DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN ANTI ACCESS/ANTI DENIAL (A2/AD) CONCEPT AS A THREAT TO NATO AND POLAND

This article presents an analysis of the development of the Russian Anti Access/Anti Denial concept – A2/AD. The considerations contained in this article focus on identifying the threats that the Russian A2/AD concept creates for NATO and Poland. This article compiles empirical data from scientific publications, formal strategic and doctrinal documents, which allowed to define the A2/AD category, specify its essence and characterize it through the prism of military and non-military forces and resources engaged by Russia in several important operational regions: the Kaliningrad Oblast, Crimea, Syria and the Arctic.The aim of this article is to evaluate the Russian Anti-Access/Anti Denial concept from the perspective of the threats it creates for NATO and Poland.The obtained research results allow us to make the conclusion that when assessing the current external conditions, effective opposition to the Russian A2/AD by NATO will be very difficult to implement. Increasing the capabilities in this area will probably require the individual member states to increase their defense spending, mainly on the modernization and development of their armed forces. In addition to increasing the financial expenditures, increasing the ability to counteract the Russian A2/AD will require proper coordination and integration of the activities of the entire NATO structure around one coherent operational concept. This applies not only to counteracting the Russian A2/AD in Europe but also in other regions of the world, which in the near future may become the theatre of military operations, both classic, asymmetric or hybrid

Russian A2/AD in the Eastern Mediterranean A Growing Risk

Much has been written about the challenges posed by the Chinese adoption of what the U.S. military calls “A2/AD” (antiaccess/area-denial) in the western Pacific. Accordingly, the Pacific remains a key focus area for the U.S. Navy and Air Force, and more recently the Army, with the Navy promising to put 60 percent of its forces in that theater as part of the “Pacific pivot.” Yet as focus remains on the Pacific, the rest of the world is not standing still. This is exemplified in the eastern Mediterranean, where the Russians have begun laying the seeds to create an A2/AD zone in the region against the United States and its allies. If fully realized, an A2/AD envelope would put Western access to the Suez Canal, the Black Sea, and the resource-rich eastern Mediterranean at the mercy of an increasingly aggressive Russian regime

Confronting the anti-access/area denial and precision strike challenge in the Baltic region

The Baltic States are once again worried that their security is under threat. The US and NATO have responded with air patrols, joint exercises, and battalion-sized groundforce deployments. As important as these efforts have been, they do not fully address Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) and precision strike capabilities, both of which undermine NATO’s stratagem for deterring aggression in the first place. Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A Hunzeker assess the current military imbalance and describe two conflict scenarios to show how A2/AD and precision weapons threaten extended deterrence. They conclude with a discussion of the policy implications

A MODERN GREAT WALL: PRC SMART CITIES AND THE A2/AD IMPLICATIONS FOR AFSOC

The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) proliferation of smart cities—integrated, government-controlled urban surveillance networks—has increased the persistent stare of surveillance technologies globally. While the place of smart cities in strategic competition has been studied, the capability of PRC smart cities to achieve military ends like Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) has yet to be explored by Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC). The structure and capabilities of PRC smart cities reveal potential A2/AD threats and exploitation opportunities for AFSOC. Using the Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) as a model, this study suggests that PRC smart cities can function as IADS-like weapon systems, with a dispersed network of surveillance technologies integrated via a centralized control layer. PRC smart cities could produce at least two A2/AD threats to AFSOC: denial of aircraft entry to airspace and suppression of logistics and sustainment requirements (e.g., electricity and fuel). Conversely, AFSOC can exploit PRC smart cities using cyber-attacks—such as distributed denial of service and software manipulation—to preserve access and placement. This thesis concludes that AFSOC should pursue two lines of effort by investing in both: “living off the grid” independent of smart city infrastructure and new cyber technologies and tactics for Suppression of Enemy Information Systems—actions to disturb smart city command and control—to combat and exploit PRC smart cities.Major, United States Air ForceApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Chińska strategia A2/AD : polityczne implikacje dla bezpieczeństwa w przestrzeni kosmicznej

Niniejszy artykuł ma za zadanie pokrótce scharakteryzować jeden z podstawowych elementów chińskiej strategii ograniczania militarnej dominacji USA, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem roli systemów kosmicznych. W najbardziej ogólnych kategoriach omawia więc amerykańską strategię militarną; a następnie opisuje chińską koncepcję A2/AD jako asymetryczną odpowiedź na amerykańską przewagę. Szczególną uwagę zwracamy na ograniczenia tej koncepcji i rolę systemów kosmicznych w ich przezwyciężaniu. I wreszcie omawiamy niektóre polityczne konsekwencje powyższego, które mogą oddziaływać na stan bezpieczeństwa kosmicznego.This paper is supposed to analyze briefly one of key elements of the Chinese strategy aimed on weakening the American military dominance, with the special attention to the role of space systems therein. It describes in the most general terms the military strategy of the United Statest, then it pictures the Chinese A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) concept as an asymmetric answer to the U.S. military supremacy. The special attention is paid to its limitations and the role of space systems in overcoming the restraints. And finally it characterizes some of the political consequences that come out of all the above and that might reflect on the general state of the space security

Strengthening the deterrence and defense posture of the Baltic States: the value of allied airpower in supporting NATO’s reinforcement in a contested environment

NATO’s decision to set up the eFP battlegroups in 2016 was a major achievement, however, it is only a tripwire force, and the Alliance relies heavily on rapid reinforcement in times of crisis. Airpower is a potent tool to support rapid reinforcement, but the geography of the Baltic Sea region severely limits NATO’s operational depth which is necessary for air operations. NATO’s ability for (rapid) reinforcement of its Eastern flank by air, sea, and land, is further challenged by Russia’s anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capability. By implementing its A2/AD capability, Russia actively challenges and mitigates NATO’s deterrence posture. Currently, the Baltic States possess short-range missile air defense capability with a very limited range. While a very important part of NATO’s peacetime activities, the Baltic Air Policing Mission has limited rules of engagement (RoE) and does not prepare NATO for providing air defense for some of its most vulnerable Allies on the Eastern flank of the Alliance. This thesis relies on existing literature and twenty expert interviews to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date account of the complex issue of using airpower to strengthen the deterrence and defense posture of NATO in the Baltic States. The main findings of the research are that (1) the concept of A2/AD and its impact for deterrence is not well understood and this makes it difficult to address it; (2) There is no common understanding among the experts what a transition from Baltic Air Policing to air defense would mean; and (3) the importance of the Baltic States collectively taking the initiative in the air defense realm is currently understated. Gaining a better understanding of the contested environment presented by Russia, forging a common perception of the range of (airpower) measures that NATO has available, and exercising rapid reinforcement exercises in a joint environment could help the Alliance strengthen its deterrence and defense posture in the Baltic States. It is important that this would be done while preserving NATO’s most valuable asset – the unity of the Alliance.http://www.ester.ee/record=b5145928*es

The Black Sea and NATO in the Age of Access-Denial

The article explores the implications of the rise of Russian anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities for NATO’s Eastern Frontier, especially the broader Black Sea region. The reality is indicative of a broader global trend where assertive revisionist powers are not only questioning the post-1989 rules-based international order but are also developing the antidotes to the so-called American Way of War, one that largely shapes the NATO operational profile. This type of ecosystem is at the forefront of what Russia has been doing over the past few years in Kaliningrad and Crimea - developing concepts of operations, especially the A2/AD component, that challenge NATO’s way of reassuring its frontline allies. The problem is that the NATO caucus in the Black Sea remains highly fragmented in its threat perception. Increasingly close economic and political ties to Russia combined with diplomatic discord concerning the US and NATO makes Turkey a less reliable ally. Meanwhile, Bulgaria’s long tradition of close cultural and economic ties to Russia remains concerning. At the same time, NATO needs to do more. The West must understand that its smaller allies don’t have the luxury of time or economic power and must adapt its approach accordingly to credibly reassure its Black Sea allies

AN EXAMINATION OF INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY COOPERATION ACTIVITIES TO ENABLE EABO AS A DETERRENT

With its advanced missiles, sensor systems, and modernized navy, China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy threatens U.S. conventional military platforms’ survivability and freedom of maneuver, reducing U.S. credibility and power projection capabilities throughout the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, China’s Belt and Road Initiative strengthens its diplomatic and economic relationships with regional countries, threatening the U.S.-established rules-based regional order. As a result, the United States Marine Corps introduced Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO) as both a warfighting concept to combat China’s A2/AD capabilities and as a form of deterrence. However, its success depends on U.S. access and freedom of maneuver to sovereign nations’ territory. Consequently, the efficacy of EABO is inextricably linked to security cooperation, as it is the Department of Defense’s primary means to gain access to foreign territory. This thesis begins by examining the threats to U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific, EABO and its requirements, security cooperation, and how to best tailor it to support the execution of EABO. It then evaluates the varying degrees of security cooperation activities the U.S. engages in with Japan and Indonesia and the impact those activities may have on the feasibility of conducting EABO from their territory. The findings suggest that security cooperation activities have enhanced the feasibility of conducting EABO from Japan but not Indonesia.Major, United States Marine CorpsApproved for public release. Distribution is unlimited

Impacts of Anti-Access/Area Denial Measures on Space Systems: Issues and Implications for Army and Joint Forces

The 2018 National Defense Strategy and National Space Strategy both reaffirm the vital interests that the United States has in the domain of space. However, space remains an inherently hostile environment that has become congested, contested, and competitive among the nations. What are ways for the U.S. Army to assure the success of its space-dependent warfighting functions in an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment where space systems are degraded for significant periods of time?https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1395/thumbnail.jp