Examining Recent Expert Elicitation Judgment Guidelines: Value Assumptions and the Prospects for Rationality

This paper was presented at the VALDOR Symposium, Stockholm, June 1999. The author examines the value assumptions in the U.S. Department of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidance on the use of expert judgment relating to high level nuclear waste disposal site selection

“Triple Bottom Line” as “Sustainable Corporate Performance”: A Proposition for the Future

Based upon a review of corporate performance, corporate financial performance and corporate social performance, we propose that the concept of ―triple bottom line‖ (TBL) as ―sustainable corporate performance‖ (SCP) should consist of three measurement elements, namely: (i) financial, (ii) social and (iii) environmental. TBL as SCP is proposed to be derived from the interface between them. We also propose that the content of each of these measurement elements may vary across contexts and over time. Furthermore, TBL as SCR should be interpreted to be a relative concept that is dynamic and iterative. Continuous monitoring needs to be performed, adapting the content of the measurement elements to changes that evolve across contexts and over time in the marketplace and society. TBL as SCP may be seen as a function of time and context. Keywords: triple bottom line; sustainable corporate performance; corporate social performance; financial performanc

‘Talent-spotting’ or ‘social magic’? Inequality, cultural sorting and constructions of the ideal graduate in elite professions

Graduate outcomes – including rates of employment and earnings – are marked by persistent inequalities related to social class, as well as gender, ethnicity and institution. Despite national policy agendas related to social mobility and ‘fair access to the professions’, high-status occupations are disproportionately composed of those from socially privileged backgrounds, and evidence suggests that in recent decades many professions have become less socially representative. This article makes an original contribution to sociological studies of inequalities in graduate transitions and elite reproduction through a distinct focus on the ‘pre-hiring’ practices of graduate employers. It does this through a critical analysis of the graduate recruitment material of two popular graduate employers. It shows how, despite espousing commitments to diversity and inclusion, constructions of the ‘ideal’ graduate privilege individuals who can mobilise and embody certain valued capitals. Using Bourdieusian concepts of ‘social magic’ and ‘institutional habitus’, the article argues that more attention must be paid to how graduate employers’ practices constitute tacit processes of social exclusion and thus militate against the achievement of more equitable graduate outcomes and fair access to the ‘top jobs

Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting.

Market; Order; Rules;

Color Relationism and Enactive Ontology

In this paper, I present the enactive theory of color that implies a form of color relationism. I argue that this view constitutes a better alternative to color subjectivism and color objectivism. I liken the enactive view to Husserl’s phenomenology of perception, arguing that both deconstruct the clear duality of subject and object, which is at the basis of the other theories of color, in order to claim the co-constitution of subject and object in the process of experience. I also extend the enactive and phenomenological account of color to the more general topic of the epistemological and ontological status of sensory qualities (qualia), outlining the fields of enactive phenomenology and enactive ontology

Rules versus Discretion in Loan Rate Setting

We propose a heteroscedastic regression model to identify the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted to small and medium sized enterprises. We interpret unexplained deviations as evidence of the banks’ discretionary use of market power in the loan rate setting process. “Discretion” in the loan-pricing process is most important, we find, if: (i) loans are small and uncollateralized; (ii) firms are small, risky and difficult to monitor; (iii) firms’ owners are older, and, (iv) the banking market where the firm operates is large and highly concentrated. We also find that the weight of “discretion” in loan rates of small credits to opaque firms has decreased somewhat over the last fifteen years, consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry. Overall, our results reflect the relevance in the credit market of the costs firms face in searching information and switching lenders.financial intermediation;loan rates;price discrimination;variance analysis

Rules versus discretion in loan rate setting

We propose a heteroscedastic regression model to identify the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted to small and medium sized enterprises. We interpret unexplained deviations as evidence of the banks’ discretionary use of market power in the loan rate setting process. “Discretion” in the loan-pricing process is most important, we find, if: (i) loans are small and uncollateralized; (ii) firms are small, risky and difficult to monitor; (iii) firms’ owners are older, and, (iv) the banking market where the firm operates is large and highly concentrated. We also find that the weight of “discretion” in loan rates of small credits to opaque firms has decreased somewhat over the last fifteen years, consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry. Overall, our results reflect the relevance in the credit market of the costs firms face in searching information and switching lenders.financial intermediation, loan rates, price discrimination, variance analysis.

Rules versus Discretion in Loan Rate Setting

We propose a heteroscedastic regression model to identify the determinants of the dispersion in interest rates on loans granted to small and medium sized enterprises. We interpret unexplained deviations as evidence of the banks’ discretionary use of market power in the loan rate setting process. “Discretion” in the loan-pricing process is most important, we find, if: (i) loans are small and uncollateralized; (ii) firms are small, risky and difficult to monitor; (iii) firms’ owners are older, and, (iv) the banking market where the firm operates is large and highly concentrated. We also find that the weight of “discretion” in loan rates of small credits to opaque firms has decreased somewhat over the last fifteen years, consistent with the proliferation of information-technologies in the banking industry. Overall, our results reflect the relevance in the credit market of the costs firms face in searching information and switching lenders.financial intermediation;loan rates;price discrimination;variance analysis

Perceptual Consciousness, Short-Term Memory, and Overflow: Replies to Beck, Orlandi and Franklin, and Phillips

A reply to commentators -- Jake Beck, Nico Orlandi and Aaron Franklin, and Ian Phillips -- on our paper "Does perceptual consciousness overflow cognitive access?"