Defeating jamming with the power of silence: a game-theoretic analysis

The timing channel is a logical communication channel in which information is encoded in the timing between events. Recently, the use of the timing channel has been proposed as a countermeasure to reactive jamming attacks performed by an energy-constrained malicious node. In fact, whilst a jammer is able to disrupt the information contained in the attacked packets, timing information cannot be jammed and, therefore, timing channels can be exploited to deliver information to the receiver even on a jammed channel. Since the nodes under attack and the jammer have conflicting interests, their interactions can be modeled by means of game theory. Accordingly, in this paper a game-theoretic model of the interactions between nodes exploiting the timing channel to achieve resilience to jamming attacks and a jammer is derived and analyzed. More specifically, the Nash equilibrium is studied in the terms of existence, uniqueness, and convergence under best response dynamics. Furthermore, the case in which the communication nodes set their strategy and the jammer reacts accordingly is modeled and analyzed as a Stackelberg game, by considering both perfect and imperfect knowledge of the jammer's utility function. Extensive numerical results are presented, showing the impact of network parameters on the system performance.Comment: Anti-jamming, Timing Channel, Game-Theoretic Models, Nash Equilibriu

Game-Theoretic Frameworks and Strategies for Defense Against Network Jamming and Collocation Attacks

Modern networks are becoming increasingly more complex, heterogeneous, and densely connected. While more diverse services are enabled to an ever-increasing number of users through ubiquitous networking and pervasive computing, several important challenges have emerged. For example, densely connected networks are prone to higher levels of interference, which makes them more vulnerable to jamming attacks. Also, the utilization of software-based protocols to perform routing, load balancing and power management functions in Software-Defined Networks gives rise to more vulnerabilities that could be exploited by malicious users and adversaries. Moreover, the increased reliance on cloud computing services due to a growing demand for communication and computation resources poses formidable security challenges due to the shared nature and virtualization of cloud computing. In this thesis, we study two types of attacks: jamming attacks on wireless networks and side-channel attacks on cloud computing servers. The former attacks disrupt the natural network operation by exploiting the static topology and dynamic channel assignment in wireless networks, while the latter attacks seek to gain access to unauthorized data by co-residing with target virtual machines (VMs) on the same physical node in a cloud server. In both attacks, the adversary faces a static attack surface and achieves her illegitimate goal by exploiting a stationary aspect of the network functionality. Hence, this dissertation proposes and develops counter approaches to both attacks using moving target defense strategies. We study the strategic interactions between the adversary and the network administrator within a game-theoretic framework. First, in the context of jamming attacks, we present and analyze a game-theoretic formulation between the adversary and the network defender. In this problem, the attack surface is the network connectivity (the static topology) as the adversary jams a subset of nodes to increase the level of interference in the network. On the other side, the defender makes judicious adjustments of the transmission footprint of the various nodes, thereby continuously adapting the underlying network topology to reduce the impact of the attack. The defender\u27s strategy is based on playing Nash equilibrium strategies securing a worst-case network utility. Moreover, scalable decomposition-based approaches are developed yielding a scalable defense strategy whose performance closely approaches that of the non-decomposed game for large-scale and dense networks. We study a class of games considering discrete as well as continuous power levels. In the second problem, we consider multi-tenant clouds, where a number of VMs are typically collocated on the same physical machine to optimize performance and power consumption and maximize profit. This increases the risk of a malicious virtual machine performing side-channel attacks and leaking sensitive information from neighboring VMs. The attack surface, in this case, is the static residency of VMs on a set of physical nodes, hence we develop a timed migration defense approach. Specifically, we analyze a timing game in which the cloud provider decides when to migrate a VM to a different physical machine to mitigate the risk of being compromised by a collocated malicious VM. The adversary decides the rate at which she launches new VMs to collocate with the victim VMs. Our formulation captures a data leakage model in which the cost incurred by the cloud provider depends on the duration of collocation with malicious VMs. It also captures costs incurred by the adversary in launching new VMs and by the defender in migrating VMs. We establish sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria for general cost functions, as well as for specific instantiations, and characterize the best response for both players. Furthermore, we extend our model to characterize its impact on the attacker\u27s payoff when the cloud utilizes intrusion detection systems that detect side-channel attacks. Our theoretical findings are corroborated with extensive numerical results in various settings as well as a proof-of-concept implementation in a realistic cloud setting

Bibliographical review on cyber attacks from a control oriented perspective

This paper presents a bibliographical review of definitions, classifications and applications concerning cyber attacks in networked control systems (NCSs) and cyber-physical systems (CPSs). This review tackles the topic from a control-oriented perspective, which is complementary to information or communication ones. After motivating the importance of developing new methods for attack detection and secure control, this review presents security objectives, attack modeling, and a characterization of considered attacks and threats presenting the detection mechanisms and remedial actions. In order to show the properties of each attack, as well as to provide some deeper insight into possible defense mechanisms, examples available in the literature are discussed. Finally, open research issues and paths are presented.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A survey of timing channels and countermeasures

A timing channel is a communication channel that can transfer information to a receiver/decoder by modulating the timing behavior of an entity. Examples of this entity include the interpacket delays of a packet stream, the reordering packets in a packet stream, or the resource access time of a cryptographic module. Advances in the information and coding theory and the availability of high-performance computing systems interconnected by high-speed networks have spurred interest in and development of various types of timing channels. With the emergence of complex timing channels, novel detection and prevention techniques are also being developed to counter them. In this article, we provide a detailed survey of timing channels broadly categorized into network timing channel, in which communicating entities are connected by a network, and in-system timing channel, in which the communicating entities are within a computing system. This survey builds on the last comprehensive survey by Zander et al. [2007] and considers all three canonical applications of timing channels, namely, covert communication, timing side channel, and network flow watermarking. We survey the theoretical foundations, the implementation, and the various detection and prevention techniques that have been reported in literature. Based on the analysis of the current literature, we discuss potential future research directions both in the design and application of timing channels and their detection and prevention techniques

802.11 Fingerprinting to Detect Wireless Stealth Attacks

We propose a simple, passive and deployable approach for fingerprinting traffic on the wired side as a solution for three critical stealth attacks in wireless networks. We focus on extracting traces of the 802.11 medium access control (MAC) protocol from the temporal arrival patterns of incoming traffic streams as seen on the wired side, to identify attacker behavior. Attacks addressed include unauthorized access points, selfish behavior at the MAC layer and MAC layer covert timing channels. We employ the Bayesian binning technique as a means of classifying between delay distributions. The scheme requires no change to the 802.11 nodes or protocol, exhibits minimal computational overhead and offers a single point of discovery. We evaluate our model using experiments and simulations

Security, trust and cooperation in wireless sensor networks

Wireless sensor networks are a promising technology for many real-world applications such as critical infrastructure monitoring, scientific data gathering, smart buildings, etc.. However, given the typically unattended and potentially unsecured operation environment, there has been an increased number of security threats to sensor networks. In addition, sensor networks have very constrained resources, such as limited energy, memory, computational power, and communication bandwidth. These unique challenges call for new security mechanisms and algorithms. In this dissertation, we propose novel algorithms and models to address some important and challenging security problems in wireless sensor networks. The first part of the dissertation focuses on data trust in sensor networks. Since sensor networks are mainly deployed to monitor events and report data, the quality of received data must be ensured in order to make meaningful inferences from sensor data. We first study a false data injection attack in the distributed state estimation problem and propose a distributed Bayesian detection algorithm, which could maintain correct estimation results when less than one half of the sensors are compromised. To deal with the situation where more than one half of the sensors may be compromised, we introduce a special class of sensor nodes called \textit{trusted cores}. We then design a secure distributed trust aggregation algorithm that can utilize the trusted cores to improve network robustness. We show that as long as there exist some paths that can connect each regular node to one of these trusted cores, the network can not be subverted by attackers. The second part of the dissertation focuses on sensor network monitoring and anomaly detection. A sensor network may suffer from system failures due to loss of links and nodes, or malicious intrusions. Therefore, it is critical to continuously monitor the overall state of the network and locate performance anomalies. The network monitoring and probe selection problem is formulated as a budgeted coverage problem and a Markov decision process. Efficient probing strategies are designed to achieve a flexible tradeoff between inference accuracy and probing overhead. Based on the probing results on traffic measurements, anomaly detection can be conducted. To capture the highly dynamic network traffic, we develop a detection scheme based on multi-scale analysis of the traffic using wavelet transforms and hidden Markov models. The performance of the probing strategy and of the detection scheme are extensively evaluated in malicious scenarios using the NS-2 network simulator. Lastly, to better understand the role of trust in sensor networks, a game theoretic model is formulated to mathematically analyze the relation between trust and cooperation. Given the trust relations, the interactions among nodes are modeled as a network game on a trust-weighted graph. We then propose an efficient heuristic method that explores network heterogeneity to improve Nash equilibrium efficiency

Behavioral Mimicry Covert Communication

Covert communication refers to the process of communicating data through a channel that is neither designed, nor intended to transfer information. Traditionally, covert channels are considered as security threats in computer systems and a great deal of attention has been given to countermeasures for covert communication schemes. The evolution of computer networks led the communication community to revisit the concept of covert communication not only as a security threat but also as an alternative way of providing security and privacy to communication networks. In fact, the heterogeneous structure of computer networks and the diversity of communication protocols provide an appealing setting for covert channels. This dissertation is an exploration on a novel design methodology for undetectable and robust covert channels in communication networks. Our new design methodology is based on the concept of behavioral mimicry in computer systems. The objective is to design a covert transmitter that has enough degrees of freedom to behave like an ordinary transmitter and react normally to unpredictable network events, yet it has the ability to modulate a covert message over its behavioral fingerprints in the network. To this end, we argue that the inherent randomness in communication protocols and network environments is the key in finding the proper medium for network covert channels. We present a few examples on how random behaviors in communication protocols lead to discovery of suitable shared resources for covert channels. The proposed design methodology is tested on two new covert communication schemes, one is designed for wireless networks and the other one is optimized for public communication networks (e.g., Internet). Each design is accompanied by a comprehensive analysis from undetectability, achievable covert rate and reliability perspectives. In particular, we introduced turbo covert channels, a family of extremely robust model-based timing covert channels that achieve provable polynomial undetectability in public communication networks. This means that the covert channel is undetectable against any polynomial-time statistical test that analyzes samples of the covert traffic and the legitimate traffic of the network. Target applications for the proposed covert communication schemes are discussed including detailed practical scenarios in which the proposed channels can be implemented

Air Force Institute of Technology Research Report 2016

This Research Report presents the FY16 research statistics and contributions of the Graduate School of Engineering and Management (EN) at AFIT. AFIT research interests and faculty expertise cover a broad spectrum of technical areas related to USAF needs, as reflected by the range of topics addressed in the faculty and student publications listed in this report. In most cases, the research work reported herein is directly sponsored by one or more USAF or DOD agencies. AFIT welcomes the opportunity to conduct research on additional topics of interest to the USAF, DOD, and other federal organizations when adequate manpower and financial resources are available and/or provided by a sponsor. In addition, AFIT provides research collaboration and technology transfer benefits to the public through Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs)

Modeling Deception for Cyber Security

In the era of software-intensive, smart and connected systems, the growing power and so- phistication of cyber attacks poses increasing challenges to software security. The reactive posture of traditional security mechanisms, such as anti-virus and intrusion detection systems, has not been sufficient to combat a wide range of advanced persistent threats that currently jeopardize systems operation. To mitigate these extant threats, more ac- tive defensive approaches are necessary. Such approaches rely on the concept of actively hindering and deceiving attackers. Deceptive techniques allow for additional defense by thwarting attackers’ advances through the manipulation of their perceptions. Manipu- lation is achieved through the use of deceitful responses, feints, misdirection, and other falsehoods in a system. Of course, such deception mechanisms may result in side-effects that must be handled. Current methods for planning deception chiefly portray attempts to bridge military deception to cyber deception, providing only high-level instructions that largely ignore deception as part of the software security development life cycle. Con- sequently, little practical guidance is provided on how to engineering deception-based techniques for defense. This PhD thesis contributes with a systematic approach to specify and design cyber deception requirements, tactics, and strategies. This deception approach consists of (i) a multi-paradigm modeling for representing deception requirements, tac- tics, and strategies, (ii) a reference architecture to support the integration of deception strategies into system operation, and (iii) a method to guide engineers in deception mod- eling. A tool prototype, a case study, and an experimental evaluation show encouraging results for the application of the approach in practice. Finally, a conceptual coverage map- ping was developed to assess the expressivity of the deception modeling language created.Na era digital o crescente poder e sofisticação dos ataques cibernéticos apresenta constan- tes desafios para a segurança do software. A postura reativa dos mecanismos tradicionais de segurança, como os sistemas antivírus e de detecção de intrusão, não têm sido suficien- tes para combater a ampla gama de ameaças que comprometem a operação dos sistemas de software actuais. Para mitigar estas ameaças são necessárias abordagens ativas de defesa. Tais abordagens baseiam-se na ideia de adicionar mecanismos para enganar os adversários (do inglês deception). As técnicas de enganação (em português, "ato ou efeito de enganar, de induzir em erro; artimanha usada para iludir") contribuem para a defesa frustrando o avanço dos atacantes por manipulação das suas perceções. A manipula- ção é conseguida através de respostas enganadoras, de "fintas", ou indicações erróneas e outras falsidades adicionadas intencionalmente num sistema. É claro que esses meca- nismos de enganação podem resultar em efeitos colaterais que devem ser tratados. Os métodos atuais usados para enganar um atacante inspiram-se fundamentalmente nas técnicas da área militar, fornecendo apenas instruções de alto nível que ignoram, em grande parte, a enganação como parte do ciclo de vida do desenvolvimento de software seguro. Consequentemente, há poucas referências práticas em como gerar técnicas de defesa baseadas em enganação. Esta tese de doutoramento contribui com uma aborda- gem sistemática para especificar e desenhar requisitos, táticas e estratégias de enganação cibernéticas. Esta abordagem é composta por (i) uma modelação multi-paradigma para re- presentar requisitos, táticas e estratégias de enganação, (ii) uma arquitetura de referência para apoiar a integração de estratégias de enganação na operação dum sistema, e (iii) um método para orientar os engenheiros na modelação de enganação. Uma ferramenta protó- tipo, um estudo de caso e uma avaliação experimental mostram resultados encorajadores para a aplicação da abordagem na prática. Finalmente, a expressividade da linguagem de modelação de enganação é avaliada por um mapeamento de cobertura de conceitos