Auction-based Bandwidth Allocation Mechanisms for Wireless Future Internet

An important aspect of the Future Internet is the efficient utilization of (wireless) network resources. In order for the - demanding in terms of QoS - Future Internet services to be provided, the current trend is evolving towards an "integrated" wireless network access model that enables users to enjoy mobility, seamless access and high quality of service in an all-IP network on an "Anytime, Anywhere" basis. The term "integrated" is used to denote that the Future Internet wireless "last mile" is expected to comprise multiple heterogeneous geographically coexisting wireless networks, each having different capacity and coverage radius. The efficient management of the wireless access network resources is crucial due to their scarcity that renders wireless access a potential bottleneck for the provision of high quality services. In this paper we propose an auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of such a network so that efficiency is attained, i.e. social welfare is maximized. In particular, we propose an incentive-compatible, efficient auction-based mechanism of low computational complexity. We define a repeated game to address user utilities and incentives issues. Subsequently, we extend this mechanism so that it can also accommodate multicast sessions. We also analyze the computational complexity and message overhead of the proposed mechanism. We then show how user bids can be replaced from weights generated by the network and transform the auction to a cooperative mechanism capable of prioritizing certain classes of services and emulating DiffServ and time-of-day pricing schemes. The theoretical analysis is complemented by simulations that assess the proposed mechanisms properties and performance. We finally provide some concluding remarks and directions for future research

Wireless Regulations and Dynamic Spectrum Access in Australia

Australia assigns and allocates spectrum using three broad types of regulatory approaches; command and control, property rights and open access. Each approach entails numerous pros and cons, buttressed by uncertainties over future consumer demand, interference management, barriers to entry, and technological evolution. The development and commercialisation of dynamic spectrum access technologies (DSA) requires new regulatory approaches. This article discusses an array of intermediary, dynamically efficient spectrum management approaches, which may make better use of DSA opportunities. The article then discusses the practical hurdles and legal challenges posed by their adoption and regulation in an Australian context

An Equilibrium Analysis of the Simultaneous Ascending Auction

We analyze the dynamic simultaneous ascending auction (SAA), which was pioneered by the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in 1994 and has since become the standard to conduct large-scale, large-stakes spectrum auctions around the world. We consider an environment where local bidders, each interested in a single item, compete against one or more global bidders with super-additive values for combinations of items. In the SAA, competition takes place on an item-by-item basis, which creates an exposure problem for global bidders - when competing aggressively for a package, a global bidder may incur a loss when winning only a subset. We characterize the Bayes-Nash equilibria of the SAA, evaluate the impact of the exposure problem on revenue and efficiency, and compare its performance to that of the benchmark Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. We show that individual and social incentives are aligned in the SAA in the sense that bidders' drop-out levels maximize expected welfare. Unlike the VCG mechanism, however, the SAA is not fully efficient because when a bidder drops out, information about others' values has been only partially revealed. Like the VCG mechanism, the SAA exhibits perverse revenue properties: due to the exposure problem, the SAA may result in non-core outcomes where local bidders obtain items at very low prices, and seller revenue can be decreasing in the number of bidders. Moreover, the SAA may result in lower revenues than the VCG mechanism. Finally, when the number of items grows large, the SAA and VCG mechanisms become (efficiency and revenue) equivalent

An Economic Analysis of Domain Name Policy

One of the most important features of the architecture of the Internet is the Domain Name System (DNS), which is administered by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Logically, the DNS is organized into Top Level Domains (such as .com), Second Level Domains (such as amazon.com), and third, fourth, and higher level domains (such as www.amazon.com). The physically infrastructure of the DNS consists of name servers, including the Root Server System which provides the information that directs name queries for each Top Level Domain to the appropriate server. ICANN is responsible for the allocation of the root and the creation or reallocation of Top Level Domains. The Root Server System and associated name space are scarce resources in the economic sense. The root servers have a finite capacity and expansion of the system is costly. The name space is scarce, because each string (or set of characters) can only be allocated to one Registry (or operator of a Top Level Domain). In addition, name service is not a public good in the economic sense, because it is possible to exclude strings from the DNS and because the allocation of a string to one firm results in the inability of other firms to use that name string. From the economic perspective, therefore, the question arises: what is the most efficient method for allocating the root resource? There are only five basic options available for allocation of the root. (1) a static root, equivalent to a decision to waste the currently unallocated capacity; (2) public interest hearings (or beauty contests); (3) lotteries; (4) a queuing mechanism; or (5) an auction. The fundamental economic question about the Domain Name System is which of these provides the most efficient mechanism for allocating the root resource? This resource allocation problem is analogous to problems raised in the telecommunications sector, where the Federal Communications Commission has a long history of attempting to allocate broadcast spectrum and the telephone number space. This experience reveals that a case-by-case allocation on the basis of ad hoc judgments about the public interest is doomed to failure, and that auctions (as opposed to lotteries or queues) provide the best mechanism for insuring that such public-trust resources find their highest and best use. Based on the telecommunications experience, the best method for ICANN to allocate new Top Level Domains would be to conduct an auction. Many auction designs are possible. One proposal is to auction a fixed number of new Top Level Domain slots each year. This proposal would both expand the root resource at a reasonable pace and insure that the slots went to their highest and best use. Public interest Top Level Domains could be allocated by another mechanism such as a lottery and their costs to ICANN could be subsidized by the proceeds of the auction

Coordination in Service Value Networks - A Mechanism Design Approach

The fundamental paradigm shift from traditional value chains to agile service value networks (SVN) implies new economic and organizational challenges. This work provides an auction-based coordination mechanism that enables the allocation and pricing of service compositions in SVNs. The mechanism is multidimensional incentive compatible and implements an ex-post service level enforcement. Further extensions of the mechanism are evaluated following analytical and numerical research methods

A feature-based comparison of the centralised versus market-based decision making under lens of environment uncertainty: Case of the mobile task allocation problem

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.Decision making problems are amongst the most common challenges facing managers at different management levels in the organisation: strategic, tactical, and operational. However, prior reaching decisions at the operational level of the management hierarchy, operations management departments frequently have to deal with the optimisation process to evaluate the available decision alternatives. Industries with complex supply chain structures and service organisations that have to optimise the utilisation of their resources are examples. Conventionally, operational decisions used to be taken centrally by a decision making authority located at the top of a hierarchically-structured organisation. In order to take decisions, information related to the managed system and the affecting externalities (e.g. demand) should be globally available to the decision maker. The obtained information is then processed to reach the optimal decision. This approach usually makes extensive use of information systems (IS) containing myriad of optimisation algorithms and meta-heuristics to process the high amount and complex nature of data. The decisions reached are then broadcasted to the passive actuators of the system to put them in execution. On the other hand, recent advancements in information and communication technologies (ICT) made it possible to distribute the decision making rights and proved its applicability in several sectors. The market-based approach is as such a distributed decision making mechanism where passive actuators are delegated the rights of taking individual decisions matching their self-interests. The communication among the market agents is done through market transactions regulated by auctions. The system’s global optimisation, therefore, raise from the aggregated self-oriented market agents. As opposed to the centralised approach, the main characteristics of the market-based approach are the market mechanism and local knowledge of the agents. The existence of both approaches attracted several studies to compare them in different contexts. Recently, some comparisons compared the centralised versus market-based approaches in the context of transportation applications from an algorithm perspective. Transportation applications and routing problems are assumed to be good candidates for this comparison given the distributed nature of the system and due to the presence of several sources of uncertainty. Uncertainty exceptions make decisions highly vulnerable and necessitating frequent corrective interventions to keep an efficient level of service. Motivated by the previous comparison studies, this research aims at further investigating the features of both approaches and to contrast them in the context of a distributed task allocation problem in light of environmental uncertainty. Similar applications are often faced by service industries with mobile workforce. Contrary to the previous comparison studies that sought to compare those approaches at the mechanism level, this research attempts to identify the effect of the most significant characteristics of each approach to face environmental uncertainty, which is reflected in this research by the arrival of dynamic tasks and the occurrence of stochasticity delays. To achieve the aim of this research, a target optimisation problem from the VRP family is proposed and solved with both approaches. Given that this research does not target proposing new algorithms, two basic solution mechanisms are adopted to compare the centralised and the market-based approach. The produced solutions are executed on a dedicated multi-agent simulation system. During execution dynamism and stochasticity are introduced. The research findings suggest that a market-based approach is attractive to implement in highly uncertain environments when the degree of local knowledge and workers’ experience is high and when the system tends to be complex with large dimensions. It is also suggested that a centralised approach fits more in situations where uncertainty is lower and the decision maker is able to make timely decision updates, which is in turn regulated by the size of the system at hand

Scalable Internet auctions

Current Internet based auction services rely, in general, on a centralised auction server; applications with large and geographically dispersed bidder client bases are thus supported in a centralised manner. Such an approach is fundamentally restrictive as too many users can overload the server, making the whole auction process unresponsive. Further, such an architecture can be vulnerable to server's failures, if not equipped with sufficient redundancy. In addition, bidders who are closer to the server are likely to have relatively faster access to the server than remote bidders, thereby gaining an unfair advantage. To overcome these shortcomings, this thesis investigates ways of enabling widely distributed, arbitrarily large number of auction servers to cooperate in conducting an auction. Allowing a bidder to register with anyone of the auction servers and place bids there, coupled with periodic exchange of auction information between servers forms the basis of the solution investigated to achieve scalability, responsiveness and fairness. Scalability and responsiveness are achieved since the total load is shared amongst many bidder servers; fairness is achieved since bidders are able to register with their local servers. The thesis presents the design and implementation of an hierarchically structured distributed Internet auction system. Protocols for inter-server cooperation are presented. Each server may be replicated locally to mask node failures. Performance evaluations of centralised and distributed configurations are performed to show the advantages of the distributed configuration over the centralised one.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceIranian Ministry of Science, Research and Technology : Isfahan UniversityGBUnited Kingdo