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Fall 2011

Talking With The Enemy: An Investigation of US Efforts to Talk with the Enemy from 1933 to the Present

William Luers Ambassador

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DIPL 6196AA
fall 2011

SETON HALL UNIVERSITY – FALL SEMESTER, 2011
WHITEHEAD SCHOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL AND
DIPLOMATIC STUDIES

TALKING WITH THE ENEMY:

**An Investigation of US Presidential Efforts to Talk with the Enemy
from 1933 to the Present.**

**Course DIPL 6196 from 4 PM to 6:10 PM on Mondays,
Room to be determined**

***Instructor:** Ambassador William Luers former President of the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA), former President of the Metropolitan Museum of Art and 31 year veteran of US Foreign Service. In the Foreign Service Mr. Luers served as US Ambassador to Czechoslovakia (1983-1986) and Venezuela, (1978-1982) and held numerous posts in Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union, and in the Department of State, where he was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe (1977-1978) and for Inter-American Affairs (1975-1977). He also was a faculty member at Johns Hopkins SAIS, GW and at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton. He taught a similar course on "Talking with the Enemy" at Tufts University in 2009 at Hamilton College and at SIPA Columbia University in 2010 and 2011. He taught at John C. Whitehead School for International and Diplomatic Studies at Seton Hall University in the fall of 2010.*

***Course Description:** Through a detailed investigation of a series of case studies, this course will examine past efforts of President's of the United States to manage relations with "enemies" or adversaries. The course will examine the different strategies used by Presidents to enter conflict or engage in diplomacy ("talking with the enemy") and explore the various theories connected with decision making. The course will cover case studies ranging from Roosevelt's 1933 opening of relations with the USSR and the decision at Munich to "appease" Hitler, the decision to drop the Atomic Bomb up to present day debates over US policy toward North Korea, Libya, Cuba, and whether the US should talk directly with Iran The course will also consider how the US might deal with groups in the new paradigm of non-state actors such as Taliban, Hamas, and Hezbollah.*

Key Dates / Deadlines

- Deadline for agreement with Professor on final paper – November 14
- Deadline for submission of the final paper – December 16
- Deadline for final student consultation – December 5

Grade Breakdown

- 25% weekly short paper
- 25% class participation
- 50% final paper

Course Themes: Several key themes will be explored during the course, including:

- Managing relations with the ‘adversary’ or ‘enemy’ has been shaped mainly by the President himself assisted by trusted and loyal advisers who have not always been the most experienced and knowledgeable on the nature of the enemy or on the issues involved. **Has this lack of understanding of the enemy led to mistakes and missed opportunities or has it also on occasion led to creative approaches that were passed up by the professionals?**
- Departments of government and Congressional leaders have often opposed presidential policy choices on how best to deal with the enemy. **How have the president and his advisers dealt with this opposition and did the opposition impact the outcome?**
- **How are US decision makers influenced by domestic factors such as elections and the media?** In each case study we will explore to what degree historical and cultural bias or ignorance has hindered efforts to open up discussions with an adversary when it would have been in US interest to do so. .
- **What are the different techniques used by the US government for supplementing or reinforcing direct diplomatic relations?**
- **How often have past President’s failed adequately to define the objectives for the use of force and outline an exit strategy when making the decision to use military force rather than engage an adversary?**

Requirements: Students are expected to complete all required reading before each session. For some sessions the readings are divided into the categories of required and optional.

1) **Class Work.** For each session half of the students (alternating week by week) will write a short paper of about 400 words related to the session’s readings, except for the first class and for those class sessions dedicated to a simulation. The class will be divided into two groups in the opening session of the course for this purpose. The topic to be covered in the papers is described after the reading for each class. See below. The students writing papers will send them to all the students in the class and the professor prior to the class. Those students not writing papers (who have all the reading also) will ask questions of the paper writers. At least half of the class period will be devoted to informal interactions among the students about the readings drawing on the written papers. The professor will add appropriate comments during the discussion. Four times during the semester the professor will grade the papers and provide feedback to each student on the student’s class work.

2) **A 15 page research paper on a subject of the student’s choosing related to the theme of the course will be due at the end of the semester.** Each student will discuss ideas for the paper and agree on the topic with the professor. The paper should establish at the outset a proposition

about a specific Presidential decision (for example how was it arrived at, did it further US interests, were there unanticipated consequences, did the President take or not take the advice of the best informed advisers, did the decision achieve what it was designed to achieve, did the President's domestic political considerations seem overriding, etc). The paper will support and explain the proposition. This paper will require original source research with footnotes or endnotes. Should students fail to submit their paper on time, without full agreement with the professor on the need for a delay, the paper will be marked down as a delay penalty.

3) Preparation for Following Week. The last 15 minutes of each class will be devoted to a student briefing for the next class. Two students will make presentations to the class. One student will describe the narrative from the US point of view of the current state of US thinking and recent history of the relations with the adversary, including what the US wants out of the relationship. The other student will describe the narrative from the point of view of the adversary and the recent history of relations, including what the adversary wants out of the relationship. In the first session of the class each will take the role they would want to play. There should be about 20 roles given the fact that there will be two for each class. Each student will make one presentation. .

4) Simulations of presidential decisions will be organized for two or three sessions during the semester. These simulations are designed to replicate a decision making meeting with the president leading toward a final decision. Each student will play the role of a real individual in a meeting of the cabinet or the National Security Council. The class will elect by secret ballot the student who will play President Obama for each simulation. For the fall semester the simulations will deal with Iran and either North Korea and current issue in the Middle East such as Libya.

Monday, September 12, 2011

Class 1

The Setting for the Course – Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson

The approaches that Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson took toward US foreign relations in the early 20th Century serve as book ends for how US presidents have dealt with the “enemy.” This class will explore the difference between these two approaches and the role of the debate between “realists” and the Wilsonian policy makers in shaping US foreign relations and presidential decisions. This first session will also review the unusual American reluctance to use diplomatic relations as a routine tool to do the business of states and to defend American security. In addition to becoming familiar with these two American presidents and trends that have shaped the thinking of virtually every subsequent US president, the class will discuss some of the theories behind the decision making approach to the study of history and political science. This will not be a theory based course but the professor has sought to include in the readings some material on decision making theory. .

Readings:

- Berridge, G.R. *“Talking to the Enemy: How States Without ‘Diplomatic Relations’ Communicate”* (1994).
Required: pp. xiii-12

Morris, Edmund, *Colonel Roosevelt*, 2010, Required Chapter 23 pp 441-460
- Cooper, John Milton, *“Woodrow Wilson”*, 2009
Required: Prologue pp 3-12 and Chapter 22 pp 507-534
- Thomas, Evan, *“The War Lovers”*, 2010.
Required: Introduction Chapter (pages 3-13) and Chapter 23 (pages 397 – 413). This is a recently published popular history of three men (Teddy Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, and William Randolph Hearst) who shaped one aspect of the American presidential attitude toward conflict and the “enemy” in subsequent decades.

Class Preparation: Collect your thoughts on “what is an enemy” and on why you have chosen to take this course. One of the teams selected in this first class will be asked to prepare a briefing for the end of the second class on the background setting for the Munich Agreement.

Class 2
Monday, September 19, 2011

Changing Relations with the Soviet Union.

The establishment of relations with USSR in 1933 was a presidentially managed undertaking between the US and a large adversarial state despite opposition from members of the cabinet including from the Department of State and from prominent members of the US Congress This session will examine Franklin Roosevelt's decision to open relations with the USSR at the beginning of the era of Stalin's Great Terror. Roosevelt had determined it was in US interests to do so.

Students will read an article outlining some of the main factors that have influenced individual decision-makers in U.S. foreign policy throughout recent history, as well as a short piece introducing the ways in which the U.S. has traditionally talked with its "enemies." This article briefly outlines the difference between non-recognition and a breach in diplomatic relations.

Readings:

- Bennett, Edward M. "*Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939.*" (1985)
Required: pp. 1-24

- Rosati, Jerel A, "*The Power of Human Cognition in the Study of World Politics*"
Required: Entire, International Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (autumn, 2000), pp. 45-75.

- Bishop, Donald G. "*The Roosevelt – Litvinov Agreements: The American View*" (1965),
Required: pp. 1-26

Baer, George W. "*A Question of Trust: The Origins of U.S.-Soviet Diplomatic Relations: The Memoirs of Loy W. Henderson*" (1986),
Required: pp. 227 -243

Farnsworth, B. "*William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union*" (1967). Required reading (pp 89-115

Class Preparation: Prepare a short paper (300 words) asking a question about the reading or making an observation about a particular issue that you found interesting or provocative. The professor will use the student's questions and observations as a basis for class discussion. In the final 15 minutes of the session the designated first team will brief the class on setting for the Munich/Nazi Germany session for the next week.

Monday, September 26, 2011

Class 3

The Munich Agreement - 1938

Even though President Roosevelt was not a direct party to the Munich agreement with Hitler in 1938, he played a key role in bringing Britain, France, and Italy to the negotiating table with Hitler and in convincing them not to break off discussions. As in the case of recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, domestic factors such as isolationist tendencies and a strong U.S. desire for peace colored and shaped Roosevelt's behavior in light of the crisis. This event conditioned American leaders on how *not* to "deal with the enemy". The "Munich appeasement" shaped the thinking of American presidents on dealing with adversaries for decades.

Readings:

- Farnham, Barbara Rearden, *"Roosevelt and the Munich Crisis: A Study of Political Decision-Making"* (1997)
Required: pp. 91-128
- Munich Pact, September 29, 1938 (primary document)
- YOUTUBE "The Munich betrayal 1938"
www.youtube.com/watch?v=nZHpprf6HSM&feature=related
- Bennett, Edward M. *"Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939."* (1985)
Required: pp 127 – 152
- Dallek, Robert. *"Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945"* (1995)
Required: pp. 144-168
- Reynolds, David, "Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century" (2007), Chapter "Munich 1938", Required pp 37 - 102

Class Preparation: Write a short OPED for the NY Times (400 words) giving your view as though you were a contemporary observer of foreign policy September 1938, only days after the Munich Agreement was announced. You might want to comment in your OPED on why President Roosevelt supported the Munich Pact and on the attitudes of other Americans or Europeans toward Munich. We will discuss OPED drafting in the second class. At the end of the class one of the teams will brief the class on the historic setting for the dropping of the first nuclear bomb on Hiroshima in 1945.

Class 4

Monday, October 3, 2011

Hiroshima and the End of World War II - 1945

The controversy over President Truman's decision to drop the first nuclear bomb on Hiroshima in August of 1945 continues to be debated among historians and analysts of presidential decision making. Some "revisionist" historians have argued that President Truman was fully aware of a Japanese offer for a peace settlement in the summer of 1945 so that the bomb was not necessary. The conventional history suggests that the conditions suggested by the Japanese for their surrender were unacceptable and the alternatives were either to prolong the war which would include the invasion of Japan and the loss of possibly millions of lives or drop the bomb. The moral argument against using the atomic bomb has also loomed over that decision. In this case study, students will examine current interpretations of this controversial decision and read some of the new material that has come to light from recently declassified messages. We will examine which of Truman's main advisers were most critical in moving President Truman to that decision

- Bernstein, Barton J., *"Roosevelt, Truman and the Atomic Bomb, 1941 - 1945: A Reinterpretation"* Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 90, no. 1 Spring 1975, Required: pp. 23-69
- Frank, Richard B *"Ending the Pacific War; Harry Truman and the Decision to Drop the Bomb"*. Foreign Policy Research Institute. (April 2009) vol. 14, no. 4. Required reading.
- Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi, *"Racing the Enemy"*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2005)
Required: Chapter 4: Potsdam: The Turning Point (pp. 130 - 178)
Required: Chapter 5: The Atomic Bombs (pp. 177- 214)
Optional: Conclusion: Assessing the Roads Not Taken (pp. 290 -303)
- The Potsdam Proclamation (primary document)
- YOUTUBE "Harry S Truman's announcement on Bombing of Hiroshima
www.youtube.com/watch?v=POPmlHlaOtM&feature=related
- YOUTUBE "President Truman on Nuclear Decision in WWII"
www.youtube.com/watch?v=9QOIFURCY8g

Class Preparation: Write a 300 word statement of your view on Truman's going forward with the plans to drop the bomb on Hiroshima. Did Truman make the right decision? Did he actually make the decision? If not Truman, then who? One of the teams will brief the class on the historical setting for the Korean War leading up to the truce.

October 10 there will be no class because of fall break

Class 5

Monday, October 17, 2011

Agreement on a Truce That Suspended the Korean War - 1953

In 1953 President Eisenhower made the decision, after two years of troubled negotiations, to reach a truce, without a peace treaty, to end the war on the Korean peninsula. The stalemate in the war and the high cost of life, plus the general world environment about this costly and seemingly un-winnable war caused President Eisenhower to take the unusual step to stop the fighting. The terms of the truce left a heritage of conflict on that peninsula that has remained a factor of stability in that part of the world for decades. Indeed one of the objectives of any settlement that might be reached between the US and North Korea and between the two Koreas would most certainly have to be a final Peace Treaty formally closing that war. We will explore the decision that the president made and the considerations that went into this unusual truce.

Readings

- Stueck, William “Origins of the Korean War.” (pp. 10 – 46). The Korean War 1995
- Stueck, William. “Diplomacy Fails.” (pp. 85 – 105). The Korean War
- Hess, Gary “Truman as Commander in Chief” (pp. 42 - 74) in Presidential Decisions for War (OPTIONAL)
- Foot, Rosemary “Chapter 7: The Strategy for Ending the War” (pp. 204 - 231) The Wrong War 1985
- Foot, Rosemary “Chapter 8: Conclusions (pp. 232 - 246). The Wrong War 1985
- Stueck, William. “Concluding an Armistice.” (pp. 341-347). The Korean War 1995
- Cummings, Bruce, Chapter 9: Requiem: History in the Temper of Reconciliation” (pp 225-243), The Korean War 2010 (OPTIONAL)
- NSC-147, “Analysis of Possible Outcomes of Action in Korea” April 2, 1953
- “Public Opinion Polling Korea” June 1953

Class Preparation: Read the required reading. Prepare a 500 word “opinion editorial” for the New York Times that takes a position on whether the Korean Armistice was the correct, incorrect or take another position in between. One of the teams will brief the class on the historical context of the session on the Cuban Missile Crisis.

CLASS 6

Monday, October 24, 2011

Cuban Missile Crisis -1962

The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 is one of the best documented and fully assessed decisions by a president on the decision for or against the use of force. This session will explore the recent literature on the decision making process and test the themes on what we can learn from the process that led President Kennedy opt against the use of force against Cuba. We will explore the qualities of the president's closest advisers (the "Excom), the role of outside advisers, and the experience and attitudes the president himself brought to his decision;

Readings

- ✓ Freedman, Lawrence, *"Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam"* (2000),
Required: Chapters 19 - 23, pp. 170 - 217 *pp (170-192) CH 19-20* *Missing 21, 22+ 23*
- ✓ Blight, J.G., J.S. Nye, D.A. Welch, *"The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited,"* Foreign Affairs 66 (1987),
Required: pp. 170 - 188 *(170)*
- ✓ Allison, Graham & Zelikov, Philip, *"Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis"* (1999),
Required: pp 1-12 and pp 379- 407
- ✓ Allison, Graham, "Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis", The American Political Science Review, Sept 1969 Vol LXIII , No 3
- ✓ *"The Kennedy Tapes: inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis"* edited by Ernest May and Philip Zelikow; (2002),
Optional: pp. 107 - 122 *(107)*
- Film "Seventeen Days"

Class Preparation: We will try to organize a showing of the film otherwise each student should try to see it. Each member of the class should prepare to be one of the real members of the Excom. You will each explain your perspective on what should US government policy should be and why on the 15th Day of the crisis. Still in your role as a member of the Excom you will also prepare a 300 page confidential memorandum to the President dated on the 15th day of the Crisis that gives him your private criticism of the suggestion and point of view of another member of the Excom. At the end of the discussion one of the teams will provide a briefing on the decision to Americanize the War in Vietnam.



Monday, October 31, 2011

The Decision to Americanize the War in Vietnam

Vietnam was *the* formative US foreign policy venture after WWII. There were times when better choices could have been made instead of further escalation of the military conflict – choices that were not taken, involving dealing in a different way with adversaries. In preparation for this class students will be asked to read books on the role of McNamara and McGeorge Bundy who were key protagonists in Johnson's decision to keep escalating the US military presence in Vietnam. We will examine the particular role of these two advisers and try to determine their reasons for making recommendations in 1965 that brought about President Johnson's decision to deploy US combat troops to Vietnam and to continue to escalate the war.

Readings:

- Goldstein, Gordon M. "*Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam*" (2008)
Required: Chapters 3-5 (pp. 97 – 185)
- McNamara, Robert "*In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*" (1995)
Required: Chapter 6 and 7 (pp. 145-206)
- Ball, George W. *The Past Has Another Pattern* (1973) Chapters 24 and 25 (pp 360-403)
- FILM: "*The Fog of War,*" Robert McNamara

Class Preparation: The professor will work with the class to set up a debate on the decisions in 1964-65 that led to the significant increase in American troops in Vietnam. The time will be selected in January or February 1965. Group A will argue for President Johnson's decision to increase troops and Team B will argue against the decision to significantly increase US ground forces in Vietnam. In addition each of you will be asked to write a Memorandum to The President from one of the actors in the Johnson Administration of about 400 words, giving your recommendations on what the President should do about the US role in Vietnam. This memorandum does not have to take the position you will be required to take in the debate. One team will brief the class on the historical setting for the next session on China.

Monday, November 7, 2011

Changing Relations with China - 1972

The style that Nixon/Kissinger used in opening up the relations with China in 1972 and the timing of that initiative are instructive for future state-state relations, such as evolving US-Iran relations today. Note that the Nixon initiative found a response in China, which was in the middle of the Cultural Revolution arguably one of the most repressive periods of Mao's China. This session will address how the president made his decision with a small group of advisers and, like in the case of Roosevelt in 1933, with opposition from the Department of State. The new relationship helped the US learn about and understand China far better than before through dealing with the Chinese officials and interacting with Chinese society at many levels even before the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Readings

- The Joint U.S. – *China Communiqué, Shanghai, February 27, 1972 (primary document)*
- McMillan, Margaret "*Nixon and Mao: The Week that Changed the World*" (2007)
Required: Chapters 12-14 (pp. 184- 230)
- Ross, Robert S. "*International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: U.S. –China Relations since 1972* (1986), Optional: pp. 255-287
- Accinelli, Robert, "*In Pursuit of a Modus Vivendi: The Taiwan Issue and Sino-American Rapprochement 1969-1972*" , Required: Chapter 1 (pp 32-55)
- "*My Talks with Chou En-Lai,*" *Top Secret Memorandum: Henry A. Kissinger to Nixon.* July 14, 1971. Required Reading. This is an exceptional document from the archives written by Kissinger for the President.
- YOUTUBE " History: Feb 1972 President Nixon's Visit to China (3/6) 1972/2/21"
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XUMk181xVw4&feature=related>
- YOUTUBE Chinese Footage, "Chairman Mao Zedong and Nixon
www.youtube.com/watch?v=ahWLRV-Kblc&feature=related
- YOUTUBE Nial Ferguson's "Nixon in China":
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5V9sP_nDCM&feature=related

Class Preparation: Write a 300 word statement on who was most responsible for the decision to open to China and who in Nixon's cabinet was opposed or uninformed – and why. One of the teams will brief the class on the Nixon Brezhnev Summit in 1973 and on the Regan/Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik.

Monday, November 14, 2011

DÉTENTE – The Nixon/ Brezhnev Summit in DC 1973 and the Reagan/Gorbachev Summit at Reykjavik in 1988.

The Nixon administration went into the 1973 summit with the strategic opening to China in place, a wide range of proposals to broaden relations with the Soviet Union in arms control and other areas, and a re-elected President beginning his second administration. The climate for this experienced Nixon/Kissinger team at one level was positive. Yet there was growing domestic opposition to détente with the Soviet Union at home and the US was looking at withdrawing from the poorly progressing war in Vietnam. Most importantly the Watergate allegations were building against Nixon, creating the beginning of a crisis year for the President which would increasingly cast a shadow over his presidency. The agreements at the 1973 summit meeting reflected many of the aspirations and the worries of President Nixon.

Reagan became President truly believing that the Soviet Union was the evil empire. He knew little about his opposite number in the Kremlin and did little to learn about him. Yet as he began to address the threat of nuclear war and particularly after Gorbachev became General Secretary, Reagan warmed to talking to the Soviet leadership. His summit with Gorbachev in Reykjavik was both a historic leap in US-Soviet relations and a serious setback demonstrating the still uncertain ground of distrust and misunderstanding as each side “talked to the enemy.”

Readings:

- Horne, Alistair "*Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year*" (2008)
Required: Chapter 7
- Garthoff, Raymond L "*Detente and Confrontation: American - Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*" (1994)
Required: Chapter 9&10: pp. 325 -403
- Matlock, Jack F. "*Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended*" (2004)
Required Chapters 10&11 pp 215-250
- Farnham, Barbara, "*Reagan and the Gorbachev Revolution: Perceiving the End of Threat*", *Political Science Quarterly*; Volume 116 (2), 2001 Required: pp 225-252.
- Reynolds, David, "Summits: Six Meetings that Shaped the Twentieth Century", Chapter "Moscow 1972" Optional: (pp 223- 282). The 1972 Summit laid the groundwork for Détente and this is a good description of that earlier summit. The professor has chosen to look at the 1973 summit in view of the significant steps taken and in view of the domestic clouds about Watergate that were influencing President Nixon's decisions. He has also chosen 1973 since he had been working on Soviet Affairs in the Dept of State during that summit.

Class Preparation: Prepare a brief (300 word) memorandum contrasting the way Nixon and Reagan dealt with the Soviet leader during these landmark summits toward the end of the Cold War. One of the teams will brief the class on the historical setting for the Two Iraq Wars and the two Bushes handling of these two different wars against Iraq

Monday, November 21, 2011

The Two Iraq Wars and the Two Bushes – 1990 and 2003

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 of Kuwait, President GHW Bush mounted a US effort to develop international support for action against Iraq for its violation of the UN Charter and the threat this invasion signified for regional security and particularly for the security of Saudi Arabia. This action drew the widespread approval of the world community and much of the cost was paid for by countries in the neighborhood. President Bush's decision included an agreement to set limited objectives for the war in order to get international backing and in order not to have a prolonged commitment to dealing with Iraq's internal problems. The Gulf War did not lead to the fall of Saddam Hussein.

A decade later President GW Bush came into office apparently determined to take military action against Saddam Hussein and 9/11 produced the rationale for that invasion. It is difficult to pin point a moment when the President GW Bush took the final decision to go to war, what were the reasons for the invasion and what were the specific objectives for the military action. It was unclear what event or situation would determine when US forces could withdraw. This session will seek to compare the different ways in which the two Presidents Bush approached decision making and managed conflict.

Readings:

- Frankel, Glenn, "Lines in the Sand" Washington Post National Weekly Edition, September 10, 1990 Required
- YOUTUBE George H W Bush Announces War Against Iraq (January 16 1991)
www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFrnQHaQWoA&feature=PlayList&p=C5F1041D6C9CCDE0&index
- Yetiv, Steve A. *US-Decision Making and the Persian Gulf War* (2004)
Required: "Rational Actor Model", p30-57,
Required: Elements of Groupthink on the Road to War" p104-112)
- Hitchens, Christopher. *Realpolitik in the Gulf: A game gone tilt*, Jan 1991 Harper's Required
- Packer, George. "*The Assassin's Gate: America in Iraq*"(2005)
Required: Chapter 2: Fevered Minds, pp. 39-65. The professor strongly recommends this chapter to understand the ideological underpinnings of the second Iraq war. The degree to which ideology actually played a defining role in the decision to go to war and the execution of that war is a controversial part of understanding the war and its outcome.
- Fallows, James, "Blind Into Baghdad," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Jan/Feb 2004. Required
- Dobbins, James, "Who Lost Iraq? *Foreign Affairs*, Sept/Oct, 2007 Required

- Haas, Richard N “War of Necessity; War of Choice, a Memoir of Two Iraq Wars’ (2009)
Required: Ch 9 and appendix 1 (pp 267-293)

Class Preparations: Write a short paper (300 words) comparing the decision making styles and The approach of GHW Bush and GW Bush with respect to the preparation and execution of their Iraq wars. What were the similarities and differences between their approaches to working with Allies, with the UN, with the US Congress and American people, and with the enemy – Saddam Hussein? At the end of the class a team will provide the background of US-Cuban relations and the setting for the Obama administration’s policy toward Cuba.

Monday, November 28, 2011

The Simulation of a Critical Presidential Decision -- Iran

Iran challenges the US Government to manage diplomatically and politically several issues in the new international order, including: (1) the potential and real conflict or competition between Islam and the West over Middle East and other issues, (2) the management of non-proliferation and nuclear power in this new age, and (3) the relations of state power to non-State actors (terrorists), particularly in the volatile regions of the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the Subcontinent. In the case of Iran, these complex issues must be discussed against a backdrop of deep mutual distrust and profound misunderstandings exacerbated by the lack of contact. This session will be a simulation of the challenges to the President in seeking to shape a US policy that will be effective and not bring unacceptable unanticipated consequences. .

Readings

- Luers, Pickering and Walsh, "*How to Deal with Iran*" The New York Review of Books, February 12, 2009 pp 45-48
- Freedman, Lawrence. "*A Choice of Enemies: America Confronts the Middle East.*" (2008). Required: Chapter 4: Revolution in Iran. pp. 62-84
- United States Institute of Peace and the Stimson Center, "Engagement, Coercion, and Iran's Nuclear Challenge", Report of a Joint Taskforce on US-Iran Policy, Nov 16, 2010. Required
- Additional up-to-date readings will be recommended when closer to the simulation.

Class Preparation: Do additional reading to prepare for the role you will play of a real person attending the NSC meeting on Iran in November 2011. There will be no writing assignment for this class. One member of the class will serve as President Obama and each of the other senior advisers will be represented by one class member. In the simulation the individual class members should seek to adhere as closely as possible to the policy recommendations and points of view that the actual person (Secretary Clinton, Secretary Panetta etc) would have to represent given the position each holds and the establishment each represents. One of the teams will be called on to brief the class on the setting of US policy toward "terrorist groups" such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban and other groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in preparation for a class discussion on revising US policy toward these and other non-state actors. This team will also lead the development of a current reading list on this subject matter for the next class.

Monday, December 5, 2011

What should US policy be in relation to the non-state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban and Muslim Brotherhood?

This session will be a structured discussion of what each student would recommend to the President to deal with the new category of "Enemies" -- non-state actors such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

This session will discuss in the context of an internal US Government debate including some outside experts over how the US should approach dealings with the new players in the Islamic World.

The students in the class will participate in developing a reading list for this subject.

Class Preparation: In advance of the class 5 "expert" outside advisors will be appointed who will make the case for a changed policy toward each of the major non-state actors and two experts will be selected to argue against any basic change of policy. These outside experts will brief the President with some of his principal advisors such as the NSC advisor, Secretary of State, Defense, and Homeland Security plus various other actors such as the CIA head. Finally one of the teams will prepare for the final class simulation.

Monday, December 12, 2011

The Simulation of a critical Presidential Decision: Either North Korea or a current decision being considered in the Muslim world, such as Libya

IF KOREA IS THE SUBJECT: The search over how to deal with – talk to or use force – with North Korea has gone on longer than the efforts to deal with Iran. Really since the cessation of hostilities in the Korean War, American presidents and the leaders of South Korea and other nations in the area have tried in vain to develop a policy that would work to reduce North Korea's threats to the region, that would attract them into the rapidly developing world around them, and that would eventually lead to a peace treaty that could put an end to the Korean War and open a new era for peace in the Korean peninsula. The tensions over the policies of this outcast nation have troubled virtually every US administration over the past 50 years. The class will simulate a summit meeting between the US, South Korea, Japan, China and the USSR with each team playing the role of one of those five states.

Class Preparation: The reading for this class is likely to come from articles and public reports that have yet to be written. The professor will provide the list of recommended readings at least one month prior to the simulation. However since each team will be representing a different national perspective on this problem, individual team players will want to seek out their own sources to prepare for the simulation. Within each team, specific individual roles will be assigned. In the case of the US there will be Obama, Clinton, the President's special representative on Korea (Steve Bosworth), and probably either the Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff. Counterparts will be selected for each of the other nations.