Mechanism Choice

This chapter reviews the literature on the selection of regulatory policy instruments, from both normative and positive perspectives. It first reviews the mechanism design literature to identify normative objectives in selecting among the menu or toolbox of policy instruments. The chapter then discusses the public choice and positive political theory literatures and the variety of models developed to attempt to predict the actual selection of alternative policy instruments. It begins with simpler early models focusing on interest group politics and proceeds to more complicated models that incorporate both supply and demand for policy, the role of policy entrepreneurs, behavioral and cognitive choice, and public perceptions and mass politics. It compares these theories to empirical experience. The chapter examines literature in law, economics, political science, and related fields, and it draws examples from US, European, and international regulation. It concludes with suggestions for future research. Document is the author\u27s manuscrip

Outside the Cap: Opportunities and Limitations of Greenhouse Gas Offsets

Explains the role of carbon offsets in providing flexibility and containing costs in a cap-and-trade program to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Recommends rigorous quantification, verification, and enforcement criteria to ensure the caps' integrity

Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto

In their comprehensive analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and climate policy, Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener examine the current impasse in climate policy and the potential steps nations can take to reduce greenhouse gases. They summarize the current state of information regarding the extent of global warming that would be caused by increasing uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. They explain why participation by all major greenhouse gas-emitting countries is essential to curb future greenhouse gas emissions and also note the significant obstacles to obtaining such participation. Stewart and Wiener argue it is in the national interest of the United States to participate in such a regime, provided that it is well designed. They discuss the elements of sound climate regulatory design, including maximum use of economic incentives, the comprehensive approach, and other flexibility mechanisms; participation by all major emitting countries, including developing countries; regulatory targets based on longer-term emissions pathways set to maximize net social benefits; and effective arrangements to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations by nations and sources. After evaluating the successes and failures of the Kyoto Protocol in light of those elements, the authors propose a series of U.S. initiatives at the international and domestic levels, with the aim of engaging the United States and major developing country emitters such as China in the global greenhouse gas regulatory effort and correcting the remaining defects in the design of the Kyoto Protocol. Although several alternatives to the current Kyoto Protocol regime have been proposed, Stewart and Wiener argue that the best approach for surmounting the current global climate policy impasse is a new strategy that would lead, sooner or later, to simultaneous accession by the United States and China (and other major developing country emitters) to a modified and improved version of the Kyoto Protocol agreement

A heuristic approach for the allocation of resources in large-scale computing infrastructures

An increasing number of enterprise applications are intensive in their consumption of IT, but are infrequently used. Consequently, organizations either host an oversized IT infrastructure or they are incapable of realizing the benefits of new applications. A solution to the challenge is provided by the large-scale computing infrastructures of Clouds and Grids which allow resources to be shared. A major challenge is the development of mechanisms that allow efficient sharing of IT resources. Market mechanisms are promising, but there is a lack of research in scalable market mechanisms. We extend the Multi-Attribute Combinatorial Exchange mechanism with greedy heuristics to address the scalability challenge. The evaluation shows a trade-off between efficiency and scalability. There is no statistical evidence for an influence on the incentive properties of the market mechanism. This is an encouraging result as theory predicts heuristics to ruin the mechanism’s incentive properties. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd

Reconstructing Climate Policy: Beyond Kyoto

In their comprehensive analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and climate policy, Richard B. Stewart and Jonathan B. Wiener examine the current impasse in climate policy and the potential steps nations can take to reduce greenhouse gases. They summarize the current state of information regarding the extent of global warming that would be caused by increasing uncontrolled greenhouse gas emissions. They explain why participation by all major greenhouse gas-emitting countries is essential to curb future greenhouse gas emissions and also note the significant obstacles to obtaining such participation. Stewart and Wiener argue it is in the national interest of the United States to participate in such a regime, provided that it is well designed. They discuss the elements of sound climate regulatory design, including maximum use of economic incentives, the comprehensive approach, and other flexibility mechanisms; participation by all major emitting countries, including developing countries; regulatory targets based on longer-term emissions pathways set to maximize net social benefits; and effective arrangements to ensure compliance with regulatory obligations by nations and sources. After evaluating the successes and failures of the Kyoto Protocol in light of those elements, the authors propose a series of U.S. initiatives at the international and domestic levels, with the aim of engaging the United States and major developing country emitters such as China in the global greenhouse gas regulatory effort and correcting the remaining defects in the design of the Kyoto Protocol. Although several alternatives to the current Kyoto Protocol regime have been proposed, Stewart and Wiener argue that the best approach for surmounting the current global climate policy impasse is a new strategy that would lead, sooner or later, to simultaneous accession by the United States and China (and other major developing country emitters) to a modified and improved version of the Kyoto Protocol agreement

Incentive-Based Instruments for Water Management

This report provides a synthesis review of a set of incentive-based instruments that have been employed to varying degrees around the world. It is part of an effort by The Rockefeller Foundation to improve understanding of both the potential of these instruments and their limitations. The report is divided into five sections. Section 1 provides an introduction to the synthesis review. Section 2 describes the research methodology. Section 3 provides background on policy instruments and detail on three incentive-based instruments -- water trading, payment for ecosystem services, and water quality trading -- describing the application of each, including their environmental, economic, and social performances, and the conditions needed for their implementation. Section 4 highlights the role of the private sector in implementing these instruments, and Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions

Environmental analysis for application layer networks

Die zunehmende Vernetzung von Rechnern über das Internet lies die Vision von Application Layer Netzwerken aufkommen. Sie umfassen Overlay Netzwerke wie beispielsweise Peer-to-Peer Netzwerke und Grid Infrastrukturen unter Verwendung des TCP/IP Protokolls. Ihre gemeinsame Eigenschaft ist die redundante, verteilte Bereitstellung und der Zugang zu Daten-, Rechen- und Anwendungsdiensten, während sie die Heterogenität der Infrastruktur vor dem Nutzer verbergen. In dieser Arbeit werden die Anforderungen, die diese Netzwerke an ökonomische Allokationsmechanismen stellen, untersucht. Die Analyse erfolgt anhand eines Marktanalyseprozesses für einen zentralen Auktionsmechanismus und einen katallaktischen Markt. --Grid Computing

Mechanism Choice

Mechanism choice can generally be described as the selection of some way to structure rules for social behavior. Nobel Laureate Eric Maskin recently described a mechanism as “an institution, procedure, or game for determining outcomes” (Maskin 2008: 568). In the realm of public law, mechanism choice is synonymous with “instrument choice” or policy design. The selection of the policy instrument can be as important to success or failure as the intended policy outcome. Good intentions or objectives are not enough: the choice of tools matters. A large and growing literature in instrument choice and mechanism design examines both the normative criteria for correcting market failures, matching optimal instruments to different types of problems, minimizing costs, and overcoming incomplete information; and also the positive political factors that may influence the actual selection of instruments, and the pattern of such choices across issue areas, governance systems, and time. Public policy instruments are selected and designed by public bodies –legislatures, executive agencies, and courts – that are comprised of individuals with their own policy preferences, and that are subject to pressures from private interests through lobbying, campaign contributions, and elections. Thus, it is no surprise to the student of public law that the mechanisms actually selected to implement public policy are not necessarily the ones that best pursue the public interest. This chapter begins with a brief summary of normative mechanism choice, including the legal literature on instrument choice and the economics literature on mechanism design. It then moves to a more detailed discussion of positive mechanism choice, also called public choice, political economy, or positive politics. This positive literature explores how political institutions and pressures shape the selection of mechanisms to implement policy, notably when the selected instrument departs from the normative ideal. The positive study of mechanism choice not only informs how political processes shape policy outcomes, but also sheds useful insights into those processes themselves.