Enriching Deontic Logic

It is well known that systems of action deontic logic emerging from a standard analysis of permission in terms of possibility of doing an action without incurring in a violation of the law are subject to paradoxes. In general, paradoxes are acknowledged as such if we have intuitions telling us that things should be different. The aim of this paper is to introduce a paradox-free deontic action system by (i) identifying the basic intuitions leading to the emergence of the paradoxes and (ii) exploiting these intuitions in order to develop a consistent deontic framework, where it can be shown why some phenomena seem to be paradoxical and why they are not so if interpreted in a correct way

Bases for an Action Logic to Model Negative Modes of Actions

Currently available systems of action deontic logic are not designed to model procedures to assess the conduct of an agent which take into account the intentions of the agent and the circumstances in which she is acting. Yet, procedures of this kind are essential to determine what counts as culpable not doing. In light of this, we design an action logic, AL, in which it is possible to distinguish actions that are objectively possible for an agent, viz. there are no objective impediments for the agent to do them, and actions that, besides being objectively possible, are compatible with the setting or intentions of the agent

A temporal dynamic deontic logic

This paper presents a formalization of refraining from actions and a deontic logic based on a process logic. The notion of refraining is needed to handle obligated actions. To refrain to do an action is to do something else. The process logic used is a mix of dynamic logic and temporal logic: actions in it are interpreted as sets of paths and temporal formulas describe the process of performing actions. The deontic logic has a temporal propositional constant saying that a bad thing will be done in the next moment. Normative properties of actions can be defined according to what happens in the process of performing actions

Non-monotonic reasoning with normative conflicts in multi-agent deontic logic

We present two multi-agent deontic logics that consistently accommodate various types of normative conflicts. Its language features modal operators for obligation and permission, and for the realization of individual and collective actions. The logic is non-classical since it makes use of a paraconsistent and paracomplete negation connective. Moreover, it is non-monotonic due to its definition within the adaptive logics framework for defeasible reasoning. The logic is equipped with a defeasible proof theory and semantics

Modal Action Logics for Reasoning about Reactive Systems

Meyer, J-.J.Ch. [Promotor]Riet, R.P. [Promotor]van de Wieringa, R. [Promotor

A computational framework for institutional agency

This paper provides a computational framework, based on Defeasible Logic, to capture some aspects of institutional agency. Our background is Kanger-Lindahl-P\"orn account of organised interaction, which describes this interaction within a multi-modal logical setting. This work focuses in particular on the notions of counts-as link and on those of attempt and of personal and direct action to realise states of affairs. We show how standard Defeasible Logic can be extended to represent these concepts: the resulting system preserves some basic properties commonly attributed to them. In addition, the framework enjoys nice computational properties, as it turns out that the extension of any theory can be computed in time linear to the size of the theory itself