Does Newtonian space provide identity to quantum systems?

Physics is not just mathematics. This seems trivial, but poses difficult and interesting questions. In this paper we analyse a particular discrepancy between non-relativistic quantum mechanics (QM) and `classical' (Newtonian) space and time (NST). We also suggest, but not discuss, the case of the relativistic QM. In this work, we are more concerned with the notion of space and its mathematical representation. The mathematics entails that any two spatially separated objects are necessarily \ita{different}, which implies that they are \ita{discernible} (in classical logic, identity is defined by means of indiscernibility) --- we say that the space is $T_2$, or "Hausdorff". But when enters QM, sometimes the systems need to be taken as \ita{completely indistinguishable}, so that there is no way to tell which system is which, and this holds even in the case of fermions. But in the NST setting, it seems that we can always give an \ita{identity} to them by means of their individuation, which seems to be contra the physical situation, where individuation (isolation) does not entail identity (as we argue in this paper). Here we discuss this topic by considering a case study (that of two potentially infinite wells) and conclude that, taking into account the quantum case, that is, when physics enter the discussion, even NST cannot be used to say that the systems do have identity. This case study seems to be relevant for a more detailed discussion on the interplay between physical theories (such as quantum theory) and their underlying mathematics (and logic), in a simple way apparently never realized before.Comment: Preprint, 21 pages, 1 figur

Linear superposition as a core theorem of quantum empiricism

Clarifying the nature of the quantum state $|\Psi\rangle$ is at the root of the problems with insight into (counterintuitive) quantum postulates. We provide a direct-and math-axiom free-empirical derivation of this object as an element of a vector space. Establishing the linearity of this structure-quantum superposition-is based on a set-theoretic creation of ensemble formations and invokes the following three principia: $(\textsf{I})$ quantum statics, $(\textsf{II})$ doctrine of a number in the physical theory, and $(\textsf{III})$ mathematization of matching the two observations with each other; quantum invariance. All of the constructs rest upon a formalization of the minimal experimental entity: observed micro-event, detector click. This is sufficient for producing the $\mathbb C$-numbers, axioms of linear vector space (superposition principle), statistical mixtures of states, eigenstates and their spectra, and non-commutativity of observables. No use is required of the concept of time. As a result, the foundations of theory are liberated to a significant extent from the issues associated with physical interpretations, philosophical exegeses, and mathematical reconstruction of the entire quantum edifice.Comment: No figures. 64 pages; 68 pages(+4), overall substantial improvements; 70 pages(+2), further improvement

Quantum Mechanics, Ontology, and Non-Reflexive Logics

This is a general philosophical paper where I overview some ideas concerning the non-reflexive foundations of quan- tum mechanics (NRFQM). By NRFQM I mean formalism and an interpretation of QM that considers an involved on- tology of non-individuals as explained in the text. Thus, I do not endorse a purely instrumentalist view of QM, but believe that it speaks of something, and then I try to show that one of the plausible views of this ‘something’ is as en- tities devoid of identity conditions

Quasi-set theory for a quantum ontology of properties

In previous works, an ontology of properties for quantum mechanics has been proposed, according to which quantum systems are bundles of properties with no principle of individuality. The aim of the present article is to show that, since quasi-set theory is particularly suited for treating aggregates of items that do not belong to the traditional category of individual, it supplies an adequate meta-language to speak of the proposed ontology of properties and its structure

On the Axiom of Canonicity

The axiom of canonicity was introduced by the famous Polish logician Roman Suszko in 1951 as an explication of Skolem's Paradox (without reference to the L\"{o}wenheim-Skolem theorem) and a precise representation of the axiom of restriction in set theory proposed much earlier by Abraham Fraenkel. We discuss the main features of Suszko's contribution and hint at its possible further applications