c_j^{th}$  favourite application (line 6), then  $worstAps_j$  will be iteratively reduced until it represents the new  $c_j^{th}$  favourite application (line 7).

Similarly, to reduce the time complexity of the  $offer(j)$  method, it needs to be changed from offering places to the first  $c_j$  residents remaining in the domain of  $h_j$  each time to making  $c_j$  offers at the start of propagation then repairing them as required. To keep track of the offers made, a 2 dimensional array of boolean variables of size  $m \times n$   $off$  (all initialised to 0) is added to the constraint. To implement this, the  $init()$  method is changed to make the initial offers as shown in Figure 5.9.

**init()** The changes made to the  $init()$  method are detailed in Figure 5.9. The first  $c_j$  residents in  $h_j$ 's preference list are cycled through (lines 6,7), each resident  $r_i$  is offered a place and all hospitals worse than  $h_j$  are removed from the domain of  $x_i$  (line 8). The  $off_{ja}$  variable is then made equal to 1 (line 9) to state that  $h_j$ 's  $a^{th}$  favourite resident received a proposal. The  $\check{y}_j$  variable is then updated with the preference for the last resident to be made an offer (line 11). The  $remVal\_H(j, a)$  method, that is called when a value  $a$  is removed from the domain of a variable  $y_j$ , will also require a slight alteration.

```

1. init()
2.   for  $i := 1$  to  $n$  loop
3.     apply( $i$ )
4.   end loop
5.   for  $j := 1$  to  $m$  loop
6.     for  $a := 1$  to  $c_j$  loop
7.        $i := \text{PL\_H}(j, a)$ 
8.       setMax(dom( $x_i$ ), pref_R( $i, j$ ))
9.        $off_{ja} := 1$ 
10.    end loop
11.     $\check{y}_j := c_j$ 
12.  end loop

```

Figure 5.9: The `init()` method.

```

1. remVal_H( $j, a$ )
2.    $i := \text{PL\_H}(j, a)$ 
3.   delVal(dom( $x_i$ ), pref_R( $i, j$ ))
4.   if  $off_{ja} = 1$  then
5.     offer( $j$ )
6.   end if

```

Figure 5.10: The `remVal_H( $j, a$ )` method for hospital variables.

**remVal\_H( $j, a$ )** The small change required to the `remVal_H( $j, a$ )` method (detailed in Figure 5.10), is the condition under which the `offer( $j$ )` auxiliary function is called. This function is called only when the removed value  $a$  represents a resident that has previously received an offer (line 4). The most significant changes can be seen in the `offer( $j$ )` function detailed below.

```

1. offer( $j$ )
2.   do loop
3.      $\check{y}_j ++$ 
4.      $i := \text{PL\_H}(j, \check{y}_j)$ 
5.     setMax(dom( $x_i$ ), pref_R( $i, j$ ))
6.     while  $\check{y}_j \notin \text{dom}(y_j)$  or  $\check{y}_j = l_j^h$ 
7.      $off_{j\check{y}_j} := 1$ 

```

Figure 5.11: The `offer( $j$ )` function.

**offer( $j$ )** Figure 5.11 shows the revised version of the `offer( $j$ )` function. Initially, the  $\check{y}_j$  variable is incremented to find the next resident to make an offer to (line 3). That resident  $r_i$  is then found (line 4), and all hospitals worse than  $h_j$  are removed from its domain (line

5). If  $r_i$  was removed from  $h_j$ 's domain prior to this function call then lines 3, 4 and 5 are repeated until the best resident still in  $h_j$ 's domain yet to receive an offer is found or the end of  $h_j$ 's preference list is reached (line 6). The *off* variable associated to that resident is then made equal to 1, to record that the resident received a proposal (line 7). Any residents that were removed from  $h_j$ 's domain prior to a call to this function will not be marked as having received an offer. This is because a value  $v$  may have been removed from the domain of  $y_j$  prior to the call to *offer*( $j$ ), but the call to *remVal\_H*( $j, v$ ) for that domain reduction may still be on the call stack. In this case, if the *off<sub>fv</sub>* variable were assigned the value one, when that call to *remVal\_H*( $j, v$ ) was executed, then an additional call to *offer*( $j$ ) would be made, resulting in the hospital making too many offers.

### Space for time

The space complexity for the HRN constraint is dominated by the data structure used to implement the *pref\_R*( $i, j$ ) and *pref\_H*( $j, i$ ) functions in  $O(1)$  time. This is because they require  $2nm$  space, where  $n$  is the number of residents and  $m$  is the number of hospitals, irrespective of the length of the preference lists. The largest known matching scheme, the NRMP in the US [73] generally has resident preference lists with between four and seven entries. As these matchings contain around 31,000 residents and about 2,300 hospitals, it can be seen that the total length of the preference lists will be significantly shorter than  $2nm$ . As such, removing the inverse preference lists will significantly reduce the memory required to store the constraint model. This could be achieved by implementing some kind of smart data structure such as a hash table. Alternatively, the *pref\_R*( $i, j$ ) function could search the preference list of  $r_i$  to find the position of  $h_j$  within it. The runtime of such a function will be dependent on the length of the preference lists.

## 5.3 Empirical study

The above constraints were implemented and used to solve Hospitals/Residents instances randomly generated by the instance generator detailed in Appendix B.2. Since most of the “real-life” matching schemes have short preference lists relative to the number of participants it was decided that the problem instances generated would have residents’ preference lists of uniform length 10. The Hospitals’ preference lists are of variable length, dependent on the number of residents that have that hospital in their preference list.

The sizes of the instances generated are classified by the triple  $n/m/c$ , where  $n$  is the number of residents,  $m$  is the number of hospitals and  $c$  is the uniform capacity of the hospitals. A sample size of 100 was used for each instance size. Due to the limited length preference lists used in this study, the HRN constraint was implemented with the space optimisations detailed in Section 5.2.4. For comparison, the standard constraint based model (CBM) detailed in Section 2.4.1 was also implemented. Included in this study were naive implementations of the algorithmic solutions to this problem. However, the results returned by these naive implementations showed the specialised constraint solutions outperformed the algorithmic solutions. This result was assumed to be due to the poor implementation of the algorithms and not a true reflection of the algorithms themselves. For this reason, these results have been omitted from this section. This study was carried out on a Pentium 4 2.8Ghz processor with 512 megabytes of random access memory, running Microsoft Windows XP Professional and Java2 SDK 1.4.2.6 with an increased heap size of 512 megabytes.

model	50/13/4	100/20/5	200/35/6	500/63/8	1K/100/10	5K/250/20
CBM	0.24	0.36	0.65	1.69	4.75	-
HRN	0.12	0.15	0.16	0.19	0.22	0.53

Table 5.1: The mean time to find all stable matchings for Hospitals/Residents instances (in seconds) for 100 instances

Figure 5.1 shows the mean time in seconds for the two encodings for varying problem size. A table entry of – signifies that there was insufficient space to create the model of that size using the specified encoding.

model	20K/550/37	50K/1.2K/42	200K/3K/67	500K/11.8K/85
HRN	1.42	4.2	22	35

Table 5.2: The mean time to find all stable matchings for Hospitals/Residents instances (in seconds) for 100 instances

Instances of the NRMP in the US [73] typically have around 31,000 residents and 2,300 hospitals with residents preference lists of size between 4 and 7. From Table 5.2 a constraint model using the HRN constraint can find all stable matchings to problem instances of size  $200k/3k/67$  in around 22 seconds. This indicates that this constraint solution is a potentially suitable technology to solve this problem.

The HRN model was also used to find stable matchings for three anonymised instances

from the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [56]. These instances have residents' preference lists all of uniform length three. It is important to note that the instances solved in Figure 5.3 originally included ties in the hospitals' preference lists, whereas this does not show that a constraint solution can solve the “real-life” SFAS instances, it does show that problems of that size can be solved quickly.

model	502/41/13.2	510/43/11.5	245/34/3.9
CBM	1.64	1.7	0.26
HRN	0.17	0.17	0.12

Table 5.3: The time to find a stable matching for three anonymised SFAS instances (in seconds)

## 5.4 Conclusion

In this chapter, a specialised  $n$ -ary constraint has been proposed to find stable matchings in instances of the Hospitals/Residents problem. Empirical evidence indicates that this constraint can be used to solve problem instances of a size equivalent to the “real life” matching schemes such as the NRMP in the US [73] and the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [56]. However, both of these matching schemes are richer problems than addressed in this chapter. The NRMP allows couples to submit joint preference lists and the SFAS allows the hospitals to include ties in their preference lists. For the HRN constraint to be a viable solution for either of these matching schemes these additional requirements will need to be met.



## Chapter 6

# Versatility

Empirical evidence has shown that specialised constraint solutions to stable matching problems can come close to the performance of the specialised algorithms, but they do not match them. This chapter illustrates the benefits of these constraint solutions by demonstrating their versatility. To this end a number of variants of stable matching problems are considered and it is shown how they can be represented and solved by adding simple side constraints to the previously presented specialised constraint models. The variants explored in this chapter all place some extra criteria on the classical matching problems. These problems either seek some notion of an optimal matching, according to a given criterion, or attempt to find a matching which fulfils additional criteria. Most of the models presented in this chapter have been implemented and empirically tested. Statistical information about the results of these empirical studies is also given to provide insight into the structure of the problems that have been investigated<sup>1</sup>. The problems detailed in sections 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 are included to show how these problems can be modelled, but these problems will not be empirically evaluated.

### 6.1 The sex-equal stable marriage problem

#### 6.1.1 The problem

The sex-equal stable marriage problem as posed by Gusfield et al.[49] as an open problem, is essentially an optimisation problem. In the man-optimal solution to an instance of SM, all men will be matched to their best possible partner from all possible stable matchings

---

<sup>1</sup>These empirical studies were carried out using the JSolver toolkit [2], i.e. the Java version of ILOG Solver, on a 3.2Ghz processor system with 2 Gb of random access memory, running Linux and Java2 SDK 1.5.0.3 with an increased heap size of 1850 Mb.

(and all women obtain their worst). Similarly in the woman-optimal solution all women are matched to their best possible partner (and all men to their worst). It is clear to see that it would be desirable to find a matching that is equally fair to both the male and female participants. A sex-equal stable matching is one way of trying to achieve this end. Each participant in the matching will score their partner, for example  $m_i$  may score his first choice partner 1 his second choice partner 3 etc. The objective of this problem is to minimise the difference between the sum of the male scores and the sum of the female scores. This problem has been proven to be NP-hard [59].

The Sex-Equal Stable Marriage Problem (SESMP) is now formally introduced. In an instance of SESMP, all men will have a score for each woman and all women will have a score for each man; man  $m_i$ 's score for woman  $w_j$  is denoted by  $score(m_i, w_j)$  and woman  $w_j$ 's score for man  $m_i$  is denoted by  $score(w_j, m_i)$ . In an unweighted SESMP all scores will be the same as the preferences, so  $score(m_i, w_j) = rank(m_i, w_j)$  and  $score(w_j, m_i) = rank(w_j, m_i)$ . In a weighted SESMP instance this is not so, however, the following ordering must be maintained:  $score(m_i, w_j) < score(m_i, w_k) \leftrightarrow rank(m_i, w_j) < rank(m_i, w_k)$ . For any matching  $M$ , all men and women will score the matching according to the partner they are matched to in  $M$ . If man  $m_i$  is matched to woman  $w_j$  in matching  $M$  then  $m_i$  will give that matching a score of  $score(m_i, w_j)$  and woman  $w_j$  will give it a score of  $score(w_j, m_i)$ . The sum of all scores given by men for a matching  $M$  is  $sum_m(M)$  and the sum of the women's scores is  $sum_w(M)$ . A matching  $M$  for an instance  $I$  of the stable marriage problem is sex-equal *iff*

$$\left| \sum_{(m_i, w_j) \in M} score(m_i, w_j) - \sum_{(m_i, w_j) \in M} score(w_j, m_i) \right| \begin{array}{l} \text{is minimised over all} \\ \text{stable matchings in } I. \end{array}$$

### 6.1.2 Constraint solution

A constraint model using the SMN constraint (given in Chapter 3) will have  $2n$   $z$  variables representing the men and women. The values in the domains of the  $z$  variables are preferences, which makes extending the model to find an unweighted sex-equal matching simple. To extend the model, three constrained integer variables are added, namely  $sum_m$ ,  $sum_w$  and  $diff$ , together with the constraints shown in Figure 6.1.

Constraint 1 causes the sum of the male scores for a matching to be held in the  $sum_m$  variable and constraint 2 does the equivalent with the female scores. Constraint 3 states that the absolute value of the difference between  $sum_m$  and  $sum_w$  is to be held in  $diff$ ,

$$\begin{array}{l}
1. \quad sum_m = \sum_{i=1}^n z_i \\
2. \quad sum_w = \sum_{j=n+1}^{2n} z_j \\
3. \quad diff = abs(sum_m - sum_w) \\
4. \quad minimise(diff)
\end{array}$$

Figure 6.1: Side constraints for the unweighted sex-equal stable marriage problem.

where  $abs(a - b)$  returns the absolute value of the difference between  $a$  and  $b$ . Finally, constraint 4 is a search objective to minimise  $diff$ .

To model the weighted sex-equal matching problem two sets of  $n$  variables  $weight_m$  and  $weight_w$  can be added along with the constraints shown in Figure 6.2.

$$\begin{array}{l}
1. \quad \{weight\_m_i = score(m_i, w_j) \leftrightarrow z_i = rank(m_i, w_j) | 1 \leq i \leq n \wedge 1 \leq j \leq n\} \\
2. \quad \{weight\_w_j = score(w_j, m_i) \leftrightarrow z_{j+n} = rank(w_j, m_i) | 1 \leq j \leq n \wedge 1 \leq i \leq n\} \\
3. \quad sum_m = \sum_{i=1}^n weight\_m_i \\
4. \quad sum_w = \sum_{j=1}^n weight\_w_j \\
5. \quad diff = abs(sum_m - sum_w) \\
6. \quad minimise(diff)
\end{array}$$

Figure 6.2: Side constraints for the weighted sex-equal stable marriage problem.

The sets of constraints labelled 1 and 2 ensure that  $m_i$ 's weight for the matching is held in the variable  $weight\_m_i$  and  $w_j$ 's weight for the matching is held in the variable  $weight\_w_j$ . Constraints 3 and 4 state that the sum of the weights are to be held in the variables  $sum_m$  and  $sum_w$ , respectively. Constraint 5 is the same as constraint 3 in the unweighted case. Constraint 6 is a search objective to minimise the value held in the  $diff$  variable.

### 6.1.3 Empirical study

The unweighted model was implemented with the SMN constraint and tested on the same randomly generated SM instances used in the empirical study detailed in Section 3.4. These instances were generated by the generator detailed in Appendix B.1. The instances used were of sizes  $n = 200 \dots 1000$  with a sample size of 1000 for each  $n$ . Statistics about the number of solutions contained in the instances used are shown in Table 6.1.

	200	400	600	800	1000
Max	767	1292	2334	7160	7484
Mean	140	332	558	821	1062
Min	29	62	138	192	276

Table 6.1: Maximum, Mean and Minimum numbers of solutions found for 1000 stable marriage instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

model		200	400	600	800	1000
All stable matchings	Min	0.345	0.492	0.827	1.332	1.963
	Mean	0.365	0.575	0.971	1.648	2.539
	Max	0.417	0.707	1.763	3.252	3.414
Sex-Equal	Min	0.427	0.637	0.975	1.485	2.207
	Mean	0.487	0.723	1.147	1.778	2.626
	Max	0.547	0.825	1.398	2.155	3.080

Table 6.2: The time to find all solutions and the sex-equal stable matching (in seconds) for 1000 stable marriage instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

Results given in Section 3.4 show that the time to find all stable matchings with SMN was dominated by the time to enforce arc-consistency over the initial model. For instances of size  $n = 200$ , the time to initially enforce arc-consistency was nearly 90% of the overall run time. This percentage then dropped as the instance size increased. For instances of size  $n = 1000$  the time to initially enforce arc-consistency was just over 50%. From the results displayed in Table 6.2, it can be seen that finding the sex-equal stable matching takes longer than finding all stable matchings. This is probably due to the additional constraints causing more work to be done while enforcing arc-consistency over the initial model. This extra effort outweighs the time saved by any reduction in the size of the search tree that may have been achieved by the propagation of the search objective. As the instance size increases and the dominance of the time to initially enforce arc-consistency is reduced, the gap between the time to find all solutions and the time to find the sex-equal solution is reduced. If this were tried with larger instances it would probably be found that the time saved by the reduced search tree outweighed that caused by the additional constraints and thus the sex-equal stable matching could be found faster than enumerating all solutions.

In Table 6.3, the minimum, maximum and average values of the optimal solutions found are shown. In this case the value of a solution means the absolute difference between the sums of the male and female scores for the matchings. From these results, it can be seen

	200	400	600	800	1000
Minimum	0	0	0	0	0
Mean	61.55	116.3	166.8	225.5	294.1
Median	35	64	73	107.5	132.5
Maximum	504	933	1255	1716	2207

Table 6.3: Values of sex-equal stable matchings for 1000 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

that a perfect sex-equal stable matching (meaning there was no difference between the two sums) was found for at least one instance from each of the sample sizes. The mean value was fairly constant at around thirty percent of  $n$ , whereas the median value was around eighteen percent of  $n$  for the smaller instances and dropped to thirteen percent as the instance size grew to  $n = 1000$ . This indicates that a majority of stable marriage instances contain a good sex-equal matching in which neither side is strongly favoured against the other. However, from the maximum values it can be concluded that some stable marriage instances do not contain a very well balanced sex-equal stable matching.

## 6.2 Balanced stable matching

### 6.2.1 The problem

The balanced stable matching problem is similar to the sex-equal stable matching problem. The difference between the two is that instead of finding a matching which is equally good for both the men and the women, the balanced stable matching problem seeks to find a matching which is best for whichever group is worst off. To achieve this, assuming that each participant scores the matching in the same way as the sex-equal problem, the objective is to minimise the maximum of the sums of the male and female scores for the matching. This has been proven to be an NP-hard problem [32].

The Balanced Stable Matching Problem (BSMP) is now formally introduced. In an instance of BSMP, for a matching  $M$ , all men and women will score the matching according to the partner they are matched to in  $M$ . If man  $m_i$  is matched to woman  $w_j$  in matching  $M$  then  $m_i$  will give that matching a score of  $rank(m_i, w_j)$  and woman  $w_j$  will give it a score of  $rank(w_j, m_i)$ . The sum of all scores given by men for a matching  $M$  equals  $sum_m(M)$  and the sum of the women's scores is  $sum_w(M)$ . A matching  $M$  for an instance  $I$  of the stable marriage problem is balanced *iff*

$$\max \left\{ \sum_{(m_i, w_j) \in M} \text{rank}(m_i, w_j), \sum_{(m_i, w_j) \in M} \text{rank}(w_j, m_i) \right\} \text{ is minimised, taken over all stable matchings in } I.$$

### 6.2.2 Constraint solution

This problem can be modelled in a similar way to the sex-equal stable matching problem. Two constrained integer variables  $sum_m$  and  $sum_w$  will hold the sums of the scores for the men and women respectively. This can be enforced by the constraints given in Figure 6.3.

1.	$sum_m = \sum_{i=1}^n z_i$
2.	$sum_w = \sum_{j=n+1}^{2n} z_j$
3.	$minimise(Max(sum_m, sum_w))$

Figure 6.3: Side constraints for the balanced stable marriage problem.

Constraints 1 and 2 state that the sums of the male and female scores will be held in the variables  $sumM$  and  $sumW$ , respectively. Constraint 3 is an objective function to minimise the larger of the two sum variables.

### 6.2.3 Empirical study

This model was implemented with the SMN constraint and tested on the same randomly generated SM instances used in the empirical study detailed in Section 3.4. These instances were generated by the generator detailed in Appendix B.1. The instances used were of sizes  $n = 200 \dots 1000$  with a sample size of 1000 for each value of  $n$ .

model		200	400	600	800	1000
All stable matchings	Min	0.345	0.492	0.827	1.332	1.963
	Mean	0.365	0.575	0.971	1.648	2.539
	Max	0.417	0.707	1.763	3.252	3.414
Balanced	Min	0.426	0.624	0.963	1.449	2.163
	Mean	0.468	0.702	1.114	1.732	2.579
	Max	0.517	0.825	1.352	2.065	3.016

Table 6.4: The time to find all solutions and the balanced stable matching (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

Table 6.4 shows similar results to those in Table 6.2 for finding the sex-equal stable

matching. When finding all solutions with the SMN constraint using the variable and value ordering heuristic of choose some man and assign him his first choice available partner, the first matching to be returned will be the man-optimal stable matching, which will have the lowest sum of the male scores from all possible matchings. For each subsequent matching returned there will be a trend that will see the sum of the male scores increase until the final matching is returned, which will be the women-optimal matching. Given that neither of the extremes is likely to be either balanced or sex-equal, it is fair to assume both the balanced and sex-equal matchings are likely to be one of the matchings returned in the middle of the enumeration. Given that assumption and the similarity of the two models, it is unsurprising that the performance of the two models is so similar. Comparing the results for finding the balanced and sex-equal stable matching shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.2 respectively, it can be seen that a balanced stable matching can consistently be found slightly quicker. This suggests that either the  $\max(a, b)$  function is slightly more efficient or provides stronger propagation than the  $\text{abs}(a - b)$  function.

	200	400	600	800	1000
Minimum	2495	7457	13744	21281	30170
Mean	2839	8029	14747	22690	31707
Median	2840	8027	14752	22694	31721
Maximum	3255	8690	15763	23889	33305

Table 6.5: Values of balanced stable matchings for 1000 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

In Table 6.5 it can be seen that the variation in the quality of the balanced stable matchings found for these sets of instances reduces as the instance sizes increase.

Given the similar times to find both the sex-equal and balanced stable matchings, a comparison of the quality of the solutions, with regard to the other problem's criteria, was performed. This comparison asked the questions, how balanced is the sex-equal matching? And, how sex-equal is the balanced matching? To measure this the maximum of the sums of the male and female matchings were recorded for the sex-equal stable matching, as was the difference between the two sums for the balanced stable matchings. These values were then compared to the optimal values in each case. These results are summarised in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6 shows that for more than 75% of all the instances the sex-equal and balanced matchings were in fact the same matching. For the instances in which these matchings

		200	400	600	800	1000
SESMP = BSMP		78.2%	77.7%	76.4%	75.9%	76.7%
Balance of SESMP	Maximum	119	165	341	337	278
	Mean	22.72	38.81	56.10	65.49	74.45
sex-equality of BSMP	Maximum	120	339	344	576	462
	Mean	27.31	47.34	64.36	73.91	81.53

Table 6.6: Comparison of the balanced and sex-equal stable matchings for 1000 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

were not the same, it can be seen that the distance between the two is small. The greatest difference between the two in terms of balance is when  $n = 600$  and the sex-equal matching was 341 away from the balanced matching, meaning that whichever set is worse off in the sex-equal matching could improve the sum of their preferences by 341, by going with the balanced matching in that instance. The greatest difference between the two in terms of sex-equality is when  $n = 800$  and the balanced matching was 576 away from the sex-equal matching, meaning that the combined score for the matching for one group was 576 greater than the other group.

## 6.3 The man-exchange stable marriage problem

### 6.3.1 The problem

The Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme has had complaints where two medical students have talked to each other and found that they would each prefer the other's hospital to their own. Due to the stability criterion, it is known that such a swap would not be preferred by the hospitals. If such a situation could be avoided it would be advantageous. In the one-to-one case this problem leads to the Man-Exchange Stable Marriage Problem (MESMP) [57]. This has the same stability requirements as the classic problem with the added condition that no two men should prefer each other's partner to their own. More formally, a matching  $M$  is *man-exchange stable* iff  $M$  is stable in the normal sense and

$$\forall (m_i, w_j) \in M, \nexists (m_k, w_l) \in M : \begin{array}{l} \text{rank}(m_i, w_j) > \text{rank}(m_i, w_l) \wedge \\ \text{rank}(m_k, w_l) > \text{rank}(m_k, w_j) \end{array}$$

It is known that not all stable marriage instances admit a man-exchange stable matching [57]. It has been proven that the problem of determining whether a man-exchange stable matching exists for a given SM instance is NP-complete [57].



### 6.3.2 Constraint solution

In [70] Manlove et al. proposed a model for this problem in which a constraint is added for each pair of men  $(m_i, m_k)$  and each pair of women  $(w_j, w_l)$  such that  $m_i$  prefers  $w_l$  to  $w_j$  and  $m_k$  prefers  $w_j$  to  $w_l$ .

$$z_i = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j) \Rightarrow z_k \neq \text{rank}(m_k, w_l) \quad \forall i, k, j, l, \text{rank}(m_i, w_l) < \text{rank}(m_i, w_j) \\ \wedge \text{rank}(m_k, w_j) < \text{rank}(m_k, w_l)$$

Figure 6.4: Side constraint for the Man-Exchange Stable Marriage problem.

In the model detailed in Figure 6.4,  $\Theta(n^4)$  such constraints are required; meaning that the space complexity of the model would be  $\Theta(n^4)$ . Each constraint could be revised at most  $O(n)$  times, as they are monotonic constraints, each can be revised in constant time, making the time complexity of enforcing arc-consistency over this model  $O(n^5)$ . Note that adding these side constraints will break the assumptions made in Theorem 9 in Section 3.3 and, thus, we would no longer expect to be able to find all man-exchange stable matchings in a failure free search.

An alternative solution would be to have an extensional constraint consisting of a list of disallowed pairs for each pair of men  $(m_i, m_k)$ . An extensional constraint  $C_{i,k}$  (where  $1 \leq i < k \leq n$ ) would act between variables  $z_i$  and  $z_k$ .

$$C_{i,k} = \left\{ (a, b) \mid \begin{array}{l} a = \text{rank}(m_i, w_j) \wedge b = \text{rank}(m_k, w_l) \\ \wedge a > \text{rank}(m_i, w_l) \wedge b > \text{rank}(m_k, w_j) \end{array} \right\}$$

Figure 6.5: Extensional constraint for the Man-Exchange Stable Marriage problem.

Constraint  $C_{i,k}$  is represented as a set of no-good pairs, as detailed in Figure 6.5.  $\Theta(n^2)$  of these constraints would be required, each of which would be  $\Theta(n^2)$  in size. Therefore, this model would require the same  $\Theta(n^4)$  space as for the previous model. Each constraint will act over two variables, each with domains of size  $O(n)$ . Therefore, revising each constraint will take  $O(n)$  time for each domain reduction. Hence, enforcing arc-consistency over this model will require  $O(n^4)$  time, which is a factor of  $n$  improvement over the previous model. The explicit constraint model replaces the  $\Theta(n^2)$  binary constraints between each pair of men with a single constraint. Having a single constraint between a pair of men will mean the constraint has more information about the relationship between the two men. This enables a greater level of consistency to be enforced. For example,

suppose that during propagation a state was reached in which two men  $m_i$  and  $m_k$  both have more than one woman remaining in their respective domains. Furthermore, suppose  $m_i$  prefers all the women remaining in  $m_k$ 's domain to those remaining in his own domain. All women in the domain of  $m_i$  that  $m_k$  prefers to all those remaining in his domain can be removed. In this state, the explicit constraint model will remove these inconsistent values, whereas the constraints in the first model would not.

### 6.3.3 Empirical study

Both of these solutions were implemented on top of a stable marriage constraint model using the SMN constraint. They were both tested on the same randomly generated SM instances used in the empirical study detailed in Section 3.4. The instances used were of sizes  $n = 20 \dots 100$  with a sample size of 1000 for each instance size. Table 6.7 summarises the results for both the constraint solutions. The times for both the SMN constraint and the conflict matrix models to find all stable matchings has been included as a comparison. A table entry of “-” indicates that an out-of-memory error occurred when attempting to solve instances of this size.

model		20	40	60	80	100
All stable matchings with SMN	Min	0.245	0.263	0.274	0.286	0.298
	Mean	0.269	0.291	0.300	0.307	0.312
	Max	0.393	0.519	0.349	0.720	0.472
All stable matchings with FT	Min	0.402	1.819	7.477	-	-
	Mean	0.443	1.980	7.787	-	-
	Max	0.572	2.163	8.989	-	-
$O(n^4)$ constraints	Min	0.425	1.677	7.156	-	-
	Mean	0.454	1.754	7.422	-	-
	Max	0.669	2.151	16.32	-	-
$O(n^2)$ constraints	Min	0.378	1.476	7.227	-	-
	Mean	0.396	1.519	7.396	-	-
	Max	0.543	1.668	7.568	-	-

Table 6.7: The time to find all man-exchange solutions or prove one does not exist (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying in size from 20 to 100

It can be seen in Table 6.7 that both constraint solutions run in similar time to that of the conflict matrix stable marriage encoding proposed in [40] (detailed in Section 2.4). This is unsurprising, due to their similar runtime complexities. The out-of-memory errors also occur at a similar instance size to the conflict matrix. Again, this can be explained by the similar size complexities. Despite the fact that arc-consistency can be enforced

over the  $O(n^2)$  constraint solution in a factor of  $n$  faster than with the  $O(n^4)$  constraint solution, the recorded solution times are similar. To explain this, the mean time to find all man-exchange solutions or prove none exist were broken down into the model creation time and the search time. These times are shown in Table 6.8.

model		20	40	60
$O(n^4)$ constraints	model	0.306	0.724	2.630
	search	0.147	1.030	4.792
$O(n^2)$ constraints	model	0.338	1.419	7.259
	search	0.057	0.100	0.137

Table 6.8: A breakdown of the mean time to find all man-exchange solutions or prove one does not exist (in seconds) for 1000 instances varying in size from 20 to 60

From Table 6.8, it can be seen that for both solutions the model creation time accounted for a significant amount of the total solution time. The higher level of propagation achieved by the model using the  $O(n^2)$  extensional constraints along with its factor of  $n$  improvement in propagation time complexity significantly reduces its time to find all solutions (or prove that none exist). However, these improvements are negated by the time required to generate the constraint model.

	20	40	60
insoluble	71.9%	88.6%	94.5%
1 solution	22.3%	7.8%	3.6%
2 solutions	5.1%	2.8%	1.1%
3 solutions	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%
4 solutions	0.2%	0.3%	0.3%
Maximum	4	9	6

Table 6.9: The number of man-exchange stable matchings found for 1000 instances varying in size from 20 to 60

Table 6.9 gives some information on the solubility of the problem instances used. It can be seen that a vast majority of these instances did not admit a man-exchange stable matching. As the instance size grows, the number of soluble instances diminishes. A majority of the soluble instances contained only one man-exchange-stable matching. No more than 5 instances for each instances size had four or more solutions. One instance contained as many as nine man-exchange stable matchings. From these results it can be seen that a high proportion of instances contain no man-exchange stable matching. This makes it unlikely that any matching scheme administrator would enforce such a criterion.

However, it may be desirable to find a matching in which the number of pairs of men that are not man-exchange stable is minimised.

## 6.4 Stable roommates

### 6.4.1 The problem

The Stable Roommates problem (SR) is a generalisation of the Stable Marriage problem in which a group of  $n$  individuals wish to be matched into pairs. For convenience, it is assumed that  $n$  is an even number. Each individual has a preference list in which all the others are ranked in strict order. The objective of the problem is to find a matching that is stable, where the definition of stability, in this case, is similar to the definition of stability in the context of the stable marriage problem. This problem has been described in detail in Section 2.3.

### 6.4.2 Constraint solution

The SM2 constraint, detailed in Section 3.2, ensures that the constrained pair do not form a blocking pair or be assigned values that violate the matching, meaning that it ensures that either they are matched to each other or are both matched to different people. As the definition of stability for the Stable Roommates problem is similar to that for the Stable Marriage problem, an instance of SR can be modelled by posting an SM2 constraint for each pair of participants that appear in each other's preference list. SR can also be modelled using the SMN constraint that was detailed in Section 3.3. Each participant will be represented by a single constrained integer variable, with domain values representing preferences. The constraint will then be set up such that the variable representing participant  $r_i$  will go in place of the variables representing both  $m_i$  and  $w_i$ . Similarly,  $r_i$ 's preference list will be copied in place of both  $m_i$  and  $w_i$ 's preference lists. During propagation, variable  $z_i$  and variable  $z_{n+i}$  will be the same variable, meaning that any value removed from  $dom(z_i)$  will also be removed from  $dom(z_{n+i})$ . When the SMN constraint is used to find stable matchings in a Stable Marriage instance, it is the case that removing a value from a male variable can only cause propagation to occur to a female variable. When SMN is used to solve a stable roommates instance, this is no longer the case; as a result some proofs presented in Chapter 3 will not carry over to the SR case. As a result, enforcing arc-consistency will no longer be sufficient to find a solution, neither can it be guaranteed

that all solutions can be found in a failure free search. However, this constraint can be used to find all stable matchings (or prove that none exist) for any given stable roommates instance.

### 6.4.3 Empirical study

Both the SM2 and SMN solutions were implemented and used to solve randomly generated stable roommates instances (produced by the random instance generator detailed in Appendix B.5). The instance sizes ranged from 200 to 1000 with 100 instances per value of  $n$ .

model			200	400	600	800	1000
SM2	first solution	Min	0.497	1.007	2.060	3.701	5.941
		Mean	0.543	1.194	2.557	4.729	7.779
		Max	0.596	1.421	3.021	5.490	9.433
	all solutions	Min	0.519	1.133	2.353	4.414	7.534
		Mean	0.564	1.260	2.725	5.016	8.170
		Max	0.615	1.385	3.013	5.511	9.230
SMN	first solution	Min	0.360	0.450	0.630	0.893	1.342
		Mean	0.377	0.471	0.664	0.947	1.416
		Max	0.421	0.490	0.694	1.009	1.468
	all solutions	Min	0.368	0.470	0.665	0.928	1.402
		Mean	0.383	0.479	0.674	0.963	1.432
		Max	0.421	0.490	0.689	1.009	1.455

Table 6.10: Time to find the first solution (or prove one does not exist) and all solutions for the Stable Roommates problem (in seconds) for 100 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

From Table 6.10, it can be seen that, finding a stable matching for a stable roommates instance (or proving the instance insoluble) with these constraint solutions can be achieved in similar time to a stable marriage instance with the equivalent number of participants<sup>2</sup>.

	200	400	600	800	1000
% of insoluble instances	44	54	54	55	64
mean number of solutions	2.642	3.434	3.586	3.733	4.75
maximum number of solutions	8	16	12	24	36

Table 6.11: Solubility results for the Stable Roommates problem for 100 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

From Table 6.11, it can be seen that as  $n$  increases the percentage of insoluble instances

---

<sup>2</sup>Note that a stable roommates instance has  $n$  participants and a stable marriage instance contains  $2n$  participants

increases<sup>3</sup>. Comparing this table to similar results for the Stable Marriage problem given in Chapter 3, it can be seen that the number of solutions in the soluble stable roommates instances is much lower than that of stable marriage instances with an equivalent number of participants.

	200	400	600	800	1000
Minimum	1	1	2	1	2
Mean	4.83	5.71	6.03	6.42	7.66
Maximum	11	22	16	34	37

Table 6.12: Search effort (choice points) to find all solutions or prove insolubility of the Stable Roommates problem for 100 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

Table 6.12 shows the search effort required to find stable matchings or to prove that none exist. Here the search effort is measured in choice points. A choice point is generated after every round of propagation which does not result in either a solution or a failure<sup>4</sup>. It can be seen that all instances used require at least one choice point. This means that enforcing arc-consistency over this model was not sufficient to find a solution or prove insolubility for any of these instances. The algorithmic solution proposed in [53] is made up of two phases. The first consists of a series of proposals similar to that of the GS algorithm for the stable marriage case. We conjecture that, because of the equivalence of the reductions made by the EGS algorithm and enforcing arc-consistency over SMN, enforcing arc-consistency over this model will reduce the variable domains to a state equivalent to an application of the first phase of the stable roommates algorithm. The second phase of the roommates algorithm involves a process which is repeated until all preference lists are reduced to a single entry or one or more preference lists contain no entries. This process involves finding and eliminating rotations. A rotation is a cyclic list of pairs of participants. Such a cycle starts with a pair of participants  $(p_0, q_0)$ , where  $q_0$  is the first entry on  $p_0$ 's reduced preference list (reduced from deletions made in phase one). Second pair in the cycle will be  $(p_1, q_1)$ , where the second entry in  $p_0$ 's preference list is the same as the first entry in  $p_1$ 's preference list. The cycle then continues in the same way until  $(p_k, q_k)$ , where the second entry in  $p_k$ 's preference list is the first entry in  $p_0$ 's preference list. A rotation can be found in  $O(n)$  time.

This phase of the algorithm could be simulated within the constraint model by altering

---

<sup>3</sup>These results correlate with results given in an unpublished report by Colin Sng of the University of Glasgow.

<sup>4</sup>In this context a failure is caused when the domain of a search variable is reduced to an empty set.

the search process as follows. After enforcing arc-consistency for the first time, a variable  $z_i$  will be found such that  $r_i$  is the first participant in a pair in a rotation. The smallest value in the domain of  $z_i$  will then be removed and the effects of this reduction will be propagated. I conjecture that the effects of this propagation will be the equivalent of a reduction produced by the second phase of the roommates algorithm. This is because removing the best available partner from  $r_i$ 's domain will force  $r_i$  to propose to the next best potential roommate in his domain  $r_k$ . It is known that  $r_k$  prefers  $r_i$  to the next participant in the rotation, this proposal will cause the second participant in the cycle to be rejected by  $r_k$ . This will then continue until the cycle loops back round to  $r_i$ . If this does not result in either a domain wipe-out or a solution then another rotation will be found. If this process results in a domain wipe-out then the roommates instance has been proved to be insoluble and no backtracking is required. Alternatively, if this process results in all variable domains being reduced to a single value, that assignment will represent a stable matching.

## 6.5 Egalitarian stable roommates

### 6.5.1 The problem

Similar to the sex-equal and balanced stable matchings, the egalitarian stable roommates problem is an optimal stable matching problem. Each participant scores the matching in the same way as for the unweighted sex-equal stable marriage problem described in Section 6.1, meaning that a participant scores the matching according to the position of their given partner in their preference list. The objective of the egalitarian stable roommates problem is to find a stable matching that minimise the sum of the scores for all participants. Such a matching is called an egalitarian stable matching. It has been proven that finding an egalitarian stable matching, if one exists, for an instance of the stable roommates problem is NP-hard [32]. As with the sex-equal and balanced stable matching problems, the egalitarian stable roommates problem can be extended by allowing participants to assign weights to each prospective partner. A matching is then scored by summing each participant's weight for their assigned partner. The problem of finding a matching for a given stable roommates instance with a minimal score under these conditions is known as the "optimal" stable roommates problem. This problem has also been proved to be NP-hard [31].

### 6.5.2 Constraint solution

The variable domains in a constraint model using the SMN constraint represent preferences, making the unweighted egalitarian stable roommates problem simple to model.

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <math>sum = \sum_{i=1}^n z_i</math></li> <li>2. <math>minimise(sum)</math></li> </ol>
---

Figure 6.6: Side constraints for the egalitarian stable roommates problem.

To model this problem an integer variable  $sum$  is added, with an initial domain of  $n \dots n(n-1)$ . Constraint 1 in Figure 6.6 will place the sum of all participants' scores for the matching into the variable  $sum$ . Constraint 2 is an objective function to minimise the value of the  $sum$  variable. This can be extended to the weighted case as shown in Figure 6.7

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <math>\{weight_i = score(r_i, r_j) \leftrightarrow z_i = rank(r_i, r_j)   1 \leq i \leq n \wedge 1 \leq j \leq n\}</math></li> <li>2. <math>sum = \sum_{i=1}^n weight_i</math></li> <li>3. <math>minimise(sum)</math></li> </ol>
--

Figure 6.7: Side constraints for the “optimal” stable roommates problem.

From Figure 6.7, constraint 1 will ensure participant  $r_i$ 's score for the matching will be held in the integer variable  $weight_i$ . Constraint 2 will place the sum of all the  $weight_i$  variables into the  $sum$  variable. Finally, constraint 3 is a search objective to minimise the  $sum$  variable.

### 6.5.3 Empirical study

The unweighted solution was implemented and tested on the same stable roommates instances used in Section 6.4, using the SMN constraint as the base constraint model. The time to find all stable matchings with the SMN constraint is included in Table 6.13 for comparison.

Table 6.13 shows that, finding the egalitarian stable matching for these instances takes slightly longer than finding all solutions given in Table 6.10, and repeated in Table 6.13. This is probably a result of the extra effort required to propagate the additional sum



		200	400	600	800	1000
all solutions	Min	0.368	0.470	0.665	0.928	1.402
	Mean	0.383	0.479	0.674	0.963	1.432
	Max	0.421	0.490	0.689	1.009	1.455
egalitarian solution	Min	0.391	0.507	0.704	1.003	1.417
	Mean	0.399	0.522	0.722	1.036	1.474
	Max	0.449	0.539	0.746	1.117	1.526

Table 6.13: The mean time to find an egalitarian solution (if one exists) for the stable room mates problem (in seconds) for 100 instances varying in size from 200 to 1000

constraint. Usually, finding an optimal solution requires less effort than finding all solutions despite the extra overhead required to propagate the optimisation value. This is because the full search tree need not be explored due to extra propagation from the optimisation function. This is not the case here. This is probably a result of both the very low number of solutions in the problem instances as shown in Table 6.11 and the poor propagation delivered by the sum constraint.

## 6.6 Forbidden pairs

### 6.6.1 The problem

An administrator of a matching scheme may wish to ensure that a particular pair are not matched to one another in a given stable matching. This pair may still find each other acceptable and thus they could still form a blocking pair; for this reason, we cannot delete this pair from each other's preference lists. Such a (man,woman) pair is known as a *forbidden pair* [30].

Let  $F$  denote the set of forbidden pairs. A stable matching  $M$  is a valid solution to the stable marriage problem with forbidden pairs iff  $\forall (m_i, w_j) \in F, (m_i, w_j) \notin M$ . A linear time algorithm has been published to find such a matching for the stable marriage case, if one exists [30]. However, when including forbidden pairs, a stable matching may not exist for a given stable matching instance. For such an instance, it may be desirable to relax the requirement that the matching contain no forbidden pairs. It could be advantageous to find a matching that contains the fewest number of forbidden pairs. For the stable marriage case, such a matching can be found in polynomial time [33].

### 6.6.2 Constraint solution

Constraint models are now given for the Stable Marriage problem with Forbidden Pairs. These solutions can be adapted for the Stable Roommates and Hospitals/Residents cases. This problem could be modelled by adding a unary constraint for each forbidden pair in the set  $F$ , as follows:

$$1. \quad z_i \neq \text{pref}(i, j) \quad \forall ij, (m_i, w_j) \in F$$

Figure 6.8: Side constraint for the Stable Marriage Problem with Forbidden Pairs.

A constraint model representing a stable marriage instance with forbidden pairs, will require at most  $O(n^2)$  of the constraints shown in Figure 6.8. Therefore, the space complexity of the original model will not be increased. Each constraint can be propagated in  $O(1)$  time and so the time complexity will not be affected either.

The optimisation version of the problem (to find a matching containing the fewest number of forbidden pairs) could be modelled by adding an array of constrained integer variables  $f$  each with an initial domain of  $\{0, 1\}$ , for each forbidden pair. Such a variable will be assigned the value 1 if the corresponding forbidden pair is included in the matching, otherwise it will be assigned the value 0. A constrained integer variable  $sumF$  with an initial domain of  $\{0 \dots |F|\}$  would also be added to hold the sum of all the new  $f$  variables.

$$\begin{array}{l} 1. \quad z_i = \text{pref}(i, j) \Leftrightarrow f_k > 0 \quad 1 \leq k \leq |F|, \forall ij, (m_i, w_j) \in F \\ 2. \quad sumF = \sum_{k=1}^{|F|} f_k \\ 3. \quad \text{minimise}(sumF) \end{array}$$

Figure 6.9: Side constraints for the optimisation version of the Stable Marriage Problem with Forbidden Pairs.

Constraint 1, from Figure 6.9, ensures that if a forbidden pair is in a matching then the appropriate  $f$  variable is set to 1. Constraint 2 places the sum of the  $f$  variables in the variable  $sumF$ . Finally, constraint 3 is an optimisation objective to minimise the  $sumF$  variable<sup>5</sup>. This solution could also be easily extended to have a weight  $wp$  for each forbidden pair  $f$ , thus, allowing the expression of a preference over which pairs are to be excluded from the matching. This could be implemented by changing the initial domain of  $f$  to  $\{0, wp\}$ .

<sup>5</sup>This constraint model was proposed by Manlove et al. in [70]

## 6.7 Forced pairs

### 6.7.1 The problem

As well as forbidding certain pairs from being matched to each other, an administrator of a matching scheme may also wish to force a certain pair or set of pairs to be matched. Such pairs are referred to as forced pairs [60]. Finding a stable matching under these conditions can be found in linear time [30].

Let  $Q$  denote the set of forced pairs. A stable matching  $M$  is a valid solution to the stable marriage problem with forced pairs *iff*  $\forall (m_i, w_j) \in Q, (m_i, w_j) \in M$ . Such a matching need not exist. Thus, an optimisation version of the problem may be required to find a matching with the largest number of forced pairs. Such a matching can be found in polynomial time [33].

### 6.7.2 Constraint solution

One way to extend an SM constraint model to include this problem would be to have a constraint for each forced pair, as shown in Figure 6.10.

$$1. \quad z_i = \text{pref}(i, j) \quad \forall ij, (m_i, w_j) \in Q$$

Figure 6.10: Side constraint for the Stable Marriage Problem with Forced Pairs.

To model this as an optimisation problem, an array of constrained integer variables  $q$  of length  $|Q|$  is added, each with an initial domain of  $\{0, 1\}$ . A constrained integer variable  $\text{sum}Q$  with an initial domain of  $\{0 \dots |Q|\}$  would also be needed to hold the value of the solutions.

$$\begin{array}{l} 1. \quad z_i = \text{pref}(i, j) \Leftrightarrow q_k > 0 \quad 1 \leq k \leq |Q|, \forall ij, (m_i, w_j) \in Q \\ 2. \quad \text{sum}Q = \sum_{k=1}^{|Q|} q_k \\ 3. \quad \text{maximise}(\text{sum}Q) \end{array}$$

Figure 6.11: Side constraints for the optimisation version of the Stable Marriage Problem with Forced Pairs.

Constraint 1 from Figure 6.11 ensures that if a forced pair is in a matching then the appropriate  $q$  variable is set to 1. Constraint 2 places the sum of all the  $q$  variables in the variable  $\text{sum}Q$ . Finally, constraint 3 is an optimisation objective to maximise the  $\text{sum}Q$ .

variable. This solution could be extended to have a weight  $w_p$  for each forced pair  $q$ , thus, allowing the expression of a preference over which pairs get excluded from the matching. This could be implemented by changing the initial domain of  $q$  to  $\{0, w_p\}$ .

## 6.8 Couples

### 6.8.1 The problem

An extension of the Hospitals/Residents problem is to allow couples to submit joint preference lists. This allows two residents to state that they would like to be assigned to hospitals that are geographically close. This problem as described by Ronn [81] alters the definition of stability of the original problem. Therefore, this problem cannot be modelled by adding side constraints to an existing Hospitals/Residents constraint model. However, there is a simplified version of this problem in which a set of couples  $C$  (each couple consisting of two residents) wish to be assigned to the same hospital. In this version of the problem, each resident in the couple can still form a blocking pair in the same way as for the classical Hospitals/Residents problem. Under these restrictions, a stable matching need not exist, which gives rise to the optimisation problem to find a stable matching in which the largest number of couples are honoured.

Similar to the couples problem is the enemies problem, in which two residents request to be assigned to different hospitals. Residents that appear in a pair of enemies may still form a blocking pair in the usual way. Under these extra conditions, not all problem instances will admit a consistent stable matching, giving rise to the optimisation version of the problem. The objective of this problem is to find a matching in which the number of enemies assigned to the same hospital is minimised.

### 6.8.2 Constraint solution

A simple way to model the couples problem would be to make the assumption that each resident in a couple will submit a preference list which is identical to that of their partner in the couple. By making this assumption, this problem can be modelled by a single constraint for each couple.

$$1. \quad x_i = x_k \quad \forall ik, (r_i, r_k) \in C$$

Figure 6.12: Side constraint for the couples Hospitals/Residents problem.

The constraint model in Figure 6.12, posts a single constraint for each couple that states they must both be matched to the same hospital. The assumption that a pair of enemies will submit identical preference lists is less reasonable for the enemies problem than with couples. However, such an assumption does lead to a simple model as shown in Figure 6.13.

$$1. \quad x_i \neq x_k \quad \forall ik, (r_i, r_k) \in E$$

Figure 6.13: Side constraint for the enemies Hospitals/Residents problem.

To extend these models to solve the optimisation version of this problem a variable  $p$  is added for each pair (either couple or enemies). Each  $p$  variable will have an initial domain of  $\{0, 1\}$ . If  $p_a = 1$  then the request of the  $a^{th}$  pair of couples/enemies will not be honoured in the resulting matching. The constraints required to model this problem are shown below.

$$\begin{array}{l}
 1. \quad x_i \neq x_k \Leftrightarrow p_a = 1 \quad \forall ik, (r_i, r_k) \in C, 1 \leq a \leq |C| \\
 2. \quad sum = \sum_{a=1}^{|C|} p_a \\
 3. \quad minimise(sum) \\
 4. \quad x_i = x_k \Leftrightarrow p_a = 1 \quad \forall ik, (r_i, r_k) \in E, 1 \leq a \leq |E| \\
 5. \quad sum = \sum_{a=1}^{|E|} p_a \\
 6. \quad minimise(sum)
 \end{array}$$

Figure 6.14: Side constraints for the optimisation versions of the couples and enemies Hospitals/Residents problem, assuming identical preference lists.

In Figure 6.14, constraints 1, 2 and 3 are for the couples problem and constraints 4, 5 and 6 are for the enemies problem. Constraints 1 and 4 enforce the values of the  $p$  variables, constraints 2 and 5 place the sum of all the  $p$  variables in the  $sum$  variable. Finally, constraints 3 and 6 are search objectives to minimise the value of the  $sum$  variable.

If the assumption that couples will submit identical preference lists is dropped, then the Hospitals/Residents problem with couples can be modelled in a similar way to the forbidden/forced pairs problems.

As shown in Figure 6.15, for each couple  $(r_i, r_k)$  a constraint is added for each hospital  $h_j$  that appears in either  $r_i$  or  $r_k$ 's preference lists. This constraint states that, if  $r_i$  or

$$1. \quad x_i = \text{pref}(i, j) \Leftrightarrow x_k = \text{pref}(k, j) \quad \forall i, k, j, (r_i, r_k) \in C, j \in PL(i) \cup PL(k)$$

Figure 6.15: Side constraint for the couples Hospitals/Residents problem.

$r_k$  is matched to  $h_j$  then the other must also be matched to the same hospital. It is assumed that if  $j \notin PL(k)$  then  $\text{pref}(k, j)$  will return  $-1$ . The effect of this is that if  $r_i$  were matched to a hospital that does not appear in  $r_k$ 's preference list then the constraint would remove all values from the domain of  $x_k$  except the value  $-1$ , this will cause a failure and trigger a backtrack. To modify this model for the enemies problem,  $=$  is replaced with  $\neq$ .

Both the couples and enemies problems can also be modelled with extensional constraints.

$$1. \quad C_{i,k} = \left\{ (a, b) \mid \begin{array}{l} j \in PL(i), j \in PL(k), \\ a = \text{rank}(r_i, w_j) \wedge b = \text{rank}(r_k, w_j) \end{array} \right\}$$

Figure 6.16: Extensional constraint for the couples Hospitals/Residents problem.

The extensional constraint model for the couples problem shown in Figure 6.16 posts an extensional constraint for each couple  $(r_i, r_k)$  which contains the set of allowed tuples representing the two residents being matched to the same hospital. A pair  $(a, b)$  is a valid assignment, with respect to the constraint  $C_{i,k}$ , for the pair of variables representing  $r_i$  and  $r_k$  respectively, if  $a$  represents  $r_i$ 's preference for some hospital  $h_j$  and  $b$  represents  $r_k$ 's preference for the same hospital  $h_j$ .

$$1. \quad C_{i,k} = \left\{ (a, b) \mid \begin{array}{l} j \in PL(i), l \in PL(k), j \neq l, \\ a = \text{rank}(r_i, w_j) \wedge b = \text{rank}(r_k, w_l) \end{array} \right\}$$

Figure 6.17: Extensional constraint for the enemies Hospitals/Residents problem.

As shown in Figure 6.17, a pair  $(a, b)$  is a valid assignment, with respect to the constraint  $C_{i,k}$ , for the pair of variables representing  $r_i$  and  $r_k$  respectively, if  $a$  represents a hospital  $h_j$  in  $r_i$ 's domain and  $b$  represents a hospital  $h_l$  in  $r_k$ 's domain and  $h_j \neq h_l$ . These extensional constraint models can then be extended to solve the optimisation version of the respective problems as shown below.

In the constraint model in Figure 6.18,  $C_{i,k}$  refers to the extensional constraint for the couples Hospitals/Residents problem as detailed in Figure 6.16. Constraint 1 states that

<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. <math>C_{i,k} \Leftrightarrow p_a = 1 \quad \forall ik, (r_i, r_k) \in C, 1 \leq a \leq  C </math></li> <li>2. <math>sum = \sum_{i=1}^{ C } cp_i</math></li> <li>3. <math>minimise(sum)</math></li> </ol>
---

Figure 6.18: Extensional constraint for the optimisation version of the couples Hospitals/Residents problem.

either the  $i^{th}$  couple is included in the matching or the variable  $p_i$  is assigned the value 1. Constraint 2 places the sum of all the  $p$  variables into the  $sum$  variable. Finally, constraint 3 is an optimisation function to minimise the value held in the  $sum$  variable. To adapt this model for the enemies Hospitals/Residents problem, the extensional constraint in line 1 is changed to the one described in Figure 6.17.

## 6.9 Conclusions

In this chapter it has been shown that adding simple side constraints to the specialised constraint models proposed in Chapters 3 and 5 can model several extensions of classical stable matching problems. However, the true versatility of these solutions does not become apparent until a problem in which many of the above extensions are mixed together needs to be modelled. For example, there could be a Hospitals/Residents instance  $I$  in which a pair of residents  $r_2$  and  $r_7$  are good friends, and if they find that they would rather have each other's assigned hospital than their own then they will complain. To avoid this a man-exchange stability constraint is posted over their two variables. Another pair of residents  $r_3$  and  $r_9$  are married and wish to be assigned to the same hospital, so a couples constraint is posted to enforce this. A doctor at hospital  $h_5$  has requested that his son, resident  $r_4$ , not be assigned to his hospital, so a forbidden pair constraint is posted to enforce this. A teacher thinks that residents  $r_1$ ,  $r_5$  and  $r_{12}$  are too dependent on each other's help and would like to split them up, so a clique of enemy constraints is posted to enforce this. Along with all these extra conditions the most balanced matching<sup>6</sup> is required so an objective function is posted to find it. These, or any other similar set of constraints, can simply be added to any of the specialised constraints without the need to alter the base model, but will allow for very rich problems to be easily modelled and

---

<sup>6</sup>The definition of a balanced matching in the Hospitals/Residents case is not clear, it is used here for illustrative purposes only

solved (or to prove that no solution exists).

As has been shown in this Chapter, constraint technologies can provide very versatile solutions to stable matching problems. Furthermore, it can also allow for rapidly modelling hard combinatorial problems for which no algorithmic solutions currently exists. This allows such problems to be empirically studied to provide insights into the problems structure.

## 6.10 Future work

In the experiments done in this chapter, the value ordering heuristic used was not altered from that used by the original specialised constraints to find all stable matchings. That variable ordering heuristic is to choose the variable with the smallest minimum domain value and the value ordering heuristic was to choose the smallest domain value first. This is used in the all solutions case because it results in a failure free search process (as shown in Chapter 3). It may be the case that, for a problem in which we seek a specific optimal matching (under some definition of optimality) a different set of variable and value ordering heuristics may lead to finding such an optimal solution more efficiently. For example, one possible value ordering that may work well for the sex-equal stable marriage problem would be to choose a value that is the most equal locally. For example, when choosing a value to try for variable  $z_i$ , find the value that minimises the difference between  $m_i$ 's preference from the chosen woman and the woman's preference for him. More formally, choose woman  $w_j$  such that  $|rank(m_i, w_j) - rank(w_j, m_i)|$  is minimised. Alternatively a dynamic value ordering could monitor the current states of the  $sum_m$  and  $sum_w$  variables and choose a value that will help to unify them. Similarly for the balanced stable marriage problem when selecting a value from the domain of  $z_i$ , choose woman  $w_j$  such that  $max\{rank(m_i, w_j), rank(w_j, m_i)\}$  will be minimised. Or a dynamic value ordering could monitor the current states of the  $sum_m$  and  $sum_w$  variables and choose a value that will help to minimise the largest of them. Possible variable ordering heuristics include choose the variable with the largest current domain; this should cause the maximum propagation and thus reduce the search tree. Conversely, choosing the variable with the smallest domain may be advantageous for problems with a high probability of insolubility, as it may result in empty domains more quickly.



## Chapter 7

# Conclusion and future work

### 7.1 Conclusion

In Chapter 2 a number of constraint solutions for stable matching problems have been detailed. The justification for these constraint solutions has always been the inherent versatility of the generalised framework within which the constraint solutions are based. However, this versatility was not demonstrated. Empirical comparison has shown that none of these solutions come close to the runtime performance of the specialised algorithmic solutions for these problems.

My contribution to the field starts in Chapter 3, which demonstrates how the stable marriage problem can be modelled as a specialised constraint. Two specialised constraints were presented; a binary constraint SM2 and an  $n$ -ary constraint SMN. Proofs have been given which state that when propagated the SMN constraint reduces the variable domains to a state which is the equivalent of the GS-lists. Furthermore, this can be achieved in  $O(n^2)$  time (which is optimal in the size of the preference lists). Therefore, propagating the SMN constraint is sufficient to find a stable matching without search. Further proofs state that, by using a simple value ordering all stable matchings can be enumerated without failure due to an incorrect assignment. Empirical evidence has been presented which shows that these specialised constraint solutions can solve problem instances significantly faster than previously published constraint models. It can be seen that for large instances where  $n = 8000$  the SMN constraint is within a factor of four of the specialised algorithmic solution's runtime. This is achieved whilst maintaining the full versatility of the constraint satisfaction problem architecture.

In Chapter 4 two further specialisations of the  $n$ -ary stable marriage constraint were

presented. These specialisations reduce either the memory requirements to store or to propagate the constraint. Empirical evidence was given which shows the benefits of these improvements. The first constraint reduced the time to enforce arc-consistency and the second constraint reduced the time to find all solutions. However, these benefits come at the cost of versatility.

In Chapter 5 it was shown how the Hospitals/Residents problem can be modelled as a specialised constraint. Empirical evidence was presented which showed that this solution can solve problem instances significantly faster than a toolbox constraint model. Furthermore, it has been shown that the specialised constraint can solve problem instances of a size equivalent to that of the “real life” Hospitals/Residents problems.

Finally, Chapter 6 demonstrated the versatility of the constraint solutions presented in Chapters 3 and 5. This was done by adding side constraints to the existing specialised constraint models to model a number of different sub-problems. These problems either gave a definition of optimality or restricted the set of solutions by adding additional criteria. Many of these problems have been proven to be NP-Hard and some have no known algorithmic solutions. Included with these models are the results from empirical studies which show that these are indeed feasible solutions to these problems. These studies also provide some insight into the structure of these problems, some of which have had little or no previous study.

## 7.2 Future work

### 7.2.1 Enforcing GAC over SMN

In Chapter 3 a specialised  $n$ -ary constraint (SMN) for the stable marriage problem is presented. Unlike most  $n$ -ary constraints SMN enforces arc-consistency (AC), rather than generalised arc-consistency (GAC), which is the usual level of consistency enforced over such a constraint. The reason for this is that enforcing AC in this case is sufficient to find a stable matching. Maintaining this level of consistency is also sufficient to enumerate all stable matchings in a failure free search process. Therefore, enforcing a higher level of consistency will not reduce the size of the search tree.

However, if enforcing GAC was desirable for this constraint then one way this could be achieved would be by emulating the algorithm proposed by Gusfield [48] for finding the set of all stable pairs. A pair is said to be a stable pair iff it appears in at least

one stable matching. The SMN constraint represents a whole stable marriage instance; enforcing GAC over this constraint will mean that all values remaining after propagation must appear in a valid  $n$ -tuple, meaning it must appear in a stable matching. Therefore, enforcing GAC over this constraint is the equivalent of finding all stable pairs.

The algorithm proposed by Gusfield [48] for this problem exploits the lattice structure of the stable marriage problem. The algorithm starts by finding both the male-optimal and female-optimal stable matchings. It then uses a procedure called “breakmarriage” which takes an arbitrary man  $m_i$ , such that  $m_i$  has a different partner in the two matchings, and denies him his first choice partner.  $m_i$  is then placed on the free list. The GS algorithm [36] is then restarted. This is then repeated until the GS algorithm returns only one matching. It has been proven [48] that all stable pairs will be included in at least one of the matchings returned by this process. This algorithm has been shown to run in  $O(n^2)$  time.

After propagating the SMN constraint, if an arbitrary uninstantiated man variable  $z_i$  has its lowest domain value removed and the effects are propagated, the resultant domain reductions will be the equivalent of running the “breakmarriage” procedure. This is then repeated until all variables are instantiated. The stable pairs will be recorded and the state of the variable domains will be returned to that after the initial propagation call. Any domain value that does not appear in a stable pair will then be removed. The remaining domain values will then be GAC. During this process  $\Theta(n^2)$  domain values will be removed, each value will require  $O(1)$  time to propagate, thus this method will run in  $\Theta(n^2)$  time (assuming the backtrack can be achieved within the same time complexity).

It would be sufficient to implement this method as part of the *init* method of the SMN constraint and use the same *remVal* method as the AC version to maintain consistency. This would mean that this method need only be called once. Using this method, GAC can be enforced with same worst case time complexity as enforcing AC. However, the best case complexity of enforcing AC is significantly better. It is doubtful that the benefits gained by enforcing this higher level of consistency would outweigh the effort required to enforce it, but this has not yet been empirically tested.

### 7.2.2 Value and variable ordering heuristics

For the stable marriage problem, it has been shown that, using a value ordering heuristic of choosing the favourite partner remaining in the domain with an arbitrary variable ordering heuristic, is sufficient to find all stable matchings without backtracking due to a

bad branching decision. The same is also true in the Hospitals/Residents case. However, when the objective is shifted to finding some form of optimal matching a different set of heuristics may be more appropriate.

### 7.2.3 Allowing indifference

A common generalisation of a stable matching problem is to allow ties in the preference list. By allowing ties in a preference list, participants have the ability to express indifference between two or more potential partners. Some provisional work has been conducted into developing specialised constraints for stable matching problems with ties [92]. This work includes showing how a stable matching problem with ties can be represented within a specialised constraint such that all required ties information can be accessed in constant time. Provisional results of attempting to find the maximal stable matching using anonymised data from SFAS [56] have shown that this is not a viable solution for these problem instances, in its current form. It may be the case that better value and variable ordering heuristics may improve this.

An alternative solution would be to reformulate the problem as a permutation problem. It is known that under weak stability a stable matching can be found by arbitrarily breaking the ties and solving the resulting instance in the same way as the no ties case. When no ties are present in an instance all stable matchings are of the same size. Therefore, the problem could be reformulated from trying to find an optimal matching to trying to find an optimal permutation of the preference lists.

In 2002, Gent and Prosser [44] proposed a constraint model to solve the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete preference lists. The authors presented empirical results obtained by using this model to solve randomly generated problem instances. This was then used to solve problem instances generated with a fixed probability of incompleteness while varying the probability of ties from 0 to 1<sup>1</sup>. This was done in an attempt to observe a phase transition as the problem changes from easy (with no ties) to hard (some ties) and back to easy again (complete indifference). However, this phase transition was not observed. It was suggested that this may be due to the relatively small instances used ( $n = 10$ ). It would be interesting to repeat these experiments with a larger instance size to see if the phase transition can be seen. Another possible reason for the phase transition not being observed was due to the random instance generator (detailed in Appendix B.3)

---

<sup>1</sup>In this case, probability of ties means the probability of any given preference list entry being tied with the next entry on the list.

that they used. This generator favours instances with many short ties. Instances with few long ties will probably be much harder to solve. For this reason, the phase transition may be observed if the experiments were repeated using a random instance generator designed to produce instances with few long ties, such as the one proposed in Appendix B.4.

#### 7.2.4 A compact bound stable marriage constraint

Two specialisations of the SMN constraint were given in Chapter 4. In one, only domain reductions that affect the bounds of the variable were allowed. The other represented a problem instance with a single set of  $n$  variables. The former showed a reduction in the time to enforce arc-consistency (and thus find the first matching). The latter reduced the time to enumerate all solutions. It would be interesting to see how a constraint which combined these two ideas would perform. However, such a constraint would not be very useful as its compact variable representation and reduced propagation would greatly restrict its versatility.

#### 7.2.5 Bound Hospitals/Residents constraint

In Chapter 4 it was shown that reducing the memory requirements of the SMN constraint by not removing internal domain values resulted in a faster propagating constraint. A similar modification could be developed for the Hospitals/Residents constraint. The complication with this idea is that the HRN constraint as proposed in Chapter 5 represents each hospital with a single variable. If interior domain reductions were disallowed then another method of keeping track of each hospital's  $c$  favourite residents would have to be developed, since this is normally achieved via the hospital variable's domain. This problem could be addressed by having a separate variable for each post at each hospital, but the additional variables may outweigh the benefits gained. Another solution could be to only allow a domain reduction if it is a bound or one of the lowest  $c$  values in the domain of a hospital variable. Alternatively, this information could be stored within a specialised data structure made up of reversible variables.

#### 7.2.6 Specialised constraints for other variants of stable matching problems

An avenue for future research would be to develop specialised constraints for other stable matching problems. One such class of problems is matching three or more sets of par-

ticipants such as the 3-way or 3D stable matching problem [75]. It is NP-Complete to determine if a stable matching exists in a given instance, thus a constraint approach may be a viable solution for this problem.

In Chapter 6 a simplification of the stable couples problem was shown that can be solved by adding side constraints to the specialised Hospitals/Residents constraint. However, the original version of this problem [81] alters the definition of stability and thus cannot be solved by adding side constraints to an existing model. A specialised constraint may be able to represent this version of the problem as a standalone constraint. Alternatively, adding an additional method and/or auxiliary functions to the existing specialised Hospitals/Residents constraint could allow for a mix of couples and singles in the same problem.

In Chapter 6 it was shown how the man-exchange stable marriage problem can be modelled by adding simple side constraints. Both solutions proposed have large memory requirements which have a significant impact on the runtime of the solutions. A specialised constraint solution could be developed to represent this problem in a more memory efficient manner.

Not all stable roommates instances contain a stable matching. For an insoluble instance, it may be desirable to find a matching that is “Almost Stable” [8]. An “Almost Stable” matching is a matching which contains the fewest number of blocking pairs over all matchings. This problem could probably be modelled by using a stripped down version of the SMN constraint, which only enforces that returned solutions constitute a valid matching. A boolean variable could then be added for each man which holds the number of blocking pairs that man is involved with. This could probably be enforced with a stripped down version of the SM2 constraint which only enforces stability in conjunction with a disjunctive statement that says if  $m_i$  forms a blocking pair with  $w_j$  then increment some counter.

# Appendix A

## Glossary

### A.1 Terms and definitions

In this appendix a number of terms are defined that are used throughout this dissertation.

- **Constraint Solver** : A library of tools that can be used to model and solve constraint satisfaction problems. It is assumed that this constraint solver uses an AC5-like framework [96].
- **Constrained Integer Variable** : An object which is supplied by the constraint solver to represent an integer variable within a constraint satisfaction problem. Each variable has an associated finite integer domain. If at any point during search the domain of a constrained integer variable is reduced to an empty set then the current search node will be marked as a fail and a backtrack will be forced. The solver will track the values in each variable's domain and on backtracking the domains will be returned to their previous state.
- **Search variable / non-search variable** : Each constraint model has a set of search variables. A solution to that constraint model consists of a mapping of domain values to search variables. Therefore, to find a solution the constraint solver will first propagate the constraints. If that does not result in either a failure or a solution, then the solver will choose one of the search variables that is not yet instantiated and branch over that variable. This will then be repeated until all the search variables are instantiated. A non-search variable works in the same way as a search variable except that it does not have to be instantiated for a solution to be found. However

if a non-search variable has its domain reduced to an empty set then it will cause a failure to be reported and a backtrack will occur.

- **Reversible Integer Variable** : An object which is supplied by the constraint solver to store an integer value within a constraint. The values of these variables will be stored by the solver and restored on backtracking.
- **Toolbox Constraints** : A set of constraints supplied by the constraint solver to construct constraint models. Such constraints usually consist mainly of standard mathematical and logical operators.
- **Global constraint** : Bessière et al.[19] defined a global constraint  $GC$  to be a constraint which cannot be decomposed into a set of lesser arity constraints  $CS$ , such that the propagation achieved by  $GC$  is greater than  $CS$  or the time and space complexity of  $GC$  to achieve this propagation is lower than that of  $CS$ . In this dissertation the term global constraint is used to mean a constraint with an arity  $n$  where  $n$  is a parameter.
- **Specialised constraint** : A specialised constraint is a constraint that has been written to solve a specific problem or sub problem. For example, the flow constraint [23] written to help model the network flow problem.
- **Side constraints** : A side constraint is a constraint that has been added to an existing constraint model. These are normally used either to increase propagation to make the model more efficient, or to restrict the set of solutions in some way to solve some restricted version of the problem the original model was designed to solve.

## A.2 Objects and functions

The following is a list of the objects and functions used in the pseudo-code throughout this thesis.

- $dom(z)$  : Returns the current set of values that make up the domain associated with the variable  $z$ .
- $max(dom(z))$  : Returns the largest value in the domain of variable  $z$ .
- $min(dom(z))$  : Returns the smallest value in the domain of variable  $z$ .



- $isInstantiated(dom(z))$  : returns true iff  $|dom(z)| = 1$
- $getNextHigher(dom(z), a)$  : Returns the smallest value in the domain of variable  $z$  that is strictly greater than the value  $a$ , if no such value exists then this procedure returns  $a$ .
- $getValue(dom(z), a)$  : Returns the  $a^{th}$  smallest value in  $dom(z)$ , if  $|dom(z)| < a$  then it returns  $max(dom(z))$ .
- $delVal(dom(z), a)$  : Removes the value  $a$  from the domain of variable  $z$ .
- $delRange(dom(z), a, b)$  : Removes all values  $v$  from the domain of variable  $z$  such that  $a \leq v \leq b$ . Note that if  $a > b$  then no values will be removed.
- $setMax(dom(z), a)$  : Removes all values strictly greater than  $a$  from the domain of variable  $z$ .
- $PL(i, a)$  : Returns the integer index of the  $a^{th}$  person in the  $i^{th}$  person's preference list.
- $rank(m_i, w_j)$  : Returns the position of  $w_j$  in  $m_i$ 's preference list.
- $pref(i, j)$  : Returns the position of the  $j^{th}$  participant in the  $i^{th}$  participant's preference list. This function is similar to  $rank(m_i, w_j)$ . The difference between the two is the context in which they are used. In general  $pref(i, j)$  is used in pseudo-code while  $rank(m_i, w_j)$  is used in text.  $pref(i, j)$  is assumed to be implemented (unless stated otherwise) by means of an inverse preference list. For the Stable Marriage problem the inverse preference lists are modelled as a pair of two dimensional integer arrays. Note that the inverse preference lists can be constructed in  $O(n^2)$  time since the preference lists are being read by making  $pref(i, j) = k$  where  $PL(i, k) = j$ .
- $l_i^m$  : the length of  $m_i$ 's preference list.
- $swap(x, y)$  : Swaps the values of the integer variables  $x$  and  $y$ .

## Appendix B

# Problem generators

In this appendix details are presented about the problem instance generators used to generate the random instances used in the empirical studies throughout this thesis. These instance generators will be given in a Java-like pseudo-code, using the . (Dot) operator as an attribute selector. For example,  $A.b()$  will indicate a call to the method  $b()$  associated with the object  $A$ . Two predefined object classes will be used in this appendix *arrayList* and *randomInt*. An *arrayList*  $x$  is an ordered variable length array indexed from 1, with three associated methods as follows.

- $x.init(a, b)$  will initialise the *arrayList*  $x$  by adding an integer  $i$  to  $x$  for each integer in the range  $a \leq i \leq b$ .
- $x.add(a)$  will add the object  $a$  to the *arrayList*  $x$ , and thus increment the length of  $x$  by one.
- $x.remove(i)$  will return the  $i^{th}$  object from the *arrayList*  $x$ , this object will also be removed from the *arrayList*  $x$  and thus the length of  $x$  is decremented by one.
- $x.lookup(i)$  will return the index of  $i$  in the *arrayList*  $x$ . If  $i \notin x$  then  $-1$  is returned.
- $x.length$  will return the current number of objects held in the *arrayList*  $x$ .

The object *random* is a pseudo-random number generator with two associated methods as follows.

- $x.init(seed)$  will initialise the *random* object  $x$  with the integer seed value  $seed$ . Storing the  $seed$  value used along with the instance generator for a set of instances

will allow the instances to be reproduced if necessary without having to store them as a number of potentially large text files.

- $x.nextInt(y, z)$  will return an integer  $i$  arbitrarily picked from the range  $y \leq i \leq z$ .
- $x.nextReal(y, z)$  will return a real number  $i$  arbitrarily picked from the range  $y \leq i \leq z$ .

It is also assume that there is access to a method named  $write(a)$  which will output the arguments to a text file in some standard format.

## B.1 Stable marriage instance generator

The stable marriage instance generator produces a complete set of  $n$  male preference lists and  $n$  female preference lists then writes them to a text file. This generator uses the following objects.

- $list$  is an *arrayList* used to hold an ordered list of integers from which the preference list entries are randomly selected.
- $menLists$  is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , used to hold the male preference lists.
- $womenLists$  is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , used to hold the female preference lists.

```

1. SMgen(n)
2.   for  $i := 1$  to  $n$  loop
3.      $list.init(1, n)$ ;
4.     for  $k := 1$  to  $n$  loop
5.        $menLists_i.add(list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length)))$ ;
6.     end loop;
7.      $list.init(1, n)$ ;
8.     for  $k := 1$  to  $n$  loop
9.        $womenLists_i.add(list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length)))$ ;
10.    end loop;
11.  end loop;
12.   $write(menLists, womenLists)$ 

```

Figure B.1: A stable marriage instance generator for complete preference lists.

**SMgen( $n$ )** The *SMgen( $n$ )* method detailed in Figure B.1 will randomly generate a stable marriage instance with  $n$  men and  $n$  women with complete preference lists. The outer loop will cycle  $n$  times (line 2), once for each man and woman. The *list* object will be initialised with all the integer values in the range  $1 \dots n$  (line 3). A random entry will then be removed from the *list* object and placed in the *menLists <sub>$i$</sub>*  object (line 5). This will then be repeated  $n$  times (line 4) until the preference list is complete. This process is then repeated for the women (lines 7 to 10). The preference lists will then be written to file (line 12).

This generator can be extended to produce incomplete preference lists by the addition of the *tempLists* object which is an array *arrayList* of length  $n$  used as a temporary store such that *tempLists <sub>$j$</sub>*  will hold a list of men that ranked woman  $w_j$ .

```

1. SMgen(n,l)
2.   for  $i := 1$  to  $n$  loop
3.     list.init(1,  $n$ );
4.     for  $k := 1$  to  $l$  loop
5.        $j := list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length));$ 
6.       menLists $i$ .add( $j$ );
7.       tempLists $j$ .add( $i$ );
8.     end loop;
9.   end loop;
10.  for  $j := 1$  to  $n$  loop
11.    for  $k := 1$  to tempLists $j$ .length loop
12.       $i := tempLists_j.remove(random.nextInt(1, tempLists_j.length));$ 
13.      womenLists $j$ .add( $i$ );
14.    end loop;
15.  end loop;
16.  write(menLists, womenLists)

```

Figure B.2: A stable marriage instance generator for incomplete preference lists.

**SMgen( $n, l$ )** The *SMgen( $n, l$ )* method detailed in Figure B.2 will randomly generate a stable marriage instance with  $n$  men each with a preference list of length  $l$  and  $n$  women each of whom only rank the men that included them in their preference lists. For each man  $1$  to  $n$  (line 2) the *list* object will be initialised with all the integer values in the range  $1 \dots n$  (line 3). A random entry  $j$  will then be removed from the *list* object (line 5) and placed in the *menLists <sub>$i$</sub>*  object (line 6),  $i$  will then be added to *tempLists <sub>$j$</sub>*  (line 7), this is repeated  $l$  times (line 4). After cycling through all the men, *tempLists <sub>$j$</sub>*  will contain a list of all men that ranked woman  $w_j$ . Then for each woman (line 10), entries are randomly

picked out of  $tempLists_j$  (line 12) and placed in  $womenLists_j$  (line 13). This is repeated until  $tempLists_j$  is an empty list for all  $j$ . The preference lists are then written to file (line 16).

## B.2 Hospitals/Residents instance generator

The Hospitals/Residents instance generator produces a complete set of  $n$  resident preference lists and  $m$  hospital preference lists then writes them to a text file. This generator uses the following objects:

- $list$  is an *arrayList* used to hold an ordered list of integers from which the preference list entries are randomly selected.
- $resLists$  is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , used to hold the resident preference lists.
- $hosLists$  is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $m$ , used to hold the hospital preference lists.

```

1. HRgen(n,m)
2.   for i := 1 to n loop
3.     list.init(1, m);
4.     for k := 1 to m loop
5.       resListsi.add(list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length)));
6.     end loop;
7.   end loop;
8.   for j := 1 to m loop
9.     list.init(1, n);
10.    for k := 1 to n loop
11.      hosListsj.add(list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length)));
12.    end loop;
13.  end loop;
14.  write(resLists, hosLists)

```

Figure B.3: A Hospitals/Residents instance generator for complete preference lists.

**HRgen( $n, m$ )** The  $HRgen(n, m)$  method detailed in Figure B.3 will randomly generate a Hospitals/Residents instance with  $n$  residents and  $m$  hospitals with complete preference lists. The first loop will cycle  $n$  times (line 2), once for each resident. The  $list$  object will be initialised with all the integer values in the range  $1 \dots m$  (line 3). A random entry will

then be removed from the *list* object and placed in the *resLists<sub>i</sub>* object (line 5). This will then be repeated *n* times (line 4) until the preference list is complete. This process is then repeated for the hospitals (lines 8 to 13). The preference lists will then be written to file (line 14). It is assumed that the uniform capacities of the hospitals will be taken in as a parameter and added separately via the *write()* method.

This generator can be extended to produce incomplete preference lists. Along with the above objects the *tempLists* object is added. This is an array *arrayList* of length *m* used as a temporary store such that *tempLists<sub>j</sub>* will hold a list of residents that ranked hospital *h<sub>j</sub>*.

```

1. HRgen(n,m,l)
2.   for i := 1 to n loop
3.     list.init(1, m);
4.     for k := 1 to l loop
5.       j := list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length));
6.       resListsi.add(j);
7.       tempListsj.add(i);
8.     end loop;
9.   end loop;
10.  for j := 1 to n loop
11.    for k := 1 to tempListsj.length loop
12.      i := tempListsj.remove(random.nextInt(1, tempListsj.length));
13.      hosListsj.add(i);
14.    end loop;
15.  end loop;
16.  write(resLists, hosLists)

```

Figure B.4: A Hospitals/Residents instance generator for incomplete preference lists.

**HRgen(*n, m, l*)** The *HRgen(n, m, l)* method detailed in Figure B.4 will randomly generate a Hospitals/Residents instance with *n* residents each with a preference list of length *l* and *m* hospitals each of whom only rank the residents that included them in their preference lists. For each resident 1 to *n* (line 2) the *list* object will be initialised with all the integer values in the range  $1 \dots m$  (line 3). A random entry *j* will then be removed from the *list* object (line 5) and placed in the *resLists<sub>i</sub>* object (line 6), *i* will then be added to *tempLists<sub>j</sub>* (line 7), this is repeated *l* times (line 4). After cycling through all the residents, *tempLists<sub>j</sub>* will contain a list of all residents that ranked hospital *h<sub>j</sub>*. Then, for each hospital (line 10), entries are randomly picked out of *tempLists<sub>j</sub>* (line 12) and placed in *hosLists<sub>j</sub>* (line 13), this is repeated until *tempLists<sub>j</sub>* is an empty list for all *j*.

The preference lists are then written to file (line 16).

### B.3 Gent et al SMTI instance generator

The generator detailed in this section was proposed by Gent et al in 2002 [44] and was used to generate stable marriage instances with ties and incomplete preference lists. This generator uses the following objects:

- *list* is an *arrayList* used to hold an ordered list of integers from which the preference list entries are randomly selected.
- *menLists* is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , used to hold the male preference lists.
- *womenLists* is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , used to hold the female preference lists.
- *menTies* is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , used to hold the ties information about the men's preference lists.
- *womenTies* is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , used to hold the ties information about the women's preference lists.

**SMTIgen**( $n, p_1, p_2$ ) The *SMTIgen*( $n, p_1, p_2$ ) method detailed in Figure B.5 will randomly generate a stable marriage instance with  $n$  men and  $n$  women, where  $p_1$  is the probability that some woman is omitted from a man's preference list, and  $p_2$  is the probability of some preference list entry being tied with the next entry. First, a complete stable marriage instance with no ties is generated (lines 2 to 11) in the same way as shown in Appendix B.1. Then each of the male preference lists is cycled through (line 12) and for each list entry (line 13) a random number is generated, if that number is less than or equal to  $p_1$  then that list entry is removed (line 15), and that man is also removed from the relevant woman's list (lines 16 and 17). Each man is cycled through again (line 20) and for each list entry (line 21) a random number is generated. If that number is less than or equal to  $p_2$  (line 22) then a 1 will be added to *menTies<sub>i</sub>* (line 23) otherwise a 0 will be added (line 25). This process is then repeated for the women (lines 28 to 35). The problem instance is then written to file (line 36).

```

1. SMTIgen( $n, p_1, p_2$ )
2.   for  $i := 1$  to  $n$  loop
3.      $list.init(1, n)$ ;
4.     for  $k := 1$  to  $n$  loop
5.        $menLists_i.add(list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length)))$ ;
6.     end loop;
7.      $list.init(1, n)$ ;
8.     for  $k := 1$  to  $n$  loop
9.        $womenLists_i.add(list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length)))$ ;
10.    end loop;
11.  end loop;
12.  for  $i := 1$  to  $n$  loop
13.    for  $p := n$  to  $1$  loop
14.      if  $random.nextReal(0, 1) \leq p_1$  then
15.         $j := menLists_i.remove(p)$ ;
16.         $k := womenLists_j.lookUp(i)$ ;
17.         $womenLists_j.remove(k)$ ;
18.      end loop;
19.    end loop;
20.  for  $i := 1$  to  $n$  loop
21.    for  $k := 1$  to  $menLists_i.length$  loop
22.      if  $random.nextReal(0, 1) \leq p_2$  then
23.         $menTies_i.add(1)$ ;
24.      else then
25.         $menTies_i.add(0)$ ;
26.      end loop;
27.    end loop;
28.  for  $j := 1$  to  $n$  loop
29.    for  $k := 1$  to  $womenLists_j.length - 1$  loop
30.      if  $random.nextInt(1, 10) \leq p_2$  then
31.         $womenTies_j.add(1)$ ;
32.      else then
33.         $womenTies_j.add(0)$ ;
34.      end loop;
35.    end loop;
36.   $write(menLists, menTies, womenLists, womenTies)$ 

```

Figure B.5: A stable marriage instance generator for incomplete preference lists with ties.

## B.4 Hard SMTI instance generator

The generator described in this section was designed to allow the user influence over both the frequency and length of the ties by specifying separate probabilities for each. For simplicity it will be assumed that incomplete preference lists have already been generated by using some system, either the one specified in Appendix B.1 or as by lines 1 to 19 from Figure B.5. This means that only the ties information need be generated over the existing



incomplete preference lists. This generator uses the following objects:

- *menLists* is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , containing the previously generated male preference lists.
- *menTies* is an array of *arrayLists* of length  $n$ , used to hold the ties information about the men's preference lists.
- *openTie* is a boolean variable used to retain if a tie is currently open.

```

1. SMTIgen( $n, p_1, p_2$ )
2.   for  $i := 1$  to  $n$  loop
3.     openTie := false;
4.     for  $k := 1$  to menLists $i$ .length loop
5.       if openTie then
6.         if random.nextReal(0, 1)  $\leq p_2$  then
7.           menTies $i$ .add(1);
8.         else then
9.           menTies $i$ .add(0);
10.          openTie := false;
11.        else then
12.          if random.nextReal(0, 1)  $\leq p_1$  then
13.            menTies $i$ .add(1);
14.            openTie := true;
15.          else then
16.            menTies $i$ .add(0);
17.          end loop;
18.        end loop;

```

Figure B.6: A ties generator for previously generated preference lists.

**SMTIgen**( $n, p_1, p_2$ ) The tie generator, detailed in Figure B.6, generates an *arrayList* object containing ties information with respect to the male preference lists. It is assumed that this will be repeated for the women's preference lists. For each man (line 2) *openTie* will first be initialised to *false* (line 3). Each preference list entry is cycled through (line 4), if a tie is not open (line 11) then a random number in the range  $0 \dots 1$  will be generated. If that number is less than or equal to  $p_1$  then the current preference list entry will be in a tie with its predecessor (line 13) and a tie is opened (line 14). Otherwise if a tie is already open (line 5) then another random number will be generated, if that number is less than or equal to  $p_2$  then the current preference list entry will be in a tie with its predecessor

(line 13). If the generated number is greater than  $p_2$  then the tie will be closed (line 10). In this generator the arguments  $p_1$  and  $p_2$  are the probability that a tie will start and the probability that once started the tie will end. Therefore, by making  $p_1$  a relatively high number and  $p_2$  a relatively low number, the ties generated will consist of a small number of long ties. This reflects the ties structure observed in the anonymised data obtained from the Scottish Foundation Allocation Scheme (SFAS) [56].

## B.5 Stable roommates instance generator

The stable roommates instance generator produces a complete set of  $n$  preference lists and writes them to a text file. This generator uses the following objects:

- *list* is an *arrayList* used to hold an ordered list of integers from which the preference list entries are randomly selected.
- *prefLists* is an array *arrayList* of length  $n$ , used to hold the preference lists.

```

1. SRgen(n)
2.   for i := 1 to n loop
3.     list.init(1, n);
4.     list.remove(i);
5.     for k := 1 to n loop
6.       prefListsi.add(list.remove(random.nextInt(1, list.length)));
7.     end loop;
8.   end loop;
9.   write(prefLists)

```

Figure B.7: A stable roommates instance generator for complete preference lists.

**SRgen( $n$ )** The *SRgen*( $n$ ) method detailed in Figure B.7 will randomly generate a stable roommates instance with  $n$  participants with complete preference lists. The outer loop will cycle  $n$  times (line 2), once for each participant. The *list* object will be initialised with all the integer values in the range  $1 \dots n$  (line 3) and then  $i$  will be removed from the list (line 4) to ensure participants don't rank themselves. A random entry will then be removed from the *list* object and placed in the *prefLists<sub>i</sub>* object (line 6). This will then be repeated  $n$  times (line 5) until the preference list is complete. The preference lists will then be written to file (line 9).

# Bibliography

- [1] Generic Constraint Development Environment. <http://www.gecode.org/>.
- [2] ILOG JSolver. <http://www.ilog.com/products/jsolver/>.
- [3] ILOG Solver. <http://www.ilog.com/products/cp/>.
- [4] JChoco constraint programming system. <http://choco.sourceforge.net/>.
- [5] Koalog Constraint Solver. <http://www.koalog.com/>.
- [6] SICStus Prolog. <http://www.sics.se/isl/sicstuswww/>.
- [7] The ECLiPSe Constraint Programming System. <http://eclipse.crosscoreop.com/>.
- [8] D. J. Abraham, P. Biro, and D. F. Manlove. Almost stable matchings in the roommates problem. In *Proceedings of WAOA 2005: the 3rd Workshop on Approximation and Online Algorithms*, volume 3879 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 1–14. Springer, 2006.
- [9] B. Aldershof, O. M. Carducci, and D. C. Lorenc. Refined inequalities for stable marriage. *Constraints*, 4:281–292, 1999.
- [10] T. Atkinson, A. Bartk, M. C. Silaghi, E. Tuleu, and M. Zanker. Private and efficient stable marriages (matching) - a discsp benchmark. In *Proceedings of the ECAI 2006 Workshop on Distributed Constraint Satisfaction*, 2006.
- [11] J. C. Beck, P. Prosser, and R. J. Wallace. Towards understanding variable ordering heuristics for constraint satisfaction problems. In *Proceedings of the Fourteenth Irish Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science Conference (AICS03)*, pages 11–16, 2003.
- [12] J. C. Beck, P. Prosser, and R. J. Wallace. Failing first: An update. In *Proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'04)*, pages 959–960, 2004.

- [13] J. C. Beck, P. Prosser, and R. J. Wallace. Trying again to fail-first. In *Joint Annual Workshop of ERCIM/CoLogNet on Constraint Solving and Constraint Logic Programming (CSCLP'04)*, pages 41–55, 2004.
- [14] J. C. Beck, P. Prosser, and R. J. Wallace. Variable ordering heuristics show promise. In *Proceedings the 10th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'04)*, pages 711–715, 2004.
- [15] C. Bessière and M.-O. Cordier. Arc-consistency and arc-consistency again. In *Proceedings of the American Association of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'93)*, pages 108–113, 1993.
- [16] C. Bessiere and R. Debruyne. Optimal and suboptimal singleton arc-consistency algorithms. In *Proceedings of the 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'05)*, pages 54–59, 2005.
- [17] C. Bessiere, E. C. Freuder, and J.-C. Regin. Using constraint metaknowledge to reduce arc-consistency computation. *Artificial Intelligence*, 107:125–148, 1999.
- [18] C. Bessiere, E. Hebrard, B. Hnich, Z. Kiziltan, C.-G. Quimper, and T. Walsh. Reformulating global constraints: The slide and regular constraints. In *Proceedings of Symposium on Abstraction Reformulation and Approximation (SARA'07)*, pages 80–92, 2007.
- [19] C. Bessière and P. V. Hentenryck. To be or not to be ... a global constraint. In *Proceedings the 9th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'03)*, pages 789–794, 2003.
- [20] C. Bessière and J.-C. Régin. Arc-consistency for general constraint networks: Preliminary results. In *Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'97)*, pages 398–404, 1997.
- [21] C. Bessière and J.-C. Régin. Refining the basic constraint propagation algorithm. In *Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'01)*, pages 309–315, 2001.
- [22] C. Bessiere, J.-C. Regin, R. H. C. Yap, and Y. Zhang. An optimal coarse-grained arc-consistency algorithm. *Artificial Intelligence*, 165:165–185, 2005.

- [23] A. Bockmayr, N. Pisaruk, and A. Aggoun. Network flow problems in constraint programming. In *Proceedings the 7th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'01)*, pages 196–210, 2001.
- [24] I. Brito and P. Meseguer. Distributed forward checking. In *Proceedings the 9th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'03)*, pages 801–806, 2003.
- [25] I. Brito and P. Meseguer. Distributed stable matching problems. In *Proceedings the 11th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'05)*, pages 152–166, 2005.
- [26] I. Brito and P. Meseguer. Distributed stable matching problems with ties and incomplete lists. In *Proceedings the 12th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'06)*, pages 675–679, 2006.
- [27] Canadian Resident Matching Service. How the matching algorithm works. Web document available at <http://www.carms.ca/matching/algorithm.htm>.
- [28] A. Chmeiss and P. Jegou. Efficient path-consistency propagation. *International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools*, 7:121–142, 1998.
- [29] R. Debruyne and C. Bessière. Some practicable filtering techniques for the constraint satisfaction problem. In *Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'97)*, volume 1, pages 412–417. Morgan Kaufmann, 1997.
- [30] V. M. F. Dias, G. D. da Fronseca, C. M. H. de Figueiredo, and J. L. Szwarcfiter. The stable marriage problem with restricted pairs. In *Theoretical Computer Science*, volume 306, pages 391–405, 2003.
- [31] T. Feder. A new fixed point approach for stable networks and stable marriages. In *Proceedings of the twenty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing (STOC'89)*, pages 513–522, 1989.
- [32] T. Feder. *Stable networks and product graphs*. PhD thesis, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, 1992. Advisor-Donald E. Knuth.
- [33] T. Fleiner, R. W. Irving, and D. F. Manlove. Efficient algorithms for generalised stable marriage and roommates problems. *Theoretical Computer Science*, 381:162–176, 2007.

- [34] E. C. Freuder. Partial Constraint Satisfaction. In *Proceedings of the 11th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'89)*, pages 278–283, 1989.
- [35] D. Frost and R. Dechter. Look-ahead value ordering for constraint satisfaction problems. In *Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'95)*, pages 572–578, 1995.
- [36] D. Gale and L. S. Shapley. College admissions and the stability of marriage. *American Mathematical Monthly*, 69:9–15, 1962.
- [37] D. Gale and M. Sotomayor. Some remarks on the stable matching problem. *Discrete Applied Mathematics*, 11:223–232, 1985.
- [38] J. Gaschnig. A general backtracking algorithm that eliminates most redundant tests. In *Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'77)*, page 457, 1977.
- [39] J. Gaschnig. Performance measurement and analysis of certain search algorithms. Technical report, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1979.
- [40] I. P. Gent, R. W. Irving, D. F. Manlove, P. Prosser, and B. M. Smith. A constraint programming approach to the stable marriage problem. In *Proceedings the 7th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'01)*, pages 225–239, 2001.
- [41] I. P. Gent, C. Jefferson, and I. Miguel. Minion: A fast scalable constraint solver. In *Proceedings of the 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'06)*, pages 98–102, 2006.
- [42] I. P. Gent, E. MacIntyre, P. Prosser, B. M. Smith, and T. Walsh. An empirical study of dynamic variable ordering heuristics for the constraint satisfaction problem. In *Proceedings the 2nd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'96)*, pages 179–193, 1996.
- [43] I. P. Gent, E. Macintyre, P. Prosser, and T. Walsh. The constrainedness of search. In *Proceedings of the American Association of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'96)*, pages 246–252, 1996.

- [44] I. P. Gent and P. Prosser. An empirical study of the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete lists. In *Proceedings of the 15th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'02)*, pages 141–145, 2002.
- [45] I. P. Gent and P. Prosser. SAT encodings of the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete lists. In *Proceedings of the Fifth International Symposium on the Theory and Applications of Satisfiability Testing (SAT'02)*, pages 133–140, 2002.
- [46] M. L. Ginsberg. Dynamic backtracking. *Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research*, 1:25–46, 1993.
- [47] M. J. Green and D. A. Cohen. Tractability by approximating constraint languages. In *Proceedings the 9th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'03)*, pages 392–406, 2003.
- [48] D. Gusfield. Three fast algorithms for four problems in stable marriage. *SIAM J. Comput.*, 16(1):111–128, 1987.
- [49] D. Gusfield and R. W. Irving. *The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms*. The MIT Press, 1989.
- [50] R. M. Haralick and G. L. Elliott. Increasing tree search efficiency for constraint satisfaction problems. *Artificial Intelligence*, 14:263–313, 1980.
- [51] W. D. Harvey and M. L. Ginsberg. Limited discrepancy search. In *Proceedings of the 14th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'95)*, pages 607–615, 1995.
- [52] P. V. Hentenryck, H. Simonis, and M. Dincbas. Constraint satisfaction using constraint logic programming. *Artificial Intelligence*, 58(1-3):113–159, 1992.
- [53] R. Irving. An efficient algorithm for the stable roommates problem. In *Journal of Algorithms*, volume 6, pages 577–595, 1985.
- [54] R. Irving, D. Manlove, and S. Scott. The hospitals/residents problem with ties. In *Proceedings of SWAT 2000: The 7th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory (Halldorsson, Magnus, M., Ed.)*, volume 1851 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 259–271. Springer, 2000.

- [55] R. W. Irving. Stable marriage and indifference. In *Discret Applied Mathematics*, volume 48, pages 261–272, 1994.
- [56] R. W. Irving. Matching medical students to pairs of hospitals: a new variation on a well-known theme. In *Proceedings of the Sixth Annual European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA '98)*, volume 1461 of *Lecture Notes in Computer Science*, pages 381–392. Springer-Verlag, 1998.
- [57] R. W. Irving. Stable matching problems with exchange restrictions. *Journal of Combinatorial Optimization*, 2008.
- [58] K. Iwama, D. Manlove, S. Miyazaki, and Y. Morita. Stable marriage with incomplete lists and ties. In *Proceedings of the 26th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming (ICALP99)*, pages 443–454, 1999.
- [59] A. Kato. Complexity of the sex-equal stable marriage problem. *Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics (JJIAM)*, 10:1–19, 1993.
- [60] D. E. Knuth. *Stable Marriage and its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems*. American Mathematical, 1997.
- [61] C. Lecoutre and S. Cardon. A greedy approach to establish singleton arc-consistency. In *Proceedings of the 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'05)*, pages 199–204, 2005.
- [62] I. J. Lustig and J. F. Puget. Program does not equal program: Constraint programming and its relationship to mathematical programming. *Interfaces*, 31:29–53, 2001.
- [63] A. K. Mackworth. Consistency in networks of relations. *Artificial Intelligence*, 8:99–118, 1977.
- [64] A. K. Mackworth. On reading sketch maps. In *Proceedings of the 5th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'77)*, pages 598–606, 1977.
- [65] D. F. Manlove. Stable marriage with ties and unacceptable partners. Technical Report TR-1999-29, Dep. Computing Science, Univ. Glasgow, 1999.
- [66] D. F. Manlove, R. W. Irving, K. Iwama, S. Miyazaki, and Y. Morita. Hard variants of stable marriage. *Theoretical Computer Science*, 276:261–279, 2002.



- [67] D. F. Manlove and G. O'Malley. Modelling and solving the stable marriage problem using constraint programming. In *The Fifth Workshop on Modelling and Solving Problems with Constraints*, pages 10–17, 2005.
- [68] D. F. Manlove and G. O'Malley. Modelling and solving the stable marriage problem using constraint programming. Technical Report TR-2005-192, the Computing Science Department of Glasgow University, 2005.
- [69] D. F. Manlove, G. O'Malley, P. Prosser, and C. Unsworth. A constraint programming approach to the hospitals / residents problem. In *Workshop on Modelling and Reformulating Constraint Satisfaction Problems at CP'05*, pages 28–43, 2005.
- [70] D. F. Manlove, G. O'Malley, P. Prosser, and C. Unsworth. A constraint programming approach to the hospitals / residents problem. In *Integration of AI and OR Techniques in Constraint Programming for Combinatorial Optimization Problems (CP-AI-OR'07)*, pages 155–170, 2007.
- [71] K. Mehlhorn and S. Thiel. Faster algorithms for bound-consistency of the sortedness and the alldifferent constraint. In *Proceedings the 6th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'00)*, pages 306–319, 2000.
- [72] R. Mohr and T. C. Henderson. Arc and path-consistency revisited. *Artificial Intelligence*, 28:225–233, 1986.
- [73] National resident matching program. Web document available at [http://www.nrmp.org/about\\_nrmp/how.html](http://www.nrmp.org/about_nrmp/how.html).
- [74] C. Ng and D. S. Hirschberg. Lower bounds for the stable marriage problem and its variants. *SIAM J. Comput.*, 19(1):71–77, 1990.
- [75] C. Ng and D. S. Hirschberg. Three-dimensional stable matching problems. *SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics*, 4(2):245–252, 1991.
- [76] G. Pesant and M. Gendreau. A view of local search in constraint programming. In *Proceedings the 2nd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'96)*, pages 353–366, 1996.
- [77] P. Prosser. Hybrid algorithms for the constraint satisfaction problem. *Computational Intelligence*, 9:268–299, 1993.

- [78] J.-F. Puget and M. Leconte. Beyond the glass box: Constraints as objects. In *International Logic Programming Symposium*, pages 513–527, 1995.
- [79] J.-C. Régin. A filtering algorithm for constraints of difference in csps. In *Proceedings of the American Association of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI'94)*, pages 362–367, 1994.
- [80] J.-C. Régin. Ac-\*: A configurable, generic and adaptive arc-consistency algorithm. In *Proceedings the 11th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'05)*, pages 505–519, 2005.
- [81] E. Ronn. NP-complete stable matching problems. *Journal of Algorithms*, 11:285–304, 1990.
- [82] M.-C. Silaghi, A. Abhyankar, M. Zanker, and R. Bartak. Desk-mates (stable matching) with privacy of preferences, and a new distributed csp framework. In *Eighteenth International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference (FLAIRS'05)*., pages 671–677, 2005.
- [83] M.-C. Silaghi, M. Zanker, and R. Bartak. Desk-mates (stable matching) with privacy of preferences, and a new distributed csp framework. In *Immediate Applications of Constraint Programming Workshop*, 2004.
- [84] B. M. Smith. Succeed-first or fail-first: A case study in variable and value ordering heuristics. In *Proceedings of the third Conference on the Practical Applications of Constraint ( PACT'97)*, pages 321–330, 1997.
- [85] B. M. Smith and S. A. Grant. Trying harder to fail first. In *Proceedings of the 13th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI'98)*, pages 249–253, 1998.
- [86] B. M. Smith and P. Sturdy. An empirical investigation of value ordering for finding all solutions. In *Proceedings of the Workshop on Modelling and Solving Problems with Constraints (ECAI 2004)*, 2004.
- [87] B. M. Smith and P. Sturdy. Value ordering for finding all solutions. In *Proceedings of the 19th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'05)*, pages 311–316, 2005.
- [88] R. M. Stallman and G. J. Sussman. Forward reasoning and dependency directed backtracking in a system for computer-aided circuit analysis. *Artificial Intelligence*, 9:135–196, 1977.

- [89] K. Telikepalli, M. Kurt, M. Dimitrios, and P. Katarzyna. Strongly stable matchings in time  $o(mn)$  and extension to the hospitals-residents problem. In *Proceedings of the 21st Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science*, pages 222–233, 2004.
- [90] E. Tsang. *Foundations of Constraint Satisfaction*. Academic Press, 1993.
- [91] E. Tsang. A glimpse of constraint satisfaction. *Artificial Intelligence Review*, 13:215–227, 1999.
- [92] C. Unsworth. A specialised binary constraint for the stable marriage problem with ties and incomplete preference lists. In *Doctoral program at the 12th International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming (CP'06)*, 2006.
- [93] C. Unsworth and P. Prosser. An n-ary constraint for the stable marriage problem. In *The Fifth Workshop on Modelling and Solving Problems with Constraints*, pages 32–38, 2005.
- [94] C. Unsworth and P. Prosser. A specialised binary constraint for the stable marriage problem. In *Proceedings of Symposium on Abstraction Reformulation and Approximation (SARA '05)*, pages 218–233, 2005.
- [95] P. Van Hentenryck. A logic language for combinatorial optimization. *Annals of Operations Research: Special Issue on Links with Artificial Intelligence*, pages 247–273, 1989.
- [96] P. van Hentenryck, Y. Deville, and C.-M. Teng. A generic arc-consistency algorithm and its specializations. *Artificial Intelligence*, 57:291–321, 1992.
- [97] T. Walsh. Depth-bounded discrepancy search. In *Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'97)*, pages 1388–1395, 1997.
- [98] Z. Yuanlin and R. H. C. Yap. Making AC-3 an optimal algorithm. In *Proceedings of the 17th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'01)*, pages 316–321, 2001.