Spectrum utilization using game theory

This thesis was submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy and awarded by Brunel University.Spectrum utilization is the most recent communications issue which takes great deal of attention from communication researchers where most of the efforts have been dedicated for spectral efficient utilization. Spectrum sharing is one of the solutions considered in the problem of lack of available frequency for new communication services which are unlicensed. In this work we propose an optimal method for spectrum utilization to increase spectral efficiency. It considers the problem of spectrum holes found in Primary User's (PU) band and detected using one of the spectral sensing methods. The solution is formulated with the help of Game theory approach in such a way that the primary user who has unoccupied frequency can share it with a group of secondary users (SU) in a competitive way. One of the SUs will be a secondary primary user (SPU), share available frequency from PU then offer his sharing to serve other SUs in different rate of sharing. Each user in the group of secondary users has a chance to be secondary primary user depending on reputation of each SU. Enhancing reputation is the only way for any SU to assure a share in the spectrum where it considered the factor of increasing or decreasing rate of sharing as well as factor of being SPU or an ordinary SU. A theoretical non-cooperative game model is introduced in a comparison with a proposed non-dynamic technique which depends on number of subscribers who occupy frequency in each time period. Multi-users compete on sharing the frequency from one of the users who offers sharing at a time when he has low number of subscribers that occupy his band. It is found that non-dynamic sharing results in inefficient spectrum utilization which is one of the reasons of spectrum scarcity where this resource is allocated in fixed way. Spectrum sharing using game theory solves this problem by its ability to make users compete to gain highest rate of spectrum allocation according to the real requirement of each user at each time interval. The problem of urgent case is also discussed when the primary user comes back to using his band which is the specific band of sharing with the secondary users group. SPU makes it easy to unload the required band from multi-users because PU does not need to request his band from each SU in the group

Enforcement in Dynamic Spectrum Access Systems

The spectrum access rights granted by the Federal government to spectrum users come with the expectation of protection from harmful interference. As a consequence of the growth of wireless demand and services of all types, technical progress enabling smart agile radio networks, and on-going spectrum management reform, there is both a need and opportunity to use and share spectrum more intensively and dynamically. A key element of any framework for managing harmful interference is the mechanism for enforcement of those rights. Since the rights to use spectrum and to protection from harmful interference vary by band (licensed/unlicensed, legacy/newly reformed) and type of use/users (primary/secondary, overlay/underlay), it is reasonable to expect that the enforcement mechanisms may need to vary as well.\ud \ud In this paper, we present a taxonomy for evaluating alternative mechanisms for enforcing interference protection for spectrum usage rights, with special attention to the potential changes that may be expected from wider deployment of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) systems. Our exploration of how the design of the enforcement regime interacts with and influences the incentives of radio operators under different rights regimes and market scenarios is intended to assist in refining thinking about appropriate access rights regimes and how best to incentivize investment and growth in more efficient and valuable uses of the radio frequency spectrum

Design and optimisation of a low cost Cognitive Mesh Network

Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have been touted as the most promising wireless technology in providing high-bandwidth Internet access to rural, remote and under-served areas, with relatively lower investment cost as compared to traditional access networks. WMNs structurally comprise of mesh routers and mesh clients. Furthermore, WMNs have an envisaged ability to provide a heterogeneous network system that integrates wireless technologies such as IEEE 802.22 WRAN, IEEE 802.16 WiMAX, IEEE 802.11 Wi-Fi, Blue-tooth etc. The recent proliferation of new devices on the market such as smart phones and, tablets, and the growing number of resource hungry applications has placed a serious strain on spectrum availability which gives rise to the spectrum scarcity problem. The spectrum scarcity problem essentially results in increased spectrum prices that hamper the growth and efficient performance of WMNs as well as subsequent transformation of WMN into the envisaged next generation networks. Recent developments in TV white space communications technology and the emergence of Cognitive radio devices that facilitate Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) have provided an opportunity to mitigate the spectrum scarcity problem. To solve the scarcity problem, this thesis reconsiders the classical Network Engineering (NE) and Traffic Engineering (TE) problems to objectively design a low cost Cognitive Mesh network that promotes efficient resources utilization and thereby achieve better Quality of Service (QoS) levels

WING/WORLD: An Open Experimental Toolkit for the Design and Deployment of IEEE 802.11-Based Wireless Mesh Networks Testbeds

Wireless Mesh Networks represent an interesting instance of light-infrastructure wireless networks. Due to their flexibility and resiliency to network failures, wireless mesh networks are particularly suitable for incremental and rapid deployments of wireless access networks in both metropolitan and rural areas. This paper illustrates the design and development of an open toolkit aimed at supporting the design of different solutions for wireless mesh networking by enabling real evaluation, validation, and demonstration. The resulting testbed is based on off-the-shelf hardware components and open-source software and is focused on IEEE 802.11 commodity devices. The software toolkit is based on an "open" philosophy and aims at providing the scientific community with a tool for effective and reproducible performance analysis of WMNs. The paper describes the architecture of the toolkit, and its core functionalities, as well as its potential evolutions

Secondary user pricing strategies in a cognitive radio environment

There has been a growing demand for spectrum availability due to inefficient management of the radio frequency spectrum and underutilization of all spectrum bands. Spectrum has been managed with the same approach for over the last decade and only recently due to the phenomenal growth in mobile and broadband communications has attention been given to it. Intelligent communication systems such as cognitive radio have been identified in assisting the need for the limited resource, wireless spectrum. If spectrum trading becomes commercially successful, it can provide great economic and social benefits for the service provider, primary and secondary users. In order to maintain viability of spectrum trading, a pricing strategy is necessary for secondary users, it is also imperative to find a game theory model that minimally impacts the primary users in terms of their service, however it should aid in decreasing the cost to the primary users. Game theory along with economic theory is used to analyse the relationships/cooperation between the users and service provider. This work contributes to the field of dynamic spectrum access and aims to compare pricing strategies of secondary users in terms of the revenue earned by the primary service providers as well as investigate the impact of regulations on said pricing strategies. The pricing strategies modelled and simulated in MATLAB include the market-equilibrium pricing strategy and the competitive pricing strategy. These two strategies are chosen as they are the most relevant in South Africa. The two pricing strategies are compared in terms of advantages and disadvantages as well the revenue earned by each of the primary services. The framework for testing is provided along with the test cases. The influence of telecommunication regulations and policy on the frameworks and results are discussed in detail as well as the impact of the telecommunication regulation and policy in South Africa

A Mechanism Design Approach to Bandwidth Allocation in Tactical Data Networks

The defense sector is undergoing a phase of rapid technological advancement, in the pursuit of its goal of information superiority. This goal depends on a large network of complex interconnected systems - sensors, weapons, soldiers - linked through a maze of heterogeneous networks. The sheer scale and size of these networks prompt behaviors that go beyond conglomerations of systems or `system-of-systems\u27. The lack of a central locus and disjointed, competing interests among large clusters of systems makes this characteristic of an Ultra Large Scale (ULS) system. These traits of ULS systems challenge and undermine the fundamental assumptions of today\u27s software and system engineering approaches. In the absence of a centralized controller it is likely that system users may behave opportunistically to meet their local mission requirements, rather than the objectives of the system as a whole. In these settings, methods and tools based on economics and game theory (like Mechanism Design) are likely to play an important role in achieving globally optimal behavior, when the participants behave selfishly. Against this background, this thesis explores the potential of using computational mechanisms to govern the behavior of ultra-large-scale systems and achieve an optimal allocation of constrained computational resources Our research focusses on improving the quality and accuracy of the common operating picture through the efficient allocation of bandwidth in tactical data networks among self-interested actors, who may resort to strategic behavior dictated by self-interest. This research problem presents the kind of challenges we anticipate when we have to deal with ULS systems and, by addressing this problem, we hope to develop a methodology which will be applicable for ULS system of the future. We build upon the previous works which investigate the application of auction-based mechanism design to dynamic, performance-critical and resource-constrained systems of interest to the defense community. In this thesis, we consider a scenario where a number of military platforms have been tasked with the goal of detecting and tracking targets. The sensors onboard a military platform have a partial and inaccurate view of the operating picture and need to make use of data transmitted from neighboring sensors in order to improve the accuracy of their own measurements. The communication takes place over tactical data networks with scarce bandwidth. The problem is compounded by the possibility that the local goals of military platforms might not be aligned with the global system goal. Such a scenario might occur in multi-flag, multi-platform military exercises, where the military commanders of each platform are more concerned with the well-being of their own platform over others. Therefore there is a need to design a mechanism that efficiently allocates the flow of data within the network to ensure that the resulting global performance maximizes the information gain of the entire system, despite the self-interested actions of the individual actors. We propose a two-stage mechanism based on modified strictly-proper scoring rules, with unknown costs, whereby multiple sensor platforms can provide estimates of limited precisions and the center does not have to rely on knowledge of the actual outcome when calculating payments. In particular, our work emphasizes the importance of applying robust optimization techniques to deal with the uncertainty in the operating environment. We apply our robust optimization - based scoring rules algorithm to an agent-based model framework of the combat tactical data network, and analyze the results obtained. Through the work we hope to demonstrate how mechanism design, perched at the intersection of game theory and microeconomics, is aptly suited to address one set of challenges of the ULS system paradigm - challenges not amenable to traditional system engineering approaches

The Wireless Craze, The Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, The Spectrum Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's 'Big Joke': An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy

In 1959 the Federal Communications Commission invited economist Ronald Coase to testify about his proposal for market allocation of radio spectrum rights. The FCC's first question: 'Is this all a big joke'' Today, however, leading policy makers, including the current FCC Chair, decry the 'spectrum drought' produced by administrative allocation and call for the creation of private bandwidth markets. This essay examines marketplace trends driving regulators' change of humor, and considers the path of spectrum policy liberalization in light of emerging technologies, theories of unlimited bandwidth, reforms such as FCC license auctions, and recent progress in deregulating wireless markets in the U.S. and around the globe.

An Agent-Based Model for Secondary Use of Radio Spectrum

Wireless communications rely on access to radio spectrum. With a continuing proliferation of wireless applications and services, the spectrum resource becomes scarce. The measurement studies of spectrum usage, however, reveal that spectrum is being used sporadically in many geographical areas and times. In an attempt to promote efficiency of spectrum usage, the Federal Communications Commission has supported the use of market mechanism to allocate and assign radio spectrum. We focus on the secondary use of spectrum defined as a temporary access of existing licensed spectrum by a user who does not own a spectrum license. The secondary use of spectrum raises numerous technical, institutional, economic, and strategic issues that merit investigation. Central to the issues are the effects of transaction costs associated with the use of market mechanism and the uncertainties due to potential interference.The research objective is to identify the pre-conditions as to when and why the secondary use would emerge and in what form. We use transaction cost economics as the theoretical framework in this study. We propose a novel use of agent-based computational economics to model the development of the secondary use of spectrum. The agent-based model allows an integration of economic and technical considerations to the study of pre-conditions to the secondary use concept. The agent-based approach aims to observe the aggregate outcomes as a result of interactions among agents and understand the process that leads to the secondary use, which can then be used to create policy instruments in order to obtain the favorable outcomes of the spectrum management

TV White Spaces: A Pragmatic Approach

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