The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country

This Essay starts by laying out the shortcomings of the WTO. In Part II it lays out the issues at stake in the Seattle Conference. Part III is about the effects of the Seattle fiasco. Part IV gives the author\u27s views on what a development round should be. Part V asserts that the WTO should promote fair labor standards. Finally, Part VI discusses the prospects for the WTO to address concerns of developing nations

The WTO from the Perspective of a Developing Country

This Essay starts by laying out the shortcomings of the WTO. In Part II it lays out the issues at stake in the Seattle Conference. Part III is about the effects of the Seattle fiasco. Part IV gives the author\u27s views on what a development round should be. Part V asserts that the WTO should promote fair labor standards. Finally, Part VI discusses the prospects for the WTO to address concerns of developing nations

Presidential Succession Act of 2007

A proposed bill that modifies the presidential succession list to include, following the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Ambassador to the United Nations, the Ambassador to Great Britain, the Ambassador to Russia, the Ambassador to China, and the Ambassador to France.https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_congressionalmaterials_ppsl/1002/thumbnail.jp

Presidential Succession Act of 2005

A proposed bill to modify the presidential succession list after the Secretary of Veterans Affairs. The list would include the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Ambassador to the United Nations, the Ambassador to Great Britain, the Ambassador to Russia, the Ambassador to China, and the Ambassador to France.https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/twentyfifth_amendment_congressionalmaterials_ppsl/1003/thumbnail.jp

Talking With The Enemy: An Investigation of US Efforts to Talk with the Enemy from 1933 to the Present

Through a detailed investigation of a series of case studies, this course will take a close look at past efforts of the United States to manage relations with “enemies” or adversaries. The course will examine the different strategies Presidents have used to enter conflict or to “talk with the enemy” : Roosevelt’s 1933 opening of relations with the USSR; the decision at Munich to “appease’ Hitler; Truman’s decision to drop the nuclear bomb on Hiroshima, Nixon’s opening to China; the decision to Americanize the war in Vietnam rather than negotiate: the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 and the debates over US policy in Afghanistan and whether the US should talk directly with Iran The course will undertake some examination of how the US might deal with groups in the new paradigm of non-state actors such as Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah. The course will also seek to explore the various theories connected with decision making in analyzing historical events

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia\u27s increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia\u27s experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a sovereignity gap, lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia\u27s success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated integration efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru\u27s traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful

Talking With The Enemy: An Investigation of US Efforts to Talk with the Enemy from 1933 to the Present

Through a detailed investigation of a series of case studies, this course will examine past efforts of President’s of the United States to manage relations with “enemies” or adversaries. The course will examine the different strategies used by Presidents to enter conflict or engage in diplomacy (“talking with the enemy”) and explore the various theories connected with decision making. The course will cover case studies ranging from Roosevelt’s 1933 opening of relations with the USSR and the decision at Munich to “appease’ Hitler, the decision to drop the Atomic Bomb up to present day debates over US policy toward North Korea, Libya, Cuba, and whether the US should talk directly with Iran The course will also consider how the US might deal with groups in the new paradigm of non-state actors such as Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah