Adaptive logic characterizations of input/output logic

We translate unconstrained and constrained input/output logics as introduced by Makinson and van der Torre to modal logics, using adaptive logics for the constrained case. The resulting reformulation has some additional benefits. First, we obtain a proof-theoretic (dynamic) characterization of input/output logics. Second, we demonstrate that our framework naturally gives rise to useful variants and allows to express important notions that go beyond the expressive means of input/output logics, such as violations and sanctions

Cumulative Aggregation

From any two conditional obligations “X if A” and “Y if B”, cumulative aggregation derives the combined obligation “X ∪ Y if A ∪ (B\X)”, whereas simple aggregation derives the obligation “X ∪ Y if A ∪ B”. We propose FC systems consisting of cumulative aggregation together with factual detachment, and we give a representation result for FC systems, as well as for FA systems consisting of simple aggregation together with factual detachment. We relate FC and FA systems to each other and to input/output logics recently introduced by Parent and van der Torre

Detachment in Normative Systems: Examples, inference Patterns, Properties

There is a variety of ways to reason with normative systems. This partly reflects a variety of semantics developed for deontic logic, such as traditional semantics based on possible worlds, or alternative semantics based on algebraic methods, explicit norms or techniques from non-monotonic logic. This diversity raises the question how these reasoning methods are related, and which reasoning method should be chosen for a particular application. In this paper we discuss the use of examples, inference patterns, and more abstract properties. First, benchmark examples can be used to compare ways to reason with normative systems. We give an overview of several benchmark examples of normative reasoning and deontic logic: van Fraassen’s paradox, Forrester’s paradox, Prakken and Sergot’s cottage regulations, Jeffrey’s disarmament example, Chisholm’s paradox, Makinson’s Möbius strip, and Horty’s priority examples. Moreover, we distinguish various interpretations that can be given to these benchmark examples, such as consistent interpretations, dilemma interpretations, and violability interpretations. Second, inference patterns can be used to compare different ways to reason with normative systems. Instead of analysing the benchmark examples semantically, as it is usually done, in this paper we use inference patterns to analyse them at a higher level of abstraction. We discuss inference patterns reflecting typical logical properties such as strengthening of the antecedent or weakening of the consequent. Third, more abstract properties can be defined to compare different ways to reason with normative systems. To define these more abstract properties, we first present a formal framework around the notion of detachment. Some of the ten properties we introduce are derived from the inference patterns, but others are more abstract: factual detachment, violation detection, substitution, replacements of equivalents, implication, para-consistency, conjunction, factual monotony, norm monotony, and norm induction. We consider these ten properties as desirable for a reasoning method for normative systems

Multiagent Deontic Logic and its Challenges from a Normative Systems Perspective

This article gives an overview of several challenges studied in deontic logic, with an emphasis on challenges involving agents. We start with traditional modal deontic logic using preferences to address the challenge of contrary-toduty reasoning, and STIT theory addressing the challenges of non-deterministic actions, moral luck and procrastination. Then we turn to alternative normbased deontic logics detaching obligations from norms to address the challenge of Jørgensen’s dilemma, including the question how to derive obligations from a normative system when agents cannot assume that other agents comply with their norms. We discuss also some traditional challenges from the viewpoint of normative systems: when a set of norms may be termed ‘coherent’, how to deal with normative conflicts, how to combine normative systems and traditional deontic logic, how various kinds of permission can be accommodated, how meaning postulates and counts-as conditionals can be taken into account,how sets of norms may be revised and merged, and how normative systems can be combined with game theory. The normative systems perspective means that norms, not ideality or preference, should take the central position in deontic semantics, and that a semantics that represents norms explicitly provides a helpful tool for analysing, clarifying and solving the problems of deontic logic. We focus on the challenges rather than trying to give full coverage of related work, for which we refer to the handbook of deontic logic and normative systems

Towards compliance checking in reified I/O logic via SHACL

Reified Input/Output logic has been recently proposed to handle natural language meaning in Input/Output logic. So far, the research in reified I/O logic has focused only on KR issues, specifically on how to use the formalism for representing contextual meaning of norms. This paper is the first attempt to investigate reasoning in reified I/O logic, specifically compliance checking. This paper investigates how to model reified I/O logic formulae in Shapes Constraint Language (SHACL), a recent W3C recommendation for validating and reasoning with RDFs/OWL

"The Logic of the Liver". A Deontic View of the Intentionality of Desire

Desires matter. How are we to understand the intentionality of desire? According to the two classical views, desire is either a positive evaluation or a disposition to act: to desire a state is to positively evaluate it or to be disposed to act to realize it. This Ph.D. Dissertation examines these conceptions of desire and proposes a deontic alternative inspired by Meinong. On this view, desiring is representing a state of affairs as what ought to be or, if one prefers, as what should be. Desire involves a deontic manner of representing: a norm of the ought-to-be type features in desire’s intentional mode, as opposed to content. The dissertation is structured in three parts. In order to defend this conception, I formulate three main desiderata for a promising theory of the intentionality of desire in the introduction (§0). The first concerns desire’s direction of fit, i.e. the intuition that the world should conform to our desires. The second concerns the death of desire principle, i.e. the intuition that one cannot desire what one represents as actual. The last pertains to desire’s role in psychological explanations, i.e. the intuition that desires can explain some mental states and be explained by other mental states. The first part examines the main conceptions of desire in light of these desiderata. I argue that the classical pictures of desire do not adequately meet our desiderata. The first chapter is devoted to the evaluative conception (§1), while the second examines the motivational approach (§2). Following these criticisms, I then present the deontic view of desire (§3). In the second part, I defend this conception with the help of three arguments. The main idea is that appealing to norms of the ought-to-be type can satisfy our chief desiderata: the world should conform to norms (world-to-mind direction of fit, §4), norms are grounded on values and in turn ground obligations (explanation, §5), and norms are about non-actual states of affairs (death of desire principle, §6). In the last part, I develop the deontic view to draw a cartography of the various types of desire. Some desires are correct, while others are inappropriate. This distinction is explained by the deontic conception, as it matches that between states of affairs that ought to obtain and states that should not obtain (§7). Two study cases are examined: caprice and the impermissibility of desire aggregation. Intuitively, hopes, wishes, or urges are types of desire. The next chapter presents a typology inspired by the deontic view and the type of norms there are (§8). The last chapter discusses the main objections to the deontic approach (§9). In conclusion, I show the relevance of the deontic view for several debates in philosophy of mind and ethics. Desires are crucial because they are the ‘eye’ of what should be