2,198 research outputs found
Chain: A Dynamic Double Auction Framework for Matching Patient Agents
In this paper we present and evaluate a general framework for the design of
truthful auctions for matching agents in a dynamic, two-sided market. A single
commodity, such as a resource or a task, is bought and sold by multiple buyers
and sellers that arrive and depart over time. Our algorithm, Chain, provides
the first framework that allows a truthful dynamic double auction (DA) to be
constructed from a truthful, single-period (i.e. static) double-auction rule.
The pricing and matching method of the Chain construction is unique amongst
dynamic-auction rules that adopt the same building block. We examine
experimentally the allocative efficiency of Chain when instantiated on various
single-period rules, including the canonical McAfee double-auction rule. For a
baseline we also consider non-truthful double auctions populated with
zero-intelligence plus"-style learning agents. Chain-based auctions perform
well in comparison with other schemes, especially as arrival intensity falls
and agent valuations become more volatile
Data security and trading framework for smart grids in neighborhood area networks
Due to the drastic increase of electricity prosumers, i.e., energy consumers that are also producers, smart grids have become a key solution for electricity infrastructure. In smart grids, one of the most crucial requirements is the privacy of the final users. The vast majority of the literature addresses the privacy issue by providing ways of hiding user’s electricity consumption. However, open issues in the literature related to the privacy of the electricity producers still remain. In this paper, we propose a framework that preserves the secrecy of prosumers’ identities and provides protection against the traffic analysis attack in a competitive market for energy trade in a Neighborhood Area Network (NAN). In addition, the amount of bidders and of successful bids are hidden from malicious attackers by our framework. Due to the need for small data throughput for the bidders, the communication links of our framework are based on a proprietary communication system. Still, in terms of data security, we adopt the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 128bit with Exclusive-OR (XOR) keys due to their reduced computational complexity, allowing fast processing. Our framework outperforms the state-of-the-art solutions in terms of privacy protection and trading flexibility in a prosumer-to-prosumer design
Parallel Continuous Double Auction for Service Allocation in Cloud Computing
Cloud Computing is a service oriented architecture in which every computing resources is delivered to users as a service. Nowadays market-oriented approach has attracted a lot of researchers because of its great ability to manage Cloud services efficiently and dynamically. Each service consists of various resources which all should be allocated to utilize the service. In this paper a parallel continuous double auction method for efficient service allocation in cloud computing is presented in which by using a novel parallel sorting algorithm at auctioneer, enables consumers to order various resources as workflow for utilizing requested services efficiently. Also in the presented method consumers and providers make bid and offer prices based on time factor. Experimental results show that proposed method is efficient in success rate, resource utilization and average connection time and also overall performance of system is improved by parallel approach
Dual Auction Mechanism for Transaction Forwarding and Validation in Complex Wireless Blockchain Network
In traditional blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to
full nodes (i.e., miners) regardless of the contribution of forwarding
behaviors of light nodes. However, the lack of forwarding incentive reduces the
willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the
energy-constrained Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET). This paper proposes a novel
dual auction mechanism to allocate transaction fees for forwarding and
validation behaviors in the wireless blockchain network. The dual auction
mechanism consists of two auction models: the forwarding auction and the
validation auction. In the forwarding auction, forwarding nodes use Generalized
First Price (GFP) auction to choose transactions to forward. Besides,
forwarding nodes adjust the forwarding probability through a no-regret
algorithm to improve efficiency. In the validation auction, full nodes select
transactions using Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism to construct the block.
We prove that the designed dual auction mechanism is Incentive Compatibility
(IC), Individual Rationality (IR), and Computational Efficiency (CE).
Especially, we derive the upper bound of the social welfare difference between
the social optimal auction and our proposed one. Extensive simulation results
demonstrate that the proposed dual auction mechanism decreases energy and
spectrum resource consumption and effectively improves social welfare without
sacrificing the throughput and the security of the wireless blockchain network
Trusted UAV Network Coverage using Blockchain, Machine Learning and Auction Mechanisms
The UAV is emerging as one of the greatest technology developments for rapid network
coverage provisioning at affordable cost. The aim of this paper is to outsource network coverage of a specific
area according to a desired quality of service requirement and to enable various entities in the network to
have intelligence to make autonomous decisions using blockchain and auction mechanisms. In this regard,
by considering a multiple-UAV network where each UAV is associated to its own controlling operator,
this paper addresses two major challenges: the selection of the UAV for the desired quality of network
coverage and the development of a distributed and autonomous real-time monitoring framework for the
enforcement of service level agreement (SLA). For a suitable UAV selection, we employ a reputation-based
auction mechanism to model the interaction between the business agent who is interested in outsourcing
the network coverage and the UAV operators serving in closeby areas. In addition, theoretical analysis
is performed to show that the proposed auction mechanism attains a dominant strategy equilibrium. For
the SLA enforcement and trust model, we propose a permissioned blockchain architecture considering
Support Vector Machine (SVM) for real-time autonomous and distributed monitoring of UAV service. In
particular, smart contract features of the blockchain are invoked for enforcing the SLA terms of payment
and penalty, and for quantifying the UAV service reputation. Simulation results confirm the accuracy of
theoretical analysis and efficacy of the proposed model
Complexity Theory, Game Theory, and Economics: The Barbados Lectures
This document collects the lecture notes from my mini-course "Complexity
Theory, Game Theory, and Economics," taught at the Bellairs Research Institute
of McGill University, Holetown, Barbados, February 19--23, 2017, as the 29th
McGill Invitational Workshop on Computational Complexity.
The goal of this mini-course is twofold: (i) to explain how complexity theory
has helped illuminate several barriers in economics and game theory; and (ii)
to illustrate how game-theoretic questions have led to new and interesting
complexity theory, including recent several breakthroughs. It consists of two
five-lecture sequences: the Solar Lectures, focusing on the communication and
computational complexity of computing equilibria; and the Lunar Lectures,
focusing on applications of complexity theory in game theory and economics. No
background in game theory is assumed.Comment: Revised v2 from December 2019 corrects some errors in and adds some
recent citations to v1 Revised v3 corrects a few typos in v
Combinatorial auctions for electronic business
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have recently generated significant interest as an automated mechanism for buying and selling bundles of goods. They are proving to be extremely useful in numerous e-business applications such as e-selling, e-procurement, e-logistics, and B2B exchanges. In this article, we introduce combinatorial auctions and bring out important issues in the design of combinatorial auctions. We also highlight important contributions in current research in this area. This survey emphasizes combinatorial auctions as applied to electronic business situations
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